Com. v. Willams, R. ( 2023 )

J-A19014-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RISHEEN WILLIAMS :
:
Appellant : No. 2527 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 1, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0007601-2019
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 7, 2023
Risheen Williams appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after
the trial court revoked an earlier sentence of probation. Although we affirm
the revocation of Appellant’s probation, we vacate the resultant sentence and
remand for proceedings consistent with this memorandum.
We glean the following facts from the certified record. On July 15, 2021,
Appellant pled guilty to one count of false identification to law enforcement
and two violations concerning licenses, specifically possession of a fictitious or
fraudulently altered driver’s license. The trial court sentenced him to an
aggregate term of two years of probation and placed him under the intensive
supervision of the Philadelphia County Antiviolence Unit, which entailed
weekly reporting and frequent drug screenings.
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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On February 11, 2022, about seven months into his sentence, Appellant
appeared before the court for a violation of probation (“VOP”) hearing.
Therein, the court addressed threatening remarks Appellant made to the
supervisor of his probation officer, as well as an outstanding arrest warrant
for violating a Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) order. The court continued the
hearing for three days, ordering that Appellant turn himself in on the warrant,
and did not lodge a detainer. Appellant self-reported to the authorities the
same day. As a result, while the court found Appellant in technical violation
and revoked probation at the continued hearing on February 14, 2022, it chose
to resentence him to an aggregate term of two years of probation instead of
incarceration. It further added a condition that Appellant participate in an
anger management program, noting that Appellant had displayed an unsavory
“attitude” in his interactions with the court and probation office. See N.T. VOP
Hearing, 2/14/22, at 8-9.
One month later, on March 14, 2022, Appellant participated in a
probation review hearing that had been scheduled as a matter of course at
the time of his resentencing. At the review hearing, the probation officer
testified that Appellant tested positive for use of marijuana once and
additionally admitted on another occasion that he would test positive for
marijuana. The Gagnon I1 Summary prepared by Appellant’s probation
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1 A Gagnon I hearing is a pre-revocation hearing to determine if probable
cause exists that a violation was committed. After this determination is made,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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officer also stated that Appellant admitted to “steady smoking.” See Gagnon
I Summary, 4/4/22, at 2. The court told Appellant that he was not permitted
to use marijuana while on probation, noting that he had been informed of this
by his probation officers, and scheduled a return date thirty days out. See
N.T. VOP Hearing, 3/14/22, at 8. The court indicated that it wanted to ensure
that the levels of marijuana in Appellant’s system were going down. Id. It
did not expressly revoke probation, nor did it indicate that any violation would
be ameliorated if his levels decreased. Before the scheduled return date,
however, Appellant was arrested for simple assault and terroristic threats,
with the alleged victim being the same as the PFA complainant. Based on the
new charges, the court lodged a detainer against Appellant.
On July 11, 2022, the charges against Appellant for simple assault and
terroristic threats were dismissed for lack of prosecution. Later that same
day, from jail Appellant initiated a three-way call to his daughter and his
probation officer. During the call, he requested that his detainer be lifted and
asked the officer when he might be released. After being informed by his
probation officer that the judge presiding over his matters was on vacation,
Appellant then asked what would happen to him if something horrible were to
happen to the judge while she was away. Considering this as potentially a
threat, the probation officer noted the remark as concerning in a Gagnon II
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a Gagnon II hearing is conducted where the Commonwealth is required to
establish that the defendant did violate his parole/probation.”
Commonwealth v. Stafford, 29 A.3d 800, 802 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(citation omitted). See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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Summary report, and another VOP hearing was held in early August to address
this and the detainer. However, the court continued the hearing and kept the
detainer in effect until it had the opportunity to obtain an audio recording of
the telephone conversation.
The continued VOP hearing was ultimately held on September 1, 2022.
The court reviewed the recording of the jail call in open court and did not
explicitly state on the record whether Appellant’s comments on the three-way
call constituted a threat. Nonetheless, it deferred to the probation officer’s
interpretation that the statement was a threat based on the fact that the
“probation officer does this every day as to what stands out; what doesn’t
stand out. . . . I think that is really relevant.” N.T. VOP Hearing, 9/1/22, at
27. The court also noted Appellant’s anger on the call and referenced
Appellant’s prior history of showing anger and a lack of respect in the
courtroom. Id. at 20-21. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court revoked
Appellant’s probation, noting that:
I already found [Appellant] in technical violation. He had tested
positive for marijuana. He didn’t have a marijuana card at that
time, and he also got a new arrest.
