Com. v. Seger, E. ( 2023 )

J-S15036-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
EMERSON PAUL LOUIS SEGER : No. 1425 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered September 29, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-28-CR-0001016-2020
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 30, 2023
The learned majority affirms the order of the trial court holding that
there was insufficient evidence to convict Emerson Paul Louis Seger
(“Appellee”) of attempted murder. As I deem the Commonwealth’s evidence
sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict, I must respectfully dissent.
Our standard of review informs my consideration of this matter.
Evidentiary sufficiency is a legal question subject to de novo, plenary review.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 234 A.3d 576, 581 (Pa. 2020). In
conducting that review, “we examine whether the evidence presented and
admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a
light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, support the
jury’s verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Murray, 83
A.3d 137, 150-51 (Pa. 2013). The “determination of the ultimate question of
evidentiary sufficiency [is] . . . whether any rational trier of fact could have
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found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Commonwealth v. Martin, 297 A.3d 424, 432 (Pa.Super. 2023).
The facts of the case are not in dispute and are faithfully recited by the
majority. See Majority Memorandum at 1-3. For ease of my analysis, on the
night in question, Appellee and three other individuals went to Frislet Joseph’s
residence to confront him about a prior dispute that he had with one of
Appellee’s companions. After arriving, Appellee and the other men kicked at
Joseph’s door. Through the door, they could hear Joseph yelling. When they
became aware that Joseph was informing law enforcement of the situation,
they decided to leave. Appellee went to a window near the door and fired
three shots through the window in the direction of the door and, thereafter,
Appellee and his cohorts fled the scene.
My esteemed colleagues correctly note that the crime of attempted
murder is “composed of two primary elements: (1) the mens rea element,
which is the specific intent to kill . . . and (2) the actus reus element, which is
the commission of one or more acts which collectively constitute a substantial
step toward the commission of a killing.” Id. at 5-6 (cleaned up). The actus
reus element is uncontested and is satisfied through Appellee’s action of
travelling to Joseph’s residence and shooting through the window. See id. at
11. Rather, the disputed element is the mens rea element, i.e., whether
Appellee possessed the specific intent to kill. The trial court found, and the
learned majority agreed, that the Commonwealth failed to proffer sufficient
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evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellee possessed such
intent.
Upon review of the certified record, I do not believe that the majority
was sufficiently deferential to the jury’s verdict. Drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, the factfinder
could have rationally concluded that Appellee possessed the requisite intent
to kill to satisfy a conviction for attempted murder. Critically, the shots fired
by Appellee were not discharged outside the residence into the air or at the
ground, suggesting mere “warning” shots not meant to hit Joseph. Instead,
shooting through a window into the occupied residence at a height designed
to strike a person supports the reasonable inference that Appellee intended to
kill Joseph. Moreover, because one of Appellee’s companions testified that he
could hear Joseph through the door, it was well within the province of the jury
to infer, based upon the direction in which Appellee fired the gun, that he was
aiming his shot at where he believed Joseph to be.
This is not a case where “the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that
as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Kearney, 92 A.3d 51, 64 (Pa.Super.
2014). Certainly, the Commonwealth did not present direct evidence that
Appellee knew precisely where Joseph was in the house and targeted him.
However, it was not obligated to do so. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Fitzpatrick, 159 A.3d 562, 567 (Pa.Super. 2017) (“The Commonwealth may
sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
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doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence”). Nonetheless, the jury
was not required to engage in pure speculation or surmise intent from nothing.
Rather, the factfinder could rationally infer from the surrounding
circumstances that Appellee discharged his gun to where he thought that
Joseph was situated inside the residence in order to strike and kill him.
Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the evidence presented at trial
supported the reasonable inference made by the jury that Appellee possessed
the requisite intent to kill. Since I would therefore reverse the trial court’s
order invalidating the jury’s verdict as to the crime of attempted murder, I
respectfully dissent.
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