Com. v. Haskins, J. ( 2023 )

J-S33017-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAMES STYNE HASKINS :
:
Appellant : No. 163 WDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 6, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-CR-0008050-2021
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED: November 7, 2023
James Haskins (Appellant) appeals from the January 6, 2023, judgment
of sentence entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, after the
trial court convicted Appellant of one count of resisting arrest.1 On appeal,
Appellant solely challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, alleging the
Commonwealth failed to prove that he intended to prevent a public servant
from conducting a lawful arrest. Based on the following, we affirm.
I. Facts & Procedural History
The underlying facts concerning the Appellant’s conviction are taken
from the trial testimony and are summarized as follows:
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S. § 5104.
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On the evening of October 3, 2021, Tarentum Borough Police Officer
Jeremy Belusar, was on routine patrol and stopped at a red light in the right
lane. See N.T., 10/5/22, at 17. Officer Jeremy Belusar observed Appellant’s
car, a gold sedan, stopped two car lengths behind him in the left lane. Id. at
16. Noting this behavior, Officer Belusar ran the vehicle’s registration and
discovered there was an arrest warrant for the owner of the vehicle – James
Haskins. Id. Upon learning of the warrant, Officer Belusar initiated a traffic
stop. Id. The officer “confirmed that the driver was in fact Appellant.” Trial
Ct. Op. at 3.
Officer Belusar then notified dispatch that he would be initiating the stop
and requested additional units as backup. See N.T at 17. Officer Belusar
activated his overhead lights. Appellant’s vehicle abruptly stopped before
continuing to the nearest parking lot. Appellant exited his vehicle and “began
yelling and advancing aggressively toward [Officer Belusar’s] position.” Id.
at 18. The officer observed Appellant clench his fists at his sides and pace
back and forth between the two vehicles, demanding to know the reason for
the stop. Id. Officer Belusar ordered Appellant to “get back in his vehicle[,]”
and later, “to get on the ground several times.” Id. Appellant repeatedly
ignored all these commands. Id. Consequently, Officer Belusar engaged his
taser which had little effect on Appellant. Id. at 19. Appellant was able to rip
the cords from his body and resumed yelling and pacing angrily. Id. Shortly
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thereafter, other officers arrived to assist, including Officer Bajack,2 who
commanded Appellant to get down on the ground. Id. at 19-20. Appellant
again refused to comply, and the officer discharged his taser, which also did
not incapacitate Appellant. Id. at 19-20.
Eventually, the officers tackled Appellant to the ground, “advising him
multiple times to put his hands behind his back.” N.T. at 20. Appellant pushed
off the ground numerous times, but ultimately, the officers took him into
custody. See id.
Subsequently, Officer Belusar charged Appellant with resisting arrest,
obstructing administration of law or other government function, disorderly
conduct, and careless driving.3
On October 5, 2022, Appellant, appeared before the Honorable Bruce R.
Beemer for a non-jury trial. Officer Belusar and Appellant both took the stand
and testified. In his defense, Appellant stated he exited his vehicle and “put
[his] hands outstretched” while repeatedly asking the officers why he was
pulled over. N.T. at 28. At first, Appellant testified that he did not make any
attempts to strike the officers, but later admitted that he exited his vehicle
against the officer’s direction and advanced toward the officer, in order to
“stand his ground.” Id. at 30, 32. Appellant reasoned that he was emotional
____________________________________________
2 Officer Bajack’s first name does not appear in the record.
3 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 5101, 5503(a)(4); 75 Pa.C.S. § 3714.
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given the fact that his vehicle was undergoing repairs and he had a limited
amount of power steering fluid left. See id. at 27-28. He also indicated that
he was not aware there was a warrant out for his arrest. See id. at 31.
At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of
resisting arrest, explaining its rationale as follows:
[O]nce the lawful stop is effectuated and the officers had the
information that [Appellant] has an active warrant for another
county out for him, [he] simply cannot engage in the act that he
did -- which, by his own admission, he did -- which is[:] get out
of his vehicle, approach the officer and essentially demand the
information that he was looking for, and thereby, not engage in
lawful compliance, get on the ground to engage in the other type
of questions. . . . And the officer was placed in a position of having
to deploy a taser, to gain control of the situation; particularly,
when he was isolated as a single officer before the second officer
arrived, it’s clear that they had to employ means that justified or
to overcome their resistance in this case.
I found the testimony credible that he was not compliant.
He didn’t comply with the orders to get on the ground. Now,
maybe in his own mind, he felt he didn’t get an answer to a
question that he wanted, but they discharged a taser, it didn’t
cause him to get on the ground and be compliant, it caused him
to remove the cords, and he ended up getting tased a second
time. And then, when they had to take him to the ground, he was
pushing off of the ground, he wouldn’t put his hands behind his
back. The fact that the officers were not injured does not mean
that there was not a substantial risk of bodily injury that was
created for one or both of the officers.
