Skender, C. v. Skender, D. ( 2023 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
CAITLIN R. SKENDER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
DANIEL R. SKENDER : No. 482 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Dated March 31, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County Domestic Relations at
No(s): Docket No. 41948,
PACSES No. 593300990
DANIEL R. SKENDER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CAITLIN R. SKENDER :
:
Appellant : No. 483 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Dated March 31, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County Domestic Relations at
No(s): Docket No. 41975
BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 12, 2023
Appellant, Caitlin R. Skender (Mother), appeals from separate orders
dated March 31, 2022. One order, docketed in this Court at 482 WDA 2022,
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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denied Mother’s request to reconsider court-ordered child support owed to
Appellee, Daniel R. Skender (Father) for the parties’ two minor children. The
second order, docketed in this Court at 483 WDA 2022, terminated Father’s
claim for child support at a different trial court docket. For the reasons that
follow, we consolidate the appeals,1 affirm the trial court’s decision to award
child support to Father, and remand for the trial court to formally consolidate
the two actions and completely merge the separate trial court dockets.
We summarize the facts and procedural history of this matter as follows.
Mother and Father are the parents of two minor children (who were six and
four years old at the time of the hearings before the trial court). The parties
share physical custody of their children under a custody agreement dated
February 8, 2019. As mentioned, each party separately filed for child support
against the other party, with each action docketed separately before the trial
court. A domestic relations officer (“conference officer”) held a hearing on
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1 We sua sponte consolidate the appeals because they involve related issues
and parties. See Pa.R.A.P. 513 (“[…W]here the same question is involved in
two or more appeals in different cases, the appellate court may, in its
discretion, order them to be argued together in all particulars as if but a single
appeal.”). As will be discussed, Mother filed a complaint for child support on
July 30, 2021. The trial court docketed the case as number 41948 (hereinafter
“Mother’s docket”) and we docketed Mother’s appeal in that case as 482 WDA
2022. On August 23, 2021, Father filed a separate claim for child support
(essentially a counterclaim to Mother’s support action) which was docketed in
the trial court at number 41975 (hereinafter “Father’s docket”). We have
docketed Mother’s appeal in that case as 483 WDA 2022. Mother, as the
appealing party in both cases, has filed separate briefs with this Court. For
ease of discussion and citation, we refer to Mother’s brief at 482 WDA 2022
as “Mother’s Brief on Mother’s Docket” and we refer to Mother’s Brief at 483
WDA 2022 as “Mother’s Brief on Father’s Docket.”
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both claims August 24, 2021. At the hearing, and throughout subsequent
proceedings on these matters, the parties did not dispute each other’s incomes
and have always acknowledged that Mother has a larger income than Father.
On September 3, 2021, upon the recommendation of the conference officer,
the trial court entered a support order in favor of Mother and against Father
at Mother’s docket. On the same date, the trial court also entered an order
at Father’s docket dismissing his claim for child support without prejudice,
finding that Father was not entitled to support and ordering the “case … closed
with a zero balance.” Order of Court, Father’s Docket, 9/3/2021 at *1. The
trial court also noted that “if a demand for a de novo hearing is filed … both
cases will be scheduled [together] and heard concurrently.” Id. On
September 3, 2021, Father filed a timely demand for a de novo hearing at
Mother’s docket only. Consequently, the trial court simultaneously scheduled
a de novo hearing at both Mother’s docket and Father’s docket. See Order of
Court, Father’s Docket, 9/23/2021, at 1.
The trial court held a single hearing on November 10, 2021, wherein
each party testified. Counsel stipulated to each party’s annual gross income.
See N.T., 11/10/2021, at 3 (“Father makes $48,000.00 a year. Mother’s
income is at $62,926.50 a year, gross annual.”); see also id. at 25
(“[Mother’s] gross income is not really disputed, but [counsel is unsure] the
calculation of [her] pension and the dues … is correct.”). Mother also
presented evidence of her childcare expenses for the children. On February
16, 2022, the trial court filed identical findings of fact, captioned with both
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Mother’s docket number and Father’s docket number, at both dockets. The
trial court also filed separate orders at each docket on February 16, 2022. At
Mother’s docket, the trial court entered an order awarding Mother child
support, and arrears, from Father. At Father’s docket, the trial court entered
an order “terminat[ing the court’s] interest in [Father’s] matter.” See Order
of Court, Father’s Docket, 2/16/2022, at *1.
