Com. v. Betts, T. ( 2023 )

J-S19031-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
TASAI MARQUISE BETTS :
:
Appellant : No. 1470 MDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 19, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0001004-2014,
CP-22-CR-0003339-2013
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 27, 2023
Tasai Marquise Betts (“Betts”) appeals from the dismissal, following a
hearing, of his first petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”).1 We affirm.
In a prior decision, we detailed the underlying facts:
The factual and procedural history of this case concerns two
episodes of criminal behavior. On the evening of June 13, 2013,
a man sleeping in his car near the 1700 block of Miller Street in
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, was shot and robbed by a masked
assailant [(“the attempted murder case”)]. In a separate incident,
[Betts] was arrested on June 22, 2013, following a lengthy vehicle
[police] pursuit . . . which ended in an officer-involved crash [(“the
vehicle chase case”)].[2] Officers recovered two handguns from
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1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
2 The issues in the instant matter arise from the attempted murder case. We
note Betts’s first trial in that case ended in a mistrial. Commonwealth witness
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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[Betts’s] car, one of which was forensically linked to the
aforementioned shooting.
In connection with the [attempted murder case], a jury
convicted [Betts] of attempted criminal homicide [and related
offenses]. With respect to the vehicle chase [case], a jury
convicted [Betts] of aggravated assault [and related offenses].
[T]he trial court sentenced [Betts] at both dockets to an
aggregate term of twenty-one to forty-two years of imprisonment,
followed by fifteen years of probation. On direct appeal, this Court
affirmed [Betts’s] judgment of sentence.[3] See Commonwealth
v. Betts, 159 A.3d 1018 (Pa. Super. 2016) (unpublished
memorandum). [O]ur Supreme Court denied [Betts’s] petition for
allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Betts, [] 169 A.3d
1039 ([Pa.] 2017) (per curiam order).
[Betts] filed a timely pro se PCRA petition alleging, inter alia,
that [direct appeal] counsel had erred by challenging the weight,
but not the sufficiency, of the evidence underlying [Betts’s]
convictions. [Attorney] Damian DeStefano [(“PCRA counsel”)],
was appointed to represent [Betts]. He filed a supplemental PCRA
memorandum arguing, inter alia, that [Betts’s] trial counsel was
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Robert Parker (“Parker”) testified he had seen Betts in possession of the gun
used in the attempted murder in May 2013. Commonwealth v. Betts, 240
A.3d 616, 618 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2020). The trial court granted a mistrial when,
in response to a question from the Commonwealth about his familiarity with
the gun, Parker testified Betts pointed it at his head in a threatening manner.
Id.3 While the Office of the Public Defender of Dauphin County represented Betts
throughout the trial proceedings, different lawyers from the office represented
him at different stages. Attorney Amanda Batz (“trial counsel”) represented
Betts at trial in both the attempted murder and the vehicle chase cases. Trial
counsel also represented Betts at the post-trial motions stage of the
attempted murder case. Attorney Natalie Burstall (“sentencing counsel”)
represented Betts at sentencing. Attorney Ryan Lysaght (“Rule 1925
counsel”) represented Betts at the post-trial motion stage of the vehicle chase
case and filed the notices of appeal and the Rule 1925(b) statement in both
cases. Attorney James Karl (“direct appeal counsel”) represented Betts on
direct appeal.
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ineffective by “opening the door” to the introduction of statements
that [Betts] had previously robbed [Parker] at gunpoint.
Commonwealth v. Betts, 240 A.3d 616, 618 (Pa. Super. 2020) (dates,
record citations, and footnote omitted, footnotes added).
The PCRA court held a hearing on Betts’s PCRA petition on August 1,
2018. At the hearing, Betts and trial counsel testified about trial counsel’s
cross-examination of Parker. See N.T., 8/1/18, at 3-16. PCRA counsel also
questioned Betts, over the Commonwealth’s objections, about trial counsel’s
handling of a claim of after-discovered evidence, namely that Parker had
allegedly recanted his trial testimony identifying the gun. Id. at 7-8.