Taking everything into account of what I’ve heard from probation
and the history that’s been before me, on the violation concerning
licenses, it’s a misdemeanor of the first degree. I will revoke your
probation, and I’ll do eleven and a half to twenty-three months
house arrest, and I want you supervised by the domestic
[antiviolence] unit.
Id. at 27-28.
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The court thus resentenced Appellant as to the violation concerning
licenses and issued no further penalty regarding the conviction for false
identification to law enforcement. It did not award credit for any time
Appellant was in jail. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration nunc pro
tunc on September 22, 2022, twenty-one days from the date he was
resentenced. While the motion was pending, he filed a timely notice of appeal
on September 30, 2022. Accordingly, the trial court entered an order
cancelling the hearing on the motion, noting that it lacked jurisdiction to
address it.
Thereafter, both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.
1925. Appellant presents the following issues for our review, which we have
reordered for ease of disposition:
I. Whether the court’s sentence was both illegal and violative of
[Appellant’s] due process rights insofar as his only violation
was use of marijuana[,] which he is medically permitted to use?
II. Whether the sentence was excessive insofar as the court failed
to consider relevant mitigating factors, inappropriately
considered circumstances as aggravating insofar as they were
not in fact aggravating factors and/or gave undue weight to
these purported aggravating factors and failed to acknowledge
that [Appellant] sat in on her detainer since March of 2022?
III. Whether the court ordered an illegal sentence insofar as it did
not award [Appellant] credit for time served?
Appellant’s brief at 7 (cleaned up).
Our standard and scope of review are as follows:
When considering an appeal from a sentence imposed following
the revocation of probation, our review is limited to determining
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the validity of the probation revocation proceedings and the
authority of the sentencing court to consider the same sentencing
alternatives that it had at the time of the initial sentencing.
Revocation of a probation sentence is a matter committed to the
sound discretion of the trial court, and that court’s decision will
not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an error of law or an
abuse of discretion.
Commonwealth v. Parson, 259 A.3d 1012, 1019 (Pa.Super. 2021) (cleaned
up).
Appellant first contends that his sentence was illegal and in
contravention of his due process rights because his only violation was use of
marijuana, which he is now medically permitted to use. See Appellant’s brief
at 18-23. Specifically, he states that “the sentence was . . . illegal insofar as
there was no evidence of any probation violation warranting revocation.” Id.
at 18. He continues, “[t]here was simply no basis for the [c]ourt to revoke
probation and impose a custodial sentence.” Id.
Although Appellant couches this claim as an attack on an illegal
resentence, it is clear that he actually challenges the court’s basis for
revocation. As to that issue, we have stated that before the trial court may
revoke probation, the court must first find, “based on the preponderance of
the evidence, that the probationer violated a specific condition of probation or
committed a new crime[.]” Parson, supra at 1019 (cleaned up). Once a
court determines that a violation has occurred, it may then “consider the
rehabilitative effectiveness of the probation in deciding whether to revoke
probation.” Commonwealth v. Giliam, 233 A.3d 863, 869 (Pa.Super.
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2020). A court has the authority to revoke probation based on acts that fall
short of criminal conduct. See Commonwealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d 1033,
1042 (Pa.Super. 2014). Further, “[u]nlike a criminal trial where the burden
is upon the Commonwealth to establish all of the requisite elements of the
offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt, at a [probation] revocation
hearing the Commonwealth need only prove a violation of probation by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Parson, supra at 1019 (citation omitted).
In addressing this issue, the trial court noted that from the time
Appellant’s probation initially commenced in July of 2021, he was high risk
and under the intensive supervision of the Philadelphia County Antiviolence
Unit, which entailed frequent drug screenings. See Trial Court Opinion,
3/27/23, at 13. It opined that it “properly found beyond a preponderance of
the evidence that Appellant violated his probation when presented with
evidence that he tested positive for marijuana on February 16, 2022[,] and
on March 9, 2022 when Appellant admitted that he would test positive for
marijuana.” Id. It noted that his use of marijuana was prohibited, and that
he did not possess a medical marijuana card on those dates in question. Id.
The court also determined that “Appellant’s violative conduct, along with
Appellant being criminally charged multiple times while on probation for
crimes ranging from PFA violations to terroristic threats, all of which involve
the same complainant, was enough in demonstrating to the court probation
was ineffective in rehabilitating Appellant.” Id. As such, the court concluded
that revocation was appropriate in this matter.
