Com. v. Hall, F. ( 2023 )

J-S16043-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
FREDERICK HALL :
:
Appellant : No. 1528 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 7, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-09-CR-0003679-2020
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
FREDERICK HALL :
:
Appellant : No. 1529 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 7, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-09-CR-0004952-2020
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED OCTOBER 19, 2023
Frederick Hall (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas after a jury convicted
him at two criminal dockets of one count each of robbery, strangulation, theft
by unlawful taking, simple assault, and driving under the influence (DUI) —
J-S16043-23
general impairment, and two counts of witness intimidation. 1 On appeal, he
challenges the sufficiency of a curative instruction regarding four phone calls
presented by the Commonwealth at trial. He also raises a claim that the trial
court erroneously limited the scope of Appellant’s cross-examination of a
witness. We affirm.
We glean the underlying facts of this matter from the trial court’s
opinion:
On June 12, 2020, [Falicia Stroye (Victim)] was finishing a
[12] hour overnight shift as a Licensed Practical Nurse at Jefferson
Bucks Hospital. Her shift ended at 7:00 a.m. and she was heading
home to her apartment [on] Plaza Boulevard[ in] Morrisville,
Bucks County, Pennsylvania. On her way home, [she] texted . . .
her boyfriend, Appellant[. Victim] recognized he was drunk again
and told him not to come to her apartment.
Despite this admonishment, [Victim] saw Appellant . . .
sitting in his burgundy Ford pick[-]up truck at the top of the hill
near her apartment. Appellant . . . followed [V]ictim to her
apartment where he used his truck to block her in a parking spot.
Appellant . . . jumped out of his truck and opened the door to
[V]ictim’s car before she could lock it. Appellant . . . then began
swinging his fists and striking [V]ictim in her head and face.
[V]ictim was wearing a stethoscope from work around her neck.
Appellant . . . used the stethoscope to choke [V]ictim. Her shirt
was ripped. [Appellant] also used a sun visor from [Victim’s] car
to strike her repeatedly about the face and head.
Appellant . . . was using both open and closed fists to strike
[V]ictim. However, during the assault, [V]ictim was able to
remove mace from her pocketbook and spray Appellant . . . in the
face. This interrupted the attack and [V]ictim dialed 9-1-1 for
help[, but the call was “immediately disconnected before a 911
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3701(a)(1)(iv), 2718(a)(1), 3921(a), 2701(a)(1); 75 Pa.C.S.
§ 3802(a)(1); 18 Pa.C.S. § 4952(a)(6), respectively.
-2-
J-S16043-23
operator answered the call.”2] Appellant . . . grabbed [V]ictim’s
phone and keys before fleeing the scene. As he left, Appellant
. . . said “I’m going to kill you and your whole family.”
Morrisville Borough [Police Corporal William Smith and
Officer Erica McIntyre] responded to [V]ictim’s apartment to
investigate the abandoned 9-1-1 call. They met with [V]ictim who
described the assault. [Corporal Smith] passed Appellant[’s]
vehicle while driving to [V]ictim’s apartment. [He] immediately
left the scene to try to find Appellant . . . or his vehicle. [Officer
McIntyre] stayed with [V]ictim[ and] described [her] injuries:
[Victim] had various injuries about her face and neck.
Around her neck there [were] red marks. On her face[,] her
left ear had blood coming out of it. [There was blood on her
nostril.3] There was a knot above her eye on her forehead.
There was a knot on her chin as well as her cheekbone area.
* * *
[Corporal Smith] found [Appellant’s] truck parked
approximately five . . . miles away. The truck was running and
Appellant . . . was sitting in the driver’s seat. [Corporal Smith]
approached Appellant . . . and noted he had pepper spray on him.
[Corporal Smith] also noted Appellant . . . had a heavy odor of
[alcohol] about his person and that he was unsteady on his feet.
Appellant . . . was irritated and non-cooperative. He was placed
under arrest. [Officer McIntyre arrived at the scene to aid
Corporal Smith and] recovered [V]ictim’s cellphone and keys from
Appellant[’s] truck and . . . returned [them] to [V]ictim. [V]ictim
immediately noticed that records of text messages and phone calls
between her and Appellant . . . had been deleted.
