Com. v. Coit, W. ( 2023 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
WILLIAM COIT :
:
Appellant : No. 2012 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 29, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0001047-2019
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 10, 2023
Appellant William Coit appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed
following his conviction for violations of the Uniform Firearms Act (VUFA) and
related offenses. Appellant argues that the trial court erred by limiting the
scope of cross-examination. We affirm.
The trial court set forth the following factual and procedural history:
Around 7:00 p.m. on Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 330 E.
Somerset Street in Philadelphia[], Appellant argued with the
complainant, Kenneth Wall as he sat on his steps with his dog,
playing loud music behind a black security gate attached to his
doorframe. When Mr. Wall declined to lower the volume,
Appellant went to his nearby vehicle and retrieved a black semi-
automatic gun from the car and fired a shot. [] Appellant,
accompanied by an unidentified individual, proceeded to threaten
Mr. Wall and his family, stating he was going to “firebomb Mr.
Wall’s house,” and advising he “better move” because he was “not
safe around here.”
Mr. Wall fled into his home and called the police, who arrived
quickly to the location, while Appellant, with the gun in his
waistband, left the scene with his cohort. Investigating Detective
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Stanley Przylowski recovered a nine-millimeter fired cartridge
casing from the sidewalk, took photographs of the scene and
recorded statements from witnesses. That evening, Mr. Wall,
identified Appellant in a photo array, and the following day,
December 3, 2018, an arrest warrant was issued. Appellant was
arrested December 15, 2018, on the same block where the
incident occurred.
Following a waiver trial on February 8, 2022, Appellant was
convicted of possession of a firearm prohibited, firearms not to be
carried without a license, carrying firearms in public in
Philadelphia, possession [of] an instrument of crime [], terroristic
threats, simple assault, [and] recklessly endangering another
person[. The trial court acquitted Appellant of] the remaining
charge of aggravated assault. A [pre-sentence investigation] and
a mental health assessment were ordered. On June 29, 2022,
Appellant was sentenced to 5-to-10 years with probation for the
charge of possession of a firearm prohibited, and 3 ½ to 7 years
for firearm[s] not to be carried without a license, no probation, to
be served concurrently. He received no further penalty on the
remaining charges. Appellant argued a motion to reconsider,
subsequently denied by the [trial court] on August 8, 2022.
Trial Ct. Op., 10/11/22, at 2-3 (citations to the record omitted) (formatting
altered).
On August 15, 2022, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellant
subsequently filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and the trial court issued
an opinion addressing Appellant’s claims.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
[Whether] the trial court committed reversible error in precluding
defense counsel from cross-examining the complainant to
establish bias following his failure to appear for the preliminary
hearing and then-pending charges for possession of a firearm[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 3 (citation omitted).
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In his sole issue on appeal,1 Appellant argues that the trial court abused
its discretion when it restricted Appellant’s counsel from cross-examining the
complainant about a pending firearms charge and the complainant’s failure to
appear at the preliminary hearing. Id. at 10. In support, Appellant asserts
that “[t]rial counsel wished to pursue this line of questioning to reveal the
potential bias of the complainant, who may have been receiving preferential
treatment in exchange for his testimony against Appellant, and to establish a
defense that the complainant is the person who possessed the firearm.” Id.
at 15. Additionally, Appellant claims that the fact “[t]hat Mr. Wall had an open
matter for [VUFA] and failed to appear for Appellant’s preliminary hearing is
relevant because it tended to make it more probable that Mr. Wall possessed
the firearm at the time of the confrontation on December 2, 2018.” Id. at 13
(citing Pa.R.E. 401). Further, Appellant claims that the complainant’s failure
to appear at the preliminary hearing was relevant because “the determination
____________________________________________
1 The Commonwealth contends that Appellant has waived his issue on appeal
by failing to file a timely Rule 1925(b) statement. Our review of the record
confirms that Appellant initially filed a Rule 1925(b) statement on September
7, 2022, one day after the trial court’s twenty-one-day deadline. On
September 9, 2022, without requesting or receiving leave of court, Appellant
filed a supplemental Rule 1925(b) statement. The trial court accepted
Appellant’s untimely supplemental Rule 1925(b) statement and issued a Rule
1925(a) opinion addressing those claims. Therefore, although Appellant’s
Rule 1925(b) statements were untimely, we decline to find waiver. See
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 81 A.3d 103, 104 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(citation omitted) (stating that “the untimely filing of a court-ordered Rule
1925(b) statement does not automatically result in wavier of the issues on
appeal. If the trial court accepts an untimely Rule 1925(b) statement and
addresses the issues raised in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, we will not determine
the issues to be waived”).
