Jack Frost Construction v. Bertothy, J. ( 2023 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
JACK FROST CONSTRUCTION, INC. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JASON T. BERTOTHY AND DANA A. :
BERTOTHY :
: No. 208 WDA 2022
Appellants :
Appeal from the Judgment Entered February 8, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County Civil Division at
No(s): 2019-541-CD
BEFORE: BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: October 6, 2023
Jason T. Bertothy and his wife, Dana A. Bertothy (collectively “the
Bertothys”), appeal from the $40,5564.26 judgment entered on the verdict in
favor of Jack Frost Construction, Inc. (“Jack Frost”). We vacate the judgment
and remand for further proceedings.
I. Facts and Procedural History
The certified record supports the following history of this case as
outlined in the findings of fact enumerated in the trial court opinion and order
entered on August 25, 2021. In November 2017, the Bertothys contracted
with Jack Frost for the construction of a single-family residence (“the
Contract”). The Contract, which was negotiated between the Bertothys and
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Jack Frost’s owner, Billy Joe Sallurday, specifically referenced, but did not
incorporate, a September 12, 2017 estimate (“the Estimate”) that outlined a
flat fee for materials, plans and labor totaling $480,107.00.1 The Contract
provided that payments were due within ten days of the submission of an
invoice and that Jack Frost retained the right to cease work if payments were
not timely received. In this vein, the contract included a provision that
calculated interest at a rate of 1.5% per month or 18% per year. Neither the
Contract nor the Estimate stated a completion date, but a proviso in the
Estimate advised that the arrangement was “contingent upon . . . delays
beyond [the contractor’s] control.” Estimate, 9/12/17, at 2.
Over the ensuing year, construction was plagued by delays associated
with winter weather, an abnormal amount of rainfall, and the failure of a sub-
contractor, namely the Bertothys’ son, Trent, to excavate the site, grade the
driveway, and dig the trenches for housing electrical and water supply lines.
The various delays prompted an ongoing dispute between the parties over the
pace of construction and the use and storage of construction materials at the
site.
Between the start of the project in November 2017 and July 2018, the
Bertothys satisfied all four of the periodic invoices that Jack Frost submitted
totaling $122,357.00. However, the Bertothys withheld payment on the fifth
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1 While the Contract states the incorrect date of the Estimate, the parties do
not dispute that they agreed to the Estimate provided on September 12, 2017.
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pay application (“Pay Application No. 5”) for $63,060.26 due to what they
claimed were unresolved construction defects that they believed Jack Frost
had failed to remedy, and because that application requested payment for
work that had not been completed. While the trial court ultimately determined
that Jack Frost continued to work on the project despite the non-payment of
Pay Application of No.5, the parties dispute the amount and pace of
construction after July 2018.
On October 4, 2018, the Bertothys’ counsel mailed Jack Frost a cease-
and-desist letter. Prior to receiving the letter, Jack Frost had partially framed
the structure, sheathed the roof, and completed the deck footer, footer,
foundation, and plumbing slab. The concrete work was approved by Pennsafe
Building Inspection Services, LLC. Within six days of issuing the letter, the
Bertothys had the property inspected by David Connelly, a structural engineer,
who observed extensive moisture near the foundation, slab, framing, exterior
walls, and roof trusses. See N.T., 11/5/19, at 102-11, 114-17, 118-19, 120-
26, 130-31. Specifically, Mr. Connelly identified, inter alia, a wet slab and
interior foundation, weather-compromised lumber used in framing and
sheathing, and the accumulation of mold and mildew on the floor joists and
roof trusses. Id. at 108-09, 114-26, 130-31. Overall, he described the
prolonged moisture exposure as,
A lot of wet construction, in a nutshell. Everything seemed to be
pretty-well soaked, even the interior. Yes, there was roof
sheathing on the structure. There was still water coming through
. . . that allowed a lot of water into the interior structure. . . .