Trial Ct. Op. 10/31/22, at 1-3 (some paragraph breaks inserted & record
citations omitted).
____________________________________________
2 N.T. Jury Trial, 3/3/22, at 7.
3 N.T., 3/3/22, at 50.
-3-
J-S16043-23
Appellant was arrested that same day. At Criminal Docket CP-09-CR-
0003679-2020 (Docket 3679), he was charged with two counts of robbery,
and one count each of strangulation, terroristic threats, theft by unlawful
taking, receiving stolen property (RSP), simple assault, DUI — general
impairment, possession of an instrument of crime (PIC), and operation of a
vehicle without ignition interlock.4
Appellant was held at the Bucks County Correctional Facility, and
“[a]bout a week after this incident [he] mailed two . . . separate letters from
the [Facility] to [V]ictim requesting her not to appear in court.” Trial Ct. Op.
at 3. Appellant also made “approximately [165] intercepted prison phone
calls” to Victim. See id. In some of these phone calls, Appellant asked Victim
“to not come to court or testify against him.” Id. Based on the above conduct,
Appellant was charged with two counts of witness intimidation at Criminal
Docket CP-09-CR-0004952-2020 (Docket 4952).
On February 16, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a motion to consolidate
Dockets 3679 and 4952 for trial.5 The trial court held a hearing on September
____________________________________________
418 Pa.C.S. §§ 3701(a)(1)(iii), 2707(a)(1), 3921(a), 3925(a), 907(a), and
3808(a)(1), respectively.
5 Appellant was also charged at an additional docket, CP-09-CR-0003684-
2020, with one count each of operation of a vehicle without ignition interlock
and operating a vehicle while license was suspended, related to DUI for an
incident that occurred on January 23, 2020. See N.T. Sentencing, 4/7/22, at
6-8. The Commonwealth did not seek to consolidate this matter with Dockets
3679 and 4952 for trial; however, Appellant pleaded guilty to these charges
on April 7, 2022, the same day he was sentenced for his convictions at Dockets
3679 and 4952.
-4-
J-S16043-23
8th, where the Commonwealth clarified it charged Appellant with two counts
of witness intimidation based upon two letters he sent Victim while
incarcerated, which it planned to present at trial. See N.T., 9/8/21, at 26-27.
The Commonwealth also stated that it sought to admit some of the phone calls
Appellant made to Victim while incarcerated to provide “context” for the two
counts of witness intimidation. See id. at 27-29. The court directed the
parties to come to an agreement as to which phone calls the Commonwealth
would introduce at trial. See id. at 31.
On September 16, 2021, the trial court granted the Commonwealth’s
motion to consolidate Dockets 3679 and 4952 for trial. Order, 9/16/21. This
matter proceeded to a two-day jury trial on March 2, 2022, where Victim,
Corporal Smith, and Officer McIntyre testified. Relevant to Appellant’s claims
on appeal, the Commonwealth played portions of four of the intercepted prison
phone calls. N.T. Jury Trial, 3/2/22, at 89-92. The jury was not aware that
Appellant was incarcerated while making the phone calls. We note the parties
had entered into a stipulation, which was read to the jury, that Appellant made
phone calls to Victim, which were intercepted and recorded, and the
recordings were redacted, but fair and accurate copies of the calls. Id. at 86-
88. On cross-examination, Appellant asked Victim if the four phone calls
“represent[ed] an extremely small portion of” the approximately 165 phone
calls. See id. at 103. The Commonwealth objected, stating this line of
questioning “suggest[ed]” Appellant spoke to Victim about not coming to court
only in those four calls, which was “not accurate.” Id. at 103-04. The
-5-
J-S16043-23
Commonwealth argued Appellant’s counsel was “opening the door to more
phone calls being played.” Id. at 104. The court sustained the objection and
gave the jury a curative instruction, explaining that while Appellant’s
questions implied “there may not have been other conversations regarding
not coming to court[,]”the evidence was a “fair cross representation” of the
calls. Id. at 112.
