In the Int. of: W.P., a Minor ( 2023 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: W.P., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: D.F., MOTHER :
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: No. 633 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered March 29, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Juvenile Division at No(s):
CP-67-DP-0000251-2021
IN THE INTEREST OF: T.P., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: D.F., MOTHER :
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:
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: No. 634 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered March 29, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Juvenile Division at No(s):
CP-67-DP-0000252-2021
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 6, 2023
In this consolidated matter, D.F. (Mother) appeals the orders of the York
County Court of Common Pleas (the juvenile court) to change the permanency
goal of the dependency proceedings involving Mother’s two children: five-
year-old daughter, W.P.; and three-year-old son, T.P. The orders changed
the primary goal of the family’s permanency plan from reunification to
adoption, pursuant to the Juvenile Act. See generally 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351.
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On appeal, Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion,
because the record demonstrates Mother’s substantial progress under the
permanency plan and thus does not support a goal change. After careful
review, we conclude that the court acted within its broad discretion, and we
affirm.
The relevant factual and procedural history is as follows: The family
came to the attention of the York County Office of Children, Youth and Families
(the Agency) in May 2021. Mother was involved in a car accident in the early
hours of the morning with her daughter in the car. It was later determined
that Mother had been driving under the influence of drugs. The Agency initially
created a safety plan involving a kinship placement, but when the plan failed
several weeks later, the Agency filed dependency petitions. In June 2021, the
juvenile court adjudicated the Children dependent and placed them in the
home of a foster parent.
During the 21 months between the dependency adjudication in June
2021 and the goal change hearing in March 2023, the juvenile court
acknowledged that Mother made significant progress with the reunification
plan; however, in the months immediately leading up to the goal change
decision, the court also concluded that Mother’s progress had plateaued. The
record provides the following timeline:
• The November 2021 permanency review order
noted that Mother had begun substance abuse
treatment, was employed, had attended
supervised visitation with the Children, and that
she resolved her criminal case by pleading guilty to
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DUI, for which she was sentenced to 270 days of
house arrest and five years of probation.
• In February 2022, Father died from a suspected
drug overdose.
• In March 2022, Mother had tested positive on a
drug screen and thus violated a condition of her
sentence. Although she was briefly incarcerated,
she soon returned to house arrest.
• In its May 2022 permanency review order, the
court determined that Mother’s progress was
moderate. Mother tested negative for illicit
substances, maintained her employment, and
visited the Children.
• In August 2022, the supervised visits were moved
to Mother’s home.
• By October 2022, Mother had maintained housing
and employment; her drug test results were
“appropriate;” and she did not miss any visits. The
Agency indicated that Mother had made significant
progress, and thus was not immediately seeking
termination of Mother’s rights, even though the
Children had been in placement for 15 months.
• In December 2022, however, Mother was placed
back on house arrest after she tested positive for
phentermine, a prescription weight-loss drug.
Mother claimed she received the pill from a friend
without realizing that it was a prescription drug. As
a result of this positive test, the Agency did not
move forward with its plan to afford Mother
unsupervised visits or overnight visits with the
Children. Around this time, Mother was prescribed
Adderall for ADHD [(Attention-Deficient/
Hyperactivity Disorder)].
• In January 2023, Mother’s visits returned to fully
supervised. The court heard testimony that
Mother’s boyfriend was living in the home, which
was particularly problematic because the boyfriend
had a criminal history for drug offenses. Mother
had missed three visits. The service provider,
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Catholic Charities, was also concerned that
Mother’s levels of Adderall would fluctuate and
were not consistent. Mother had also initially
tested positive for methamphetamines, but one of
those tests was ultimately deemed a false positive;
another test was awaiting confirmation.
• In March 2023, the court learned that Mother had
again tested positive for methamphetamines, but
that these tests were confirmed and were not false
positives. The court further concluded that Mother
did not sufficiently course-correct since the
January 2023 permanency review hearing, as we
explain in detail infra.