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[T]he exterior sheathing, really seemed to [have] taken on a lot
of water.
Id. at 102. The visual inspection was performed approximately six days after
Mr. Sallurday was last on the job site and claimed that he observed no
moisture-related damage when he left. Id. at 138; N.T., 11/4/20, at 48, 70-
71.
On April 1, 2019, Jack Frost sued the Bertothys for breach of contract
due to their alleged failure to satisfy Pay Application No. 5 in accordance with
the Contract. It also sought $13,006.27 for windows that had been purchased
in anticipation of installation. The Bertothys’ answer and new matter included
several counterclaims including breach of contract based upon Jack Frost’s
alleged failure to perform in a timely and workmanlike manner. The Bertothys
also pled violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law (“UTPCPL”) sections 201-2(4)(vii), (xiv), and (xxi), which
relate to a business’s representation of goods and services, compliance with
written warranties, and fraudulent or deceptive conduct, respectively.2
Following a bench trial over three days between November 2020 and
March 2021, and review of the parties’ proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the trial court found in favor of Jack Frost and awarded it
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2 The Bertothys’ counterclaims also included alternative counts of unjust
enrichment and negligence. As the Bertothys do not challenge the trial court’s
rejection of these counts, we do not discuss them herein.
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$40,560.26, plus the contractual interest rate, for the unpaid materials and
labor costs outlined in Pay Application No. 5.3
As to the Bertothys’ counterclaims, the court rejected all of the requests
for relief, holding: (1) the issue concerning Jack Frost’s alleged failure to
perform in a timely and workmanlike manner was not ripe because the
Bertothys had not permitted the contractor to fix the potential defects
associated with the incomplete performance prior to issuing the cease-and-
desist letter and taking possession of the worksite; (2) all of the completed
work had been performed in a workmanlike manner; and (3) Jack Frost did
not engage in any of the alleged conduct that purportedly violated the UTPCPL.
This timely appeal followed the denial of the Bertothys’ post-trial
motions and the entry of judgment on the verdict. Both the Bertothys and
the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
The Bertothys present seven questions for our review, which we re-
ordered for ease of disposition:
1. Whether, under relevant law, the trial court erred in permitting
an expert witness to testify at trial who [Jack Frost] failed to
disclose or identify during discovery.
2. Whether, under relevant law, the trial court erred in finding
[Jack Frost] is entitled to $40,560.26 for labor and materials,
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3 While Jack Frost requested $63,060.26 in damages, plus $13,006.27 for the
new windows, the court concluded that it only established $40,560,26 of that
amount. See Trial Court Opinion and Order, 8/25/21, at 7 (holding, Jack Frost
did not establish $13,006.27 damages for windows or $22,500.00 in damages
for plumbing materials and HVAC equipment that was not used on the project.
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without any documentary evidence or business records to
substantiate the amount claimed.
3. Whether, under relevant law, the trial court erred in making
findings contrary to the evidence presented at trial.
4. Whether, under relevant law, the trial court erred in refusing to
consider [the Bertothys’] counterclaim, because the claim was
“not ripe.”
5. Whether, under relevant law, the trial court erred in finding the
implied warranty of reasonable workmanship is limited to latent
defects.
6. Whether, under relevant law, the trial court erred in finding the
work [Jack Frost] completed was performed in a workmanlike
manner, despite also finding the existence of non-latent
construction defects.
7. Whether, under relevant law, the trial court erred in failing to
rule on undisputed facts that assertedly constitute violations of
the Pennsylvania [UTPCPL].
Appellant’s brief at 3-4.
The following tenets inform our review.
Our standard of review in non-jury trials is to assess
whether the findings of facts by the trial court are supported by
the record and whether the trial court erred in applying the law.
Upon appellate review[,] the appellate court must consider the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner and
reverse the trial court only where the findings are not supported
by the evidence of record or are based on an error of law. Our
scope of review regarding questions of law is plenary.