The Commonwealth also presented Officer McIntyre’s body camera
footage, depicting a conversation immediately after the incident on June 12,
2020, where the officer told Victim that Appellant would go to jail that day.
See Trial Ct. Op. at 13-14. Officer McIntyre also explained that she did not
know when Appellant would be released, and it would depend upon his ability
to make bail. Id. Appellant then informed the trial court he wished to cross-
examine the officer about the fact that he was incarcerated from the time of
his arrest until trial. N.T., 3/3/22, at 69. However, the court ruled Appellant
could only ask if Appellant was transported to the Bucks County Correctional
Facility that day. Id. at 84-85. Appellant did not testify or present evidence
on his own behalf.
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Appellant guilty at Docket 3679
of one count each of robbery, strangulation, theft, simple assault, and DUI —
-6-
J-S16043-23
general impairment.6 At Docket 4952 the jury found him guilty of both counts
of witness intimidation.
On April 7, 2022, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of four
to eight years’ incarceration at Docket 3879. At Docket 4952, the court
sentenced Appellant to a term of four to eight years’ imprisonment, to run
concurrently to the sentence at Docket 3879.
On April 18, 2022, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion to reconsider
his sentence, arguing it was “excessive[.]”7 Appellant’s Moton to Modify &
Reconsider Sentence, 4/18/22, at 2 (unpaginated). He also requested the
trial court to hold a hearing. See id. Before ruling on this motion, the court
filed an order, stating that “by agreement of the parties,” Appellant shall
receive credit for time served since June 12, 2021. Order, 4/22/22. Because
this order was filed within 30 days of the imposition of sentence, we consider
it to be an amended judgment of sentence. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505 (“[A] court
____________________________________________
6 The trial court noted in its opinion Appellant was not convicted of robbery.
See Trial Ct. Op. at 4. However, the verdict reflects he was found not guilty
of one count of robbery under Section 3701(a)(1)(iii), and convicted of one
count under Section 3701(a)(1)(iv). See N.T., 3/3/22, at 209-10.
7 Appellant’s sentence was imposed on April 7, 2022. The tenth day after
sentencing fell on a Sunday, and thus, Appellant had until the next business
day to file a timely motion. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (for computations of time,
if the last day of any such period shall fall on a Saturday, Sunday, or on a
legal holiday, that day shall be omitted from the computation); Pa.R.Crim.P.
720(A)(1) (written post sentenced motions must be filed within 10 days of
sentencing). Therefore, Appellant’s post-sentence motion, filed Monday, April
18th, was timely.
-7-
J-S16043-23
upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order within 30 days
after its entry . . . if no appeal from such order has been taken or allowed.”).
On May 4th, the trial court entered a second order, denying Appellant’s
request for a hearing. Order, 5/4/22.
Appellant filed timely, separate notices of appeal at each docket8 and
complied with the trial court’s order to file a statement of errors complained
of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).9 He raises the following claims
for our review:
A. Did the trial court err in giving an improper curative instruction
regarding the phone calls from Appellant to [Victim]?
B. Did the trial court err in refusing to allow Appellant to cross-
examine Officer McIntyre regarding Appellant’s incarceration?
Appellant’s Brief at 9.
____________________________________________
8 On November 28, 2022, this Court sua sponte consolidated Appellant’s
appeals. Order, 11/28/22.
9 The trial court’s Rule 1925(b) order does not appear in the certified record.
However, the criminal docket reflects that the court granted Appellant an
extension to file his Rule 1925(b) statement, and this order was served upon
him on September 26, 2022. Appellant filed his statement on September
29th. See Docket 3679 at 25; Docket 4952 at 23. Neither the court nor the
parties raise concerns as to the timeliness of Appellant’s Rule 1925(b)
statement.
We further note Appellant raised two additional claims in his Rule
1925(b) statement: (1) the trial court erred in consolidating Dockets 3679 and
4952 for trial; and (2) the trial court gave an improper jury instruction
regarding witness intimidation. See Appellant’s Statement of Matters
Complained of on Appeal, 9/29/22. He abandons these claims on appeal.
