R.D.S. v. B.A.B. ( 2023 )


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  • J-A20034-23
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
    R.D.S., NOW KNOWN AS R.D.W.                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant               :
    :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    B.A.B.                                       :   No. 121 MDA 2023
    :
    Appeal from the Order Entered December 19, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
    Civil Division at No(s): 20048497C
    BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                 FILED: NOVEMBER 6, 2023
    R.D.S., n/k/a R.D.W. (“Father”), appeals from the order entered on
    December 19, 2022, in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County,
    awarding him partial physical custody, B.A.B. (“Mother”) primary physical
    custody, and the parties shared legal custody of their son, C.W. (“Child”), born
    in April of 2014. The order further denied Father’s request to enroll Child in
    the Graham Academy. After careful review, we affirm the ruling of the learned
    Honorable Stefanie Salavantis.
    The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this
    case as follows:
    ____________________________________________
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A20034-23
    Father and Mother are parents to three (3) children,
    [their daughters,] B.S., age eighteen (18), [and] S.S.,
    age fifteen (15), and [their son, Child], age eight (8).
    However, only custody of [Child] is at issue in the
    instant matter.
    The history of this case is very extensive, spanning
    the last nineteen (19) years. Significantly, until Fall
    of 2019, Mother was the primary custodian of all three
    (3) minor children, with Father having physical
    custody on alternating weekends.3 In September of
    2019, Mother was indicated for child abuse due to
    failure to act on an allegation of inappropriate sexual
    contact between the oldest child, B.S., and Mother’s
    boyfriend, [R.R.]. [Child] was not the subject of this
    allegation.
    Simultaneous with Mother’s indication through
    Children and Youth Services, Father filed an
    emergency petition for special relief in September of
    2019. On September 17, 2019, an order based upon
    the agreement of the parties was entered, which
    provided Father with primary physical custody of, and
    the authority to make certain legal decisions for, the
    three children. The court notes that Father never had
    legal custody of any of the children, specifically the
    child at issue, C.W., until the September 17, 2019
    order.4 Mother timely appealed her indication status
    through the Department of Human Services, and after
    a wait period of over three (3) years, the indicated
    status of both Mother and Mother’s boyfriend were
    expunged by an order dated October 6, 2022.
    Between September 2019 and [the subject
    proceeding], the parties were before the court
    repeatedly between Mother’s requests to increase her
    physical custody periods of the minor children and
    multiple contempt petitions and petitions for special
    relief filed by both parties. Among the petitions filed
    by Father are repeated allegations of sexual and
    physical abuse by Mother against the parties’ two
    daughters. Notably, each of those petitions was either
    withdrawn by Father or dismissed by the court after
    hearings. Despite Children and Youth Services and
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    law enforcement involvement, none of Father’s
    allegations were substantiated and no further action
    was taken against Mother. None of Father’s petitions
    alleged any misconduct by Mother or anyone in
    Mother’s home against [Child].
    Due to the outstanding [child abuse] indication
    appeal, the most current order prior to [the subject
    proceeding, dated May 6, 2021,] provided that Father
    had primary physical custody of [Child], and Mother
    had partial supervised physical custody on alternating
    Saturdays from 10:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. and
    alternating Sundays from 10:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m.,
    supervised by the maternal grandmother.
    Also important to the history of this case is the fact
    that in March of 2022, this family was referred by the
    court for counseling with Ms. Mary Pat Melvin
    Scarantino. Following the beginning of counseling,
    the parties’ two daughters began acting aggressively
    and destructively when in Mother’s custody, which
    worsened as time went on.            Because of their
    escalating behaviors and safety concerns, Mother’s
    periods of custody have only included [Child] for the
    past several months. In June of 2022, Mary Pat
    Melvin Scarantino issued a report in which she
    opined that [Child] should return to Mother’s
    primary custody. Following receipt of that report,
    and one (1) week prior to the scheduled
    commencement of [the subject proceeding] in July of
    2022, Father again made an unsubstantiated
    allegation of sexual abuse, this time against the
    maternal grandfather. Father’s allegation resulted in
    an investigation by Children and Youth Services,
    which delayed trial in this matter until December of
    2022. This most recent investigation resulted in an
    unfounded determination, and the case was closed.