On March 18, 2022, Father filed a motion for reconsideration at Father’s
docket, but not at Mother’s docket. Citing Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-4,2 Father
argued that the trial court erred as a matter of law by ordering him to pay
Mother child support when he was “the lesser wage earner.” Father’s Motion
for Reconsideration, 3/18/2022, at 5-6, ¶ 9. Father further argued that the
trial court erred by dismissing his complaint for support and closing his case.
Id. at 6, ¶ 12. On the same day, the trial court filed an order expressly
granting reconsideration at Father’s docket only. Thereafter, on March 31,
2022, the trial court docketed separate orders at both Mother’s docket and
Father’s docket that vacated the court’s earlier February 16, 2022 orders
“upon review of the testimony presented at the [November 10, 2021] hearing
de novo, along with reconsidering the applicability of Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16.4 to
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2 Rule 1910.16-4 provides, in pertinent part, that “when a child spends an
equal number of annual overnights with the parties[, t]he trier-of-fact shall
not require the party with the lower monthly net income to pay basic child
support to the party with the higher monthly net income. However, this
subdivision shall not preclude the entry of an order requiring the party with
less monthly net income to contribute to additional expenses pursuant to
Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.16-6.” Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-4(2)(ii) (emphasis added).
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the undisputed facts regarding each party’s average net monthly income[.]”
Order of Court, 3/31/2022, at *1. Moreover, each order docketed on March
31, 2002 cross-referenced the other party’s docket. Id. The trial court
entered two additional orders, one on each docket, on March 31, 2022. At
Father’s docket, the trial court ordered Mother to pay Father $484.00 per
month in child support and $44.00 per month for arrears. Order of Court,
Father’s Docket, 3/31/2022, at 2. The order further directed that, “[Mother]
shall provide to [Father] the receipts for all childcare expenses[, Father shall
pay his proportional share of childcare expenses directly to [Mother], within
thirty (30) days of receiving the receipt [and] reimburse [Mother] for his
proportional share of childcare expenses incurred since July 30, 2021.” Id. at
3. At Mother’s docket, the trial court entered an order “based upon
[r]econsideration under the separate order of court dated March 31, 2022,
[Father’s support] obligation in this matter shall terminate effective July 30,
2021” because the trial court “determined that an obligation is not due
[Mother] as the parties share custody equally and [her] income exceeds
[Father’s].” Order of Court, Mother’s Docket, 3/31/2022, at 1. Mother filed
timely motions for reconsideration, captioned with Mother’s docket number
and Father’s docket number, at each docket. On April 21, 2022, the trial court
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denied relief in separate orders noted on each docket and Mother timely
appealed both decisions.3
Before we examine the merits of Mother’s appeals, however, we must
address Mother’s argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to reconsider
its February 2022 orders at both trial court docket numbers. See Mother’s
Brief on Father’s Docket, at 12-13 (“No reconsideration was ever requested
[on Mother’s docket] by either party, nor was the February 15, 2022 [o]rder
at [Father’s docket] modified, vacated or in any way changed within thirty
(30) days of its entry” in contravention of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505); see also
Mother’s Brief on Mother’s Docket, at 12-13 (Father “filed a [m]otion for
[r]econsideration on March 15, 2022 as it relates to his case only, at [Father’s
docket]. He did not file a [m]otion for [r]econsideration as to [Mother’s] case
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3 Mother filed separate notices of appeal, one at each docket, on April 28,
2022. Mother, however, failed to file corresponding concise statements of
errors complained of on appeal as required pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i). On May 17, 2022, the trial court ordered Mother to file a Rule
1925 concise statement within 21 days. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/8/2022,
at 3. The docket reveals that Mother did not file a concise statements until
June 17, 2022, or 30 days later. See Commonwealth v. Schofield, 888
A.2d 771, 774 (Pa. 2005) (“[F]ailure to comply with the minimal requirements
of Pa.R.A.P.1925(b) will result in automatic waiver of the issues raised.”).
