Com. v. Griffith, L. ( 2023 )


Menu:
  • J-S19028-23
    
    2023 PA Super 208
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :          PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    LASTACIA MARIE GRIFFITH                      :
    :
    Appellant               :     No. 1106 MDA 2022
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 6, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
    CP-67-CR-0005762-2021
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
    OPINION BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                         FILED: OCTOBER 19, 2023
    Lastacia Marie Griffith appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
    following her conviction for theft of property lost, mislaid, or delivered by
    mistake.1 Griffith argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the
    conviction. We affirm.
    Following an incident in October 2021, Griffith was charged with the
    above crime and proceeded to a bench trial. At trial, Jocelyn Murphy (“the
    victim”) testified that she and Griffith both attended a Halloween party in York
    City and afterward, there was a physical altercation between her and one of
    Griffith’s friends. N.T., 7/6/22, at 4-5, 7. The victim stated that Griffith and
    another person joined in, fighting against the victim. Id. at 7. The victim
    testified that after the altercation, she was taken to the home of one of
    Griffith’s family members where a second altercation occurred, this time
    ____________________________________________
    1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3924.
    J-S19028-23
    between . Id. at 9, 10, 16-17, 32. The victim said the police came and arrested
    every person involved. Id. at 10.
    She further testified that after the second altercation, she realized that
    she had lost her navy blue iPhone 12 cell phone. Id. at 10-11. The victim said
    that she, her mother, and her best friend “called it [and Griffith] answered.”
    Id. at 11. The victim said that when she later called the phone again, there
    was no answer. Id. at 12. She testified that she called Griffith the next day
    via Facebook Messenger, and Griffith said that the victim was “not getting
    [her] phone back, that it’s gone, and . . . to press charges,” and hung up. Id.
    The victim said she asked “nicely if [Griffith] could just return the phone,” and
    Griffith “said no. It’s gone.” Id. at 12-13.
    The Commonwealth played a video recording of the victim conducting
    the Facebook Messenger call. Id. at 19. It showed the victim asking, “Can I
    come get my phone that y’all stole?” Com.’s Exhibit 1. Griffith responded, “It’s
    gone bitch, next.” The victim then asked, “So y’all damaged it?” Griffith tersely
    answered, “Tell your mom to press charges,” and hung up. Id.
    The victim never got her phone back and bought a new one for $1,000.
    Id. at 13-14. The victim also testified that a mutual friend of hers and Griffith
    called Griffith to ask her to return the phone, and Griffith refused. Id. at 14.
    The day after the party, the victim contacted York City Police and spoke
    with Officer Ross Casteel. Id. at 21-22. Officer Casteel testified that he
    attempted to call the victim’s lost phone but was unable to connect and he
    believed the phone had been turned off. Id. at 22. Officer Casteel stated that
    -2-
    J-S19028-23
    the victim showed him what appeared to be a screenshot of a “ping” of the
    phone’s location. Id. at 22-23. He recalled that the location of the ping was
    near Griffith’s home. Id. at 24, 25. Officer Casteel testified that Griffith did
    not answer when he attempted to contact her on Facebook Messenger. Id. at
    23.
    Griffith testified in her own defense. She stated that the second
    altercation happened near her home. Id. at 32. According to Griffith, after the
    arrests, she was walking home with a cousin when they found a ringing phone
    on the ground. Id. at 32-33. She said that after the party she also had lost
    her phone, and her cousin picked up the phone believing it was Griffith’s phone
    because she and the victim had “the same phones.” Id. at 33, 36, 37. Griffith
    said when the phone rang, her cousin answered it and “she answered, or
    whoever answered the phone.” Id. at 33. Griffith testified that they realized
    it was not her phone and “threw the phone back wherever it was and left it
    there and haven’t seen the phone since.” Id. Griffith said she heard yelling
    when her cousin answered the phone, and she “tossed the phone back on the
    floor, and [she] felt as though whoever was responsible for their phone, that
    was on them.” Id.
    Griffith testified that she knew the victim had lost her phone prior to the
    Facebook Messenger call because a family member had told her. Id. at 39.
    She stated that she told the victim, “[I]t’s gone. Take it as a loss.” Id. Griffith
    said she told the victim to press charges “[b]ecause she already threatened
    to press charges. She said I’m going to have my mom press charges. I’m
    -3-
    J-S19028-23
    basically telling her do what you have to do because I don’t have her phone.”
    Id.
    The trial court convicted Griffith of one count of theft of property lost,
    mislaid, or delivered by mistake. Id. at 44. The court found:
    [Griffith] was made aware that the [v]ictim had lost her
    phone via Facebook Messenger calls from the [v]ictim.