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of Appellant’s guilt was wholly depend[ent] upon the credibility of [Mr. Wall].”
Id. at 19.
The right to cross-examine witnesses, although fundamental, is not
absolute. Commonwealth v. Rosser, 135 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super.
2016) (en banc). “A trial court has discretion to determine both the scope
and the permissible limits of cross-examination. The trial judge’s exercise of
judgment in setting those limits will not be reversed in the absence of a clear
abuse of that discretion, or an error of law.” Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12
A.3d 291, 335 (Pa. 2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is
rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise
of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias,
prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.
If in reaching a conclusion the trial court overrides or misapplies
the law, discretion is then abused and it is the duty of the appellate
court to correct the error.
Commonwealth v. LeClair, 236 A.3d 71, 78 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation
omitted).
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides a defendant with a constitutional right “to conduct cross-
examination that reveals any motive that a witness may have to testify
falsely.” Commonwealth v. Bozyk, 987 A.2d 753, 756 (Pa. Super. 2009);
see also Commonwealth v. Gentile, 640 A.2d 1309, 1313 (Pa. Super.
1994) (stating that “cross-examination directed toward revealing possible
bias, interest or motive of a witness in testifying against the defendant is
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always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of [her]
testimony”).
“A witness may be questioned about pending criminal charges because
the witness may be tempted to help convict the defendant in order to obtain
leniency on the charges that he currently faces.” Bozyk, 987 A.2d at 757(citation omitted). However, “trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the
Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-
examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, and
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is
repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Id. at 756 (citation omitted); see
also Rosser, 135 A.3d at 1088.
With respect to a trial court’s authority to restrict the scope of cross-
examination, our Supreme Court has explained:
A trial judge’s refusal to allow a line of questioning on cross-
examination amounts to exclusion of evidence; preservation for
appeal of an objection to the exclusion generally requires a formal
proffer of the contents and relevancy of the excluded evidence. .
..
Of course, the proffer of a defendant whose cross-examination has
been restricted does not need to be extremely specific, for the
obvious reason that the defendant cannot know exactly how the
witness will respond, especially when the cross-examination is an
attempt to show bias. Nevertheless, the proffer must at least be
sufficient to establish that the cross-examination will likely reveal
information nominally relevant to the proceeding. A simple
assertion that cross-examination will reveal bias is not sufficient
to establish a need for that cross-examination; it is necessary
to demonstrate a relevant relationship between the
expected testimony on cross-examination and the nature
of the issue before the court.
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Commonwealth v. Smyrnes, 154 A.3d 741, 752-53 (Pa. 2017) (citation and
footnote omitted, emphasis in original).
In Smyrnes, defense counsel attempted to cross-examine a witness
about whether her abilities to think rationally and recall events are affected
when she does not take her prescribed medications. Id. at 750-751. The
Commonwealth objected and argued that defense counsel’s questions should
be limited to a specific time frame. Id. at 751. The trial court instructed
defense counsel to confine his questions to the month when the murder
occurred. Id. The witness subsequently testified that she clearly recalled the
murder and the events surrounding it. Id.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by restricting
the scope of his cross-examination. Id. at 750-51. The Smyrnes Court
explained that defense counsel’s original questions were “highly generalized
and untethered to the time period addressed by [the witnesses’] testimony[.]”
Id. at 752. Therefore, our Supreme Court concluded that “in light of defense
counsel’s failure to advise the trial court that he intended to attempt to confine
his questioning according to the prescription medications in issue and any
reasonably contemporaneous episodes of impairment,” the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of the cross-examination. Id. at 753
(citation omitted); see also Rosser, 135 A.3d at 1089-90 (concluding that
the trial court properly precluded the defendant’s proposed cross-examination
of the victim where the defendant failed to provide any foundation for his
question).
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Finally, we note that in order to preserve an evidentiary issue for
appellate review, “a party must interpose a timely and specific objection in
the trial court. The rule is well settled that a party complaining, on appeal, of
the admission of evidence in the court below will be confined to the specific
objection there made.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 194 A.3d 159, 166 (Pa.
Super. 2018) (citations omitted and formatting altered).
An en banc panel of this Court further stated:
One must object to errors, improprieties or irregularities at the
earliest possible stage of the criminal adjudicatory process to
afford the jurist hearing the case the first occasion to remedy the
wrong and possibly avoid an unnecessary appeal to complain of
the matter. Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Trial judges must
be given an opportunity to correct errors at the time they are
made. Where the trial court denies relief on one theory, a
defendant may not attain appellate relief on a new theory for that
same relief.