    Also, shortly after Ms. Melvin Scarantino’s report,
    Father unilaterally ended [Child]’s sessions with Ms.
    Melvin Scarantino and enrolled [Child] in the
    Children’s Service Center. Father was subsequently
    held in contempt of this court’s order [on] July 7, 2022
    for his actions. This court also ordered that [Child]
    resume sessions with Ms. Melvin Scarantino.
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    Also during the above-referenced delay in trial, Father
    attempted to remove [Child] from the Wyoming Valley
    West School District and enroll him in the Graham
    Academy. The hearing on Father’s request to transfer
    [Child]’s school was heard concurrently with trial in
    the above-captioned matter.
    The court was able to complete an in camera interview
    with [Child] on July 7, 2022, however trial did not
    resume in this matter until December 14, 2022 due to
    the outstanding investigation of Father’s allegations
    against the maternal grandfather.
    3  Pursuant to the parties’ custody order dated
    November 9, 2017, this order was followed until
    September of 2019. The September 17, 2019 order
    addressed physical custody[;] however[, it] was silent
    regarding legal custody.
    4 In fact, Father was not even specifically given legal
    custody in the September 17, 2019 order.          His
    authority was limited to enrolling the three (3)
    children in the Crestwood School District and to re-
    engage with the Children’s Service Center. Legal
    custody of the minor children was not addressed again
    until the interim order dated May 6, 2021, wherein it
    was ordered after a record hearing that the parties
    were to share legal custody of all three (3) minor
    children.
    Trial court opinion, 2/8/23 at 3-6 (emphasis added; some footnotes omitted).1
    ____________________________________________
    1 Upon thorough review, the certified record supports the findings of the trial
    court except that the court held an in camera interview of Child on July 7,
    2022. The certified record does not include this transcript. In addition, neither
    Father nor Mother indicate in their respective briefs that an in camera
    interview occurred on July 7, 2022. However, the parties acknowledge on the
    record in open court that the court conducted at least one in camera interview
    of Child on an unspecified date, although no transcript exists in the record.
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -4-
    J-A20034-23
    The custody trial occurred on December 14, 2022, during which Mother
    testified with respect to her request for primary physical custody. Mother also
    presented the testimony of Mary Pat Melvin Scarantino, Child’s court-
    appointed counselor; R.R., Mother’s fiancé; and J.B., Child’s maternal
    grandmother.       Father testified with respect to his desire to maintain the
    existing custody order.
    By order dated and entered on December 19, 2022, the trial court
    awarded the parties shared legal custody, Mother primary physical custody,
    and Father partial physical custody every Saturday from 10:00 a.m. until 6:00
    p.m. The order also provided a holiday schedule. Further, the order denied
    Father’s emergency petition for special relief, filed on October 20, 2022, for
    Child to be enrolled in the Graham Academy.
    On January 18, 2023, Father timely filed a notice of appeal and a concise
    statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).        The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion on
    February 8, 2023.
    Father raises the following issues for review:
    1.     Did the trial court abuse its discretion or commit
    an error of law in its December 19, 2022 order
    in that it removes [Father]’s sole primary
    physical custody of [C]hild and instead awards,
    grants, and orders the switching of the legal and
    ____________________________________________
    See notes of testimony, 12/14/22 at 137-138. It is important to note that
    neither Father nor Mother requested that the court interview Child during the
    subject proceeding on December 14, 2022. See id.
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    shared physical custody of [C]hild solely to
    Mother?