Woullard v. Sanner Concrete & Supply,, 241 A.3d 1200, 1207 (Pa.Super.
2020) (quoting Century Indem. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Co., 173 A.3d 784,
802 (Pa.Super. 2017)).
II. Jack Frost’s Breach-of-Contract Claim
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We begin our review by addressing whether the Bertothys are entitled
to a new trial in defending Jack Frost’s breach-of-contract claim implicating
Pay Application No. 5.
A. Expert Testimony
The Bertothys’ first challenge relates to the trial court’s decision to
permit the contractor to present expert opinion testimony that was not
disclosed during discovery. We review the trial court’s determination for an
abuse of discretion. See Pledger by Pledger v. Janssen Pharm., Inc., 198
A.3d 1126, 1138 (Pa.Super. 2018) (“The admission of expert testimony is a
matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose rulings thereon
will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” (citation
omitted)).
The following facts are relevant to our determination. Prior to trial, the
Bertothys filed a motion in limine seeking to bar Jack Frost from presenting
its construction expert, Philip J. Bosak, because Jack Frost failed to disclose
or identify Mr. Bosak during discovery and neglected to claim that any
extenuating circumstances caused the nondisclosure.
Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 4003.5:
An expert witness whose identity is not disclosed in compliance
with subdivision (a)(1) of this rule shall not be permitted to testify
on behalf of the defaulting party at the trial of the action.
However, if the failure to disclose the identity of the witness is the
result of extenuating circumstances beyond the control of the
defaulting party, the court may grant a continuance or other
appropriate relief.
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Pa.R.C.P. 4003.5(b).
The purpose of Rule 4003.5(b) is to promote fairness and allow opposing
parties to adequately prepare for trial. See Clark v. Hoerner, 525 A.2d 377,
383 (Pa.Super. 1987). In this vein, our Supreme Court has endorsed a four-
part test to determine the propriety of admitting previously-undisclosed
expert testimony: (1) the prejudice or surprise in fact of the party against
whom the excluded witnesses would have testified; (2) the ability of that party
to cure the prejudice; (3) the extent to which waiver of the rule against calling
unlisted witnesses would disrupt the orderly and efficient trial of the case or
other cases in the court; and (4) bad faith or willfulness in failing to comply
with a pre-trial order limiting witnesses to be called to those named prior to
trial. See Feingold v. SEPTA, 517 A.2d 1270 (Pa. 1986); see also Gill v.
McGraw Electric Co., 399 A.2d 1095, 1102 (Pa.Super. 1979) (en banc)
(citing the same four factors for consideration when deciding whether a
witness should be precluded for failing to comply with pre-trial orders).
Furthermore, we have defined prejudice as “any substantial diminution of a
party’s ability to properly present its case at trial,” not simply damage to the
opponent’s case. Florig v. Estate of O'Hara, 912 A.2d 318, 325 (Pa.Super.
2006).
Instantly, Jack Frost failed to timely disclose or identify Mr. Bosak as an
expert witness in direct contravention of Rule 4003.5. Indeed, although Jack
Frost retained Mr. Bosak to inspect the property in 2019, it waited until one
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month before trial to disclose him as a witness, expert or otherwise.
Moreover, Jack Frost did not provide Mr. Bosak’s expert report to the
Bertothys until October 20, 2020, two weeks before trial. In addition, Jack
Frost neglected to allege any extenuating circumstances that prevented it
from disclosing Mr. Bosak’s identity during discovery.
Nevertheless, finding that the delay in revealing the expert was not
prejudicial to the Bertothys, the trial court denied the motion in limine and
ultimately permitted Mr. Bosak to testify as a rebuttal witness. The trial court
explained its rationale as follows:
[Jack Frost] provided notice of the intention to call Mr. Bosak
as an expert to [the Bertothys] over a month before the trial
began, and his report was provided to [the Bertothys] two weeks
before trial. Additionally, [the Bertothys] were permitted to confer
with their own experts prior to cross-examining Mr. Bosak.
