Com. v. Fernsler, M. ( 2023 )


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  • J-S19040-23
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                           :
    :
    :
    MICHAEL FERNSLER                             :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1747 MDA 2022
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 18, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0002173-2006
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                    FILED: NOVEMBER 9, 2023
    Michael Fernsler (“Fernsler”) appeals pro se from the order dismissing
    as untimely his third petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
    (PCRA).1 We affirm.
    This Court previously summarized the case history as follows:
    In August 2007, Fernsler [a former police officer] pled guilty to
    involuntary deviate sexual intercourse [] and other sexual
    offenses, relating to his having forced four-year-old twin girls to
    perform oral sex on him.1 In January 2008, the trial court
    sentenced Fernsler to an aggregate prison term of 26–52 years.
    1 We observe that, while he was out on bail and
    awaiting sentencing, Fernsler kidnapped and sexually
    assaulted a fourteen[-]year-old girl, which resulted in
    additional convictions.   See Commonwealth v.
    Fernsler, [1894 MDA 2012] (Pa. Super. 2013)
    (unpublished memorandum, [at 2]).
    ____________________________________________
    1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
    J-S19040-23
    This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence.        See
    Commonwealth v. Fernsler, 
    981 A.2d 918
     (Pa. Super. 2009)
    (unpublished memorandum). Fernsler thereafter filed a [p]etition
    for allowance of appeal, nunc pro tunc, which the Supreme Court
    of Pennsylvania denied. See Commonwealth v. Fernsler, [155
    MM 2011] (Pa. 2012).
    Fernsler filed his first PCRA [p]etition in May 2012, which
    the PCRA court later dismissed as being untimely filed. This Court
    affirmed the dismissal, after which the Supreme Court of
    Pennsylvania denied allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth
    v. Fernsler, 
    87 A.3d 385
     (Pa. Super. 2013) (unpublished
    memorandum), appeal denied, 
    85 A.3d 482
     (Pa. 2014).
    [Fernsler also filed an unsuccessful petition for a writ of
    habeas corpus in 2014. See Fernsler v. Dauphin County, Pa.,
    
    2015 WL 3838077
     (M.D. Pa. Jun. 22, 2015).]
    [In 2016,] Fernsler filed [two] identical pro se PCRA
    [p]etitions. … [T]he PCRA court dismissed Fernsler’s [p]etition,
    after which Fernsler filed a timely pro se Notice of Appeal.
    Commonwealth v. Fernsler, 
    169 A.3d 1187
     (Pa. Super. 2017) (unpublished
    memorandum at 1-2) (one footnote in original, remaining footnotes and some
    dates omitted).
    This Court affirmed the dismissal as untimely of Fernsler’s second PCRA
    petition.   See id. at 7.   Fernsler did not seek leave to appeal to the
    Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
    Fernsler pro se filed the instant PCRA petition, his third, on December
    21, 2021. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who, after concluding Fernsler’s
    PCRA petition was time-barred, filed a “no-merit” letter and motion to
    withdraw pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
     (Pa. 1988),
    and Commonwealth v. Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
     (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
    -2-
    J-S19040-23
    See Motion to Withdraw, 3/16/22. The PCRA court granted counsel’s motion
    to withdraw and issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss the PCRA
    petition without a hearing, to which Fernsler filed a pro se response. The court
    subsequently dismissed the petition. Fernsler timely appealed.2
    On appeal, Fernsler raises the following issues pro se:
    [1.] Were [Fernsler’s] Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
    of the United States Constitution and Article One, Section Eight
    of the Pennsylvania Constitution violated due to law
    enforcement negligence in the collection of evidence which was
    utilized to obtain probable cause for [the] issuance of arrest and
    search warrants?
    [2.] Were [Fernsler’s] Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment
    rights of the United States Constitution and Article One, Section
    Eight of the Pennsylvania Constitution violated due to unfactual
    [sic] testimony under oath provided on the [a]ffidavit of
    [p]robable [c]ause used to obtain warrants?
    [3.] Were [Fernsler’s] Sixth and Eighth Amendment rights of
    the United States Constitution and Article One, Section Eight of
    the Pennsylvania Constitution violated due to [i]neffective
    [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel for failure to provide professional and
    ethical representation to [Fernsler]?
    [4.] Were [Fernsler’s] Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
    of the United States Constitution and Article One, Section Eight
    of the Pennsylvania Constitution violated due to the aggravated
    sentence as a result of a guilty plea?
    Fernsler’s Brief at v-vi (bolding omitted).
    ____________________________________________
    2 The PCRA court did not order Fernsler to file a concise statement of errors
    complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925. The PCRA court issued an
    opinion adopting its earlier opinion dismissing Fernsler’s PCRA petition. See
    Opinion Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925, 2/6/23, at 1.
    -3-
    J-S19040-23
    We review the dismissal of a PCRA petition to determine “whether the
    PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and whether its
    conclusions of law are free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Busanet,
    