Although the Children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) opposed the goal
change, the court nevertheless determined that reunification could not be
achieved within a reasonable timeframe.1 Technically speaking, the court kept
concurrent goals in the permanency plan, but the court changed the primary
goal to adoption and the secondary goal to reunification.
Mother timely filed this appeal. She presents the following issues for
our review:
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse
its discretion in accepting the report and testimony of
the caseworker despite testimony from other sources
that disputed that caseworker and the caseworker’s
own testimony on [the] failure to investigate the
stated concerns?
2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse
its discretion when it changed the court ordered goal
from reunification to adoption without clear and
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1 Given that the GAL was not in agreement with the juvenile court, we are
disappointed that the GAL did not file a brief to assist us in this appeal.
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convincing evidence that a change of goal would serve
the best interests of the Children?
Mother’s Brief at 5.
We address Mother’s issues contemporaneously.2 We begin by
observing the relevant standard of review. “[T]he standard of review in
dependency cases requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact
and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the
record, but does not require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s
inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we review for an abuse of
discretion.” In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010) (citations omitted).
We have explained:
Placement of and custody issues pertaining to dependent
children are controlled by the Juvenile Act [42 Pa.C.S.A. §§
6301-6365], which was amended in 1998 to conform to the
federal Adoption and Safe Families Act (“ASFA”). The policy
underlying these statutes is to prevent children from
languishing indefinitely in foster care, with its inherent lack
of permanency, normalcy, and long-term parental
commitment. Consistent with this underlying policy, the
1998 amendments to the Juvenile Act, as required by the
ASFA, place the focus of dependency proceedings, including
change of goal proceedings, on the child. Safety,
permanency, and well-being of the child must take
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2 As an initial matter, we note that Mother did not divide the argument section
of her brief into as many parts as there are questions to be argued. We remind
Mother that such formatting is required by Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) and that
circumvention of the Rules of Procedure could result in waiver. Here, Mother
folds her first argument regarding the court’s credibility findings into her
second, primary argument that the court’s decision to change the permanency
goal lacked evidentiary support.
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precedence over all other considerations, including the
rights of the parents.
In re A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing In re N.C., 909
A.2d 818, 823 (Pa. Super. 2006)) (further citations and footnotes omitted)
(emphasis original).
Although the relevant statutory provisions of the Juvenile Act do not
reference the phrase “goal change,” the phrase has become a term of art.
R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1183, n.6. The concept of a “goal change” is consistent with
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(g), which requires the juvenile court, at the conclusion
of a permanency review hearing, to “order the continuation, modification or
termination of placement or other disposition which is best suited to the
safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.” Id.
Such a decision is synonymous with a decision to continue or change the
permanency plan goal. Id.
To arrive at this decision, the juvenile court must consider the following
matters at the conclusion of each permanency review hearing:
(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of
the placement.
(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of
compliance with the permanency plan developed for the
child.
(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating the
circumstances which necessitated the original
placement.
(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current
placement goal for the child.
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(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the
child might be achieved.
(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize
the permanency plan in effect.
(6) Whether the child is safe.
[…]
(9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of
the last 22 months or the court has determined that
aggravated circumstances exist and that reasonable
efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the
child from the child's parent, guardian or custodian or to
preserve and reunify the family need not be made or
continue to be made, whether the county agency has
filed or sought to join a petition to terminate parental
rights and to identify, recruit, process and approve a
qualified family to adopt the child unless:
(i) the child is being cared for by a relative best
suited to the physical, mental and moral welfare of
the child;
(ii) the county agency has documented a
compelling reason for determining that filing a
petition to terminate parental rights would not
serve the needs and welfare of the child; or
(iii) the child's family has not been provided with
necessary services to achieve the safe return to the
child's parent, guardian or custodian within the
time frames set forth in the permanency plan.
