Com. v. Ramey, M. ( 2023 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MARQUIS RAMEY :
:
Appellant : No. 355 EDA 2023
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 19, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0001422-2013
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 12, 2023
Marquis Ramey (“Ramey”) appeals pro se from the order dismissing his
third petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”).1 We affirm.
In 2014, the trial court found Ramey guilty of loitering and prowling at
night, possession of instruments of crime, receiving stolen property, persons
not to possess a firearm, carrying a firearm without a license, and criminal
conspiracy, and sentenced him to nine to twenty years in prison. This Court
affirmed the judgment of sentence and our Supreme Court denied allowance
of appeal on August 23, 2016. See Commonwealth v. Ramey, 136 A.3d
1031 (Pa. Super. 2016) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 145 A.3d
____________________________________________1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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725 (Pa. 2016). Ramey did not see further review in the United States
Supreme Court.
Ramey filed a timely first pro se PCRA petition, and the PCRA court
appointed counsel. Ramey filed several petitions to remove appointed counsel
and, after a Grazier hearing,2 he was permitted to proceed pro se. Ultimately,
the PCRA court dismissed the petition. This Court affirmed the dismissal. See
Commonwealth v. Ramey, 209 A.3d 1080 (Pa. Super. 2019) (unpublished
memorandum). In 2019, Ramey filed a second pro se PCRA petition which
the PCRA court dismissed. This Court affirmed the dismissal of Ramey’s
second PCRA petition and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Ramey, 236 A.3d 1079 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished
memorandum), appeal denied, 240 A.3d 874 (Pa. 2020). In May 2022, Ramey
filed a pro se “Motion for Relief and Modify Sentence.” However, before the
lower court could address that motion, Ramey filed a notice of appeal. This
Court quashed the appeal as interlocutory. See Commonwealth v. Ramey,
1473 EDA 2022 (Pa. Super. 2022).
On October 19, 2022, Ramey filed a pro se “Request for Question in
Review” wherein he challenged the legality of his sentence for persons not to
possess a firearm and claimed that his sentence for receiving stolen property
was excessive. The PCRA court treated the filing as Ramey’s third PCRA
____________________________________________
2 See Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).
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petition.3 The PCRA court determined that the petition was untimely and that
it lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition because Ramey failed to plead or
prove any exception to the PCRA’s one year time bar. On this basis, the PCRA
court issued a notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing
pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Ramey filed a response to the notice. On
January 19, 2023, the PCRA court dismissed the petition. Ramey filed a timely
notice of appeal.4 Both Ramey and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P.
1925.
Ramey raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the sentencing court had the authority to imply [sic]
the “mandatory minimum sentence” enhancement after being
found “not guilty” of any “crime of violence[.]”[]
____________________________________________
3 Although Ramey styled his filing as “Request,” the PCRA court properly
treated it as a petition filed pursuant to the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542
(providing that “[t]he action established in this subchapter shall be the sole
means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law
and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist when this subchapter
takes effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis”); see also
Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. 2001) (holding that “[n]o
other statutory or common law remedy ‘for the same purpose’ is intended to
be available; instead, such remedies are explicitly ‘encompassed’ within the
PCRA.”).
4 Ramey filed a timely notice of appeal in this Court on February 1, 2023,
which was docketed at 355 EDA 2023. However, Ramey also filed a timely
notice of appeal in the trial court on January 27, 2023, which notice was not
forwarded to this Court. Upon its discovery, the prothonotary of this Court
docketed the January 27, 2023 notice of appeal at 829 EDA 2023. This Court
then issued a rule to show cause why the appeal at 829 EDA 2023 should not
be quashed as duplicative of the appeal at 355 EDA 2023. No response was
received, and the appeal at 829 EDA 2023 was dismissed as duplicative of the
appeal at 355 EDA 2023.
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2. Whether the PCRA court abused its discretion for not allowing
[Ramey’s] ineffective assistance of counsel [sic] to be process
[sic] and argued.
3. Whether the sentencing court abused its discretion by not
merging “person not to possess firearm” with “receiving stolen
property[.]”[]
4. Also, [Ramey] seeks permission to challenge the discretionary
aspects of the sentence.
Ramey’s Brief at 3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).5
Our standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is well-
settled:
We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level.
This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the
evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it
is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. This
Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the
record supports it. Further, we grant great deference to the
factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those
findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we
afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Where the
petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de
novo and our scope of review plenary.
Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
omitted).
Under the PCRA, any petition including a second or subsequent petition
must be filed within one year of the date on which the judgment of sentence
____________________________________________
5 Notably, Ramey’s second and third issues were not raised in his petition and
would be deemed waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). However, given our
disposition, we need not address waiver.
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becomes final. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence
becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review
in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional
in nature, and a court may not address the merits of the issues raised if the
PCRA petition was not timely filed. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994
A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).
In the instant matter, Ramey’s judgment of sentence became final on
November 21, 2016, ninety days after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied
his petition for allowance of appeal and he declined to petition the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. See U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13 (stating
that an appellant must file petition for writ of certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court within ninety days after entry of judgment by a state court of
last resort). Thus, Ramey had until November 21, 2017, to file a timely PCRA
petition. The instant petition, filed on October 19, 2022, was filed nearly five
years after the judgment of sentence became final. Therefore, the instant
petition is facially untimely under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).
Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition if the
petitioner can plead and prove one of three exceptions set forth under 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1), which provides:
(b) Time for filing petition.—
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(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or
subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the
judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation
of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United
States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this section and has been held by that court to
apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Any PCRA petition invoking one of these
exceptions “shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could have
been presented.” Id. § 9545(b)(2). If the petition is untimely and the
petitioner has not pleaded and proven a timeliness exception, the petition
must be dismissed without a hearing because Pennsylvania courts are without
jurisdiction to consider the merits of the petition. See Commonwealth v.
Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 468 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Our review confirms that Ramey failed to plead or prove any exception
to the PCRA’s one-year time bar. Consequently, the PCRA court lacked
jurisdiction to consider the merits of the petition. See id. Accordingly, we
affirm the dismissal of Ramey’s third PCRA petition.
Order affirmed.
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Date: 12/12/2023
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