However, because the dockets further reveal that the prothonotary did not
give the parties notice of the trial court’s Rule 1925(b) order, we decline to
find Mother’s issues waived on appeal. See In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 510
(Pa. Super. 2007) (“Because the docket does not show that notice of the court
order to file a Rule 1925(b) statement was served on the parties, as required
by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 236(b), we decline to conclude that
Mother has waived her issues on appeal.”); see also Pa.R.C.P. 236(b).
Moreover, the trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on
July 8, 2022, addressing all of the issues set forth in Mother’s Rule 1925(b)
statement.
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at [Mother’s docket]. The [trial c]ourt granted reconsideration as to [Father’s]
case only by order dated March 17, 2022.”).
We have previously determined:
The effect which an application for reconsideration will have on
the appeal process is addressed in Pa.R.A.P., Rule 1701. This rule
tolls the time for taking an appeal only when the court files “an
order expressly granting reconsideration ... within the time
prescribed by these rules for the filing of a notice of appeal.”
Phrased differently the trial court is permitted to grant
reconsideration only if such action is taken during the applicable
appeal period. An order granting reconsideration will only be
effective if it is made and entered on the docket before expiration
of the applicable appeal period, 30 days from the entry of the
order which is the subject of the reconsideration motion, and if it
states that it is expressly granting reconsideration. It should be
emphasized that the Rule requires reconsideration to be expressly
granted. It is insufficient for the trial court to merely set a hearing
date on the reconsideration motion or issue a [r]ule to [s]how
[c]ause. Failure to “expressly” grant reconsideration within the
time set by the rules for filing an appeal will cause the trial court
to lose its power to act on the application for reconsideration.
See: Note following Pa.R.A.P. 1701.
Schoff v. Richter, 562 A.2d 912, 913 (Pa. Super. 1989). “If a court fails to
act on a timely reconsideration motion within the appeal period, it loses
jurisdiction to do so.” Manufacturers & Traders Tr. Co. v. Greenville
Gastroenterology, SC, 108 A.3d 913, 918 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal
citation omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 903 (“[N]otice of appeal … shall be filed
within 30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken.”).
“The time within which a trial court may grant reconsideration of its orders is
a matter of law....” Greenville Gastroenterology, SC, 108 A.3d at 917
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(citation omitted). “For questions of law, our standard of review is de novo,
and our scope of review is plenary.” Id. (citation omitted).
Moreover,
[p]ursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505, the trial court “upon notice to
the parties may modify or rescind any order within thirty days
after its entry, notwithstanding the prior termination of any term
of court, if no appeal from such order has been taken or allowed.”
The lower court's authority under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 to modify
or rescind an order “is almost entirely discretionary; this power
may be exercised sua sponte, or may be invoked by a request for
reconsideration filed by the parties, and the court's decision to
decline to exercise such power will not be reviewed on appeal.”
Justice v. Justice, 612 A.2d 1354, 1357 (Pa. Super. 1992).
* * *
After the expiration of thirty days, the trial court loses its broad
discretion to modify, and the order can be opened or vacated only
upon a showing of extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, a fatal defect apparent on the face of the record
or some other evidence of “extraordinary cause justifying
intervention by the court.” Simpson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 504
A.2d 335 (Pa. Super. 1986); Orie v. Stone, 601 A.2d 1268 (Pa.
Super. 1992).
Stockton v. Stockton, 698 A.2d 1334, 1337 (Pa. Super. 1997).
We begin our analysis by considering Mother’s claim that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its February 2022 order at Father’s docket.
This claim rests on the contention that the trial court lost jurisdiction to
entertain Father’s request for reconsideration when it failed to act by
affirmatively granting reconsideration within the applicable appeal period.