    2.     Did the trial court abuse its discretion or commit
    an error of law, based upon the testimony of
    record below, in limiting Father’s physical
    custody of [C]hild without any evidence or
    testimony that [Father]’s time with [C]hild
    should be restricted or diminished?
    3.     Did the trial court abuse its discretion or commit
    an error of law, based upon the testimony of
    record below, and failing to follow the mandates
    and factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328?
    4.     Were the trial court’s conclusions unreasonable
    as shown by the evidence of record?
    5.     Did the trial court abuse its discretion or commit
    an error of law by failing to enter a custody
    order that is in the best interest of [C]hild?
    Father’s Brief at 3.2
    We review Father’s issues according to the following scope and standard
    of review:
    [T]he appellate court is not bound by the deductions
    or inferences made by the trial court from its findings
    of fact, nor must the reviewing court accept a finding
    that has no competent evidence to support it. . . .
    However, this broad scope of review does not vest in
    the reviewing court the duty or the privilege of making
    its own independent determination. . . . Thus, an
    appellate court is empowered to determine whether
    the trial court’s incontrovertible factual findings
    support its factual conclusions, but it may not
    interfere with those conclusions unless they are
    ____________________________________________
    2 Father does not raise an issue with respect to the court’s denial of his request
    to enroll Child in the Graham Academy, and so we do not address this aspect
    of the order.
    -6-
    J-A20034-23
    unreasonable in view of the trial court’s factual
    findings; and thus, represent a gross abuse of
    discretion.
    R.M.G., Jr. v. F.M.G., 
    986 A.2d 1234
    , 1237
    (Pa.Super. 2009) (quoting Bovard v. Baker, 
    775 A.2d 835
    , 838 (Pa.Super. 2001)). Moreover,
    [O]n issues of credibility and weight of the evidence,
    we defer to the findings of the trial [court] who has
    had the opportunity to observe the proceedings and
    demeanor of the witnesses.
    The parties cannot dictate the amount of weight the
    trial court places on evidence. Rather, the paramount
    concern of the trial court is the best interest of the
    child. Appellate interference is unwarranted if the trial
    court’s consideration of the best interest of the child
    was careful and thorough, and we are unable to find
    any abuse of discretion.
    R.M.G., Jr., supra at 1237 (internal citations
    omitted). The test is whether the evidence of record
    supports the trial court’s conclusions. Ketterer v.
    Seifert, 
    902 A.2d 533
    , 539 (Pa.Super. 2006).
    A.V. v. S.T., 
    87 A.3d 818
    , 820 (Pa.Super. 2014). In addition,
    [T]he discretion that a trial court employs in custody
    matters should be accorded the utmost respect, given
    the special nature of the proceeding and the lasting
    impact the result will have on the lives of the parties
    concerned. Indeed, the knowledge gained by a trial
    court in observing witnesses in a custody proceeding
    cannot adequately be imparted to an appellate court
    by a printed record.
    Ketterer v. Seifert, 
    902 A.2d 533
    , 540 (Pa.Super. 2006) (quoting Jackson
    v. Beck, 
    858 A.2d 1250
    , 1254 (Pa.Super. 2004)).
    The primary concern in custody cases is the best interests of the child.
    “The best-interests standard, decided on a case-by-case basis, considers all
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    factors that legitimately have an effect upon the child’s physical, intellectual,
    moral, and spiritual well[-]being.”    Saintz v. Rinker, 
    902 A.2d 509
    , 512
    (Pa.Super. 2006) (citing Arnold v. Arnold, 
    847 A.2d 674
    , 677 (Pa.Super.
    2004)).
    The Child Custody Act requires that trial courts consider the following
    sixteen best interest factors when awarding custody:
    § 5328.     Factors to consider when awarding
    custody.
    (a) Factors. – In ordering any form of custody, the
    court shall determine the best interest of the child by
    considering all relevant factors, giving weighted
    consideration to those factors which affect the safety
    of the child, including the following:
    (1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit
    frequent and continuing contact between the child and
    another party.