N.T. at 42-43 (paragraph break added). The court acquitted him of the
remaining charges.
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On January 6, 2023, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of 18
months’ probation. Appellant did not file any post-motions but did file a timely
notice of appeal.4
II. Issue
In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant argues there was insufficient
evidence to support a finding that he intended to prevent his own arrest. See
Appellant Brief at 11. Appellant points out that while he “did not comply with
the officer’s orders to get back in his vehicle or to get on the ground[,]” he
did not “advance toward Officer Belusar, aggressively or otherwise.” Id. at
12-13. He alleges that when the officer wantonly shot him with the taser, he
maintains he was merely pacing back and forth and focuses on the fact that
he was never told the reason for the stop, stating:
[T]he mere fact that [Appellant] persistently asked Officer Belusar
why he had been pulled over did not establish, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that he intended to prevent the officer from
discharging his duties. Although [Appellant] was clearly frustrated
and upset at the time of the incident, these emotions were not
evidence of his defiance and resistance. This is particularly true
given the fact that Officer Belusar admitted that [Appellant] was
stopped not because of hazardous driving behavior, but because
of an unrelated arrest warrant. Furthermore, Officer Belusar
admitted that he never told [Appellant] why he had been stopped.
Consequently, even in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as the verdict winner, the evidence failed to
sufficiently prove that it was [Appellant]’s conscious object to
____________________________________________
4 On February 10, 2023, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Appellant filed on a timely concise statement on March 3, 2023. The trial court
issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on April 25, 2023.
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cause the result of preventing police from effectuating the arrest.
[He] was not even aware of the reason for being pulled over.
Id. (record citation omitted).
Moreover, Appellant contends the trial court’s reliance on
Commonwealth v. McDonald, 17 A.3d 1282 (Pa. Super. 2011), is misplaced
and its analysis is flawed because the sufficiency issue in McDonald
concerned the substantial force element of resisting arrest and failed to
account for the intent element. See Appellant Brief at 12. Appellant also
juxtaposes his conduct with instances where defendants attempted to strike
or pulled and pushed away from officers. See id. at 14, citing
Commonwealth v. Schlier, 206 EDA 2020 (unpub. memo.) (Pa. Super. Oct.
7, 2020) and Commonwealth v. Albano, 166 EDA 2021 (unpub. memo.)
(Pa. Super. Nov. 10, 2021). Appellant argues these defendants demonstrated
a “specific intent,” unlike the instant case, where “there was no evidence that
[Appellant] intentionally moved away from the police.” Appellant’s Brief at 13.
III. Standard of Review
Our standard of review concerning a sufficiency argument is well-
settled.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine
whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth as verdict winner, is sufficient to prove every
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. As an appellate
court, we may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our
judgment for that of the fact-finder. Any question of doubt is for
the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive
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that as a matter of law no probability of fact can be drawn from
the combined circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Martin, 297 A.3d 424, 434 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation
omitted).
IV. The Elements of Resisting Arrest
A person commits the crime of resisting arrest, in relevant part, when
“with the intent of preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful arrest
or discharging any other duty, [the] person creates a substantial risk of
bodily injury to the public servant or anyone else, or employs means
justifying or requiring substantial force to overcome the resistance.” 18
Pa.C.S. § 5104. “Section 5104 criminalizes two types of conduct intended to
prevent a lawful arrest: the creation of a substantial risk of bodily injury to
the officer or anyone else or means justifying or requiring a substantial force
to overcome.” Commonwealth v. Clemens, 242 A.3d 659, 666 (Pa. Super.
2020) (citation & internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, we note that
evidence of “passive resistance requiring substantial force to overcome” has
previously been held to provide sufficient evidence to support a resisting arrest
conviction. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 922 A.2d 926, 928 (Pa. Super.
2007).
Because Appellant advances an argument that focuses on his alleged
lack of intent, we note the following:
As a general rule, therefore, it is not criminal merely to flee
arrest. However, where the circumstances of the flight expose
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the pursuing officers to substantial danger a conviction for
resisting arrest is proper. The statute, it is clear, does not require
the aggressive use of force such as a striking or kicking of the
officer.
Commonwealth v. Miller, 475 A.2d 145, 146 (Pa. Super. 1984) (citations &
quotation marks omitted). “[I]ntent can be proven by direct or circumstantial
evidence; it may be inferred from acts or conduct or from the attendant
circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Rahman, 75 A.3d 497, 503 (Pa. Super.
2013) (citation & quotation marks omitted).