Moreover, the [November 2020] trial was extended through March
2021, giving [the Bertothys] an additional four months to prepare
any supplementary experts and/or witnesses necessary, or
request other relief. [Despite] stating [they] were prejudiced,
there has been no showing of actual prejudice suffered by [the
Bertothys].
Trial Court Opinion, 12/28/21, at 9.
Considering the several opportunities that the Bertothys had to prepare
for their cross-examination of Mr. Bosak, most significantly the extended four-
month-delay between the close of the Bertothys’ case-in-chief in November
2020 and the witness’s eventual rebuttal testimony during March 2021, we do
not discern an abuse of discretion in this case. As the preceding discussion
illustrates, rigid adherence to deadlines in these circumstances is in tension
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with our rules and prevailing decisional law.4 While trial courts may preclude
an expert from testifying based upon violation of discovery order or deadline,
the trial court’s decision to permit the testimony in the case was a reasonable
exercise of discretion.
B. Weight of the Evidence
The Bertothys’ next two issues relate to the trial court’s findings of fact
concerning Jack Frost’s damages of $40,560.26 in labor and materials, the
start date, Mr. Sallurday’s representations about the anticipated duration of
construction, the end date, and the weather problems that hampered
construction. While the Bertothys frame these issues as allegations of trial
court error in ignoring what they characterize as uncontroverted facts, their
arguments effectively assert that the trial court’s findings are against the
weight of the evidence. Critically, the Bertothys do not contend that Jack
Frost failed to present evidence of its damages or its representations about
the anticipated start, duration, and completion of the project. Instead, they
assail the evidence that Jack Frost adduced as inferior to the evidence that
they presented to the trial court. Hence, they challenge the greater weight of
the evidence.
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4 See, e.g., Pa.R.C.P. 126 (“The rules shall be liberally construed to secure
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding
to which they are applicable. The court at every stage of any such action or
proceeding may disregard any error or defect of procedure which does not
affect the substantial rights of the parties.”).
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In such cases, our review is exceptionally limited:
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of
discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict
is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has
had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an
appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings
and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial
court’s determination that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting or
denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict
was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new
trial should be granted in the interest of justice.
It is not the role of an appellate court to pass on the credibility of
witnesses; hence we will not substitute our judgment for that of
the factfinder. Thus, the test we apply is not whether we would
have reached the same result on the evidence presented, but
rather, after due consideration of the evidence which the trial
court found credible, whether the trial court could have reasonably
reached its conclusion.
Fazio v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 62 A.3d 396, 413 (Pa.Super. 2012)
(cleaned up). “We will respect a trial court’s findings with regard to the
credibility and weight of the evidence unless the appellant can show that the
court’s determination was manifestly erroneous, arbitrary and capricious[,] or
flagrantly contrary to the evidence.” J.J. Deluca Co., Inc. v. Toll Naval
Associates, 56 A.3d 402, 410 (Pa.Super. 2012) (quoting Ecksel v. Orleans
Const. Co., 519 A.2d 1021, 1028 (Pa.Super. 1987)).
In addressing the Bertothys’ weight claim, the trial court reasoned as
follows:
The findings stated within-this court’s opinion and order
were based on a full review of the testimony and evidence
presented by the parties during the three[-]day trial. . . . No new
evidence has been presented which would cause this court to find
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the previous testimony and evidence is no longer credible. Only
when a verdict is shocking should judgment be entered in favor of
the moving party or a new trial granted. . . . Therefore, this court
does not find that the verdict is so shocking as to require relief,
and in the interests of justice, [the Bertothys’] post-trial motion
must be denied.
Trial Court Order and Opinion, 12/8/21/ at 8 (cleaned up).
