Com. v. Campbell, L. ( 2023 )

J-S14015-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
LOUIS RUSHAD CAMPBELL :
:
Appellant : No. 1361 WDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 21, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-07-CR-0000872-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
LOUIS RUSHAD CAMPBELL :
:
Appellant : No. 1374 WDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 21, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-07-CR-0000938-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
LOUIS RUSHAD CAMPBELL :
:
Appellant : No. 1375 WDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 21, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-07-CR-0000955-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
J-S14015-23
:
v. :
:
:
LOUIS RUSHAD CAMPBELL :
:
Appellant : No. 1376 WDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 11, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-07-CR-0000939-2017
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED: November 14, 2023
Louis Rushad Campbell appeals from the order entered in the Blair
County Court of Common Pleas on October 22, 2022, dismissing Campbell’s
petitions1 filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.
C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After remand, and pursuant to our directive, PCRA
counsel has filed a new petition to withdraw as counsel, in which he maintains
there are no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal.2 For the reasons
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Campbell filed separate notices of appeal under the four lower court dockets
involved. We consolidated the appeals sua sponte as they raised identical
challenges to the PCRA court’s order.
2 When counsel seeks to withdraw from representation on collateral appeal,
as here, Turner and Finley apply. See Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d
816, 817 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d
927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988)
(en banc)).
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discussed below, we find the PCRA court properly denied Campbell relief and
affirm. We further grant counsel permission to withdraw.
After a confidential informant purchased heroin from Campbell, he was
arrested and charged with four counts of possession with intent to distribute
covering sales and associated crimes from the previous three days. Just prior
to the start of his jury trial, Campbell entered an open nolo contendere plea
to all counts of the criminal information at the above dockets. While there is
a somewhat convoluted pretrial history of Campbell switching counsel several
times and for a brief period representing himself pro se, he was represented
by counsel at the time of his plea. Sentencing was deferred for preparation of
a presentence investigation report.
Despite being represented by counsel, Campbell subsequently filed a
pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court dismissed the motion
without prejudice to allow Campbell to file a counseled motion. Counsel then
filed a new motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The trial court denied the
motion and sentenced Campbell to an aggregate term of twelve years and
three months to twenty-four and one-half years’ incarceration.
Campbell thereafter filed pro se PCRA petitions under each separate
docket from December 2020 to January 2021. Counsel was appointed and
filed an amended PCRA petition, followed by a second amended petition. After
two evidentiary hearings, the PCRA court denied the PCRA petition on October
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24, 2022. That same day, counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel with
the PCRA court. A hearing on the motion was scheduled.
Counsel subsequently filed a notice of appeal on Campbell’s behalf in
order to protect Campbell’s appellate rights. The PCRA court then filed an
order stating it would take no further action on counsel’s motion to withdraw,
or a pro se motion seeking counsel’s withdrawal, due to the notice of appeal
transferring jurisdiction to the Superior Court.
Counsel then filed a motion to withdraw with this Court, along with a
brief stating there are no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal. However, we
found counsel failed to substantially comply with the requirements of
Turner/Finley. Accordingly, we directed counsel to either file an advocate’s
brief or a petition to withdraw that met the requirements of Turner/Finley.
Counsel has since filed a new application to withdraw as counsel. Before
any substantive analysis, we must again examine whether PCRA counsel has
met the procedural requirements for withdrawing as counsel.
Counsel petitioning to withdraw from PCRA representation
must proceed … under [Turner], and [Finley] … Turner/Finley
counsel must review the case zealously. Turner/Finley counsel
must then submit a “no-merit” letter to the trial court, or brief on
appeal to this Court, detailing the nature and extent of counsel's
diligent review of the case, listing the issues which the petitioner
wants to have reviewed, explaining why and how those issues lack
merit, and requesting permission to withdraw.
Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy of the
“no-merit” letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel's petition to
withdraw; and (3) a statement advising petitioner of the right to
proceed pro se or by new counsel.
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If counsel fails to satisfy the foregoing technical
prerequisites of Turner/Finley, the court will not reach the merits
of the underlying claims but, rather, will merely deny counsel's
request to withdraw. Upon doing so, the court will then take
appropriate steps, such as directing counsel to file a proper
Turner/Finley request or an advocate's brief.
However, where counsel submits a petition and no-merit
letter that do satisfy the technical demands of Turner/Finley, the
court—trial court or this Court—must then conduct its own review
of the merits of the case. If the court agrees with counsel that the
claims are without merit, the court will permit counsel to withdraw
and deny relief. By contrast, if the claims appear to have merit,
the court will deny counsel's request and grant relief, or at least
instruct counsel to file an advocate's brief.
Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721 (Pa. Super. 2007) (some
citations omitted)
We find counsel has filed a proper application to withdraw as counsel
and substantially complied with the requirements of Turner, Finley, and
Commonwealth v. Friend, 896 A.2d 607 (Pa. Super. 2006).3 Cambell has
filed a response. We therefore turn to our own independent review of the
record to determine if we agree with counsel’s conclusion that Campbell’s
PCRA petition was meritless.
____________________________________________
3 Of note, while we find counsel has “substantially complied” with the
Turner/Finley requirements, we find counsel has only done the bare
minimum in terms of briefing requirements in order for us to proceed with our
review. The discussion portion of the brief is only one short paragraph,
consisting of only three sentences. Counsel does not personally include any
citations or mention any potential issues. Rather, counsel instead wholly
adopts the PCRA court’s consideration of the matter in its opinion
accompanying the order dismissing the PCRA petition. As this is counsel’s
second attempt at withdrawal, we caution counsel to be more careful in the
future in personally analyzing potential issues on the merits.