    (2) The present and past abuse committed by a party
    or member of the party’s household, whether there is
    a continued risk of harm to the child or an abused
    party and which party can better provide adequate
    physical safeguards and supervision of the child.
    (2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a)(1)
    and (2) (relating to consideration of child abuse and
    involvement with protective services).
    (3) The parental duties performed by each party on
    behalf of the child.
    (4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s
    education, family life and community life.
    (5) The availability of extended family.
    (6) The child’s sibling relationships.
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    (7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based
    on the child's maturity and judgment.
    (8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against
    the other parent, except in cases of domestic violence
    where reasonable safety measures are necessary to
    protect the child from harm.
    (9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving,
    stable, consistent and nurturing relationship with the
    child adequate for the child's emotional needs.
    (10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily
    physical, emotional, developmental, educational and
    special needs of the child.
    (11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.
    (12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or
    ability to make appropriate child-care arrangements.
    (13) The level of conflict between the parties and the
    willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with
    one another. A party’s effort to protect a child from
    abuse by another party is not evidence of
    unwillingness or inability to cooperate with that party.
    (14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or
    member of a party’s household.
    (15) The mental and physical condition of a party or
    member of a party’s household.
    (16) Any other relevant factor.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).
    This Court has emphasized that the trial court, as the finder of fact,
    determines “which factors are most salient and critical in each particular case.”
    M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 
    63 A.3d 331
    , 339 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citing A.D. v. M.A.B.,
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    J-A20034-23
    
    989 A.2d 32
    , 35-36 (Pa.Super. 2010)).              Further, we have held that
    Section 5323(d) of the Act “requires the trial court to set forth its mandatory
    assessment of the [. . .] factors prior to the deadline by which a litigant must
    file a notice of appeal.”3 C.B. v. J.B., 
    65 A.3d 946
    , 955 (Pa.Super. 2013).
    ____________________________________________
    3 In this case, the trial court did not render its assessment of the statutory
    factors prior to the appeal deadline. Rather, the court addressed the factors
    in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, which was after Father filed the notice of appeal.
    See Trial court opinion, 2/8/23 at 8-18. Because Father does not assert this
    as an issue in his concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and in
    the statement of questions involved in his brief, we do not raise it sua sponte
    to grant relief. See In re M.Z.T.M.W., 
    163 A.3d 462
    , 466 (Pa.Super. 2017)
    (“[I]t is well-settled that issues not included in an appellant’s statement of
    questions involved and concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
    are waived.”).
    Nevertheless, it is important to note that the custody order on appeal
    provided, “Either party may request to the Chambers of the undersigned to
    issue formal Findings of Fact within five (5) business days of the entry of this
    Order. In that event, Findings will be issued prior to Monday, January 16,
    2023, in accordance with C.B. v. J.B., 
    65 A.3d 946
     (Pa.Super. 2013).” Order,
    12/19/22 at ¶ 15.
    In light of this Court’s holding in C.B., we reasoned:
    Ideally, trial courts should address the statutory
    factors, either orally in open court or in a written
    opinion, contemporaneously with the issuance of the
    custody order. If, because of the court’s substantial
    case load or other factors, compliance with the Act is
    not possible contemporaneously with the order, the
    trial court should indicate in the custody order that its
    examination of the factors is forthcoming shortly, so
    as to not impede a litigant’s ability to pursue an appeal
    if the litigant so chooses. This affords the trial court
    some flexibility in carrying out its function, while also
    providing litigants a reasonable amount of time to
    analyze the trial court’s rationale, to determine
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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    J-A20034-23
    Turning to the merits of this appeal, Father’s argument in his brief fails
    to comply with the Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure providing,
    The argument shall be divided into as many parts as
    there are questions to be argued; and shall have at
    the head of each part — in distinctive type or in type
    distinctively displayed — the particular point treated
    therein, followed by such discussion and citation of the
    parties as are deemed pertinent.
