Com. v. Schmidt, R. ( 2023 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RUSSELL A. SCHMIDT :
:
Appellant : No. 358 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 27, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0005668-2021
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED: November 16, 2023
Russell A. Schmidt appeals from the judgment of sentence entered after
the trial court, after a stipulated bench trial, found him guilty of driving while
impaired by alcohol and driving while operating privileges were suspended.
Schmidt argues that the trial court erred in failing to suppress evidence of his
inebriation gained after he was stopped because the basis for the stop was an
erroneous PennDOT record summary. We conclude that regardless of any
errors about the status of Schmidt’s license, the officer had reasonable
suspicion for the stop and therefore affirm.
The factual and procedural history of this appeal are essentially
undisputed; the only relevant disputes concern whether Schmidt’s driving
privileges were suspended at the time of the stop, and whether the arresting
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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officer’s good faith reliance on the information contained in PennDOT records
was sufficient to justify the stop regardless of the accuracy of that information.
With that in mind, we note that on May 6, 2021, Officer Allan Yonek of the
Harmar Township Police Department observed Schmidt driving a vehicle
southbound on Freeport Road. Officer Yonek entered Schmidt’s license plate
number into his computer, which reported that Schmidt’s operating privileges
had been suspended. The computer report contained a picture of Schmidt that
matched Officer Yonek’s observations of the driver. Relying solely on his belief
that Schmidt’s license had been suspended, Officer Yonek stopped Schmidt.
Based on his interactions with Schmidt, Officer Yonek charged Schmidt
with driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.16% or higher, driving while
impaired by alcohol to an extent that Schmidt could not safely drive, and
driving while his license was suspended. Schmidt filed a motion to suppress
all evidence gained from the traffic stop, alleging that the computer record
indicating that his license had been suspended was incorrect.
After a hearing, the trial court denied Schmidt’s motion to suppress, and
the parties immediately agreed to a stipulated non-jury trial. Officer Yonek’s
affidavit of probable cause and a lab report indicating Schmidt’s blood alcohol
content from May 6, 2021, were entered into evidence without objection from
Schmidt. The court found Schmidt guilty on all charges and sentenced him to
90 to 180 days of incarceration on the driving with a blood alcohol content
over 0.16% charge, no further penalty on the charge of driving under the
influence of alcohol such that he could not safely drive, and a $200 fine on the
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driving while his license was suspended charge. Schmidt did not file a post-
sentence motion but did file this timely appeal.
On appeal, Schmidt raises a single challenge to the trial court’s denial
of his motion to suppress. When this Court reviews a trial court’s denial of a
suppression motion, we are limited to reviewing only the evidence presented
at the suppression hearing. See Commonwealth v. Carey, 249 A.3d 1217,
1223 (Pa. Super. 2021). We look to see whether the suppression court’s
factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions
drawn from those facts are correct. See id. While we are bound by the
suppression court’s factual findings if those findings are supported by the
record, we are not bound by the suppression court’s legal conclusions. See
id. To the contrary, it is our duty to determine if the suppression court properly
applied the law to the facts. See id.Schmidt contends that his license was not, as a matter of law,
suspended on May 6, 2021, and that therefore, the information contained in
Officer Yonek’s computer was incorrect. He argues that since Officer Yonek
relied on faulty information, Officer Yonek, as a matter of law, could not have
had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop him.
Initially, Schmidt highlights that the April 28, 2021 entry in Schmidt’s
certified driving record references 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4355. Further, Officer Yonek
testified that this entry reflects the issuance of a warning notice, not a notice
of a suspension. See N.T., Suppression Hearing, 12/2/2021, at 14. Under
section 4355, a person who is sufficiently delinquent on a child support
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obligation can have his driver’s license suspended. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
4355(a)(2). However, prior to suspension, the obligor must be given 30 days’
notice before the license is suspended to allow for an opportunity to pay the
necessary arrearages. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4355(b). We also note that neither
the Commonwealth nor the trial court present argument contrary to Schmidt’s
assertion that his license was not suspended on May 6, 2021.
Since May 6, 2021, was not 30 days after April 28, 2021, we must
conclude that Schmidt’s license was not suspended when Officer Yonek
stopped him. However, this does not necessarily mean that the trial court
erred in denying Schmidt’s motion to suppress. Rather, we still must
determine whether Officer Yonek’s good-faith reliance on the faulty
information in his computer was sufficient to justify stopping Schmidt.