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The crux of Campbell’s issues, as distilled from his amended petitions,
as well as from the arguments raised at both PCRA hearings, is that his nolo
contendere plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.
Specifically, Campbell contends he did not understand that he would lose the
right to continue to challenge the evidence against him through the filing of
certain pre-trial motions, including a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Campbell also raises this same claim in the context of ineffective assistance
of plea counsel, alleging counsel failed to explain the consequences of entering
the plea. Finally, Campbell alleges he lacked the mental capacity to enter his
plea due to suffering from COVID-19 and the effects of strong medication
given to him for his illness.
The statements made during a plea colloquy bind a criminal
defendant. See Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 384 (Pa.
Super. 2002). As a result, a defendant cannot assert grounds for withdrawing
the plea that contradict statements made at that time. See Commonwealth
v. Stork, 737 A.2d 789, 790-91 (Pa. Super. 1999). Further, “[t]he law does
not require that appellant be pleased with the outcome of his decision to enter
a plea of guilty: ‘All that is required is that [appellant’s] decision to plead guilty
be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made.’” Commonwealth v.
Yager, 685 A.2d 1000, 1004 (Pa. Super. 1996) (en banc) (citation omitted).
In a written plea colloquy, Campbell affirmed he was not being treated
for a mental illness and had not consumed any drugs, narcotics, or other
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medication within the last forty-eight hours. See Written Plea Colloquy,
12/17/2019, at 2-3. Campbell also specifically represented that he understood
that by pleading nolo contendere, he was giving up the right to present any
pre-trial motions, as well as the right to pursue any pre-trial motions that had
already been filed. See id. at 7. Finally, Campbell affirmed he was satisfied
with his lawyer’s representation and that he had sufficient time to discuss the
case with his lawyer and consider the advantages and disadvantages of
entering a nolo contendere plea instead of going to trial. See id. at 9. Later,
during his oral plea colloquy, Campbell represented that he completed the
written colloquy and signed each page. See N.T., 12/17/2019, at 4-5.
Campbell affirmed that all of the answers in the written colloquy were his own.
The trial court found that under the totality of the circumstance,
including consideration of both the oral and written colloquies, Campbell’s plea
was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. See Trial Court Opinion,
10/21/2022, at 4-9. We agree.
Between both of his colloquies, Campbell affirmed that he understood
his rights, and the rights he was giving up. He was further given sufficient
opportunity to ask questions of his counsel and the court prior to entering his
plea.
As far as Campbell’s second claim, Campbell simply provided no support
for his claim that he did not understand what he was doing due to being under
heavy medication for COVID-19. Campbell provided no supporting medical
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documentation, or other corroborating evidence, despite testifying at two
PCRA evidentiary hearings. Both the trial court and plea counsel stated that
they did not observe Campbell to be ill in any manner or that his mental
capacity was affected in any manner. See N.T., 3/22/22, at 32-33; see also
Trial Court Opinion, 10/21/2022, at 10. Further, both the trial court and plea
counsel noted that Campbell never communicated that he was sick or on
medication. See N.T., 3/22/22, at 32-33; see also Trial Court Opinion,
10/21/2022, at 10. The trial court credited plea counsel’s testimony, while
finding Campbell’s testimony was not credible. See Trial Court Opinion,
10/21/2022, at 10. As such, we find Campbell’s challenges to the validity of
his guilty plea without merit.
To the extent Campbell argues plea counsel was ineffective for failing to
explain the consequences of entering a plea, we find such a claim equally
without merit.
“A criminal defendant has the right to effective counsel during a plea
process as well as during trial.” Commonwealth v. Rathfon, 899 A.2d 365,
369 (Pa. Super. 2006). However, “[a]llegations of ineffectiveness in
connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if
the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing
plea.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 141 (Pa. Super. 2002)
(citation omitted). Also, “[w]here the defendant enters his plea on the advice
of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends upon whether counsel’s
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advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
We presume counsel is effective, and an appellant bears the burden to
prove otherwise. See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 57 A.3d 1185, 1195 (Pa.
2012). The test for ineffective assistance of counsel is the same under both
the Federal and Pennsylvania Constitutions. See Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Commonwealth v. Kimball, 724 A.2d 326,
330-332 (Pa. 1999). An appellant must demonstrate: (1) his underlying claim
is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by counsel
did not have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interests; and
(3) but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the proceedings would have been different. See Commonwealth
v. Solano, 129 A.3d 1156, 1162-63 (Pa. 2015). A failure to satisfy any prong
of the test for ineffectiveness will require rejection of the claim. See id. at
1163.
As we have already found Campbell’s plea was entered knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily, his claims of ineffectiveness of plea counsel are
without merit. Again, Campbell affirmed his knowledge of the rights he was
giving up during his colloquies. Further, Campbell had sufficient opportunity
to ask questions of plea counsel regarding the plea. As such, Campbell cannot
show his claim is of arguable merit.
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For the reasons set forth above, we conclude Campbell is entitled to no
relief. The record supports the PCRA court's determinations, and we agree
with counsel that Campbell’s claims lack merit. Moreover, having conducted
an independent review of the record in light of the petition to withdraw, we
agree that the PCRA petition is meritless.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we affirm the PCRA court’s
dismissal of Campbell’s PCRA petition without a hearing and grant counsel’s
petition to withdraw.
Order affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.
11/14/2023
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