From this, we conclude that the trial court’s failure to find the verdict
conscience-shocking was not an abuse of discretion. Thus, the weight claim
fails.
II. Bertothys’ Counterclaims.
Having found no reason to disturb the verdict in favor of Jack Frost, we
turn to the Bertothys’ three issues relating to the trial court’s rejection of their
counterclaims against Jack Frost. Essentially, the Bertothys assert that the
court erred in concluding that (1) the breach of contract allegations were not
ripe absent evidence that they provided the contractor reasonable opportunity
to rectify any potential defects associated with incomplete performance; (2)
the implied warranty of reasonable workmanship did not apply to obvious
defects; and (3) the certified record did not support the trial court’s factual
finding that Jack Frost performed the contract in a workman-like manner. We
address these arguments seriatim.
A. Opportunity to Cure
First, contrary to the trial court’s legal conclusion, the Bertothys were
not required to provide Jack Frost an opportunity to cure any construction
defects. In Church v. Tantarelli, 953 A.2d 804, 807 (Pa.Super. 2008), we
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noted that there is no common law or statutory rights to cure construction
defects in private residential construction projects. We further explained that
the prevailing case of Hood v. Meininger, 105 A.2d 126 (1954),
does not stand for the proposition that a plaintiff must establish
he gave a contractor a reasonable opportunity to rectify defects in
order to establish a cause of action for breach of a construction
contract, and no case of which we are aware cites Hood for this
proposition. Frankly, we are unaware of any case which stands for
this proposition. While cure and mitigation are unquestionably
relevant to the issue of damages in a contract dispute as a general
matter, there is simply no support in our caselaw for th[is]
proposition[.]
Church supra at 807.
Instantly, neither the Contract nor the Estimate included a right-to-cure
clause that required the Bertothys to give Jack Frost notice of alleged defects
prior to directing it to stop performance. Hence, the trial court erred in
rejecting, as premature, the Bertothys’ counterclaim seeking damages for
those defects because they did not provide Jack Frost an opportunity to cure.
Second, the court erred in concluding that the Bertothys’ breach-of-
contract allegations necessarily would fail because the implied warranty of
reasonable workmanship did not cover the visible defects that the Bertothys
alleged.5 In reaching this conclusion, the trial court isolated the Bertothys’
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5 Modern jurisprudence defines “workmanlike manner,” as “doing the work in
an ordinarily skilled manner as a skilled workman should do it.” PHILIP L.
BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER & O'CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW
§ 9:77 (2022). The warranty is predicated on the founding principle that
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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averment stating, “[t]he contract contained an implied warranty that the work
would be performed in a reasonable, timely and workmanlike manner.”
Answer, New Matter, and Counterclaim, 4/29/19, at ¶45. Rather than
accepting the statement at face value that the Bertothys expected the work
to be performed as agreed, the court interpreted this averment as invoking
the implied warranty of workmanlike performance, which it further reasoned
applied only to latent defects. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/25/21, at 4. The
court continued that, since the Bertothys’ cause of action alleged obvious,
non-latent construction defects, the doctrine did not apply. Id. at 6.
However, as explained, infra, the trial court’s fixation with the Bertothys’
reference to an implied warranty is misplaced.
Pennsylvania is a fact pleading jurisdiction. Young v. Lippl, 251 A.3d
405 (Pa. 2021). Thus, so long as the Bertothys pled facts constituting a
breach of contract, they were not required to plead a specific legal theory. As
this Court has explained:
Pennsylvania courts have long-held as a general principal
that “plaintiffs should not be forced to elect a particular theory in
pursuing a claim” and risk the “possibility that meritorious claims
will fail because the wrong legal theory was chosen.” Schreiber
v. Republic Intermodal Corp, 473 Pa. 614, 375 A.2d 1285,
1291 (1977) (citation omitted). “Although a plaintiff is not
required to specify the legal theory underlying the complaint, the
material facts which form the basis of a cause of action must be
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“[a] contractor's failure to perform in a workmanlike manner could result in
the rendering of work of little or no value to the contractee and, under the
circumstances, no obligation to pay for such services would arise regardless
of the parties’ failure to express this intention in their agreement.” Id.- 14 -
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alleged.” Lampus v. Lampus, 541 Pa. 67, 660 A.2d 1308, 1312
n.2 (1995).