After entertaining briefs from both parties, the [PCRA] court filed
an opinion concluding that trial counsel did not render ineffective
assistance. The order attached to the opinion notified [Betts] of
the PCRA court’s intent to dismiss his petition[] and provided him
an opportunity to respond pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.
[PCRA counsel] submitted a reply to the notice of dismissal
that largely reiterated the prior arguments concerning trial
counsel’s allegedly erroneous cross-examination. Two days later,
[Betts] filed pro se objections alleging that [PCRA counsel] had
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to: (1) assert trial
counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to refute fingerprint evidence
tying [Betts] to [the victim’s vehicle in the attempted murder
case]; and (2) raise direct [appeal] counsel’s ineffectiveness for
failing to seek a new trial on the basis of allegedly inconsistent
statements made by [] Parker post-trial. Appellant's timely pro
se objections were accepted for filing and docketed in the trial
court.
[T]he PCRA court entered a final order dismissing [Betts’s]
PCRA petition. In the text of this order, the PCRA court referenced
only the arguments concerning trial counsel’s cross-examinations
of [] Parker. [Betts] filed a single pro se notice of appeal while
still represented by [PCRA counsel]. Five days later, [PCRA
counsel] submitted timely notices of appeal at both docket
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numbers noted above. That same day, he also filed a petition on
[Betts’s] behalf that purported to seek permission to proceed pro
se and requested a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v.
Grazier, [] 713 A.2d 81 (1998).
[T]he Grazier hearing was held. However, [Betts] advised
the PCRA court that he had not requested a Grazier hearing[] but
wished to discuss his allegations of [PCRA counsel’s]
ineffectiveness and obtain substitute counsel.
****
After a colloquy, the PCRA court granted [Betts] leave to
proceed pro se and [PCRA counsel] leave to withdraw.
Betts, 240 A.3d at 618-20 (dates, footnotes, and record citations omitted).
On appeal, after a discussion of the procedural irregularities in the
matter, this Court found the PCRA court erred by forcing Betts to proceed pro
se and not considering the claims of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel
contained in his pro se response to the Rule 907 notice. Betts, 240 A.3d at
621-25. This Court remanded the matter for the appointment of new PCRA
counsel and directed:
Newly-appointed [remand] counsel shall: (1) review [Betts’s] pro
se objections concerning [PCRA counsel’s] ineffectiveness; (2) file
supplemental briefing limited to discussing the merits of those
claims within a reasonable time frame; and (3) continue to
represent [Betts] for the duration of these PCRA proceedings. The
Commonwealth shall have an opportunity to file a response to any
supplemental filings from [Betts]. Thereafter, the PCRA court
shall have the discretion to proceed as it deems fit under
Pennsylvania law and the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
Procedure, including ordering further proceedings and granting or
denying [Betts’s] PCRA petition.
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Id. at 625. Of import to this appeal, this Court did not rule on Betts’s claim
trial counsel was ineffective for engaging in an improper cross-examination of
Parker.
In March 2022, the PCRA court held a hearing on Betts’s pro se
objections. On September 19, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed Betts’s PCRA
petition. Betts timely filed a notice of appeal.4 Betts’s single notice of appeal
listed the docket numbers of both the attempted murder and the vehicle chase
cases.
On appeal, Betts raises the following issues for our review:
A. Whether the [PCRA] court erred in dismissing [Betts’s] PCRA
petition where [Betts] presented claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel which undermined the truth-determining
process so that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence
could have taken place?
1. Trial counsel failed to retain a fingerprint expert.
2. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel in failing to adequately cross-examine
Commonwealth witness [] Parker.
3. Trial counsel [failed] to seek a new trial based upon
Commonwealth witness [] Parker’s post-trial
comments.
Betts’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization and underlining omitted).