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In response, Appellant contends that the court’s consideration of any
arrest or incidents pre-dating February 14, 2022 violated 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9771(d), which restrains the court from considering facts occurring prior to
the imposition of probation.2 See Appellant’s brief at 19. While
acknowledging that he tested positive for marijuana on one occasion and
admitting on another that he would test positive, Appellant avers that he was
appropriately reprimanded by the court at the VOP hearing on March 14, 2022,
and therefore these violations did not provide a basis for violation at the
September 1, 2022 VOP hearing. Id. at 20-21. He maintains that this is
especially so because he obtained a medical marijuana card several days after
the March 14, 2022 hearing, meaning that he was no longer at risk of violating
probation on this basis moving forward. Id. at 22. Appellant also notes that,
although he was arrested for new charges in the interim, those charges were
dismissed prior to his resentencing in September and thus could not be
considered as a violation. Id. at 21. Therefore, he believes he was “in
complete compliance with his probation” when it was revoked on September
1, 2022. Id.
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2 This statute states in relevant part as follows:
There shall be no revocation or increase of conditions of sentence
under this section except after a hearing at which the court shall
consider the record of the sentencing proceeding together with
evidence of the conduct of the defendant while on probation.
Probation may be eliminated or the term decreased without a
hearing.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(d).
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After careful review of the applicable law and the certified record, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit an error of
law in revoking Appellant’s probation. Initially, the court correctly determined
that he violated a specific condition of probation. See Giliam, supra at 869.
In particular, Appellant committed two technical violations in less than a
month of being resentenced on February 14, 2022, when he used marijuana
prior to obtaining a medical marijuana card. It is also apparent that
Appellant’s non-permitted consumption of marijuana, for which he had
undergone frequent drug screenings since July of 2021, constituted a violation
of a specific condition of his probation. Notably, Appellant does not contest
the positive test or his admission, or that the acts themselves violated a
condition of his probation.
We reject Appellant’s claim that the court could not find him in technical
violation for the marijuana use at the September 1, 2022 VOP hearing because
there was a prior hearing in March. When the court heard the matter at the
VOP hearing in March, it did not make a determination to revoke probation.
Rather, the court scheduled a subsequent review hearing for one month out.
See N.T. VOP Hearing, 3/14/22, at 8 (“I want to give it a thirty[-]day date to
make sure you’re doing what you’re supposed to do and to make sure that
these marijuana levels are going down, okay?”). However, due to various
intervening factors, including Appellant’s subsequent arrest and comments
made during a recorded telephone call with his probation officer, the matter
was not addressed again until the September 1, 2022 VOP hearing. At that
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time, the court was then free to conclude that based on Appellant’s failed drug
screening and admission of “steady smoking,” he violated a specific condition
of his probation. The mere fact that the court scheduled a thirty-day review
date did not nullify his technical violations or guarantee that he would be
entitled to receive no further penalty, even if his levels decreased.
Having concluded that the trial court properly found a violation, we also
determine that the court did not err in revoking Appellant’s probation. As
noted above, in making this decision, the court was permitted to consider the
probation’s rehabilitative effectiveness. See Giliam, supra at 869. At the
ultimate VOP hearing, the court specifically stated on the record that in making
this finding, it considered the technical violations, Appellant’s arrest post-
resentencing, the testimony from the probation officer, and the history of his
supervision. See N.T. VOP Hearing, 9/1/22, at 27. The record reflects that
this was Appellant’s second proven violation since his supervision initially
began in July of 2021. Further, Appellant had a history of anger issues, which
the court noted from Appellant’s call to his probation officer. In all, the court’s
decision comports with the main focus of a probation revocation hearing, being
“whether the conduct of the probationer indicates that the probation has
proven to be an effective vehicle to accomplish rehabilitation and a sufficient
deterrent against future anti-social conduct.” Colon, supra at 1042.
We further reject Appellant’s contention that revocation was improper
because his medical marijuana card was subsequently issued after the March
2022 VOP hearing. Appellant asserts that obtaining the card reduced both the
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severity of his infractions and the likelihood of future lapses. However, it is
not at all clear why he believes that obtaining the card after his violations
diminished the gravity of his prior failure to abide by the terms of his
probation. Further, even with a medical marijuana card, his use could still
constitute a violation of probation if it is demonstrated that he did so in
contravention to any provision of the Medical Marijuana Act. See 35 P.S.
§ 10231.303(a) (stating that “use or possession of medical marijuana as set
forth in this act is lawful within this Commonwealth”) (emphasis added).
Finally, while Appellant’s marijuana use was the only express violation of a
condition of probation found by the court, in deciding whether to revoke
probation, the court was nonetheless permitted to consider additional factors,
including Appellant’s supervision history and history of anger, as discussed
above.