Schmidt contends that because Pennsylvania does not recognize a good-
faith exception to the exclusionary rule, Officer Yonek’s reliance on incorrect
information is insufficient to justify the traffic stop. While Schmidt is correct
that Pennsylvania does not recognize a good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule, we note that the boundaries and implications of this
rejection are not entirely clear. See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 164 A.3d
1133 (Pa. 2017) (affirming, due to an equally divided Court, an order
suppressing evidence on the basis that information in a search warrant
application, though believed in good faith by the affiant, was fabricated by an
informant). Pennsylvania’s rejection of the good faith exception is based on
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our state constitution’s heightened guarantee of privacy. See
Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 897 (Pa. 1991).
Most importantly however, Schmidt has not provided us with any
authority that applies the rejection of the good faith exclusion in scenarios
requiring only reasonable suspicion as opposed to probable cause. See id.(rejecting good faith exception for search warrant later found to lack probable
cause); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 86 A.3d 182 (Pa. 2014) (rejecting
good faith exception for trooper relying on incorrect computer report that
appellant had an active arrest warrant); Commonwealth v. Antoszyk, 985
A.2d 975 (Pa. Super. 2009) (rejecting good faith exception for search warrant
where informant lied to affiant); Commonwealth v. Frederick, 124 A.3d
748 (Pa. Super. 2015) (rejecting good faith exception where officers wholly
failed to comply with the “knock and announce” rule); Commonwealth v.
Carper, 172 A.3d 613 (Pa. Super. 2017) (rejecting good faith exception where
officer used unconstitutional written explanation of rights); Commonwealth
v. Bergamasco, 197 A.3d 805 (Pa. Super. 2018) (rejecting good faith
exception where officer did not have probable cause to believe a crime had
been committed while outside his home jurisdiction).
Schmidt also fails to argue that Officer Yonek’s stop required anything
other than reasonable suspicion to justify it. Based on our research, we
conclude that reasonable suspicion is the appropriate burden when an officer
suspects a driver may be operating with a suspended license. See
Commonwealth v. Farnan, 55 A.3d 113, 118 (Pa. Super. 2012).
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We find this distinction to be critical. Reasonable suspicion is a lower
burden than probable cause: “a police officer may in appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes
of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable
cause to make an arrest.” Commonwealth v. Cook, 735 A.2d 673, 676 (Pa.
1999) (citation omitted). Reasonable suspicion is “a less stringent standard
than probable cause necessary to effectuate a warrantless arrest[.]” Farnan,
55 A.3d at 116. Reasonable suspicion does not require an officer to delay his
detention of an individual until he has exhausted every other avenue of
investigation. See id. at 118.
Most importantly, the lesser burden of proof for reasonable suspicion is
based on the lesser intrusion into the individual’s freedom and privacy:
An arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion upon individual
freedom from a limited search for weapons, and the interests each
is designed to serve are likewise quite different. An arrest is the
initial stage of a criminal prosecution. It is intended to vindicate
society’s interest in having its laws obeyed, and it is inevitably
accompanied by future interference with the individual’s freedom
of movement, whether or not trial or conviction ultimately follows.
The protective search for weapons, on the other hand, constitutes
a brief, though far from inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity
of the person. It does not follow that because an officer may
lawfully arrest a person only when he is apprised of facts sufficient
to warrant a belief that the person has committed or is committing
a crime, the officer is equally unjustified, absent that kind of
evidence, in making any intrusions short of an arrest.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968).
Under Terry, investigative stops based on reasonable suspicion are
permitted precisely because they involve a lesser invasion of the detainee’s
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privacy. As such, we cannot automatically apply Pennsylvania’s rejection of
the good faith exception in cases that involve a lesser intrusion into an
appellant’s privacy. Rather, we must assess whether the invasion of privacy
caused by the stop is sufficient to violate the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Officers are rarely certain about their suspicions. And this is why they
are permitted to investigate further with temporary, limited seizures of the
person to perform their investigation. If any factual mistake in the officer’s
rationale automatically required suppression, Terry style investigative stops
would not exist. Here, since Officer Yonek was only engaged in a temporary
stop to investigate whether Schmidt was driving while his license was
suspended. There is no indication in the record that the Officer Yonek’s
investigation exceeded the normal bounds of a Terry stop or otherwise
constituted the functional equivalent of a full arrest. Therefore, the logic
underlying Pennsylvania’s rejection of the good faith exception does not apply.
Accordingly, we conclude that Officer Yonek’s honest, good faith reliance
on the information from his computer was sufficient to justify his stop of
Schmidt. The trial court therefore did not err in denying Schmidt’s motion to
suppress.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
President Judge Emeritus Stevens joins the memorandum.
Judge Olson did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case.
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11/16/2023
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