Com. v. Porter, H. ( 2023 )


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  • J-S38009-23
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    HECTOR PORTER                                :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 2778 EDA 2022
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 30, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-23-CR-0001789-2021
    BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                          FILED NOVEMBER 7, 2023
    Hector Porter appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in the
    Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, following his non-jury trial and
    conviction of simple assault. After our review, we affirm.
    The trial court set forth the facts of this case as follows:
    On December 21, 2020 [Porter] was arrested and charged with []
    aggravated assault, [] simple assault, [] possession of an
    instrument of crime, and [] harassment arising from an incident
    in which [Porter] assaulted his wife, [] Ann Marie Jones-Porter by
    striking her in the head with a handgun. On May 4, 2022 and May
    11, 2022[,] this court presided over a non-jury trial and rendered
    a verdict of guilty on the charge of simple assault. On June 30,
    2022 this court imposed judgment of sentence on [Porter] to
    confinement in the George W. Hill Correctional Facility for a
    minimum term of time served (from December 12, 2020 to
    December 29, 2020) to a maximum term of 12 months.
    Trial Court Opinion, 2/13/23, at 1-2.
    ____________________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S38009-23
    Porter raises the following issues on appeal:
    1. Whether the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to
    support the conviction for simple assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A.
    2701a)(1) where the evidence at trial failed to establish that
    appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused
    bodily injury?
    2. Whether the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion
    for a new trial, as the verdict was against the weight of the
    evidence where the evidence of record was so inherently
    unreliable such that the determination of appellant’s guilt
    was based purely on speculation and conjecture, in violation
    of appellant’s constitutional rights under the state and
    federal constitutions?
    Appellant’s Brief, at 4.
    Porter argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a
    reasonable doubt that he intended to cause injury to his wife. He claims he
    and his wife were “engaged in a heated scuffle” in their home, that he was
    trying to grab a phone from her, that she “admittedly kicked him and bit him
    in the arm before he [] responded by striking her in the head.”               See
    Appellant’s Brief, at 13, citing N.T. Non-Jury Trial, 5/4/22, at 49, 51.
    The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
    is whether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
    most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
    to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
    a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
    the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
    addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
    the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
    innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
    resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
    inconclusive that[,] as a matter of law[,] no probability of fact may
    be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
    may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
    -2-
    J-S38009-23
    evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
    must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
    considered. Finally, the finder of fact[,] while passing upon the
    credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
    is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 
    84 A.3d 736
    , 756 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
    omitted).
    A person commits simple assault if they “attempt[] to cause or
    intentionally, knowingly[,] or recklessly cause[] bodily injury to another[.]”
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1). Bodily injury is defined as “[i]mpairment of
    physical condition or substantial pain.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301. A person
    attempts to commit a crime when they, “with the intent to commit a specific
    crime, [perform] any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the
    commission of that crime.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a). “[I]ntent may be inferred
    from the circumstances surrounding the incident if a specific intent to cause
    bodily injury may reasonably be inferred therefrom.” In re C.E.H., 
    167 A.3d 767
    , 770 (Pa. Super. 2017), citing Commonwealth v. Polston, 
    616 A.2d 669
    , 679 (Pa. Super. 1992).
    Here, the evidence established that on December 21, 2020, following an
    argument, Porter demanded to know who the victim was talking to on her
    phone. He backed the victim against a wall; the victim bit Porter in the arm
    and kicked him to get him away from her. Porter then pulled out his gun and
    struck her with it, hitting her forehead and left eye. The victim called the
    police. See N.T. Non-Jury Trial, 4/20/20, at 5-8, 10.
    -3-
    J-S38009-23
    Officer Matthew Barr testified that he received a dispatch for a “domestic
    with a firearm” on the date in questions, and that when he arrived at the
    scene, Porter was agitated and the victim was visibly upset. Id. at 17-18.
    Officer Barr testified that he “could see the injury on [the victim’s] head,” and
    that the victim had “considerable swelling.” Id. at 18, 23. He also testified
    that he recovered Porter’s gun. Id. at 19. At the time of the trial, four months
    after the incident, the victim testified that she still had pain. Id. at 6.
    Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence
    was sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Porter intended
    to cause bodily injury to the victim by using his gun to strike her forehead and
    that the victim sustained bodily injury. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1); see
    also Commonwealth v. Duck, 
    171 A.3d 830
    , 837 (Pa. Super. 2017)
    (evidence sufficient for finding of simple assault where defendant pushed the
    victim into doorframe and caused victim to suffer laceration that bled and
    produced visible scab); Commonwealth v. Martuscelli, 
    54 A.3d 940
    , 948-
    49 (Pa. Super. 2012) (intent to inflict bodily injury supporting conviction for
    simple assault may be shown by circumstances that reasonably suggest
    defendant intended to cause injury).
    Next, Porter claims the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
    He argues the Commonwealth’s evidence was “inherently unreliable and
    contradictory,” and the verdict “could only have been based on speculation
    and conjecture.” Appellant’s Brief, at 11. This claim is meritless.
    -4-
    J-S38009-23
    An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence
    is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. The Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court has explained that appellate review of a weight
    claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying
    question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the
    evidence. To grant a new trial on the basis that the verdict is
    against the weight of the evidence, this Court has explained that
    the evidence must be so tenuous, vague[,] and uncertain that the
    verdict shocks the conscience of the court.
    Commonwealth v. Childs, 
    63 A.3d 323
    , 326–327 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
    omitted).
    A new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the
    testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a
    different conclusion.    Commonwealth v. Widmer, 
    744 A.2d 745
    , 752
    (2000).      Rather, “the role of the trial judge is to determine that
    ‘notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight
    that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny
    justice.’ ” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see
    the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest
    consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial
    judge when reviewing a trial court's determination that the verdict
    is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable
    reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s
    conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of
    the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest
    of justice.
    
    Id. at 753
     (emphasis added).
    In rejecting Porter’s weight of the evidence claim, the trial court
    explained:
    -5-
    J-S38009-23
    This court listened to all the evidence and testimony of the
    witnesses in the case and believed the evidence outlined in the
    Commonwealth’s case supported the guilty verdict.               The
    testimony of [the victim] and Officer Bar established beyond a
    reasonable doubt that [Porter] committed the crime of simple
    assault. This court assessed these witnesses who testified at trial
    and observed the evidence presented[,] including testimony,
    photographs[,] and medical records[,] and is not persuaded by
    {porter’s] argument that there was not reliable proof of injury.
    This court weighed the facts fairly[.] [The verdict] is not shocking
    to any sense of justice. [T]he record is void of the court showing
    partiality, prejudice, ill-will, [or] bias.
    Trial Court Opinion, supra at 7-8.       We agree.
    When passing on the credibility of the witnesses in this case, the trial
    court, sitting as fact finder, was free to accept all, some, or none of the
    testimony presented.       Clearly, the court found the victim and Officer Barr
    credible.   This   Court   will   not   go   behind   the   trial   court’s   credibility
    determinations. We find no abuse of discretion. Widmer, 
    supra.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Date: 11/7/2023
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2778 EDA 2022

Judges: Lazarus, J.

Filed Date: 11/7/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024