Here, the support orders and findings of fact at issue were dated by the trial
court as February 15, 2022. However, “an order is ‘entered’ when it has been
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docketed and notice of the docketing has been given to the parties.” Reeves
v. Middletown Athletic Ass'n, 866 A.2d 1115, 1120 (Pa. Super. 2004),
citing Yeaple v. Yeaple, 402 A.2d 1022, 1024 (Pa. 1979). Upon our review,
the orders at issue were noted on the respective dockets on February 16,
2022, but there is no statement on the record that notice was given to the
parties. As a technical matter, then, the commencement of the limiting appeal
period was not triggered. See Pa.R.A.P. 108(a)(1) ("in computing any period
of time under these rules involving the date of entry of an order by a court or
other government unit, the day of entry shall be the day the clerk of the court
or the office of the government unit mails or delivers copies of the order to
the parties”). Regardless, the trial court entered an order expressly granting
reconsideration on Father’s docket on March 18, 2022, or 30 days after the
February 16, 2022 order was first noted on the trial court’s ledger. As such,
because the appeal period was not triggered by proper entries on the trial
court docket and because the trial court expressly granted reconsideration
within 30 days of the date the subject order was first noted on the docket, we
discern no impediment to the trial court’s subsequent decision to revisit its
February 2022 order.
Next, we consider the procedural conundrum created by Father’s failure
to seek reconsideration at Mother’s docket, which serves as the basis for
Mother’s position that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the February
16, 2022 order at Mother’s docket. Father’s motion to reconsider at Father’s
docket averred that the trial court erred as a matter of law in awarding Mother
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support under Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-4 when the evidence showed, and Mother
conceded, that she earned more income than Father. Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-
4(2)(ii) precluded the trial court from requiring the lower monthly net income
earner, Father in this case, to pay basic child support to the party with the
higher monthly net income, or Mother. Because the undisputed evidence
showed that Mother was the higher income earner and Rule 1910.16-4(2)(ii)
prohibited an award of child support to her, the February 16, 2022 order
entered at Mother’s docket suffered from a fatal defect that was apparent
upon the face of the record. See, e.g., Danz v. Danz, 947 A.2d 750, 756
(Pa. Super. 2008) (“Rule 1920.2(b) requires a trial court to ensure the record
establishes venue is proper—either by residence, written agreement, or tacit
agreement through participation—before directing entrance of a divorce
decree. The divorce decree in this case suffers from ’a fatal defect apparent
upon the face of the record’ due to the fact that the trial court failed to comply
with Rule 1920.2(b).”). For this additional reason, the trial court was justified
in vacating the February 16, 2022 orders at both dockets after the 30-day
general requirement for rescinding orders under Section 5505 expired.
Finally, with regard to the procedural posture of the case, we note the
following. Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 213:
(a) In actions pending in a county which involve a common
question of law or fact or which arise from the same transaction
or occurrence, the court on its own motion or on the motion of
any party may order a joint hearing or trial of any matter in issue
in the actions, may order the actions consolidated, and may make
orders that avoid unnecessary cost or delay.
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(b) The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice,
may, on its own motion or on motion of any party, order a
separate trial of any cause of action, claim, or counterclaim,
set-off, or cross-suit, or of any separate issue, or of any number
of causes of action, claims, counterclaims, set-offs, cross-suits, or
issues.
Pa.R.C.P. 213(a)-(b).4 “[U]nder Rule 213(a), a trial court has three options
where pending actions involve either a common question of law or fact, or
which arise from the same transaction: (1) ordering a joint trial or hearing on
any matter at issue; (2) ordering the actions ‘consolidated’; and (3) issuing
other orders designed to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” Kincy v. Petro,
2 A.3d 490, 493 (Pa. 2010). More specifically, our Supreme Court has
recognized:
The term ‘consolidation’ is used in three different senses: First,
where all except one of the several actions are stayed until one is
tried, in which case the judgment in the one is conclusive as to
the others; second, where several actions are combined into one
and lose their separate identity and become a single action in
which a single judgment is rendered; and, third, where several
actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its
separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment.