Id. at 419.
Instantly, the Bertothys pled, inter alia,
32. [Jack Frost’s] work was not performed in a reasonable,
timely and workmanlike manner, the evidence of which includes,
but is not limited to:
a. [Jack Frost] sporadically and sparingly working on the
[P]roject;
b. The improper installation and/or grading of the foundation;
c. Failing to construct portions of the Project as agreed to by
the parties;
d. Failing to adequately protect the property from water and
moisture damage, which includes the growth of significant mildew
and mold;
e. Permitting and/or directing materials to be stored outside,
unprotected and exposed to the weather, thereby substantially
damaging and compromising said materials;
f. Installing substantially damaged and compromised
materials into the Project;
g. Improper installation of trusses;
h. Failing to construct the [p]roperty in accordance with
industry standards, laws, and regulations and/or building codes;
and
f. Otherwise failing to complete the [P]roject in a reasonable,
timely and workmanlike manner.
Answer, New Matter, and Counterclaim, 4/29/19, at ¶32 and
¶43 (incorporating averments into breach of contract claim). It is axiomatic
that, to the extent that the Bertothys never accepted these obvious defects,
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they are not precluded from asserting them as bases for the breach-of contract
claim.
As is clear from the foregoing excerpt, the Bertothys pled material facts
in support of their claim for a breach of contract based on Jack Frost’s allegedly
substandard performance. Specifically, the Bertothys contended that Jack
Frost failed to perform as expected and as required by the Contract and
Estimate that was attached to the complaint. Id. at ¶¶ 26-32, 43-39. In this
regard, we also observe that the Estimate referenced in the Contract
specifically warranted, “All Work to be completed in a professional manner
according to standard practices.” Estimate, 9/12/17, at 2. Hence, insofar as
the Bertothys were not required to invoke a specific legal theory as to their
breach-of-contract claim, our review of the pleading bears out that they set
forth sufficient material facts to form the basis of that cause of action,
notwithstanding the reference to an “implied warranty” to highlight their
expectation that the work would be performed satisfactorily. Thus, the trial
court erred in ignoring the pleadings and applying law that purportedly limited
the potential breach of performance to latent defects as an alternative basis
to reject the Bertothys’ breach-of-contract claim.
B. Non-latent Defects
The Bertothys also assert that the trial court erred in making the
contradictory findings of fact that Jack Frost performed in a workmanlike
manner, while also recognizing the existence of non-latent defects. Bertothys’
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brief at 27. This assertion invokes the conditional language that the trial court
used after stating its position that Jack Frost was precluded from fixing “any
potential error or defects prior to [the Bertothys] taking possession of the
house[.]” Trial Court Opinion, 8/25/21, at 6. After making that
determination, the court continued, “[f]urther, many of the defects, such as
water pooling on the basement slab, were not latent defects[.]” Id.
Notwithstanding the Bertothys’ characterization of the trial court’s latter
reference to “defects” as a genuine finding of fact, the reference actually
related to the court’s observation of the obvious nature of some of the
incomplete work that formed the bases of several of the Bertothys’ complaints.
Hence, contrary the Bertothys’ protestations, the trial court’s findings are not
in conflict. As the court clearly explained in the “Findings of Fact” section of
its opinion: “The work that was complete, was done in a workmanlike manner,
and any incomplete work could have been fixed of any defect prior to
completion of the house.” Id. at 2. Accordingly, this assertion is unavailing.