Accordingly, we conclude that the court’s decision to revoke probation
was not in error and Appellant’s due process rights were not violated.
Therefore, we affirm the order revoking Appellant’s probation.
Appellant next argues that the court imposed an excessive sentence.
Our standard of review for this claim is well settled:
Sentencing is a matter vested within the discretion of the trial
court and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of
discretion. An abuse of discretion requires the trial court to have
acted with manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice,
bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly
erroneous. It is also now accepted that in an appeal following the
revocation of probation, it is within our scope of review to consider
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challenges to both the legality of the final sentence and the
discretionary aspects of an appellant’s sentence.
Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d 1280, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citations
omitted).
Nonetheless, a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence does
not entitle an appellant to “review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Derry,
150 A.3d 987, 991 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citation omitted). Rather,
[w]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal defect,
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question
that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Id. (cleaned up).
Here, Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal. However, the certified
record reflects that his motion for reconsideration was filed twenty-one days
after he was resentenced, and therefore is facially untimely pursuant to
Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(E) (providing that “[a] post-sentence motion to modify a
sentence imposed after revocation shall be filed within ten days of the date of
imposition”).3 This Court has held that “[a]n untimely post-sentence motion
does not preserve issues for appeal.” Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d
____________________________________________3 Further, at the time he was resentenced, Appellant was advised of his right
to request reconsideration of the sentence within ten days and his right to
have a lawyer file that motion if he could not afford one, in compliance with
Pa.R.Crim.P. 708 (D). See N.T. VOP Hearing, 9/1/22, at 31.
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717, 719 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citation omitted). Since Appellant has failed to
preserve this issue, we are not at liberty to entertain it.
Appellant’s final claim is that his sentence is illegal because the trial
court did not award him credit for the time he spent in jail from March 25,
2022, to September 1, 2022. See Appellant’s brief at 15-17. As to this issue,
we must agree with Appellant. This Court has observed that “[a] claim
asserting that the trial court failed to award credit for time served implicates
the legality of the sentence.”4 Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 181 A.3d 1165,
1166 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted). “Issues relating to the legality of a
sentence are questions of law.” Id. (citation omitted). As such, our standard
of review is de novo and the scope of review is plenary. Id.The Pennsylvania Sentencing Code, with regard to awarding credit for
time served, provides in relevant part as follows:
§ 9760. Credit for time served
After reviewing the information submitted under [§] 9737
(relating to report of outstanding charges and sentences) the
court shall give credit as follows:
(1) Credit against the maximum term and any
minimum term shall be given to the defendant
for all time spent in custody as a result of the
criminal charge for which a prison sentence is
imposed or as a result of conduct on which such
a charge is based. Credit shall include credit for
the time spent in custody prior to trial, during
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4 Issues pertaining to the legality of a sentence are not waived by failure to
raise them in the lower court. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hill, 238 A.3d
399, 409 (Pa. 2020).
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trial, pending sentence, and pending the
resolution of an appeal.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9760.
Appellant asserts that because none of his time in jail was credited to
the simple assault and terroristic threats charges that were dismissed, he
must receive credit for that time in conjunction with the sentence sub judice,
relying on Commonwealth v. Smith, 853 A.2d 1020 (Pa.Super. 2004). See
Appellant’s brief at 16-17. For its part, the Commonwealth concedes that
Appellant is entitled to credit for time he spent incarcerated, relying in part on
Smith as well. See Commonwealth’s brief at 7-8.
In Smith, this Court held that,
because Smith’s pretrial incarceration is attributable to both his
probation detainer and the new criminal charges, it must be
attributed to either his sentence under the new criminal
charges or to a sentence imposed for violation of probation.
Because Smith’s pre-trial incarceration was not already credited
to any violation of his probation, it was error for the trial court to
refuse to give credit to Smith on his . . . sentence.
Smith, supra at 1026 (emphasis added).
The instant matter is controlled by Smith, although the circumstances
are reversed. There is no question that Appellant’s incarceration from March
25, 2022, through September 1, 2022, was a result of both new charges and
the detainer lodged against him. However, none of his time in jail was credited
to the simple assault and terroristic threats charges because they were
ultimately dismissed for lack of prosecution prior to his VOP resentencing. As
such, pursuant to Smith and § 9760, this time must be credited to his VOP
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sentence. We therefore vacate the sentence and remand for the trial court to
resentence Appellant, awarding him credit for time served in custody.
Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing
consistent with this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/07/2023
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