Before reaching Betts’s issues, we address our jurisdiction. As noted,
Betts’s single notice of appeal contained two docket numbers. In
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4 Betts and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), our Supreme Court
held “where a single order resolves issues arising on more than one docket,
separate notices of appeal must be filed for each case,” or the appeal will be
quashed. Id. at 976-77; see also Pa.R.A.P. 341, note. Here, the PCRA court
order dismissing Betts’s petition informed Betts he had the right to appeal
within 30 days of the order, not that he needed to file a separate appeal for
each docket number. Order, 9/19/22. Pursuant to Commonwealth v.
Larkin, 235 A.3d 350 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc), and Commonwealth v.
Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157 (Pa. Super. 2019), this language constitutes a
breakdown in court operations, and we thus decline to quash Betts’s appeal.
See Larkin, 235 A.3d at 354 (finding breakdown in court operations and
declining to quash, where defendant was misinformed of his appellate rights);
Stansbury, 219 A.3d at 159 (breakdown in court operations occurred where
PCRA court advised appellant he could appeal dismissal of petition by filing
within 30 days “a written notice of appeal to the Superior Court”) (emphasis
in original). Accordingly, we address Betts’s substantive claims.
Betts asserts he received ineffective assistance of trial, Rule 1925, direct
appeal, and PCRA counsel. Betts’s Brief at 14-23. We review ineffectiveness
claims under the following standard:
Appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition is
limited to the examination of whether the PCRA court’s
determination is supported by the record and free of legal error.
The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no
support for the findings in the certified record. This Court grants
great deference to the findings of the PCRA court, and we will not
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disturb those findings merely because the record could support a
contrary holding. In contrast, we review the PCRA court’s legal
conclusions de novo.
Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 232 A.3d 739, 744 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, a “PCRA court’s
credibility findings are to be accorded great deference, and where supported
by the record, such determinations are binding on a reviewing court.”
Commonwealth v. Williams, 141 A.3d 440, 452 (Pa. 2016).
With respect to claims in ineffective assistance of counsel,
counsel is presumed to have been effective and [] the petitioner
bears the burden of proving counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness. To
overcome this presumption, a petitioner must establish that: (1)
the underlying substantive claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel
did not have a reasonable basis for his or her act or omission; and
(3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s
deficient performance, that is, a reasonable probability that but
for counsel’s act or omission, the outcome of the proceeding would
have been different. A PCRA petitioner must address each of
these prongs on appeal. A petitioner’s failure to satisfy any prong
of this test is fatal to the claim.
Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 177 A.3d 136, 144 (Pa. 2018) (citations
omitted). “Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to pursue a baseless
or meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1042 (Pa.
Super. 2007) (citation omitted). Where an appellant claims ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel, “the petitioner must show that there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the direct appeal proceeding would
have been different but for counsel’s deficient performance.”
Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 750 (Pa. 2014).
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Regarding claims of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel, in
Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), our Supreme Court
held “a PCRA petitioner may, after a PCRA court denies relief, and after
obtaining new counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA counsel’s
ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even if on appeal.” Id. at 401
(footnote omitted). This is Betts’s first PCRA petition. In our earlier decision,
we held Betts raised his claims of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel at
the earliest opportunity. Betts, 240 A.3d at 622-23. Thus, Bradley applies.
“Where a petitioner alleges multiple layers of ineffectiveness, he is
required to plead and prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, each of the
three prongs of ineffectiveness relevant to each layer of representation.”
Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273 A.3d 989, 1003 n.11 (Pa. 2022) (citation
omitted).
In determining a layered claim of ineffectiveness, the critical
inquiry is whether the first attorney that the defendant asserts
was ineffective did, in fact, render ineffective assistance of
counsel. If that attorney was effective, then subsequent counsel
cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise the underlying
issue.
Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Betts first claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain a
fingerprint expert to counter the Commonwealth’s evidence that police
investigators found a partial palm-print, which was a 24-point match to Betts,
on the victim’s car in the attempted murder case. See Appellant’s Brief at 17-
18; N.T., 10/29/14, at 183-85.
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“To establish ineffective assistance of counsel for the failure to present
an expert witness, appellant must present facts establishing that counsel knew
or should have known of the particular witness.” Commonwealth v.