    [Griffith], in response to these calls, claimed that the phone
    was gone and hung up on the [v]ictim . . . [.] [B]ecause
    [Griffith] was aware that the phone was lost, claimed the
    phone was gone, and hung up on the victim, [Griffith]
    possessed the requisite intent to deprive the [v]ictim of her
    property.
    ...
    [Griffith] was aware that the phone she picked up was lost
    or mislaid. The recording of the phone call corroborated the
    victim’s testimony. While [Griffith’s] testimony was that
    multiple people lost personal property the evening of the
    altercations with the [v]ictim, we do not find [Griffith’s]
    version of events to be credible. [Griffith] testified that she
    knew the phone was not hers. Further, [Griffith] even noted
    that the [v]ictim was “harassing” her regarding the lost
    phone. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to establish
    that [Griffith] knew that the cell phone in question was lost
    or mislaid property.
    ...
    [Griffith] noted that her cousin had picked up a phone
    assuming it belonged to [Griffith]. Upon realizing that the
    phone did not belong to [Griffith], they threw the phone
    back on the ground. [Griffith] had a phone call with the
    [v]ictim wherein she told the victim that the phone was
    gone. At no point during the conversation with the victim
    did [Griffith] tell her that she had found a phone on the
    ground and where the victim could go to look for that phone.
    Additionally, [Griffith], being aware of the value of an
    iPhone, failed to take affirmative steps to secure the phone
    she found on the ground. As noted by her own testimony,
    [Griffith] simply threw the phone back on the ground where
    -4-
    J-S19028-23
    she found it. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to
    establish that [Griffith] failed to take reasonable measures
    to restore the property to the person entitled to have it.
    Trial Court Opinion, filed Sept. 29, 2022, at 5-7 (“1925(a) Op.”).
    The trial court sentenced Griffith to one year of probation and restitution
    in the amount of $1,000.2 Griffith timely appealed.
    Griffith raises the following issue:
    Whether there was insufficient evidence to convict Ms.
    Griffith of theft of lost or mislaid property where Ms. Griffith
    did not demonstrate the requisite intent to deprive the
    complainant       of   her    property    and   because     the
    Commonwealth did not provide sufficient evidence to
    establish Ms. Griffith failed to take a reasonable measure to
    restore the property when she left it where she found it?
    Griffith’s Br. at 4.3
    When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we “must
    determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable
    inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in a light most favorable to the
    Commonwealth as verdict winner, support the conviction beyond a reasonable
    doubt.” Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 
    67 A.3d 19
    , 23 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en
    banc) (citation omitted). “Where there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier
    of fact to find every element of the crime has been established beyond a
    ____________________________________________
    2 The Court stated that, if restitution was paid, the probationary period may
    end after six months. N.T. at 47-48.
    3 Griffith’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement also included a challenge to the
    sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding that she knew the property
    had been lost or mislaid. However, Griffith does not argue the issue in her
    brief. She has therefore abandoned it and we will not address it.
    -5-
    J-S19028-23
    reasonable doubt, the sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail.” 
    Id.
     (citation
    omitted). This standard applies equally where the Commonwealth’s evidence
    is circumstantial. Commonwealth v. Patterson, 
    180 A.3d 1217
    , 1229
    (Pa.Super. 2018). In conducting this analysis, we may not substitute our
    judgment for that of the factfinder. 
    Id. at 1230
    . Additionally, the
    Commonwealth’s evidence “need not preclude every possibility of innocence.”
    Feliciano, 
    67 A.3d at 23
     (citation omitted). The factfinder is free to believe
    all, part, or none of the evidence. 
    Id.
    Griffith argues the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence
    to sustain the conviction for theft of lost or mislaid property. She argues that
    the evidence merely showed that she interacted with the phone after the
    second altercation. In her view, it did not show an intent to deprive the victim
    of the phone. Griffith claims that her statements that the phone was “gone”
    and that the victim should press charges were expressions of frustration and
    not evidence of an intent to deprive the victim of the phone. She asserts that
    her statements reflected her beliefs that the phone was gone and that the
    animosity stemming from recent altercations with the victim would inevitably
    lead the victim to press charges. She further argues that the act of picking up
    the phone, answering it, and putting it back where it had been lying it did not
    demonstrate either that she had the intent to deprive or that she knew that it
    belonged to the victim.