    Pa.R.A.P. 2119. Father raises the above-cited five questions in his brief, but
    his argument is divided into the following two parts: (1) the court order “is
    against the weight of the evidence and is an abuse of discretion,” and (2) the
    order “did not consider the best interest of” Child. See Father’s Brief at 9,
    13; see also Pa.R.A.P. 2101 (“Briefs. . . shall conform in all material respects
    with the requirements of these rules as nearly as the circumstances of the
    particular case will admit, otherwise they may be suppressed, and, if the
    defects are in the brief . . . of the appellant and are substantial, the appeal or
    other matter may be quashed or dismissed.”) Because the defects in Father’s
    brief are not substantial, we address them. As Father’s arguments are related,
    we address them together.
    ____________________________________________
    whether to appeal, and to decipher which issues might
    be meritorious in that appeal.
    C.B., 
    65 A.3d at 955
    . In the instant matter, the trial
    court erred by failing to comply with C.B. and instead
    making its timely assessment of the statutory factors
    conditional upon either party’s request.
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    Father baldly asserts that the trial court failed to consider all the
    evidence and properly weigh it. Specifically, Father argues that he is the more
    stable parent, and he can offer Child the more stable living environment. See
    Father’s Brief at 18. In addition, without referencing any evidence, he asserts
    that the court awarded Mother primary physical custody based upon her
    gender. See id. at 10-12; see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(b) (“In making a
    determination under subsection (a), no party shall receive preference based
    upon gender in any award granted under this chapter.”). Father also asserts
    that the court “ignored” his opposition to Child being separated from his two
    older sisters who reside in his custody if Mother is awarded primary physical
    custody of him. Id. at 14. These assertions are meritless.
    In assessing the Section 5328(a) factors, the court weighed none of
    them in Father’s favor. The court weighed (2), (3), (5), (11), and (12) equally
    between the parties. The court found (14)–(16) inapplicable in this case. See
    Trial court opinion, 2/8/23 at 6-18. We discern no abuse of discretion by the
    court in applying the relevant law to the sustainable facts of this case.
    The court found determinative that Father “has been engaging in a
    course of conduct designed to alienate [C]hild’s affections from” Mother. Id.
    at 8 (footnotes omitted).       The court explained, in assessing Section
    5328(a)(1), as follows.
    Father was asked during his testimony what he tells
    [Child] about maintaining a relationship with Mother,
    and Father was unable to give a straight answer.
    Father did testify that he “absolutely” talks with
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    [Child] about the custody case, which the court
    believes certainly would have an impact on [Child]’s
    relationship with Mother. Also of significance, Father
    was questioned regarding his position on encouraging
    the parties’ other two children, B.S. and S.S., to have
    a relationship with Mother due to the fact that they
    both are currently estranged from Mother. Father
    agreed that he has not made any efforts to reconnect
    his daughters with Mother. Father testified that “it’s
    their choice” whether they want to speak with Mother
    or not. Although one of the daughters is now eighteen
    (18) years old, the second daughter is still a minor
    and living under Father’s roof. Father claimed that if
    [Child] did not want to have a relationship with Mother
    that he would tell [Child] that maintaining a
    relationship with Mother is “in his best interest;”
    however, the court did not find that testimony to be
    credible. Father’s complete lack of action regarding
    his daughters having a relationship with Mother raises
    great concerns for the court that he will act in the
    same manner with regard to [Child]’s relationship with
    Mother.
    The court does not believe that Father will encourage
    and permit continuing and frequent contact between
    [Child] and Mother.      To the contrary, the court
    believes that if Father were to retain primary physical
    custody, [Child]’s relationship with Mother would
    deteriorate to the point of non-existence, as is
    currently happening with his two older sisters and
    Mother. The court does believe that Mother would
    encourage [Child] to maintain a healthy relationship
    with Father if [Child] were living primarily with her.