Millward, 830 A.2d 991, 994 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). Further,
“the [appellant] must articulate what evidence was available and identify the
witness who was willing to offer such evidence.” Commonwealth v. Bryant,
855 A.2d 726, 745 (Pa. 2004) (citations omitted).
Betts does not state what evidence was available and has not identified
any witness willing to offer testimony countering the Commonwealth’s
fingerprint evidence. Betts’s Brief at 17-19. Because Betts failed to identify
an expert witness willing to testify, his claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel fails. See Bryant, 855 A.2d at 745; see also Commonwealth v.
Gwynn, 943 A.2d 940, 945 (Pa. 2008) (when defendant claims counsel was
ineffective for failing to introduce expert testimony at trial, he must articulate
“what evidence was available and identify a witness who was willing to offer
such [evidence].”) (citations omitted). Betts’s first claim does not merit relief.
In his second claim, Betts argues trial counsel was ineffective for
improperly cross-examining Commonwealth witness Parker at his second trial.
Betts’s Brief at 19-20. Trial counsel questioned Parker about his statement to
the police regarding Betts’s gun:
Trial Counsel: Do you remember telling [the police] that you
believed it was a 9mm handgun?
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Parker: I thought it, yes. With a gun pointed at me, I didn’t
know what it was. Yes.
N.T., 10/29/14, at 213-14 (emphasis added). Trial counsel moved for a
mistrial, which the trial court denied. Id. at 215-18. Trial counsel then
requested a limiting instruction. Id. During its charge, the trial court
instructed the jury:
You heard testimony from [] Parker, who testified earlier this
morning. His testimony should only be considered by you for the
limited purpose of identification of either [] Betts or the firearm.
And you’ll use the same criteria I gave you as to testimony and
credibility.
Id. at 278-79. Betts did not object to the charge as given and did not ask for
any additional instruction. Id. at 294.
Betts acknowledges Parker “was clearly a difficult witness.” Betts’s Brief
at 21. However, he complains:
Instead of asking a yes or no question, the question asked by trial
counsel allowed for additional testimony from [] Parker. That
testimony prejudiced [Betts] in that the jury was left with the
assumption [Betts] pointed a gun at [] Parker’s head.
Trial counsel had no reasonable basis for not carefully
crafting her questions to avoid prejudice. [Betts] was prejudiced
by the fact the jury heard [Betts] pointed a gun at the witness[.]
Id.
A criminal defendant has the constitutional right to confront witnesses
against him; this right includes the right of cross-examination. See
Commonwealth v. Buksa, 655 A.2d 576, 579 (Pa. Super. 1995). Counsel
can use cross-examination to test a witness’s version of the events, to
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impeach his credibility, or to establish his motive for testifying. See id. The
scope and vigor of any cross-examination is a matter of trial strategy that we
leave to the sound discretion of counsel. See Commonwealth v. Molina,
516 A.2d 752, 757 (Pa. Super. 1986). Further, our Supreme Court has held
counsel is ineffective for failing to impeach an important witness in the
absence of a reasonable strategic basis for this action. See Commonwealth
v. Baxter, 640 A.2d 1271, 1274-75 (Pa. 1994); see also Commonwealth
v. Murphy, 591 A.2d 278, 279-80 (Pa. 1991) (finding defense counsel
ineffective for failing to cross-examine key prosecution witnesses about
possible bias).
At Betts’s first PCRA hearing, trial counsel testified she deliberately
limited her cross-examination of Parker “knowing he was a little goofy.” N.T.,
8/1/18, at 14. However, she noted she needed to cross-examine Parker to
try to
shed some level of doubt on whether or not [Betts] actually had
this firearm prior to the shooting ─ and that was the only way to
do it. We didn’t have any other witnesses. There was no other
evidence to show that he didn’t have a gun.
And I believe [] Parker had given a couple different, like,
weird statements, slightly change[s to] his statements prior to the
first two trials that ─ that kind of would have been something I
could have worked with as far impeaching him.
