In the Int. of: E.D.A. III, a Minor ( 2023 )

J-A23011-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: E.D.A., III, A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: E.D.A., JR., FATHER :
:
:
:
: No. 683 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered April 20, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
2022-0007a,
2022-0008a, 2022-0009a,
2022-0010a, 2022-0019a
IN THE INTEREST OF: E.J.A., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: E.A., JR., FATHER :
:
:
:
: No. 684 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered April 20, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
2022-0009a
IN THE INT. OF: R.M.A., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: E.A., JR., FATHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 685 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered April 20, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
2022-0010a
J-A23011-22
IN THE INT. OF: A.B.A., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: E.A., JR., FATHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 686 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered April 20, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
2022-0019a
IN THE INTEREST OF: B.W., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: E.A., JR., FATHER :
:
:
:
: No. 687 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered April 20, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
2022-0007a
BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED DECEMBER 14, 2023
E.A., Jr. (“Father”), appeals from the decrees entered on April 20, 2022,
which terminated involuntarily his parental rights to B.W., born in May 2014;
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Ed.A., born in June 2015; R.A., born in June 2018; El.A., born in August 2019;
and A.A., born in June 2021.1 We affirm.
The York County Office of Children, Youth, and Families (“CYF”) first
became involved with the family in 2019 due to concerns with substance abuse
by Mother and Father. A referral was made to CYF in August 2020 based on
an allegation that they were abusing drugs and not properly disciplining or
supervising the four oldest children. Those children were placed into care and
adjudicated dependent on September 16, 2020. After A.A. was born, he was
likewise placed into care and adjudicated dependent.2
____________________________________________
1 We have adjusted the abbreviations used within this writing to align with
those used by this Court in several related cases presently or recently before
this Court. To wit, with respect to termination, T.W.A. (“Mother”), El.A., and
R.A., have also appealed, and those appeals are docketed at 755-759 MDA
2022, 740 MDA 2022, and 741 MDA 2022, respectively. Additionally, Father
and Mother also appealed the goal change from reunification to adoption,
docketed at 201-205 MDA 2022 and 295-299 MDA 2022, respectively. Finally,
Father and Mother appealed from an order finding them both perpetrators of
abuse as to B.W. and El.A. This Court stayed all matters, including the instant
termination appeal, pending resolution of the abuse appeals. Ultimately, we
affirmed the findings of abuse. See Int. of B.W., 2023 WL 5526687(Pa.Super. 2023) (non-precedential decision) (affirming the finding of abuse
as to Father); Int. of B.W., 290 A.3d 702, 2022 WL 17973239 (Pa.Super.
2022) (non-precedential decision) (affirming the finding of abuse as to
Mother). Although the stay has been lifted in the termination matters, it
remains active on the goal change appeals. Regrettably, the cumulative effect
has been the tragic prolongation of several Children’s Fast Track cases for this
family, which are, by nature, meant to be resolved quickly by this Court for
the benefit of the impacted children.
2 All five children were eventually placed in the same pre-adoptive resource
home along with an older half-sibling, where they remained at the time of the
termination hearing.
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As a result of the dependency adjudications, Father was ordered to, inter
alia, cooperate with both announced and unannounced home visits by CYF;
complete a mental health evaluation and follow treatment recommendations;
actively participate in services; obtain employment and provide proof of
income to CYF; maintain safe, clean, and appropriate housing; submit to
random drug testing; and continue his drug and alcohol treatment and
participation in the methadone program. See Family Service Plan, 10/2/20,
at 14, 16-18; see also Family Service Plan, 3/12/21, at 14 (adding, among
other things, that Father notify CYF of any change in household members,
attend medical appointments for the children, and adhere to the conditions of
his probation); Family Service Plan, 8/9/21 (same, issued following A.A.’s
birth and adjudication of dependency).
Meanwhile, in the companion dependency matters, allegations of
physical abuse were made against Father and Mother in December 2020 and
January 2021, as to B.W. and El.A., leading to an abuse investigation. The
report included allegations that the parents slapped the children with an open
hand, including when El.A. was less than one month old, and struck the
children with a belt.