-8-
J-S16043-23
In his first claim, Appellant argues the trial court gave an improper
curative instruction to the jury regarding the contents of the intercepted prison
phones calls played at trial. Appellant’s Brief at 12. As discussed above, the
Commonwealth presented portions of four of the phone calls made by
Appellant to Victim. Before the phone calls were played, the trial court read
the following stipulation, made by the parties, to the jury:
[Appellant] called [Victim] and spoke with [her]. The phone calls
were intercepted and recorded. The intercepted phone calls are
fair and accurate copies of the intercepted phone calls, with
portions redacted pursuant to pretrial rulings from [the trial
court].
N.T., 3/2/22, at 87-88. The Commonwealth then played the portions of the
four phone calls for the jury. Id. at 89-92.
On Appellant’s cross examination of Victim, the following exchange
occurred concerning the phone calls:
[Appellant’s counsel]: So over the course of 160 phone calls, at
10 to 15 minutes or so, rough low estimate, a piece, that
represents an extremely small portion of those phone calls. Is
that fair to say?
[Commonwealth]: Objection, Your Honor. . . .
* * *
(Whereupon, the following discussion was held at sidebar)
[Commonwealth: T]here are numerous redactions that were made
in anticipation of [the trial court’s] rulings, in addition to a
redaction that [the court] ordered. I think that [Appellant’s]
counsel’s questions right now are trying to suggest that the only
time [Appellant] said something about getting help or not coming
to court is what we’ve heard, which we all know is not accurate.
-9-
J-S16043-23
I think that [Appellant’s] counsel is opening the door to more
phone calls being played.
Minimally[,] I would ask [the trial court] to give an
instruction that [it] approved what was being played and [it]
ordered redactions in this case[.] I think the Commonwealth is
being prejudiced right now by the implication that we’re hiding
other phone calls that [the court] ordered couldn’t come in or that
we all agreed that I wouldn’t reference him being in jail, all these
other things, and so I would ask minimally for a curative
instruction.
But also[,] I would ask potentially to play additional portions
of phone calls with this line of questioning.
* * *
[Appellant’s counsel]: I respectfully disagree. I think what I’m
getting at here is completely different than what [the
Commonwealth] thinks that I’m trying to get at.
What I’m trying to get at here is we’re talking about portions
of phone calls that are this big, but, in fact, there [are] 160 phone
calls that are made between . . . the two individuals, and that in
those phone calls they talk about a variety of other things
including, I’ve already referenced, the relationship.
My point is just to make that this is just a small portion of
those phones calls that . . . have been played.
[Trial court]: The objection is sustained. The clear implication is
. . . that the four calls were the only calls that had anything to do
with . . . threatening or intimidation of a witness, and they have
been redacted, and I think that you’re opening the door for her to
bring in every other phone call to prove. I mean you’re saying
[these are] the only times he said anything, and these are love
letters,[10] and this is, and that’s not what’s true.
* * *
____________________________________________
10 Appellant’s counsel referred to the two letters, which were the basis for the
witness intimidation charges, as “love letters.” See N.T., 3/2/22, at 97.
- 10 -
J-S16043-23
[Trial court:] The remedy is [Appellant’s counsel] either [ends that
line of questioning] or we listen to 165 phone calls. . . .
* * *
[The court’s] concern is the point that you are clearly
making is that only four phone calls even contain mention of not
coming to court. I don’t know. I didn’t listen to the 165 phone
calls, but according to the Commonwealth, it’s mentioned in a lot
of them. If so, [the Commonwealth is] going to be permitted to
play them if you are going to make the —
* * *
[argument] that that’s all that exists.
* * *
[Trial court]: I will give a cautionary instruction unless you want
to continue [with this questioning]. I’m not trying to limit you.
[Appellant’s counsel]: I understand.
N.T., 3/2/22, at 103-09.