    54 A.3d 35
    , 45 (Pa. 2012). “Our scope of review is limited to the findings of
    the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable
    to the party who prevailed in the PCRA court proceeding.” 
    Id.
    PCRA petitions, including second and subsequent petitions, must be filed
    within one year of the date an appellant’s judgment of sentence becomes final.
    See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).        “[A] judgment becomes final at the
    conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
    Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
    expiration of the time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).
    The timeliness of a PCRA petition is jurisdictional.   If a PCRA petition is
    untimely, a court lacks jurisdiction over it.      See Commonwealth v.
    Wharton, 
    886 A.2d 1120
    , 1124 (Pa. 2005); see also Commonwealth v.
    Callahan, 
    101 A.3d 118
    , 121 (Pa. Super. 2014) (courts do not have
    jurisdiction over an untimely PCRA petition). “Without jurisdiction, we simply
    do not have the legal authority to address the substantive claims [in a PCRA
    petition].”   Commonwealth v. Lewis, 
    63 A.3d 1274
    , 1281 (Pa. Super.
    2013).
    Fernsler’s judgment of sentence became final on August 10, 2009,
    thirty days after this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence and Fernsler
    -4-
    J-S19040-23
    failed to file a timely petition for leave to appeal with the Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). He did
    not file the instant petition until December 21, 2021. Thus, the petition is
    untimely. A petitioner may overcome the time-bar if he pleads and proves
    one of the three statutory exceptions set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).
    See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 
    171 A.3d 675
    , 678 (Pa. 2017). The three
    exceptions are: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation
    of the claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized
    constitutional right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 
    51 A.3d 231
    , 233-34 (Pa.
    Super. 2012); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii). A petition invoking
    an exception must be filed within one year of the date the claim could have
    been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). If a petitioner fails to invoke a
    valid exception, the court is without jurisdiction to review the petition or
    provide relief. See Spotz, 171 A.3d at 676.
    Critically, Fernsler has not pled or proven an exception to the PCRA’s
    timeliness requirement.3 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). On appeal, he
    does not acknowledge his petition is untimely, does not mention the timeliness
    ____________________________________________
    3 While Fernsler checked the boxes next to claims regarding “improper
    obstruction by governmental officials” and “newly discovered evidence” in his
    PCRA petition, he never expanded upon those claims below and does not
    discuss them at all in his brief on appeal. See PCRA Petition, 12/21/21, at 2;
    Fernsler’s Brief at 4-38.
    -5-
    J-S19040-23
    requirements, and does not argue he meets any of the exceptions. Fernsler’s
    Brief at 4-38.
    The PCRA court held:
    In the instant matter, [Fernsler’s] PCRA [p]etition is untimely, as
    it was not filed within one year of the date his judgment became
    final. Because [Fernsler’s] PCRA [p]etition is untimely, [the PCRA
    c]ourt lacks jurisdiction to address any merits.
    PCRA Court Opinion, 11/18/22, at 4 (unnumbered) (citation omitted).
    Appellant’s petition is untimely, and like the PCRA court, we lack
    jurisdiction and “legal authority to address [any] substantive claims.” Lewis,
    
    63 A.3d at 1281
    .4
    Order affirmed.
    ____________________________________________
    4 In any event, Fernsler’s challenges to the way the police collected the
    evidence in this matter and to any errors in the affidavit of probable cause are
    procedurally barred because of his guilty plea. See Commonwealth v.
    Lincoln, 
    72 A.3d 606
    , 609 (Pa. Super. 2013) (stating that by pleading guilty
    a defendant “waives his right to challenge … all nonjurisdictional defects
    except the legality of the sentence and the validity of the plea.”). Moreover,
    these issues, along with Fernsler’s challenge to his sentence and his claims of
    ineffective assistance of pre-trial, plea, sentencing, and appellate counsel are
    also subject to waiver because Fernsler could have raised them on direct
    appeal or in his prior PCRA petitions but did not. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b)
    (“For purposes of this subchapter, an issue is waived if the petitioner could
    have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review,
    on appeal or in a prior state postconviction [sic] proceeding.”).
    -6-
    J-S19040-23
    Judgment Entered.
    Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/09/2023
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1747 MDA 2022

Judges: Sullivan, J.

Filed Date: 11/9/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024