Failure in many cases to clearly distinguish between these various
uses of the word has caused no little apparent confusion in the
decisions. Where a technical consolidation takes place, the result
is that one verdict is rendered which is conclusive of the entire
subject matter of the litigation. Consequently, different actions
cannot be consolidated unless between the same parties and
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4 We note that subsection (e) of Rule 231 was preempted by federal law but
is inapplicable instantly. See Simmons v. Simpson House, Inc., 259 F.
Supp. 3d 200, 211 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (Rule 213(e) is a rule of compulsory
joinder, providing that wrongful death and survival actions may be enforced
in one action, but if independent actions are commenced they shall be
consolidated for trial but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled that Rule
213(e) conflicts with the Federal Arbitration Act and is preempted).
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involving the same subject-matter, issues, and defenses. But
where separate actions in favor of or against two or more persons
have arisen out of a single transaction, and the evidence by which
they are supported is largely the same, although the rights and
liabilities of parties may differ, it is within the discretion of the trial
judge to order all to be tried together, though in every other
respect the actions remain distinct and require separate verdicts
and judgments.
* * *
[S]eparate actions cannot be consolidated to the extent the
actions lose their separate identities and become a single action
what we will refer to as “complete consolidation”—unless the
actions involve the same parties, subject matter, issues, and
defenses.
Id. at 494 (internal citation omitted). Consolidation is permissible to avoid
“multiple trials and proceedings involving common facts or issues arising from
the same transaction or occurrence.” Pa.R.C.P. 213, Comment. “The
duplication of efforts is a benefit to both the parties and the courts.” Id. Rule
213 was further promulgated for “the prevention of inconsistent verdicts ...
the elimination of trial delays, speedier litigation, and the reduction of
expenses for the parties.” See 3 Standard Pa. Practice 2d § 19.17.
An appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard to the trial
court’s decision regarding consolidation. See Azinger v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., 105 A. 87, 88 (Pa. 1918) (“The question is one that must necessarily be
left to the discretion of the trial judge, and where the issues are the same and
they arise out of the same transaction, and it does not appear the trial of the
cases together would tend to place the objecting party at a disadvantage, or
give an undue advantage to his adversary, the action of the court in ordering
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the cases tried together will not be reversed.”). Our Supreme Court has
explained, therefore, the rules pertaining to consolidation hinge upon whether
or not the separate identities of the actions have been erased. See Rutta v.
Oz, 240 A.3d 156, at *2 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum), citing
Azinger, 105 A. at 88.
Here, upon our review of the record and applicable law, we conclude
that the trial court abused its discretion regarding consolidation. At the outset,
we observe that the two matters before us involve identical parties and their
competing support claims concerning the same children. Moreover, while the
parties expressed differing views about the evidence, the two cases never
truly possessed separate and distinct identities. As set forth above, however,
Father filed several documents at only one docket, but the trial court
subsequently took action to enter orders at both dockets. For example, Father
filed a demand for a de novo hearing at Mother’s docket only, but the trial
court entered an order at Father’s docket scheduling a hearing based upon
Father’s demand at Mother’s docket. See Order of Court, Father’s Docket,
9/23/2021, at 1 (“On September 21, 2021, [Father’s counsel] filed a
[d]emand for de novo hearing on the reverse captioned case[.]”). Likewise,
when Father filed a motion for reconsideration at Father’s docket only, the
trial court reconsidered its decision on Mother’s docket and ultimately vacated
its prior ruling by separate order. See Order of Court, Mother’s Docket,
9/23/2021, at 1 (“[U]pon review of the testimony presented at the de novo
hearing, along with reconsidering the applicability of Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-4 to
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the undisputed facts regarding each party’s average net monthly income, it is
hereby ordered that the order of court dated February 15, 2022 is vacated.”)
(emphasis and unnecessary capitalization omitted). While the trial court
ultimately amended its original February 2022 orders at both dockets,
questions have emerged as to whether it was proper for the court to do so
given that procedural formalities that permit the court to revisit its earlier
rulings were not strictly followed in both cases. We have resolved those
inquiries but, in our view, these issues were entirely avoidable, posed a risk
of inconsistent determinations, and have led to the unnecessary expenditure
of considerable judicial resources.