Id.We disagree with Betts’s assertion the question asked by trial counsel,
“Do you remember telling [the police] that you believed it was a 9mm
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handgun?”, was not designed to elicit a yes or no answer. Moreover, trial
counsel articulated a clear and reasonable strategic basis for the way she
cross-examined Parker. See id. Had trial counsel not cross-examined Parker,
as Betts now suggests she should not have, she could have been found
ineffective for failing to try to impeach an important Commonwealth witness.
See Baxter, 640 A.2d at 1274-75; Molina, 516 A.2d at 757.
In any event, Betts cannot show Parker’s statement prejudiced him. On
direct appeal, Betts challenged the trial court’s denial of his motion for a
mistrial based on Parker’s statement. Betts, 159 A.3d 1018 (unpublished
memorandum at 10-16). In denying this claim, this Court stated “this prior
possession incident was indicative of Betts[’s] guilt, and the probative value
of this prior bad acts evidence outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice.” Id.
at 16. Thus, based upon our prior ruling, Betts cannot show trial counsel’s
cross-examination prejudiced him, and his claim does not merit relief.
Wholaver, 177 A.3d at 144.
In his third and final claim, Betts maintains trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to “seek a new trial based upon [] Parker’s post-trial comments
[which concerned the color of the firearm].” Betts’s Brief at 21-23. The record
does not support this contention.
The record demonstrates trial counsel sought, and was granted, leave
to file an amended post-sentence motion. In that motion, trial counsel asked
the court to grant Betts a new trial based upon after-discovered evidence in
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the form of a new statement by Parker regarding “the color of the firearm he
identified.” Motion for a New Trial Based Upon After-Discovered Evidence,
1/29/15, at 1 (unnumbered). The trial court held a hearing on Betts’s motion
in February 2015. The trial court then denied the motion. See N.T., 2/25/15,
at 11. Thus, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion for a
new trial based on after-discovered evidence.
However, the record also reflects the denial of this motion was not
preserved for direct appeal because it was not included in Betts’s Rule 1925(b)
statement. See Rule 1925(b) Statement, 8/18/15, at 1 (unnumbered). Betts
claims Rule 1925 counsel was ineffective for not preserving the claim for
appeal.5 See Betts’s Brief at 22.
The law regarding requests for a new trial based on after-discovered
evidence is settled. To establish this claim, an appellant must show that the
evidence:
(1) could not have been obtained prior to trial by exercising
reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely corroborative or
cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to impeach a witness’s
credibility; and (4) would likely result in a different verdict.
Commonwealth v. Castro, 93 A.3d 818, 821 n.7 (Pa. 2014) (citation
omitted). In determining “whether the alleged after-discovered evidence is of
____________________________________________
5 Betts may be claiming direct appeal counsel was ineffective for not raising
the claim on direct appeal. However, we will not fault counsel for failing to
raise an unpreserved claim. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); see also Taylor,
933 A.2d at 1042 (counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless
claim).
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such nature and character that it would likely compel a different verdict if a
new trial is granted,” a court must “consider the integrity of the alleged after-
discovered evidence, the motive of those offering the evidence, and the overall
strength of the evidence supporting the conviction.” Commonwealth v.
Padillas, 997 A.2d 356, 365 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). Also, “the
proposed new evidence must be producible and admissible.” Castro, 93 A.3d
at 825 (citation omitted). It is the petitioner’s burden to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he met each of the factors necessary for
a new trial. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 939 A.2d 355, 359 (Pa. Super.
2007).
At the hearing on the after-discovered evidence claim, the
Commonwealth recited the parties’ stipulation concerning Parker’s various
statements:
So[,] on May 29th, 2013, that was the robbery of [] Parker. On
or about that date he gave an oral statement to Harrisburg police.
He identified the gun as silver and black.
He then wrote a statement where he identified . . . the gun
as silver and black.
****
During trial number one, which resulted in a mistrial, and
trial number two . . . Parker was presented with the gun which
. . . could fairly be described as silver and black. [H]e actually
used those words, handled the gun, identified it, yes, this is the
gun that was held to my face by the defendant in the case.