[…]
(12) If the child has been placed with a caregiver,
whether the child is being provided with regular, ongoing
opportunities to participate in age-appropriate or
developmentally appropriate activities. In order to make
the determination under this paragraph, the county
agency shall document the steps it has taken to ensure
that:
(i) the caregiver is following the reasonable and
prudent parent standard; and
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(ii) the child has regular, ongoing opportunities to
engage in age-appropriate or developmentally
appropriate activities. The county agency shall
consult with the child regarding opportunities to
engage in such activities.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f).
Based on the determinations under Section 6351(f), the juvenile court
must then determine the best permanency plan option under 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
6351(f.1), which includes reunification and adoption.
Instantly, the juvenile court conducted a permanency review hearing on
March 29, 2023. After hearing the testimony, the court determined that the
primary goal of the permanency plan should be adoption and the secondary
goal should be reunification. In its detailed Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the
court explained its findings and reasons for the goal change:
The court heard testimony that was positive to some
degree. Mother continued residing at the same location and
working with the providers. There was concern that Mother
was either overusing or being prescribed Adderall by her
OB-GYN. Given the vast differences in Mother’s levels of
Adderall on drug tests, the agency wanted Mother to switch
to a psychiatrist who could supervise, diagnose, or
implement medication management. Mother did switch to
a different physician, however, that physician was a family
doctor, not a psychiatrist. The Agency reported working on
having collaboration between Mother’s doctors on this issue.
The court also heard testimony from an advocate from
Catholic Charities, […], that Adams County Probation
contacted her to report that Mother lost her job for not
reporting to work for two weeks straight. Mother did find
another job and was in her second week of work at the time
of the hearing. [The Catholic Charities advocate] reported
that visits with the Children went well, but Mother was not
always in the moment with the Children, sometimes not
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sitting with them for the two-hour visit and constantly
thinking about next tasks. [The advocate] testified that on
four or five occasions since the last hearing, T.P. broke away
from Mother’s hand as they were leaving for visits and would
run outside into the parking lot. [The advocate] also
reported that Mother parents out of guilt as is common for
parents with children in foster care. Mother buys the
Children gifts to the extent that it has become a problem.
[The advocate] indicated that is an issue they have been
working on from the beginning, but Mother continues to buy
the Children things. Mother has brought gifts to every visit
except for two since Christmas. W.P. now expects gifts and
asks Mother what did she buy her at visits. Mother has been
instructed not to bring presents unless it is a holiday or until
further discussion after the passage of some time.
There was also concern regarding Mother’s previous
boyfriend. As stated above, Mother has not notified anyone
that her boyfriend was living in the home and this was
viewed as a safety concern. The boyfriend had been in the
home during one home visit. Additionally, on January 25,
2023, [the] boyfriend was in the background on a Zoom visit
and his computer was observed in the home on February
28, 2023. [The advocate] testified that she pulled up the
boyfriend’s record on the PA docket in Mother’s presence
and there were drug charges so there was also concern of
possible drug history for him. Mother subsequently
indicated that she broke up with [the] boyfriend. However,
[the advocate] testified that on March 14, 2023
[(approximately two weeks before the goal change
hearing)], Mother told another advocate that “once she gets
the kids back,” she and [the] boyfriend “are going to discuss
their future together.” In addition, [the] Agency caseworker
[…] reported that Mother had three drug tests that were
positive for methamphetamines on February 23, 2023,
February 24, 2023, and March 3, 2023. This was confirmed
by a lab. However, Mother raised concerns because she has
had false positives before and these three drug tests were
not sent out to ascertain her levels, as is her standing
request.
Due to the concerns regarding Mother’s parenting, her use
of her prescribed Adderall, Mother’s focus at visits, and
other concerns, the Agency was not able to recommend
moving forward with partially unsupervised visits until
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Mother had met some of her therapeutic goals. An attorney
appearing on behalf of the guardian ad litem stated that the
guardian ad litem recommended against changing the goal
because Mother was trying very hard, though
acknowledging that “Mother’s progress has slowed a bit.”
Mother’s progress has slowed a bit to a point in which the
Children had already been in placement for twenty-one
months at the time of the permanency review hearing.
Additionally, the Agency was still not yet able to recommend
partially unsupervised visits, and Mother’s compliance and
progress were both rated as minimal.