In this matter, the parties, actions, subject-matter, issues, and defenses
all clearly centered solely on identical questions of child support. As such, we
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to completely
consolidate the two actions. Hence, we remand this matter for the trial court
to enter an order consolidating the matters and completely merging the two
dockets into one. Keefer v. Keefer, 741 A.2d 808, 811 (Pa. Super. 1999)
(“[W]here two actions are [completely] consolidated pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.
213(a) only one action retains its identity and the others are absorbed by it.”).
Having resolved the procedural anomalies in this case, we proceed to examine
the merits of Mother’s appellate contentions.
On appeal at Father’s docket, Mother presents the following issues for
our review:
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A. Whether the trial court erred in its calculation of the parties’
net incomes?
B. Whether the trial court erred in the calculation of child
support[] owed from Mother to Father?
C. Whether the trial court erred in closing [Father’s] case and
reversing and then re-opening [Father’s] case wherein
[Mother’s] expenses outweigh any monthly support owed from
[Father] to [Mother]?
Mother’s Brief on Father’s Docket, at 10 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
In child support cases, our standard or review is as follows:
The amount of a support order is largely within the discretion of
the trial court, whose judgment should not be disturbed on appeal
absent a clear abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is not
merely an error of judgment, but rather a misapplication of the
law or an unreasonable exercise of judgment. A finding that the
trial court abused its discretion must rest upon a showing by clear
and convincing evidence, and the trial court will be upheld on any
valid ground. For our purposes, an abuse of discretion requires
proof of more than a mere error of judgment, but rather evidence
that the law was misapplied or overridden, or that the judgment
was manifestly unreasonable or based on bias, ill will, prejudice
or partiality.
Isralsky v. Isralsky, 824 A.2d 1178, 1186 (Pa. Super. 2003) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
In her first issue, Mother contends that the trial court erred in calculating
the parties’ gross annual salaries and net incomes. Mother’s Brief on Father’s
Docket, at 15-17. More specifically, Mother asserts that the trial court used
lower, different figures for computing her annual income in its earlier findings
of fact and corresponding orders on September 3, 2021 and February 15,
2022. Id. at 16 (“[T]he September 3, 2021 [o]rder indicated that [Mother’s]
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income was based on her salaried amount of $61,386.00[.”). She claims that
“it appears that it was the [c]ourt’s intent to [continue to] use the income
numbers set forth in the September 3, 2021 [o]rder and that clearly is not
what occurred.” Id. at 17; see also generally Mother’s Brief at Mother’s
Docket, at 20-21 (similar arguments).
The trial court first recognized that counsel for the parties agreed upon
the conference officer’s initial calculation of each party’s net monthly income.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/8/2022, at 6. However, as set forth above, “[c]ounsel
for the parties stipulated on the record at the hearing de novo to [Mother’s]
annual gross income in the amount of $62,926.50 and [Father] earning an
annual gross income of $48,000.00.” Id. As such, the trial court recalculated
each party’s net income “to be slightly higher than determined by the
[c]onference [o]fficer.” Id.
Upon review of the record, we agree with the trial court’s determination
and discern no abuse of discretion. Mother stipulated to higher earnings at
the later de novo hearing. The trial court considered those new figures in
computing gross annual salaries and net incomes for the parties. As such,
Mother is not entitled to relief on her first issue.
Next, Mother asserts that the trial court “failed to correctly calculate
[Mother’s] net monthly income including her mandatory deductions for
retirement and union dues[.]” Mother’s Brief at Father’s Docket, at 14; see
id. at 20 (“[I]t does not appear that the appropriate deductions were made
for [her] mandatory retirement and union dues.”); see also generally
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Mother’s Brief at Mother’s Docket, at 22 (similar arguments). Again, Mother
urges this Court to utilize $61,386.00 as her gross income. Mother’s Brief at
Father’s Docket, at 20. On this issue, the trial court recognized that Mother’s
“involuntary employer withholdings, along with union dues and the pension
contribution, were both subtracted from her gross income by the [c]onference
[o]fficer using [a] net income calculation template.” Trial Court Opinion,
7/8/2022, at 4. The trial court considered those calculations. Moreover,
Mother presented the trial court with extensive evidence pertaining to her
mandatory employment contributions at the de novo hearing. N.T.,
11/10/2021, at 24-27. Thus, we presume that the trial court considered these
adjustments in its decision. Based upon our review, there is no evidence that
the law was misapplied or overridden, or that the trial court’s judgment was
manifestly unreasonable or based on bias, ill will, prejudice or partiality. As
such, we discern no abuse of discretion in determining Mother’s net monthly
income and Mother’s second issue does not warrant relief.