    Trial court opinion, 2/8/23 at 8-9; see also notes of testimony, 12/14/22 at
    108-109, 123-128, 131 (Father’s testimony supporting the court’s findings).
    It is important to note Mother’s testimony that her relationship with
    Child was presently “Good. Very, very good.” Id. at 37. Mother testified that
    she also had a “very good” relationship with her two daughters prior to losing
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    primary physical custody in 2019, and even during an unspecified initial period
    of exercising supervised physical custody.      Id. at 39-40.    However, she
    explained that “further on, [S.S.] and [B.S.], I don’t know what happened.
    They were just destroying my mother’s house,” where Mother’s supervised
    visits occurred. Id. at 34. Mother testified that she is not seeking custody of
    her fifteen-year-old daughter, B.S., “[b]ecause of her behaviors. I think if she
    did come home, I think she would do damage to my house. And I think she
    could put me in danger.” Id. at 36.
    In its related assessment of Section 5328(a)(8), the court explained that
    it credited the testimony of the family’s court-appointed counselor, Ms.
    Scarantino, and found it determinative in fashioning the custody order. See
    Trial court opinion, 2/8/23 at 16. The court aptly found as follows regarding
    Ms. Scarantino’s testimony:
    She testified that [Child] has been compromised
    emotionally and psychologically by Father.          As
    mentioned earlier, Ms. Scarantino testified that
    [Child] reported to her that he has no friends, is
    experiencing bullying at school, and feels that no one
    pays attention to him at Father’s house. [Child] also
    reported to Ms. Scarantino that Father is the only
    person that he socializes with. However, [Child]’s
    relationship with Father is one based on fear and
    intimidation. Ms. Scarantino first issued a report to
    the parties’ counsel and to the court dated June 9,
    2022, which addresses these concerns.
    Ms. Scarantino testified that following the parties’
    receipt of her June 9, 2022 report, she observed a
    “dramatic change” in [Child]’s behavior, noting that
    he regressed to refusing to answer questions, looking
    to Father before answering any questions, and then
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    began expressing a desire to stay with Father merely
    because he had “a lot of toys” at Father’s residence.
    Ms. Scarantino additionally testified that based upon
    her observations, [Child] is clearly “vehemently
    afraid” of Father. She noted that she had also
    observed a stark change in [Child]’s body language
    when Father enters the room.
    Prior to issuing her first report to counsel and the
    court, [Child] had consistently been forthcoming with
    Ms. Scarantino, and had expressed a clear desire to
    return to living with Mother and a fear of Father. Ms.
    Scarantino ultimately testified that, in her professional
    opinion, [Child] will be “very seriously damaged” if he
    remains residing primarily with Father.               Ms.
    Scarantino testified that Child has a strong, loving
    bond with Mother, and that Mother is very nurturing
    to [Child].
    Trial court opinion, 2/8/23 at 15-16; see also notes of testimony, 12/14/22
    at 9-14, 19, 21-23, 27-28 (Ms. Scarantino’s testimony supporting the court’s
    findings).
    In addition to finding Ms. Scarantino’s testimony credible, the trial court
    stated:
    This court has also had the benefit of interacting with,
    and observing, this family throughout many court
    proceedings, including trial. The court shares the
    same concerns regarding Father’s escalating conduct
    and agrees that [Child] will be compromised if he
    continues to reside primarily with Father.
    Father’s actions throughout the lengthy history in this
    case, particularly since 2019, demonstrate a clear,
    and escalating, deliberate intent to alienate the
    affections of the children from Mother. Unfortunately,
    his repeated actions have been successful in
    effectually ending the relationship [of] the parties’ two
    older daughters, S.S. and B.S., with Mother. The
    silver lining in this very troubling case is that there is
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    still time to preserve [Child]’s relationship with
    Mother. However, that goal cannot be achieved with
    Father having any significant period of custody with
    [C]hild to the exclusion of Mother.