[…]
After twenty-one months, there is a continuing need for
placement. The Children are both together in a safe
placement that is appropriate and where they will continue
to receive therapy. Despite progress in certain areas that
necessitated the original placement, Mother’s compliance
and progress remain minimal and there are still no
unsupervised visits.
Given the current status, the current goal of reunification
does not seem feasible in the short term. It is clear that
reunification is not imminent, although the Children have
been in placement for twenty-one months. “The court
cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need
for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress
and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901
A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006)]. The Children are safe
and together in their current placement. This court believes
that it was in W.P. and T.P.’s best interest to change the
primary goal to adoption and the concurrent goal to
reunification.
T.C.O. at 6-9; 14-15 (style adjusted).
On appeal, Mother maintains that the record does not support a goal
change. She argues that she had made substantial progress under the
permanency plan, and that the court’s findings to the contrary are without
evidentiary support. Mother takes issue with several specific findings,
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including the court’s questioning of her ongoing Adderall use. On this point,
we agree with Mother.
At the subject permanency review in March 2023, the Agency argued
that the juvenile court should not expand Mother’s visitations – which is to
say, the court should delay reunification – because the Agency was still
concerned with the Children’s safety. Chief among those concerns, were the
propriety of Mother’s Adderall prescription for ADHD and, somewhat ironically,
Mother’s inability to focus during the visits. The court agreed with the
Agency’s position.
We can appreciate that the Agency initially had legitimate concerns that
Mother might have been misusing, abusing, or selling the pills. Mother had
not always been forthright with the caseworker and service provider; and
Mother’s sobriety was relatively recent. The imposition of measures to ensure
Mother’s proper use of the medication would be reasonable. Yet, the concerns
were still not allayed even after the court heard testimony during the
December 2022 permanency review hearing, wherein the service provider
testified that Mother’s pills were accounted for. N.T., 12/5/22 at 18-19.
During the January 2023 permanency review, the court heard testimony from
Mother’s drug counselor at the Open Arms Recovery Center and from Mother’s
probation officer who both testified that they had no concerns regarding the
appropriateness of Mother’s medication for Adderall. See N.T., 1/18/23 at
12; 21-22.
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Upon closer inspection of the record, we observe that the Agency was
also concerned that the medication was being overprescribed; the Agency
even questioned whether Mother had ADHD. See N.T., 1/18/23 at 60. The
Agency convinced the juvenile court that Mother’s diagnosis and treatment
plan was dubious, because the prescribing doctor was an OB-GYN. See N.T.,
3/29/23 at 42-43.
However, the record shows that the prescribing doctor, Dr. Peck, was
affiliated with Open Arms Recovery Center and was the doctor who prescribes
medications for all the patients. Id. at 33-34. Presumably then, Dr. Peck has
experience with patients in recovery, specifically Mother’s recovery,
notwithstanding the fact that she was also an OB-GYN. Still, the Agency
insisted that Mother see another doctor, and Mother complied. Id. at 43-44.
But this second doctor evidently practiced family medicine, and the Agency
was still unconvinced that Mother should be taking Adderall. The Agency felt
that a psychiatrist would be better suited to treat Mother, because Mother was
a recovering addict. N.T., 1/18/23 at 60. The Agency ultimately took the
position that Mother should not be entitled to partial visitation until she
progressed on certain objectives, including seeing a psychiatrist to evaluate
her Adderall usage. See N.T., 3/29/23 at 63-64. At the time of the subject
permanency hearing in March 2023, the Agency had yet to connect Mother
with a psychiatrist.
We are troubled by the vague notion that a parent’s adherence to a
treatment plan for a properly rendered diagnosis could be grounds for a goal
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change. As we are not bound by the juvenile court’s inferences, we conclude
that there was no basis to doubt the propriety of Mother’s diagnosis and
treatment other than conjecture.