C. UTPCPL Claim
Next, we confront whether “[t]he trial court erred in failing to rule on
undisputed facts that assertedly constitute violations of the [UTPCPL].”
Bertothys’ brief at 33. While the Bertothys’ counterclaim alleged that Jack
Frost violated 201-2(4)(vii), (xiv), and (xxi), their current argument relates
only to the Section 201-2(4) (xxi) “catchall provision which prescribes
fraudulent or deceptive conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or
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misunderstanding.” Id. at 34. Specifically, citing, inter alia, discrepancies in
Pay Application No. 5 and alleging that Mr. Sallurday represented that
construction would be complete in ten months, they contend that “undisputed
evidence presented at trial” established that Jack Frost violated the UTPCPL
by engaging in deceptive practices or misleading conduct that had a likelihood
of confusion or misunderstanding. Id. at 34.
In Gregg v. Ameriprise Financial, Inc., 245 A.3d 637, 649 (Pa.
2021), our High Court recently recounted,
the plain language of the current statute imposes liability on
commercial vendors who engage in conduct that has the potential
to deceive and which creates a likelihood of confusion or
misunderstanding. That is all that is required. The legislature
required neither carelessness nor intent when a cause of action is
premised upon deceptive conduct.
Thus, the Bertothys are correct insofar as they assert that liability under the
catchall provision could arise if they established fraudulent or deceptive
practices. However, as discussed infra, the certified record disproves their
contention that Jack Frost engaged in deceptive or misleading conduct.
In rejecting the Bertothys’ UTPCPL claim, the trial court held that they
did not support their claim with sufficient evidence that Jack Frost specified a
completion date or that they had any reason to disregard the clear language
in the contract documents that completion was contingent upon delays beyond
the contractor’s control. See Opinion and Order, 8/25/21, at 6. The court
reasoned that it would be irrational for the Bertothys to believe that home
construction that starts on the eve of winter would not experience weather-
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related delays. Id. The court further noted that some of the delays were
attributable to the Bertothys’ son, the excavation contractor, whom the
Bertothys specifically requested perform work under the contract. Id. at 7.
In its ensuing Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court expounded that the
Bertothys also failed to establish that Jack Frost violated its warranty of
reasonable workmanlike manner prior to receiving the cessation letter or that
it misrepresented the quality of work that it would perform. Thus, the court
found that the Bertothys failed to establish a violation of §201-2(4)(xxi)
catchall provision. For the following reasons, we agree.
First, as it relates to the Bertothys’ claim that Jack Frost billed them for
work that it had not yet completed, the certified record reveals that Jack Frost
purchased the plumbing and heating equipment identified in Pay Application
No. 5, and immediately incurred liability to pay for it. N.T., 11/4/20, at 43.
Thus, the cost of the equipment was properly billed to the Bertothys.
However, after the Bertothys failed to satisfy Pay Application No. 5 and
directed Jack Frost to stop construction at the site, the contractor was able to
cancel the order and recoup that expenditure. Id. at 43-44. In light of this
explanation, the record supports the trial court’s decision to reject the
Bertothys’ claim that Jack Frost’s July invoice billed for incomplete work in
contravention of the UTPCPL provision protecting consumers from a
contractor’s deceptive or misleading conduct.
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Similarly, as noted earlier in this memorandum, despite allegations that
Mr. Sallurday represented that the home would be completed within
approximately ten months to one year, the record evinces that the parties
never discussed a completion date beyond Ms. Bertothys’ initial desire to be
completed by Christmas 2018. Id. at 27. However, at the preliminary stage
when the contract was formed, it was impossible for Mr. Sallurday to
guarantee a completion date. Id. More importantly, the Contract did not
state a completion date and the September 12, 2017 Estimate, whose
legitimacy is undisputed, anticipated possible weather delays beyond the
contractor’s control, i.e. “All agreements contingent upon . . . delays beyond
our control.” As the certified record will not sustain the Bertothys’ complaint
that Jack Frost promised to complete the residence by a certain date, this
alleged violation of the catchall provision fails.