    Trial court opinion, 2/8/23 at 16-17.         The testimonial and documentary
    evidence supports the court’s findings.
    Indeed, the record reveals that, during 2021, and prior to Mother and
    her boyfriend receiving a favorable ruling in their appeal from the indicated
    child abuse report and the report ultimately being expunged from the
    ChildLine registry, Father filed custody pleadings that included new allegations
    against Mother and her boyfriend. Notes of testimony, 12/14/22 at 121-122.
    Father testified on cross-examination:
    Q. The court has addressed all those issues, correct?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Did anything ever happen to [Mother] as a result
    of you filing those petitions?
    A. No.
    Q. The police actually investigated at one point,
    correct?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And Children and Youth?
    A. Yes.
    Id. at 122. Nevertheless, Father repeated the same allegations as his reason
    why Mother’s custody award should remain supervised. Id. at 121-122.
    Father’s testimony continued on cross-examination:
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    Q. So you still believe after all that, [those allegations
    are] still an issue?
    A. I believe it’s an issue when the proper — steps
    didn’t get taken. Like, didn’t get taken care of.
    Q. What steps?
    A. Well, I mean, just, the — that my — that they didn’t
    — they didn’t take proper steps to investigate.
    Q. So you believe that there was just the failure of the
    system?
    A. Yes. Correct.
    Q. And that all those [allegations] are accurate?
    A. Yes. Correct.
    Id. at 122-123.
    With respect to Father’s bald assertion that he is the more stable parent
    and would provide a more stable living environment for Child, there is no
    record evidence to support this. Father simply argues, without explanation,
    that he is more stable “considering [Mother’s] past problems and current
    limitations. . . .” Father’s Brief at 18. To the extent that Father refers to the
    report indicating Mother a perpetrator of child abuse, this status was reversed
    by the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services in October of 2022, and
    so we reject his claim.
    Moreover, the court acknowledged “that stability is very important in a
    child’s life. However, stability is important when it is healthy and safe for the
    child. The court does not find that to be the case here. It is clear to the court
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    J-A20034-23
    that [C]hild is exhibiting concerning signs of stress and anxiety while being in
    Father’s care. The court believes that it is critical for [Child] to be in a safe
    environment, in schooling that accommodates his individualized education
    program, and for Child to remain in counseling.” Trial court opinion, 2/8/23
    at 12-13.
    Specifically, the court found:
    Even though [Child] has been consistently residing
    with Father for a long period of time, he has been
    experiencing a great deal of stress. [Child] has been
    in counseling with Ms. Scarantino since [the court
    order in] March of 2022, however that counseling was
    interrupted for a period of time by Father, who
    unilaterally decided to terminate sessions when he
    became unhappy with Ms. Scarantino’s report.
    [Child]’s counseling with Ms. Scarantino has since
    resumed following a contempt hearing [and the court
    ruling against Father] in the summer of 2022. [During
    the subject proceeding], Ms. Scarantino testified that
    [Child] is very afraid of Father. She additionally
    testified that [Child] has been experiencing bullying at
    school, and he has reported to her that he has no
    friends and that the only person he socializes with is
    Father.
    Mother testified that she observed behavior changes
    in [Child] when it is time for him to return to Father’s
    custody.    Alarmingly, it was reported that when
    [Child] is about to return to Father’s home after his
    visit with Mother ends, [Child] has accidents where he
    defecates in his clothing. This was testified to by
    Mother and maternal grandmother, and has happened
    on a number of occasions. These accidents have
    required that [C]hild be showered and changed.
    Father acknowledged that[C]hild does suffer from
    bathroom accidents, however he blames the accidents
    on Mother not properly potty training [Child], despite
    the fact that [Child] is now eight (8) years old and has
    been primarily in Father’s care since September of
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    J-A20034-23
    2019. Father claims he has been “working on [Child’s
    bathroom accidents]” for the past three (3) years.