The real problem with the court’s findings, is that a portion of Mother’s
progress was reduced to a catch-22. To explain, in the months leading up the
subject permanency review hearing, reunification turned on the expansion of
Mother’s visits. On one hand, the juvenile court was particularly concerned
with Mother’s hyperactive behavior and encouraged Mother to work on it. See
N.T., 12/5/22, at 62. The Agency also argued that Mother’s inability to focus
posed safety concerns for the Children, and thus was a barrier to expanded
visitation. See, e.g., N.T., 1/18/23, at 42; N.T., 3/29/64. But on the other
hand, the Agency questioned Mother’s ADHD diagnosis and treatment plan.
The Agency directed Mother to seek a third professional opinion, this time by
a psychiatrist, before it could recommend expanded visitation. The court
agreed.
Perhaps a psychiatrist is the best option for Mother’s long-term
medication management and treatment, and the juvenile court was free to
order further evaluations. But in the meantime, Mother’s continued Adderall
usage should not have been held against her as a basis to delay the expansion
of Mother’s visits – which is to say, a reason why the goal should be changed
from reunification to adoption. As we discuss infra, there were other, valid
reasons for the goal change, however the sheer fact that Mother was
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prescribed Adderall by the doctor from Open Arms Recovery Center should
not have been one of them.
Thus far, we have articulated how our inferences differ from those of
the juvenile court, as is permitted by our standard of review. But as our
Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned, adherence to this standard also
means that “we are not in a position to make close calls” based on fact-specific
determinations:
Not only are our trial judges observing the parties during
the hearing, but usually, as in this case, they have presided
over several other hearings with the same parties and have
a longitudinal understanding of the case and the best
interests of the individual child involved. Thus, we must
defer to the trial judges who see and hear the parties and
can determine the credibility to be placed on each witness
and, premised thereon, gauge the likelihood of the success
of the current permanency plan. Even if an appellate court
would have made a different conclusion based on the cold
record, we are not in a position to reweigh the evidence and
the credibility determinations of the trial court.
R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190.
With this in mind, we discuss the reasons why we conclude that the
juvenile court’s decision was proper. The record indicates that Mother’s
highwater mark occurred around October 2022. At that point, the Children
had been in placement for 15 months, but Mother had made significant
progress and unsupervised and/or overnight visitation seemed imminent. In
its wisdom, the juvenile court determined that a goal change was not in the
Children’s best interests, notwithstanding the length of their placement. Soon
thereafter, however, Mother made a series of choices, which led the court to
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conclude that visitation could not be expanded without posing safety risks to
the Children. In turn, the court had to reassess Mother’s progress and
concluded that reunification was no longer feasible in the short term.
First, there was Mother’s improper use of a prescription diet pill. Mother
was not forthright with the Agency after testing positive. Mother’s excuse for
taking these pills – the pills belonged to a friend, and she did not realize they
were prescription – could seem plausible. But it was not unreasonable that
the court would treat Mother’s use of the diet pill as a potential safety risk,
given Mother’s history with addiction. Once the drug screen showed that
Mother had taken an unauthorized medication, the court had to reassess the
situation and reconsider whether the visits should be expanded. The
reassessment took time, and in the interim, the Children had to remain in
placement. Moreover, Mother’s use of the pill constituted a parole violation,
the result of which could have threatened the permanence of any potential
reunification.
Second, Mother allowed her boyfriend to be in the home during her
visits. A parent’s decision to introduce children to their romantic partner is
not necessarily problematic. But here, the boyfriend had a criminal history of
drug offenses. Given Mother’s recent sobriety, it was not unreasonable for
the court to question Mother’s judgment and again reassess whether
reunification could be safely achieved while Mother was involved with this
individual. Mother argues that the record does not support the court’s finding
that the boyfriend lived with Mother. While it was not unreasonable for the
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juvenile court to make this inference, whether the boyfriend actually lived in
Mother’s home is mostly beside the point. Mother was in a relationship with
the boyfriend, and he clearly stayed at Mother’s home for some measure of
time, most notably when the Children were in the home during one of Mother’s
visits.
