Com. v. Colon, A. ( 2023 )


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  • J-A19044-23
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    ANGEL R. COLON                               :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 3167 EDA 2022
    Appeal from the Order Entered November 9, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-15-CR-0002033-2004,
    CP-15-CR-0004401-2004
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                        FILED OCTOBER 16, 2023
    Angel R. Colon (Colon) appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas
    of Chester County (trial court) which clarified an ambiguity as to whether he
    received credit for time served at his sentencing. We affirm.
    In Colon’s related appeals concerning his sentence (2418 EDA 2021 and
    2419 EDA 2021), we summarized the procedural history of the underlying
    matter as follows:
    In 2005, Colon pleaded guilty to corrupt organizations at docket
    number 2033-04 and three counts of delivery of a controlled
    substance2 at docket number 4401-04. Colon later moved to
    withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court denied the motion and
    sentenced him to an aggregate of twenty to fifty years of
    imprisonment. This Court affirmed Colon’s judgment of sentence
    on direct appeal, and Colon did not petition for allowance of appeal
    with our Supreme Court. The trial court reinstated Colon’s right
    ____________________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A19044-23
    to petition our Supreme Court for allowance of appeal following
    his first Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition, and our
    Supreme Court denied the petition on November 6, 2008. Colon
    filed several PCRA petitions between 2009 and 2015, all of which
    the PCRA court dismissed. In 2018, Colon filed a motion for time
    credit, which the court construed to be a PCRA petition and
    dismissed without a hearing.       This Court affirmed.      See
    Commonwealth v. Colon, 
    216 A.3d 409
     (Pa. Super. Apr. 22,
    2019) (unpublished memorandum).
    On August 25, 2021, Colon filed a pro se “Petition for Clarification
    and/or Correction of the Sentence in the Nature of ‘Credit for Time
    Served’, [sic] Nunc Pro Tunc.” In his petition, Colon asked the
    trial court to correct the sentencing judge’s “non-calculation of
    credit time in custody.” Colon further alleged that his co-
    defendant, also originally sentenced in 2005, had received credit
    for time served following a similar petition in 2020. The trial court
    treated Colon’s petition as an untimely PCRA petition and,
    pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907, issued
    a notice of intent to dismiss the petition on September 23, 2021.
    Colon filed a response to the court’s Rule 907 notice, in which he
    maintained that, in his petition, he had “asked [the court] to
    clarify whether his time in custody would be credited toward his
    sentence[.]”     The trial court nevertheless concluded Colon’s
    petition was an untimely PCRA petition and dismissed it without a
    hearing on October 27, 2021.          The trial court declined to
    acknowledge Colon’s assertion that he was seeking a clarification
    of his sentence; nor did the court address Colon’s assertion that
    his co-defendant had recently filed the same petition and received
    relief. Colon filed timely notices of appeal, and both he and the
    trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure
    1925.
    Commonwealth v. Colon, 2418 EDA 2021, 2419 EDA 2021, at *1 (Pa.
    Super. October 13, 2022) (unpublished memorandum decision) (footnotes
    and internal citations omitted).
    We granted Colon relief in the above appeals, remanding the case to the
    trial court to “resolve the ambiguity in Colon’s sentence, namely, to determine
    whether Colon’s sentence includes credit for time served in custody prior to
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    J-A19044-23
    sentencing.”     See id. at *4 (emphasis added).1      Significantly, Colon had
    “conceded that should the court clarify that his sentence included no credit for
    time served, he would be challenging the legality of his sentence.” Id. at *3
    n.4.
    Following remand, the trial court conducted proceedings consistent with
    our directive to clarify any ambiguity in Colon’s sentence.      In its order of
    November 9, 2022, the trial court stated that it had “reviewed the transcript
    of [Colon’s] sentencing and the applicable sentencing sheets, and the court
    has found no indication that [Colon’s] sentence includes credit for time served
    in custody prior to sentencing.” Trial Court Order, 11/9/2022, at 1.