    Griffith also argues that leaving the phone where she found it was a
    reasonable measure to return the phone to its owner. She contends that she
    -6-
    J-S19028-23
    was not obligated to help the victim to find the phone, and that the record
    does not reveal an effort by Griffith to conceal it from the victim. Griffith
    maintains she did not lie about the phone’s whereabouts or actively mislead
    the victim regarding the phone. She also contends that her actions did not
    amount to abandonment of the phone, and leaving it where it was made it
    more likely that the owner would find it, as compared to attempting to find
    the owner.
    The statute criminalizing theft of property lost, mislaid, or delivered by
    mistake provides:
    A person who comes into control of property of another that he
    knows to have been lost, mislaid, or delivered under a mistake as
    to the nature or amount of the property or the identity of the
    recipient is guilty of theft if, with the intent to deprive the owner
    thereof, he fails to take reasonable measures to restore the
    property to a person entitled to have it.
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3924.
    “Deprive” has several meanings for purposes of Section 3924, including
    “to dispose of the property so as to make it unlikely that the owner will recover
    it.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3901.4 “[I]ntent can be proven by direct or circumstantial
    ____________________________________________
    4 “Subject to additional definitions contained in subsequent provisions of this
    chapter which are applicable to specific provisions of this chapter, the following
    words and phrases when used in this chapter shall have, unless the context
    clearly indicates otherwise, the meanings given to them in this section:
    ‘Deprive.’
    (1) To withhold property of another permanently or for so extended a period
    as to appropriate a major portion of its economic value, or with intent to
    restore only upon payment of reward or other compensation; or
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -7-
    J-S19028-23
    evidence; it may be inferred from acts or conduct or from the attendant
    circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Franklin, 
    69 A.3d 719
    , 723 (Pa.Super.
    2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Faulk, 
    928 A.2d 1061
    , 1070 (Pa.Super.
    2007)).
    Griffith’s arguments lack merit. First, there was enough evidence to
    prove that Griffith had “the intent to deprive the owner” of the phone. The
    testimony was that there was a fight during which Griffith and the victim were
    on opposing sides. After a second fight, Griffith discovered the phone near her
    home, which was near the scene of the second altercation. She later learned
    that the victim had lost her phone. The victim contacted her and in response
    to the victim’s asking if should get her phone “that y’all stole,” Griffith said,
    “It’s gone, bitch. Next.” The victim then asked Griffith if she had damaged it,
    and she told her to press charges and hung up. This evidence was sufficient –
    when viewed in the Commonwealth’s favor – to prove inferentially, beyond a
    reasonable doubt, that Griffith had the intent to deprive the victim of her
    phone.5
    ____________________________________________
    (2) to dispose of the property so as to make it unlikely that the owner will
    recover it.”
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3901.
    5 The dissent misinterprets our decision. We do not hold that “by failing to
    take reasonable measures to return [the phone] after controlling it,” Griffith
    “must have had the intent to deprive Murphy of [it.]” Dissenting Opinion at 2.
    Contrary to the dissent’s characterization, we find the mens rea met by the
    plethora of evidence that Griffith not only knew Murphy’s phone was lost, but
    repeatedly informed Murphy that the phone was “gone,” that is, that Murphy
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -8-
    J-S19028-23
    Second, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to prove that
    Griffith failed to take reasonable measures to “restore” the property.
    According to her own testimony, Griffith tossed it on the ground after
    determining it was not hers. See N.T. at 33.6 She made no effort to see that
    it got back to the victim, such as alerting law enforcement or telling the victim
    where she had found it. She failed to do anything to “restore” the phone to its
    rightful owner even though she knew the victim’s phone was missing and she
    had found the phone close to the site of the second altercation. Yet according
    to Griffith, she was aware that the phone matched the description of the
    victim’s phone. The evidence was sufficient to prove that Griffith failed “to
    take reasonable measures to restore the property to a person entitled to have
    it.”
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judge Sullivan joins the opinion.
    President Judge Emeritus Bender files a dissenting opinion.
    ____________________________________________
    would be permanently deprived of it. The dissent’s hypotheticals are,
    respectfully, inapt. Griffith was not a stranger, and beyond her and her
    cousin’s throwing the phone down, she also made subsequent statements and
    took actions towards Murphy that were sufficient to establish her “intent to
    deprive the owner” of the phone.
    6 The trial court states generally that it found Griffith’s version of events not
    credible but appears to have credited at least her testimony that she threw
    the phone back on the ground. See 1925(a) Op. at 7.
    -9-
    J-S19028-23
    Judgment Entered.
    Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/19/2023
    - 10 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1106 MDA 2022

Judges: McLaughlin, J.

Filed Date: 10/19/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2023