The trial court then gave the following curative instruction:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, prior to today’s trial we’ve
had pretrial hearings in this matter, specifically concerning what
evidence gets presented to the [c]ourt. And there have been a
significant number of phone calls that have been intercepted. You
heard four. You could hear all 165 of them. You’d probably be
banging your head against the wall if I made you listen to 165
because that’s what I was doing when I was listening to them[.]
They are all very similar in the sense that you heard
[Appellant and Victim] discuss many things within the phone call.
We’ve picked and limited it to these.
However, [Appellant’s counsel] has stated . . . that there
may not have been other conversations regarding not coming to
court. I don’t believe that to be accurate in the phone calls. I
think that this is a fair cross representation of those phone calls,
- 11 -
J-S16043-23
and they were ones that I decided should be heard in court, and I
limited the Commonwealth from presenting many more of those
because you hear the quality of the conversation, and it’s not like
they’re crystal clear and you can clearly hear. All of them are that
way.
So that’s the reason for the ruling. . . . And you should not
consider that there are only four calls that mention anything about
not coming to court. . . .
N.T., 3/2/22, at 111-12 (paragraph break inserted).
Returning to Appellant’s argument, he avers the above curative
instruction was improper. Appellant’s Brief at 13. First, he states that the
instruction referenced the remaining phone calls, which were not admitted
into evidence, and thus “created a great risk of confusing the jury.” Id.
Specifically, he argues the jury was instructed that in the remaining phone
calls, Appellant told Victim “not to come to court.” Id. Next, he contends this
suggested the Commonwealth had evidence of 165 instances of witness
intimidation. Id. Appellant also maintains the instruction “commented on the
credibility of defense counsel by instructing the jury that [his] comment [was]
not accurate[.]” Id. at 14. He insists the court’s comment “accus[ing] counsel
of attempting to mislead the jury” prejudiced Appellant and deprived him of a
fair trial. Id. at 15. We conclude no relief is due.
“[T]he decision to give curative instructions is within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent manifest error.”
Commonwealth v. Ford, 650 A.2d 433, 442 (Pa. 1994). “A trial court’s
curative instructions must be viewed in the context of what occurred, i.e.,
what evidence was previously excluded and subsequently allowed, and when
- 12 -
J-S16043-23
it was allowed.” Commonwealth v. Padilla, 923 A.2d 1189, 1196 (Pa.
Super. 2007) (emphases & citation omitted).
Further, our review of a trial court’s evidentiary rulings is well-
established:
The admission or exclusion of evidence is within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and in reviewing a challenge to the
admissibility of evidence, we will only reverse a ruling by the trial
court upon a showing that it abused its discretion or committed
an error of law. Thus[,] our standard of review is very narrow.
To constitute reversible error, an evidentiary ruling must not only
be erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial to the complaining
party.
Commonwealth v. Bond, 190 A.3d 664, 667 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation
omitted).
The trial court concluded it did not err when it gave the jury a curative
instruction after Appellant’s line of questioning. See Trial Ct. Op. at 7. It
noted, “The letters and phone calls were consistent in that they concerned the
nature of the parties’ relationship and its future. They also advised [V]ictim
of the necessity of her not going to court or testifying against Appellant[,] or
there would be no future.” Id. at 11. The court determined that on cross-
examination of Victim, Appellant “strongly implied” that the four phone calls
were the only calls where he asked Victim not to come to court and testify,
and this “was simply not true.” Id. After discussing the matter with the
parties, the court decided a cautionary instruction was proper and would
“correct a false impression or belief.” Id. at 11-12.
- 13 -
J-S16043-23
We agree with the trial court’s determination that it did not abuse its
discretion. Appellant’s line of questioning implied that the remainder of the
165 phone calls did not include additional requests for Victim to not testify.
See N.T., 3/2/22, at 103 (asking Victim if the four calls played only
represented an “extremely small portion of those phone calls”). Appellant
claimed he sought to demonstrate merely that “a small portion of those
phones calls . . . have been played[,]” without any implication that the
requests were only in those four calls. See id. at 105. We disagree with
Appellant and, instead, accept the trial court’s conclusions.