The Bertothys’ remaining assertions of confusion and deceit concern the
start date and the composition of Jack Frost’s work force, respectively. As to
the former, the Bertothys contend that Jack Frost started construction prior
to executing the contract documents. However, the alleged “work” consisted
entirely of a one-day site investigation, which the contractor performed with
the Bertothys’ assistance. Id. at 99, 101. During the trial, Mr. Sallurday
explained: “We met with Jason and Dana to locate the house, locate the
septic, to find out where the utilities would come in.” Id. at 99. This
preliminary investigation with the cooperation of the Bertothys is not
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tantamount to construction work and it does not establish a likelihood of
confusion and misunderstanding under the UTPCPL.
In relation to the latter contention concerning the composition of the
Jack Frost work force, again, the record contradicts the Bertothys’ assertion
that Jack Frost was not a legitimate construction company because it relied
substantially on child labor. See Bertothys’ brief at 35. The three minors that
this argument references, Mr. Sallurday’s teenaged nephew, grandson, and
family friend, worked an aggregate total of 463 hours on the project in
accordance with state regulations and under the supervision of a construction
worker with approximately fifty-seven years of experience. See N.T.,
11/4/20, at 29, 115-16. Furthermore, due to the nature of carpentry and
framing, the composition of the five-man work crew was typical for a project
like the Bertothys’ home, which used prefabricated walls, because superfluous
laborers would increase the cost of construction unnecessarily. Id. at 29-30.
Moreover, as Mr. Sallurday explained in relation to the minors’ job-site
activities, they “use nails . . . [a]nd screw guns, [which] they are allowed to
use[.] Battery-operated tools, they're still allowed to use battery-operated
tools, just not power tools.” Id. at 116. Hence, discounting the Bertothys’
disingenuous inference that Jack Frost exploited child labor, the size and
composition of the construction crew was in no way deceptive or misleading
in violation of the UTPCPL.
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Overall, because there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
finding that the Bertothys failed to establish liability under the catchall section
of the UTPCPL, this issue must fail. Sufficient facts presented at trial
demonstrated that Jack Frost did not make any misrepresentations to the
Bertothys or act in a manner that would constitute deceptive or misleading
conduct. Insofar as the certified record supports the trial court’s
determination that the claimed representations and conduct did not create a
likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding, no relief is due.
Thus, as it relates to the three issues concerning the denial of the
Bertothys’ counterclaims, we conclude that the trial court erred in finding that
the breach of contract claim was not ripe absent evidence that the Bertothys
provided the contractor reasonable opportunity to rectify any potential defects
associated with incomplete performance. Accordingly, the Bertothys are
entitled to have the trial court decide the merits of that counterclaim based
upon the evidence presented at trial.6 Namely, the trial court must decide
whether Jack Frost was in breach of contract and whether the Bertothys
incurred any breach-related damages prior to October 4, 2018, the date that
they ordered the contractor off the site.
IV. Conclusion
____________________________________________
6 As both parties had a full and fair opportunity to present evidence to the trial
court during the three-day hearing, a new trial is not warranted.
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In summary, we affirm the $40,560.26 verdict in favor of Jack Frost and
do not disturb the trial court’s conclusion that the Bertothys failed to establish
a claim for relief pursuant to the UTPCPL or its finding that the work Jack Frost
completed prior to its dismissal was performed in a workmanlike manner.
However, for the reasons discussed above, we vacate the judgment entered
on the verdict and remand the matter for the court to address the Bertothys’
breach-of-contract counterclaim based on the evidence presented at the trial.
If the Bertothys ultimately prevail on this counterclaim, the trial court is
directed to offset the relative verdicts and, upon praecipe of one of the parties,
enter judgment in favor of the party with the net verdict.
Judgment vacated. Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
DATE: 10/6/2023
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