Third, Mother tested positive for methamphetamines. Mother argues
that the result could be a false positive; indeed, Mother had previously tested
positive for methamphetamines only for those results to be deemed negative
following a confirmatory process. The positive results in question, however,
were confirmed to be positive following that same process. Still, Mother
maintains that the confirmed screens could still be false positives, because the
Agency failed to ascertain the precise levels of methamphetamines in Mother’s
system.
This case presents similar facts to those in Interest of S.C., 2023 WL
5345378 (Pa. Super. August 21 2023) (non-precedential decision). There,
the mother reasoned that her valid use of Adderall can sometimes present as
a false positive for methamphetamines. For support, she cited the testimony
of her family doctor. The local child protective services agency disputed that
medical opinion by citing its own witness, an expert toxicologist, who testified
that Adderall only presents as amphetamines, not methamphetamines.
Ultimately, the trial court had the discretion to decide who to believe. We
concluded that the trial court did not err when it weighed the testimony of the
toxicologist more heavily than that of the mother’s family doctor. Id. at *7.
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Here, we are faced with a similar question. Mother asks us to infer that
there is a nexus between Mother’s levels of methamphetamines and the
accuracy of the confirmation process. We cannot do this, as there is no
evidence in the record to clarify why or how the Mother’s more recent positive
tests were also false positives. We also note that the Agency countered, by
arguing that because Mother should not have tested positive for
methamphetamines at any level, knowing the precise level is irrelevant to the
binary question of whether Mother had an illicit substance in her system. We
conclude that the juvenile court did not err or abuse its discretion when it
determined that Mother did, in fact, use methamphetamines. In turn, we
conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it relied on
the confirmed positive tests to determine that a goal change was in the best
interests of the Children.3
In the event our discussion appears to focus exclusively on Mother’s
conduct, we reiterate that the primary consideration of dependency
proceedings is the safety, permanency, and well-being of the Children. See
N.C., supra. The totality of these bases for the goal change here – the
prescription diet pill, the presence of the boyfriend, the positive
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3 Mother’s positive tests for methamphetamines was central to both the
juvenile court’s decision to change the goal, as well as our own decision to
affirm. The notion that a dependency case may ultimately turn on a false
positive drug screen is distressing. Although we conclude that the record
supports the court’s finding that Mother tested positive for
methamphetamines, we strongly encourage the juvenile court pay close
attention to this issue.
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methamphetamine screens – supports the juvenile court’s determination that
expansion of the visits could not be achieved without undue risks to the
Childrens safety, that Mother’s progress with the permanency plan had to be
reassessed, and that reunification was no longer imminent.
We also cannot ignore that the plateau in Mother’s progress transpired
after the Children had been in placement for 15 months. To be clear, the
Juvenile Act does not establish a litmus test that requires a juvenile court to
alter the course of reunification, due simply to the amount of time a child has
been in placement. However, the Act does alert the juvenile courts to the
potential of foster care drift – i.e., mandating courts to query whether the
agency has initiated termination proceedings once a child has been in
placement for 15 months. See In re P.Z., 11 A.3d 840, 847 (Pa. Super.
2015) (citing R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f)(9)). Given the
potential for foster care drift, juvenile courts are encouraged to utilize
concurrent planning early in the case and include adoption as a potential
alternative to reunification. R.J.T., 8 A.3d at 1191. “[C]oncurrent planning
is encouraged because it both protects the child from foster care drift, by
allowing agencies to consider adoptive resources (including kinship care) while
keeping alive the potential of reunification.” Id. (citation omitted). Instantly,
the juvenile court kept reunification a firm possibility, as evidenced by the fact
that the goal change still constituted concurrent planning – albeit with the
primary goal of adoption. Presumably then, Mother had retained access to
reunification services during the pendency of this appeal and still had an
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opportunity to course correct during the pendency of any subsequent
permanency review hearings. Id. at 1187 n.9. That notwithstanding, we
conclude the juvenile court acted within its broad discretion and changed the
permanency goals in this case.
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/06/2023
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