Additionally, the trial court’s curative instruction did not prejudice
Appellant. At trial, he implied that the four calls were isolated events of his
requesting Victim not to attend the trial. The Commonwealth disagreed and
requested a curative instruction. See N.T., 3/2/22, at 103-04. It was
appropriate for the court to then provide an instruction, mindful of “the context
of what occurred” during the cross-examination. See Padilla, 923 A.2d at
1196. As Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the court abused its
discretion, no relief is due. See Bond, 190 A.3d at 667; Ford, 650 A.2d at
442.
In his second claim, Appellant argues the trial court erred when it did
not allow him to cross-examine Officer McIntyre about the timeline of his
incarceration. Appellant’s Brief at 17. Relevant to this claim, the
Commonwealth offered into evidence Officer McIntyre’s police body camera
footage from the day of the incident showing a conversation between the
- 14 -
J-S16043-23
officer and Victim. See N.T., 3/3/22, at 28-29. Appellant objected to the
relevancy of all the body camera footage, but the trial court permitted the
Commonwealth to present it to the jury. Id. at 29-31. The footage at issue
showed the following conversation between Officer McIntyre and Victim
immediately following the incident:
[Officer McIntyre: Appellant will] be going to Bucks County prison
today. I don’t know how long he’ll stay[. H]e’ll have to get . . .
bailed out but that’s up to . . . whatever he can do.
[Victim]: Can’t y’all please make sure [Appellant] does not come
nowhere near me?
[Officer McIntyre]: Well it will be up to the Judge, the Judge will
have that . . . set up that [Appellant] can’t have any contact with
you. If he gets out of prison . . . can I stop him from coming here?
I can’t. I’m not go[ing] to lie to you.
Trial Ct. Op. at 13-14.11
After the Commonwealth played this video, Appellant’s counsel argued
it “flings the door wide open to [questions about] incarceration[,]” and stated
he intended to cross-examine Officer McIntyre about Appellant’s incarceration.
See N.T., 3/3/22, at 69. Specifically, counsel averred:
[B]ased on the video evidence . . . of [Appellant] being placed into
custody in the police vehicle, under arrest, in handcuffs, moved to
another vehicle, and then . . . there [are] discussions . . . about
[Appellant] being taken into custody [and] to the Bucks County
Correctional Facility[.] I think there was testimony by Corporal
Smith about [Appellant] at the hospital, how he had to be cleared
____________________________________________
11A transcript of this conversation was not included in the trial transcript.
However, the trial court partially transcribed it in its opinion. See Trial Ct.
Op. at 13-14 n.1. The parties do not dispute the accuracy of this transcription.
Copies of the body camera footage were also included in the certified record.
- 15 -
J-S16043-23
for incarceration[.] I think at this point I’m seeking potentially to
introduce the fact that [Appellant] is incarcerated.
Id. at 69, 74-75. The Commonwealth noted it removed “countless phones
calls” with “any reference to [Appellant] being currently incarcerated” as it
was not relevant for the jury to consider. Id. at 77. After extensive discussion
between the parties and the trial court, the court concluded Appellant could
only ask the officer whether he was transported to the Bucks County facility
that day. Id. at 69-85.
Returning to Appellant’s argument on appeal, he avers he should have
been permitted to cross-examine Officer McIntyre about the fact that he was
incarcerated from the day of the incident through trial. Appellant’s Brief at
17. He insists the video footage “opened the door” to this line of questioning,
and the preclusion of it deprived him of his right to present a defense. Id. at
17-18. Appellant maintains that Victim’s concerns about his whereabouts
implied she was afraid of him, but he reasons “[t]he fact that [he] was
incarcerated at the time [of the] phone calls . . . would negate this implication
of fear because [Victim] had to accept each of the . . . phone calls.” Id. at
20. Appellant claims this knowledge would have demonstrated to the jury
that he knew the calls were being recorded, which was “relevant to undercut
the implication that [Victim] was afraid of [him].” Id. at 21. In support,
Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Yale, 249 A.3d 1001 (Pa. 2021), which
he summarizes to have “expanded the enhanced state constitutional right to
present a defense to include the right to present evidence.” Appellant’s Brief
at 18.