Rosser, 135 A.3d at 1086 (citations omitted) (formatting altered).
Here, during Appellant’s cross-examination of the complainant, the
following exchange occurred:
[Appellant’s counsel]: Here’s what I’m arguing. Did you go to the
preliminary hearing?
[Complainant]: I went to the police when I was in fear for my
safety.
[Appellant’s counsel]: Did you go to the preliminary hearing on
February 8th of 2019?
[Complainant]: I’m not sure, sir.
[Appellant’s counsel]: Sir, you sent your wife instead?
[Complainant]: Say that again?
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[Appellant’s counsel]: You sent your wife to the preliminary
hearing. You didn’t show up, right?
[Complainant]: If that’s the facts. I’m sure you know better than
me.
[Appellant’s counsel]: Did you testify at a preliminary hearing?
[Complainant]: I don’t know, sir. I can’t recall.
[Appellant’s counsel]: Sir, you didn’t testify at a preliminary
hearing because you had an open gun case, right?
[The Commonwealth]: Objection, Your Honor.
[Appellant’s counsel]: It goes to access to guns, Your Honor. They
do it all the time.
THE COURT: Sustained.
[Appellant’s counsel]: Judge, it’s a witness. It goes to access to
guns.
[The Commonwealth]: I would ask counsel to cite the Rule of
Evidence –
[Appellant’s counsel]: [Pa.R.E.] 603, Your Honor. Witness can be
cross-examined as to their credibility on any matter[]. And the
Commonwealth constantly argues access to guns – access to
guns.
THE COURT: Sustained. It’s irrelevant. Sustained.
N.T. Trial, 2/8/22, at 31-32 (formatting altered).
Here, the record reflects that Appellant objected to the trial court’s ruling
on cross-examination on the basis that evidence of the complainant’s open
gun case could be used to establish the complainant’s “access to guns.” See
id. at 32. Additionally, Appellant referred to Rule 603, which sets forth the
requirement that witnesses take an oath or affirmation to testify truthfully.
See Pa.R.E. 603 (stating that “[b]efore testifying, a witness must give an oath
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or affirmation to testify truthfully. It must be in a form designed to impress
that duty on the witness’s conscience”). However, Appellant failed to provide
any foundation concerning his intent to question the witness in order to
establish the witness’s potential bias. Therefore, to the extent he claims that
the trial court violated “his right to cross-examine the complainant to explore
potential bias and present a defense,” he has failed to preserve that claim on
appeal. See Thomas, 194 A.3d at 166; see also Rosser, 135 A.3d at 1086.
With respect to the complainant’s pending firearms charge, the trial
court concluded that the evidence was “irrelevant” to the charges against
Appellant. Therefore, to the extent Appellant claims that the trial court
“should have assessed the admissibility of the complainant’s unlawful
possession of a firearm under the standard set forth for relevancy and applied
the similar weapon exception to permit this line of questioning,” we conclude
that the issue is meritless. Appellant’s Brief at 21, citing Pa.R.E. 401.
Finally, to the extent Appellant argues that he did not have the
opportunity to cross-examine the complainant about his failure to appear at
the preliminary hearing, the record belies that claim. See N.T. Trial, 2/8/22,
at 31-32. Additionally, Appellant did not revisit that issue after the
Commonwealth objected to Appellant’s question about the pending gun
charge. See id. at 32-40. Therefore, Appellant’s claim fails.
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For these reasons, we affirm.2
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Application for relief denied.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Date: 10/10/2023
____________________________________________
2 While this appeal was pending, Appellant filed an application for relief in this
Court. Therein, Appellant requested that we remand this matter for a
supplemental Rule 1925(b) statement so that Appellant could raise a
discretionary sentence claim that the trial court erred in failing to grant
Appellant’s request that his state sentence run concurrent to his federal
sentence. Application for Relief, 7/26/23, at 2. Appellant also asserts that
the trial court erred in failing to order the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections provide Appellant credit for time served. Id. To the extent that
Appellant seeks to amend his Rule 1925(b) statement, the request is unclear
as to whether he is asserting a discretionary sentence claim or that he is
claiming an error in the computation of his sentence term by the Department
of Corrections. To the extent that Appellant takes issue with the Department
of Corrections’ computation of his time credit, his recourse is to file an action
in the Commonwealth Court. See Commonwealth v. Heredia, 97 A.3d 392,
395 (Pa. Super. 2014) (noting that the appropriate vehicle to challenge to the
Department’s credit for time served computations is an original action in
Commonwealth Court). However, his discretionary sentence claim is waived
because he failed to file post sentence motions raising this issue. Accordingly,
Appellant’s application for relief is DENIED.
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