Com. v. Bernard, S. ( 2023 )


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  • J-S33037-23
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    SOMMER BERNARD                               :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1033 WDA 2022
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 16, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-02-CR-0001650-2016
    BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                     FILED: NOVEMBER 14, 2023
    Appellant, Sommer Bernard, appeals from the August 16, 2022, order
    entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County dismissing her
    petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-
    9546 on alternate bases of ineligibility for PCRA relief and waiver of issues.
    After finding upon careful review that Appellant is ineligible for PCRA relief, we
    affirm.
    The PCRA court has authored a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion setting forth
    the pertinent procedural history, as follows:
    On December 15, 2015, the Pittsburgh Police Department charged
    [Appellant] with one count of Receiving Stolen Property, 18
    Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a), which was charged as a Felony 3. On August
    1, 2016, the Honorable Jeffrey Manning entered an Order for
    Involuntary Treatment due to [Appellant’s] mental illness. After
    multiple postponements and the appointment of new counsel, on
    ____________________________________________
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S33037-23
    January 15, 2019, [Appellant entered a guilty plea and was
    sentenced to 2.5 to 5 years, with credit for time served of 1,063
    days, to run concurrent with a sentence from an unrelated third-
    degree murder case (CP-02-CR-2092-2017).
    On February 22, 2022, [Appellant] filed what was docketed as a
    “Request for Discovery”, and then shortly thereafter, on March 15,
    2022, filed her first PCRA Petition. On April 28, 2022, [the PCRA
    court] appointed Jacob McCrea, Esquire, to represent the
    [Appellant] in her first PCRA Petition. After reviewing the file, on
    May 11, 2022, Attorney McCrea submitted a Motion for Leave to
    Withdraw as Counsel Pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner
    (“Motion to Withdraw”), along with a No Merit Letter. In his No
    Merit Letter, Attorney McCrea explained that [Appellant’s] PCRA
    Petition lacked merit because it was filed after the one-year
    deadline, as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) and because
    she was no longer serving the sentence associated with this case,
    as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i), (iii).
    On July 6, 2022, after reviewing [counsel’s] No Merit Letter, [the
    PCRA court] granted [his] Motion to Withdraw and advised
    [Appellant] that she had 20 days to respond regarding the options
    available to her if she wished to proceed with her PCRA Petition
    without counsel. On July 20, 2022, [Appellant] filed an Objection
    to Counsel’s Motion for Leave to Withdraw and No Merit Letter.
    On August 16, 2022, [the PCRA court] issued an “Order of Court
    Dismissing Defendant’s PCRA Petition” pursuant to Rule 907 of the
    Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure.
    On September 1, 2022, Appellant filed what was docketed as a
    Notice of Appeal (“Appeal”). The Appeal was docketed at 1033
    WDA 2022.
    ....
    PCRA Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 1-3.
    On appeal, Appellant raises multiple claims of ineffective assistance of
    prior counsel and contends, additionally, that her patently untimely PCRA
    petition qualifies for review under certain exceptions to the PCRA’s one-year
    time bar. Preliminarily, however, we address whether Appellant was no longer
    -2-
    J-S33037-23
    serving a sentence of imprisonment at the time she filed the present petition,
    as this issue proves dispositive.
    It is well-settled that “[t]he [PCRA] shall be the sole means of obtaining
    collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory
    remedies for the same purpose.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. To be eligible for relief
    under the PCRA, a petitioner must either be “currently serving a sentence of
    imprisonment, probation or parole for the crime,” “awaiting execution of a
    sentence of death for the crime,” or “serving a sentence which must expire
    before the person may commence serving the disputed sentence.” 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i)-(iii).
    Our Supreme Court and this Court consistently have interpreted Section
    9543(a) to require that a PCRA petitioner be serving a sentence while relief is
    being sought. Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 
    699 A.2d 718
    , 720 (Pa. 1997);
    Commonwealth v. Matin, 
    832 A.2d 1141
    , 1143 (Pa. Super. 2003). As our
    Supreme Court explained in Ahlborn, the plain language of the PCRA statute
    requires the denial of relief for a petitioner who has finished serving his
    sentence, as eligibility for relief depends upon the petitioner’s presently
    serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation, or parole. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d
    at 720. To grant relief at a time when an appellant is not currently serving
    such a sentence would be to ignore the language of the PCRA. Id.
    Moreover, we have explained that “the [PCRA] preclude[s] relief for
    those petitioners whose sentences have expired, regardless of the collateral
    consequences of their sentence.” Commonwealth v. Fisher, 
    703 A.2d 714
    ,
    -3-
    J-S33037-23
    716 (Pa. Super. 1997). In this regard, the PCRA court loses jurisdiction the
    moment an appellant's sentence expires. See Commonwealth v. Turner,
    
    80 A.3d 754
    , 769 (Pa. 2013) (holding that when a petitioner's sentence
    expires while his PCRA petition is pending before the PCRA court, the PCRA
    court loses jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the petition).
    Here, based upon our review of the record, we agree with the PCRA
    court's opinion and the Commonwealth's analysis that Appellant finished her
    two and one-half to five-year sentence for Receiving Stolen Property—the
    crime for which she now seeks relief—more than one year before she filed the
    instant PCRA petition. As a result, she does not meet any of the foregoing
    eligibility requirements outlined in Section 9543(a) of the PCRA. Under
    Ahlborn, therefore, she is ineligible for collateral relief. Accordingly, we do
    not have jurisdiction over this appeal.
    Order affirmed.
    DATE: 11/14/2023
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1033 WDA 2022

Judges: Stevens, P.J.E.

Filed Date: 11/14/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024