Com. v. Miller, L. ( 2023 )

J-S33041-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
LOGAN BLAIZE MILLER :
:
Appellant : No. 246 WDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 10, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-25-CR-0001251-2021
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: October 30, 2023
Appellant, Logan Blaize Miller, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on October 10, 2022. In this direct appeal, Appellant's counsel filed a
petition for leave to withdraw and an accompanying brief pursuant to Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978
A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We conclude that Appellant’s counsel has complied with
the procedural requirements necessary to withdraw. Moreover, after
independently reviewing the record, we conclude that the appeal is wholly
frivolous. We, therefore, grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the
judgment of sentence.
The facts and procedural history as set forth by the trial court are as
follows:
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S33041-23
On June 21, 2021, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
(“Commonwealth”), by way of Information, charged Appellant
with Criminal Murder/Homicide - F1, Endangering Welfare of Child
- F1, and Aggravated Assault – F1, in the death of his four week
old minor child, K.M. K.M. passed away at UPMC Children's
Hospital of Pittsburgh on July 28, 2020, as a result of blunt impact
injury to the head. Appellant was formally arraigned on the above
charges on June 22, 2021. A jury trial was scheduled to commence
on October 5, 2021. On September 29, 2021, Appellant, through
counsel, filed a Motion to Continue the trial. See Motion to
Continue, 09/29/2021. The trial was continued twice in order to
allow for defense counsel to review the voluminous discovery.
Ultimately, the trial was set to commence on August 12, 2022,
with jury selection.
On August 11, 2022, Appellant pleaded no contest to Murder
of the Third Degree - F1. The Commonwealth nolle prossed the
remaining charges. On October 10, 2022, this Court sentenced
Appellant to a minimum of 96 months and a maximum period of
240 months. On October 14, 2022, Appellant filed a timely post-
sentence motion challenging his sentence. On October 17, 2022,
[the trial] Court denied Appellant's post-sentence motion. On
January 24, 2023, [the trial] Court received correspondence from
Appellant requesting this Court appoint new counsel for the
purpose of an appeal. See Letter filed January 24, 2023. Appellant
averred that trial counsel failed to inform him that his post-
sentence motion was denied. Id. In the interest of justice, [the
trial] Court reinstated Appellant's appellate rights nunc pro tunc
and appointed new counsel. See Order, 02/14/2023. Appellant
then timely filed a notice of appeal and subsequently, a concise
statement of matters complained of on appeal.
Tr. Ct. Op. at 1-2.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and, on appeal, Appellant’s
counsel filed a petition for leave to withdraw and an Anders brief. Before
reviewing the merits of this appeal, this Court must first determine whether
counsel has fulfilled the necessary procedural requirements for withdrawing
as counsel. Commonwealth v. Miller, 715 A.2d 1203, 1207 (Pa.Super.
1998).
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To withdraw under Anders, counsel must satisfy certain technical
requirements. First, counsel must “petition the court for leave to withdraw
stating that, after making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel
has determined that the appeal would be frivolous.” Miller, 715 A.2d at 1207.
Second, counsel must file an Anders brief, in which counsel:
(1) provide[s] a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
citations to the record; (2) refer[s] to anything in the record that
counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set[s] forth
counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state[s]
counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion
that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
Finally, counsel must furnish a copy of the Anders brief to his or her
client and advise the client “of [the client’s] right to retain new counsel,
proceed pro se or raise any additional points worthy of this Court’s attention.”
Commonwealth v. Woods, 939 A.2d 896, 898 (Pa.Super. 2007).
If counsel meets all of the above obligations, “it then becomes the
responsibility of the reviewing court to make a full examination of the
proceedings and make an independent judgment to decide whether the appeal
is in fact wholly frivolous.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 355 n.5; see also
Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa.Super. 2018) (en
banc) (holding that the Anders procedure requires this Court to review “the
entire record with consideration first of the issues raised by counsel. . . . [T]his
review does not require this Court to act as counsel or otherwise advocate on
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behalf of a party. Rather, it requires us only to conduct a review of the record
to ascertain if[,] on its face, there are non-frivolous issues that counsel,
intentionally or not, missed or misstated. We need not analyze those issues
of arguable merit; just identify them, deny the motion to withdraw, and order
counsel to analyze them”). It is only when all of the procedural and
substantive requirements are satisfied that counsel will be permitted to
withdraw.
In the case at bar, counsel complied with all of the above procedural
obligations. We must, therefore, review the entire record and analyze whether
this appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous. Our analysis begins with the first claim
raised in the Anders brief: whether Appellant’s plea was unknowing and
involuntary. Appellant’s Br. at 3.
The relevant standard of review is well-settled. “When considering the
propriety of a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, we are
bound by the determination of that court unless we find that it committed an
abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Mobley, 581 A.2d 949, 952
(Pa.Super. 1990) (citation omitted). Further,
by entering a nolo contendere plea, a defendant does not admit
that he is guilty. As the United States Supreme Court has held, a
plea of nolo contendere is a plea by which a defendant does not
expressly admit his guilt, but nonetheless waives his right to a
trial and authorizes the court for purposes of sentencing to treat
him as if he were guilty.