This Court recounted the testimony offered at the March 10, 2022
finding of abuse hearing as follows:
The [Child Advocacy Center] forensic interviewer . . . testified:
“B.W. disclosed being beat — his words — that El.A. was slapped
with a belt,” Father beat R.A. and El.A., Mother slapped B.W., and
B.W. observed potential drug use. B.W. further reported El.A.
suffered injuries, including bleeding from the mouth.
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CYF Caseworker [Kristen] Marshall, who observed the interview,
testified:
B.W. disclosed that he and his siblings were being
punished with a black belt with little spikes on it. He
reported that it was hurtful. B.W. actually stated it
hurt more than a gun. He stated the spikes were
sharp and caused him to bleed. He stated he would
cry and he was hit over and over. The very red marks
like — were left like it was bleeding, but it wasn’t. And
he stated that both parents would hit him.
CYF additionally entered into evidence the forensic interview
summary and a DVD video of the forensic interview. Ms. Marshall
sought, but did not receive, medical records that might show
physical injury to B.W. She also attempted multiple times to
schedule an interview with Mother and Father, but was
unsuccessful.
With respect to El.A., Ms. Marshall testified that B.W. stated
Mother and Father sometimes slapped El.A., so there was blood
under his tongue, and that El.A. would cry a lot and neighbors
would hear. As stated above, B.W.’s statements led to a referral
as to El.A. An investigation revealed El.A. was taken to the York
Hospital emergency room for bleeding from the mouth in August
2019 when he was less than a month old.
Int. of B.W., 290 A.3d 702, 2022 WL 17973239, at *2-3 (Pa.Super. 2022)
(non-precedential decision) (cleaned up). Following a prolonged
investigation, partially due to the parents’ refusal to submit to police
interviews, the court found both Mother and Father to be perpetrators of abuse
against B.W. and El.A. As noted, this Court affirmed those findings.
On January 19, 2022, CYF filed petitions to terminate Father’s rights to
all five children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (5). As to the
four oldest children, B.W., Ed.A., R.A., and El.A., CYF also sought termination
pursuant to § 2511(a)(8).
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The court held hearings on the petitions on April 1 and 18, 2022.3 With
respect to Father, CYF presented the testimony of caseworker Kristen
Marshall, Father’s probation officer and methadone counselor, and the family
advocate and family therapist from Pressley Ridge. Through their testimony,
it was relayed that Father had been consistent with his visits with the children
and had made significant progress resolving his substance abuse. However,
as of the first day of the hearing, CYF remained concerned because Father had
not alleviated the environmental concerns at the house, made progress in his
mental health treatment, or established financial stability. Additionally, visits
had not progressed beyond supervised, and Father recently tested positive for
alcohol, which particularly concerned CYF given his addiction issues and
because one of the positive results was recorded immediately before a visit.
At the second hearing, over two weeks later, Father and Mother
testified. Mother attempted to demonstrate that the house had since been
made appropriate for reunification. For his part, Father recounted his work
history and explained that he had scheduled an appointment to recommence
his mental health treatment the following day. Finally, Father presented
testimony from another CYF caseworker regarding Ms. Marshall’s alleged bias.
The children’s GAL argued that termination was in the best interests of
each child. Specifically, the GAL was concerned that the physical abuse had
____________________________________________
3 At the termination hearing, each child had their own attorney representing
their respective legal interests. David Worley, Esquire, collectively
represented the best interests of all five children as their guardian ad litem
(“GAL”).
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been unaddressed and was wary of the last-minute efforts by the parents to
finally re-initiate mental health treatment and attempt to make the home
environment appropriate. Through legal counsel, the children expressed the
following: B.W. wanted to return to his parents; Ed.A. wished to remain in
the foster home and not return to his parent’s home;4 El.A., despite the finding
of abuse, had a strong bond with his parents and would oppose termination;
R.A. also had a strong bond with her parents and would oppose termination;
and A.A., given his young age, could not express a legal position different
from that expressed by the GAL.
At the conclusion of the hearing, adopting the GAL’s concerns, the
orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights as to all five children, and
issued separate orders changing each child’s permanency goal to adoption.