    Despite that this clarification was the sole purpose of the remand of the
    case to the trial court, Colon again appealed. In his brief, Colon claims that
    the trial court erred because it “failed to acknowledge [or] address the
    ____________________________________________
    1 “If . . . the alleged error is thought to be attributable toambiguity in the
    sentence imposed by the trial court, then a writ of habeas corpus ad
    subjiciendum lies to the trial court for clarification and/or correction of the
    sentence imposed.” Commonwealth v. Perry, 
    563 A.2d 511
    , 513 (Pa.
    1989); see also Commonwealth v. Heredia, 
    97 A.3d 392
    , 394-95 (Pa.
    Super. 2014). A request for clarification of a sentence is not subject to the
    requirements of the Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546
    (PCRA). See Commonwealth v. Fowler, 
    930 A.2d 586
    , 591 (Pa. Super.
    2007).
    -3-
    J-A19044-23
    ambiguity as to why [Colon’s] co-defendant who had filed a similar petition in
    2020 [was granted relief].” Appellant’s Brief, at 10.2
    Here, Colon has failed to establish that the trial court abused its
    discretion.3 This case was remanded to the trial court for the sole purpose of
    clarifying whether Colon was entitled to credit for time served. The trial court
    did as we instructed, stating in its order that it had reviewed the relevant 2005
    orders and transcripts and concluded that Colon had not been awarded such
    credit.
    Colon suggests that he should have been or was awarded credit for time
    served because his co-defendant received such credit.       However, that fact
    alone is irrelevant. Their respective sentencing calculations hinged on several
    factors, such as whether bail was posted and whether the person was in
    custody while on a Board of Probation and Parole detainer. More succinctly,
    an award of credit time to Colon’s co-defendant and the lack of credit time
    awarded to Colon does not alone make Colon’s sentence ambiguous.
    ____________________________________________
    2 We note that Colon does not provide the dates of the “time served” for which
    he is entitled to credit.
    3 “Our standard of review of a court’s order denying a petition for writ of
    habeas corpus is limited to abuse of discretion. Thus, we may reverse the
    court’s order where the court has misapplied the law or exercised its discretion
    in a manner lacking reason.” Rivera v. Pa. Dept. of Corr., 
    837 A.2d 525
    ,
    528 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations omitted). Whether the trial court has
    authority to correct an alleged sentencing error is a pure question of law which
    we review under a de novo standard. See Commonwealth v. Kremer, 
    206 A.3d 543
    , 547-48 (Pa. Super. 2019).
    -4-
    J-A19044-23
    In addition, Colon does not identify any portion of the record which so
    much as suggests that his judgment of sentence is unclear. Claims which are
    not sufficiently developed will be deemed waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119; see
    also Commonwealth v. Felder, 
    247 A.3d 14
    , 20 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation
    omitted) (“Also, an issue identified on appeal but not developed in the
    appellant’s brief is abandoned and, therefore, waived.”).4
    In sum, the trial court had limited authority on remand to clarify the
    terms of Colon’s sentence and the trial court did so. Colon challenges that
    clarification, but he presents no cogent grounds for relief.   Thus, the trial
    court’s order must stand.
    Order affirmed.
    ____________________________________________
    4 Even had Colon been erroneously denied credit time when he was sentenced
    (an issue which is not now before us), relief for such error would only be
    available on direct appeal or by way of a post-conviction petition. See
    Commonwealth v. Fowler, 
    930 A.2d 586
    , 591 (Pa. Super. 2007). Colon
    has already unsuccessfully sought credit time in a prior appeal.           See
    Commonwealth v. Colon, 
    216 A.3d 409
     (Pa. Super. Apr. 22, 2019)
    (unpublished memorandum). He has also filed numerous post-conviction
    petitions. Accordingly, any challenge to the legality of Colon’s sentence would
    be outside the purview of this appeal, as well as procedurally barred. See
    Commonwealth v. Colon, 2418 EDA 2021, 2419 EDA 2021, at *1 (Pa.
    Super. October 13, 2022) (unpublished memorandum decision).
    -5-
    J-A19044-23
    Date: 10/16/2023
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 3167 EDA 2022

Judges: Pellegrini, J.

Filed Date: 10/16/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024