Commonwealth v. V.G., 9 A.3d 222, 226-27 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citations and
quotation marks omitted; emphasis omitted).
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“[I]n terms of its effect upon a case, a plea of nolo contendere is treated
the same as a guilty plea.” Commonwealth v. Lewis, 791 A.2d 1227, 1230
(Pa.Super. 2002), appeal denied, 806 A.2d 859 (Pa. 2002) (citations omitted).
The decision to allow a defendant to withdraw their guilty plea post-sentence
is a matter that rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. See
Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 382-383 (Pa.Super. 2002).
It is well settled in this Commonwealth that the entry of a guilty plea
constitutes a waiver of “all non-jurisdictional defects except the legality of the
sentence and the validity of the plea.” Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d
606, 609 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 87 A.3d 319 (Pa. 2014). When a
defendant seeks to withdraw a plea after sentencing, he must demonstrate
“prejudice on the order of manifest injustice before withdrawal is justified.”
Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044, 1046 (Pa.Super. 2011)
(citation omitted). “A plea rises to the level of manifest injustice when it was
entered into involuntarily, unknowingly, or unintelligently.” Commonwealth
v. Stork, 737 A.2d 789, 790 (Pa.Super. 1999), appeal denied, 764 A.2d 1068(Pa. 2000).
“The law does not require that appellant be pleased with the outcome
of his decision to enter a plea of guilty[; a]ll that is required is that
[appellant's] decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently made.” Commonwealth v. Diaz, 913 A.2d 871, 873 (Pa.Super.
2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 931
A.2d 656 (Pa. 2007). In order to ensure a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent
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plea, trial courts are required make the following inquires in the guilty plea
colloquy:
(1) the nature of the charges to which he is pleading guilty; (2)
the factual basis for the plea; (3) he is giving up his right to trial
by jury; (4) and the presumption of innocence; (5) he is aware of
the permissible ranges of sentences and fines possible; and (6)
the court is not bound by the terms of the agreement unless the
court accepts the plea.
Commonwealth v. Kpou, 153 A.3d 1020, 1023 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citation
omitted); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 590.
Appellant’s no contest plea was knowing and voluntary, and we find no
abuse of discretion by the trial court because it conducted an extensive
colloquy. As the trial court points out, Appellant’s maximum sentence was
explained by the Commonwealth and by the court. N.T., 8/11/22, at 8, 12.
Appellant had the opportunity to review the plea form with his attorney. N.T.
at 11. He was pointed to the specific paragraph on his plea form and told that
his maximum punishment was forty years’ incarceration with a maximum
$50,000 fine, and Appellant said he understood. N.T. at 12. Appellant was
made aware by the court that it was mandated to consider a sentence
enhancement of up to twenty-four months since the victim was under thirteen
years old, and Appellant stated that he understood. N.T. at 12. The
Commonwealth presented a recitation of the underlying facts supporting the
plea and the nature of the charges, and Appellant acknowledged he
understood his right to a jury trial and that he is presumed innocent until
found guilty. N.T. at 15-24. Appellant stated that he was not forced or
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promised anything in order to make his plea, N.T. at 14-15, and that it was
intelligent, knowing, and voluntary. N.T. at 24. Finally, the no contest plea
form was signed by Appellant in the presence of the court. N.T. at 13.
Therefore, since the colloquy illustrates that Appellant's plea was
knowing and voluntary and he is bound by those statements and cannot make
assertions to the contrary, we find no abuse of discretion and find Appellant’s
first claim to be frivolous.
Appellant’s second issue on appeal is that his attorney did not procure
a medical expert, and that had a medical expert been obtained who supported
Appellant’s position, he may not have pled guilty. Appellant’s Br. at 4. We view
this as a validity of the plea issue, and for substantially the same reasons as
above, Appellant’s second claim fails. Pennsylvania law presumes a defendant
who entered a plea was aware of what he was doing, and the defendant bears
the burden of proving otherwise. Kpou, 153 A.3d at 1024.
If a defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently wishes
to acknowledge facts that in themselves constitute an offense,
that acknowledgement is independent of the procedures of
proving or refuting them.
Commonwealth v. Watson, 835 A.2d 786, 797 (Pa.Super. 2003). By
pleading no contest, Appellant acknowledged the facts as stated by the
Commonwealth, regardless of what medical expert testimony the
Commonwealth would have presented at a trial to prove them, and regardless
of if Appellant could have found an expert to refute them. See id. Appellant
knew of his right to a jury trial and his right to call witnesses in his defense,
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and he may not now contradict statements made during his plea colloquy.
Thus, we find no abuse of discretion or error by the trial court.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw as counsel
granted.
Date: 10/30/2023
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