    Father offered no explanation for [Child]’s accidents.
    Trial court opinion, 2/8/23 at 11-12; see also notes of testimony, 12/14/22
    at 9-12, 15, 21-23, 27-29, 52-53, 86-87 (testimony of Ms. Scarantino,
    Mother, and the maternal grandmother supporting the court’s findings.)
    The trial court also considered the stability of Child’s schooling and that
    he would have to change school districts if he resided in Mother’s primary
    physical custody. The court found it significant that, even if Child, then in
    second grade and assigned an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”),
    remained in Father’s primary physical custody, it was “not Father’s intent to
    continue [Child]’s education in” Wyoming Valley West School District, the
    school district he currently attended. Trial court opinion, 2/8/23 at 10; see
    also notes of testimony, 12/14/22 at 24, 26. The court explained:
    In fact, along with his petition for full custody of
    [C]hild, Father additionally filed an emergency
    petition for special relief seeking to transfer [C]hild
    from the Wyoming Valley West School District to the
    Graham Academy, which is a school for children with
    autism and/or emotional challenges.
    [C]hild has never been, and to date still has not been,
    diagnosed with autism or with an emotional condition
    that would require specialized schooling. This decision
    was also not discussed with, or agreed to, by Mother.
    Father testified that neither he nor his wife are
    employed, and their family survives solely off of their
    children’s disability checks. When probed regarding
    why he believes [Child] is autistic, Father testified that
    he believes [Child] is autistic because [Child]
    sometimes “jumps up and down and flaps his hands.”
    Father has no medical or otherwise relevant training
    - 19 -
    J-A20034-23
    in this regard. Father testified that he and his wife
    toured the Graham Academy one time in the summer
    of 2022, and “someone” who took him on the tour told
    him that [Child]’s [IEP] would follow him to the
    Graham Academy. Father admitted that he did not
    discuss [C]hild’s [IEP] with this individual. Father was
    unable to provide any documentation that the Graham
    Academy was the appropriate school for [C]hild, had
    accepted [Child], or that [Child]’s [IEP] would, in fact,
    transfer to the Graham Academy. The court has a
    serious concern that Father’s intent to obtain an
    autism diagnosis for [Child] is financially motivated.
    Trial court opinion, 2/8/23 at 10-11 (footnote omitted); see also notes of
    testimony, 12/14/22 at 26, 29, 41-42, 106, 110, 115-120, 132 (testimony by
    Ms. Scarantino, Mother, and Father supporting the court’s findings).
    Finally, it is important to note that, as found by the court above, the
    sole source of income in Father’s household is the Social Security disability
    payments received by Child, S.S., and B.S., and his wife’s son.         Notes of
    testimony, 12/14/22 at 109, 131. Father testified that he and his wife were
    last employed “last year.”    Id.   Although the record does not include any
    information regarding why S.S. and B.S. receive Social Security disability,
    Father testified that his wife’s son receives it due to being diagnosed with
    autism.   Id. at 131-132.     Father testified that Child also receives Social
    Security disability for “[h]is dyslexia and other problems that he has.” Id. at
    132. The only other medical condition of Child that Father described was “that
    he did have a problem with diabetes. However, it [has] been under control….”
    Id. at 110-111.    The record does not verify that Child is diagnosed with
    diabetes. In any event, there is ample evidence that Father had a financial
    - 20 -
    J-A20034-23
    motive in seeking an autism diagnosis for Child. See id. at 110, 115-116,
    132 (Father’s testimony that he relayed to the Children’s Service Center
    alleged autistic symptoms of Child).
    In conclusion, Father’s bald assertions in this appeal have no merit. The
    trial court’s consideration of Child’s best interests was careful and thorough,
    and we discern no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the order.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/06/2023
    - 21 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 121 MDA 2023

Judges: Stevens, P.J.E.

Filed Date: 11/6/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024