****
The [] Parker trial was scheduled to begin [in] January[.]
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****
[T]hat date was January 10th of 2015. [The
Commonwealth] called [] Parker to schedule a meeting with him
Monday morning prior to trial so we could talk about and get him
ready to testify. During the course of that phone call he said, . . .
[“]I was -- I was confused. I was nervous while being cross-
examined,[”] referring to his testimony during the trial for the
[attempted murder] case.
And he went on to say that he wasn’t sure, but the gun
might have been silver with white handles.
At that point[, the Commonwealth] stopped [its]
conversation with him, set up the appointment, and told him we
would speak further on Monday.
. . . [The Commonwealth] brought him in, presented the gun
to him again. He took a look at it. He handled it. He said, yes,
my phone call was mistaken, or words to this effect . . . that is the
gun that I identified during the [attempted murder case]. That is
the gun I saw [] Betts hold on me during the course of the robbery.
So[,] in effect, he recanted his statement of the weekend
that, [“]I thought it had been a white-and-silver gun.[”]
N.T., 2/25/15, at 4-6.
The parties agreed Parker’s statements met the first two prongs of the
after-discovered evidence test but disputed whether it satisfied prongs three
and four. See id. at 7-11.
The PCRA court found “the alleged newly discovered evidence will be
used solely to impeach the credibility of [Parker’s] own statements given at
trial.” PCRA Court Opinion, 9/19/22, at 16. The PCRA court also held the
newly-discovered evidence would not have changed the outcome of the case
because:
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The victim in this case . . . was able to ultimately identify [Betts
as the man who shot him]. Further, another witness, Janel
Williams, also testified that she saw the gun and that [Betts]
referred to the gun as his. [Betts] also admitted to [the police]
that the gun was his.
Id. at 17 (record citations omitted).
Betts does not discuss these findings in his appellate brief. Betts’s Brief
at 21-23. While Betts cites to the test for after-discovered evidence, he fails
to apply it to the facts of case. Id. Instead, he avers the “after-discovered
evidence is not cumulative and would change the outcome of the verdict.” Id.
at 23.
In Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 96 A.3d 1031 (Pa. Super. 2014), the
appellant was convicted of the attempted murder of Robert Rosado
(“Rosado”). See Trinidad, 96 A.3d at 1032. A few weeks after sentencing,
the appellant filed a motion seeking a new trial based on after-discovered
evidence. Id. at 1032. The appellant claimed a new witness, Danny Ruiz
(“Ruiz), had spoken with Rosado. Id. at 1035. Rosado allegedly told Ruiz the
appellant was not the shooter. Id. at 1035-36. The trial court denied the
motion and the defendant appealed. Id.On appeal, this Court affirmed, holding:
The thrust of [the a]ppellant’s argument is that Ruiz’[s] testimony
“would likely cast doubt about the credibility of [Rosado] in the
mind of the jury and give the jury an insight as to the mind of
[Rosado] and his testimony[.]” Appellant’s newly discovered basis
for impeaching Rosado’s identification testimony does not entitle
him to another trial.
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Id. at 1037 (citations omitted) (also stating that evidence that would cause a
jury to see a witness “in a different light” is offered solely for impeachment).
We see no meaningful difference between the facts in Trinidad and the
instant matter. Here, the information about Parker’s various changes of mind
about his identification of the gun was “for impeachment alone.” Id. at 1037(citation omitted). Thus, Betts is not entitled to a new trial. See Castro, 93
A.3d at 821 n.7. We will not find Rule 1925 counsel ineffective for failing to
preserve a meritless claim. See Taylor, 933 A.2d at 1042. Betts’s third and
final claim does not merit relief.
For the above reasons, Betts’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel, Rule 1925 counsel, and appellate counsel are meritless. Because
none of these claims merit relief, Betts’s claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffective
assistance also fail. See Burkett, 5 A.3d at 1270. Accordingly, we affirm the
PCRA court’s dismissal of Betts’s PCRA petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/27/2023
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