Finally, Mother asserts that the trial court erred by ordering Father to
reimburse Mother “for his share of the costs of childcare, preschool and speech
[classes]”. Mother’s Brief at Father’s Docket, at 21. She contends that the
trial court should have off-set her expenses for childcare with her base support
obligation because “[i]t is inequitable to have Father receive a garnished
amount of child support and [Mother’s] childcare, pre-K, speech and insurance
expenses be reimbursed by [Father].” Id. at 22. She further argues that “[i]f
[Father] does not pay then [Mother] has to seek relief through the [c]ourt all
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while continuing to pay him support that he owes back to her.” Id. Mother
challenges the trial court’s opinion that Father reimburse Mother for childcare
related expenses because those expenses fluctuate throughout the year and
are not paid by her on a regular monthly basis. Id. at 21. Instead, Mother
calculates the annual amount she allegedly spends on childcare, suggests that
it is the same amount she owes Father for child support, and contends that
the amounts produce a complete offset. Id. at 22-23. As such, Mother argues
that she is not obligated to provide Father with child support. Id. at 23; see
also generally Mother’s Brief at Mother’s Docket, at 18-20 and 23-24 (similar
arguments).
Initially, we note that Mother does not provide legal authority to support
this claim. We could find this issue waived. See Eichman v. McKeon, 824
A.2d 305 (Pa. Super. 2003) (failure to cite relevant legal authority constitutes
waiver of the claim on appeal). Regardless, the trial court recognized that
Mother’s “payment of child care expenses is inconsistent and is not paid
monthly, but rather by fluctuating payments for ‘blocks’ of time.” Trial Court
Opinion, 7/8/2022, at 3; see also id. at 5 (The amount of [Mother’s] childcare
expenses fluctuate throughout the year and are not paid by her on a regular
monthly basis[.]”). The trial court found it was more prudent to order
reimbursement rather than try to annualize childcare expenses because it
“would simply invite unnecessary [future] support modification requests.” Id.
at 5. The court ultimately determined that “[b]y directing [Father] to directly
reimburse [Mother] outside of [the child s]upport [o]rder is more reasonable
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in view of the varying amounts inconsistently paid by her throughout the year
for childcare related expenses.” Id.
We discern no abuse of discretion in ordering Father to reimburse
Mother for his proportional share of childcare expenses rather than including
childcare expenses in the computation of Mother’s base child support
obligation. The Support Guidelines specifically state that with regard to
childcare expenses, “the trier-of-fact … shall allocate reasonable child care
expenses paid by the parties, if necessary to maintain employment or
appropriate education in pursuit of income.” Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(a)(1). The
Rule further provides that “[t]he trier-of-fact may require that the obligor's
share be added to the basic child support obligation, paid directly to the
service provider, or paid directly to the obligee.” Pa.R.C.P.
1910.16-6(a)(2) (emphasis added). As the Rule makes perfectly clear, the
trial court was authorized to order Father to pay Mother directly for his share
of childcare expenses and, therefore, it did not abuse its discretion in doing
so. See Horwath v. DiGrazio, 142 A.3d 877, 880 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(analyzing the intent of the Supreme Court with regard to the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the best indication of said intent is the plain language of a rule).
As such, Mother is not entitled to relief on her final claim.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decisions in
these matters, but remand the cases for the trial court to order complete
consolidation of the matters and to merge the two dockets accordingly.
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Orders affirmed. Case remanded with directions. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judge Pellegrini joins.
Judge Nichols concurs in the result.
DATE: 12/12/2023
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