V. Analysis
The trial court explained its rationale for finding Appellant guilty of
resisting arrest as follows:
Appellant does not dispute that Officer Belusar conducted a lawful
traffic stop on October 3, 2021 after learning that Appellant had
an active warrant. Nor does Appellant contest that he acted in
the manner described by Officer Belusar. It is clear from the
record, that when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, the evidence was
sufficient to establish the crime of resisting arrest beyond a
reasonable doubt. From the moment Appellant exited his vehicle
he created an aggressive and tension-filled situation. Despite
multiple orders and the display and deployment of a taser by
Officer Belusar, Appellant persisted in his actions because of his
desire to find out why he was pulled over. Appellant never
changed his stance, even after Officer Belusar later displayed his
firearm and an assisting officer also deployed his taser. All efforts
to force Appellant to comply and to gain control over the situation
failed, for no other reason than Appellant’s continued aggressive
behavior. Even as multiple officers physically took Appellant to
the ground, he continued to resist by refusing to place his hands
behind his back. See Commonwealth v. McDonald, 17 A.3d
1282 (Pa. Super. 2011) (Conviction for resisting arrest affirmed
where the actor was wrestled to the ground by multiple officers,
refused commands, and physically resisted while under threat of
being tasered, resulting in the ultimate deployment of the taser.)
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Trial Ct. Op. at 5-6.
We agree with the trial court’s determination. Appellant does not
contest the circumstances surrounding the incident, including the fact that he
was lawfully stopped based on an outstanding warrant or that he behaved in
an aggressive manner towards the officers. Rather, he claims he lacked the
necessary intent largely by blaming Officer Belusar for not telling him why he
was pulled over. See Appellant Brief at 13. Additionally, he attributes his
conduct to frustrations stemming from a purported lack of steering fluid to
operate his car. Id. Appellant’s portrayal that he never intentionally
exercised aggressive behavior or moved away from the police is misplaced.
A review of the record reveals that once Officer Belusar initiated the
traffic stop, Appellant immediately exited his vehicle and “began yelling and
advancing aggressively toward” the officer. N.T. at 18. Officer Belusar
repeatedly ordered Appellant to “get back in his vehicle[,]” and “to get on the
ground[,]” which Appellant ignored. Id. Officer Belusar engaged his taser,
but Appellant was able to rip the cords from his body and resumed yelling and
being noncompliant. Id. Additionally, Officer Bajack commanded Appellant
to get down on the ground, to which Appellant again refused to comply. Id.
at 19-20. Officer Bajack also discharged his taser, which did not disable
Appellant. Id. The officers then tried to tackle Appellant to the ground,
“advising him multiple times to put his hands behind his back[,]” but even
then, he pushed off the ground numerous times. See id. at 20. Appellant’s
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intent “may be inferred” from his actions and “the attendant circumstances.”
Rahman, 75 A.3d at 503. He repeatedly ignored the officers’ instructions and
their attempts to immobilize him with taser guns — in essence, his intent was
to prevent them from effectuating a lawful arrest.
With respect to Appellant’s argument regarding the trial court’s reliance
on McDonald, supra, we find that it is erroneous. While the intent element
was not specifically at issue in McDonald, it is evident the trial court cited to
that case because it had a similar set of facts and the court wanted to point
out that this Court previously upheld a resisting arrest conviction based on
comparable circumstances. Furthermore, his reference to Schlier, 206 EDA
2020 (unpub. memo.), and Albano, 166 EDA 2021 (unpub. memo.), as
distinguishable because he did not possess any specific intent to strike or
physically assault the officers is misplaced. We observe that while the incident
may have not created “a substantial risk of bodily injury to [Officer Belusar]
or anyone else[,]” the officers had to resort to “substantial force to overcome
[Appellant’s] resistance.” See Clemens, 242 A.3d at 666; 18 Pa.C.S. §
5104. Therefore, the Commonwealth was not required to show specific intent
to aggressively harm the officers. See Miller, 475 A.2d at 146. Moreover,
Appellant’s actions amounted to “passive resistance[,]” which necessitated the
substantial force taken by the officers to overcome his actions. See
Thompson, 922 A.2d at 928 (defendant resisted arrest when she “interlocked
her arms and legs” with her husband and “held her arms tightly beneath” the
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officer when he commanded her “several times to put her hands behind [her]
back” and officers deployed pepper spray). Accordingly, even though
Appellant may not have possessed the specific intent to physically attack the
officers, his conduct in preventing the officers from restraining him by use of
tasers and other methods provided sufficient evidence to sustain his
conviction.
We also point out that Appellant relies on selective testimony in
presenting his version of the incident. However, it is clear that the trial court,
as finder of fact, had exclusive jurisdiction to weigh all of the evidence,
determine the credibility of the witnesses, and resolve any inconsistencies in
their testimony. Here, it found Officer Belusar’s testimony regarding
Appellant’s conduct credible. See N.T. at 42-43; see also Martin, 297 A.3d
at 434. Appellant’s arguments would have this Court supplant the trial court’s
credibility determinations with our own, which we cannot to do. See id.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we
agree with the trial court’s determination that the Commonwealth presented
sufficient evidence that Appellant resisted arrest. See id.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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11/7/2023
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