- 16 -
J-S16043-23
Preliminarily, we conclude Appellant’s reliance on Yale is misplaced. In
Yale, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held a defendant may introduce
evidence of a third party’s guilt if it is relevant to their defense and the
prejudicial value does not outweigh the probative value. See Yale, 249 A.3d
at 1004, 1025. While the Court highlighted the right to present a defense, its
holding focused on presenting evidence of third-party guilt as a defense. See
id. These facts are not analogous to the present matter, where there was no
alleged third party involved in the incident. As such, we do not consider Yale
governing authority.
Next, we note the trial court suggests Appellant has waived this claim
when he failed to object to the content of the videos, but instead only
challenged their relevancy. See Trial Ct. Op. at 12-14. However, Appellant
responds his claim is “clearly preserved” as he “requested to explore [a topic]
on cross-examination[,]” which the court did not allow. Appellant’s Brief at
17 n.1. We agree that a fair reading of the trial testimony encompasses
Appellant’s argument on appeal. See N.T. 3/3/22, at 69-85. For this reason,
we decline to find that Appellant waived this claim. Nevertheless, we conclude
Appellant is not entitled to relief.
“The Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that all criminal defendants enjoy ‘the right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses.’” Commonwealth v. Rosser, 135
A.3d 1077, 1087 (Pa. Super. 2016) (en banc) (citation omitted). “[T]he trial
court has broad discretion regarding both the scope and permissible limits of
- 17 -
J-S16043-23
cross-examination. The trial [court’s] exercise of judgment in setting those
limits will not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of that discretion,
or an error of law.” Id. (citations & quotation marked omitted). Additionally:
Although the right of cross-examination is a fundamental right, it
is not absolute. The trial court may place reasonable limits on
defense counsel’s cross-examination of a prosecution witness
“based on concerns about, among other things, harassment,
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or
interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”
“Generally speaking, the Confrontation Clause guarantees an
opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-
examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever
extent, the defense might wish.”
Id. at 1087-88 (citations omitted).
The trial court concluded it did not improperly limit the scope of
Appellant’s cross-examination of Officer McIntyre. Trial Ct. Op. at 12. It
reasoned:
[T]he question of whether, or for how long, Appellant . . . was
incarcerated at the Bucks County Correctional Facility prior to trial
is irrelevant to the question of his guilt. It was clearly beyond the
scope of cross-examination of [Officer McIntyre]. . . .
. . . [T]he testimony regarding the arrest of an individual and the
procedures surrounding bail and release do not “open the door”
to testimony about the length of time a person was incarcerated.
Testimony involving the length of incarceration prior to trial is
irrelevant. Further, [Officer McIntyre] was not the appropriate
witness to be questioned on this topic.
Id. at 14-15.
We agree with the trial court’s conclusions. Despite Appellant’s
assertions, the mere facts that he was incarcerated and that Victim accepted
his phone calls, do not automatically “negate” any implication of Victim’s fear.
- 18 -
J-S16043-23
See Appellant’s Brief at 20. Even so, if Appellant were permitted to follow
this line of questioning, Officer McIntyre was merely one of the arresting
officers and told Victim immediately after the incident, she did not know how
long Appellant would be in prison or if he was going to post bail. See Trial Ct.
Op. at 13. Thus, the trial court reasonably inferred the officer was not the
proper witness to question on this matter. See id. at 14-15. It was
appropriate for the court to limit the scope of cross-examination to facts within
the officer’s knowledge. See Rosser, 135 A.3d at 1087. Appellant has not
demonstrated that the trial court erred or abused its discretion, and as such,
no relief is due.
As Appellant has failed to establish that the trial court committed error
when it gave the jury a curative instruction regarding the phone calls or limited
the scope of cross-examination to facts within Officer McIntyre’s knowledge,
he is not entitled to relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 10/19/2023
- 19 -