Father timely filed a notice of appeal and concise statement pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2). The orphans’ court complied with Rule 1925(a).
Father now presents a single question for this Court’s review: “Did the
[orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law and/or
exercise manifestly unreasonable judgment in changing the goal from
reunification with a parent to adoption as the Agency failed to meet its burden
based upon the evidence and testimony presented?” Father’s brief at 5
____________________________________________
4 Given the bond between Ed.A. and his parents, Ed.A.’s attorney interpreted
his wish not to return to his parents’ home as a request for more time for
Mother and Father to continue to make progress and not as a request for
termination of their parental rights.
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(cleaned up).5 In other words, he assails the orphans’ court’s findings that
CYF satisfied its burden as to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).
See id. at 28-29 (summarizing Father’s arguments challenging the
termination decrees).
Mindful of the history set forth above, we begin with the relevant legal
principles. Our standard of review for appeals from orders involuntarily
terminating parental rights is well-settled:
In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
decree of the termination court is supported by competent
evidence. This standard of review corresponds to the standard
employed in dependency cases, and requires appellate courts to
accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
trial court if they are supported by the record, but it does not
require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences
or conclusions of law. That is, if the factual findings are supported,
we must determine whether the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion does not result
merely because the reviewing court might have reached a
different conclusion; we reverse for an abuse of discretion only
upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill will. Thus, absent an abuse of discretion, an
error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s
decision, the decree must stand. We have previously emphasized
our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings. However,
we must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in
order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is supported
by competent evidence.
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5 The GAL for all five children, CYF, and legal counsel for B.W. and Ed.A.,
respectively, filed a single, collective brief in support of affirming the orphans’
court’s decrees.
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In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358–59 (Pa. 2021) (cleaned up).
“The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented
and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts
in the evidence.” In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004)
(citation omitted). “[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings,
we will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.” In
re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption
Act and requires a bifurcated analysis of the grounds for termination followed
by the needs and welfare of the child.
Our case law has made clear that under [§] 2511, the court must
engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
for termination delineated in [§] 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to [§] 2511(b): determination of the needs
and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the
child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have
defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
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conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re
C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (cleaned up).
Termination is proper when the moving party proves grounds for
termination under any subsection of § 2511(a), as well as § 2511(b). T.B.B.,
supra at 395. Father asserts that CYF failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence the statutory grounds for termination of her parental
rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). To affirm
the termination of parental rights, this Court need only agree with the
orphans’ court as to any one subsection of § 2511(a), as well
as § 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en
banc). We focus our analysis for all five children on § 2511(a)(5)6 and (b),
which provide as follows:
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6 We cannot countenance the dissent’s conclusion that because A.A. was
placed into care following his birth, he was never in Father’s care and
therefore, because he was not “removed” from Father’s care, § (a)(5) cannot
apply. See Dissent at 19. Our Court has held that § (a)(5) does not apply
when a child is removed while the parent is incarcerated. See In re C.S.,
761 A.2d 1197, 1200 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc). In such a scenario, the
parent could not have exercised custody, regardless of whether they were
otherwise capable. Respectfully, that is not the case here. Father was not
incarcerated at the time of A.A.’s birth such that it was impossible for him to
have custody of A.A. Both Father and Mother were available to take custody
of A.A. and would have, in fact, been in custody of A.A. but for his removal
by CYF at the hospital. In other words, despite A.A. not being removed from
the home of Father and Mother, he was clearly removed from their care at the
time of his birth. That is consistent with both the statutory language and our
case law. See e.g., In re Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d 883, 889-890 (Pa.
1986) (affirming termination pursuant to § (a)(5) where child had been under
the care of the agency since his birth and where the father had “never had
custody of, nor provided support for, [the] child”). Accordingly, we find no
impediment to applying § (a)(5) as to A.A.
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(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
....
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency
for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led
to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist,
the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within
a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance
reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy
the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
child within a reasonable period of time and termination of
the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare
of the child.
....
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.
Pursuant to this framework, we first address whether the orphans’ court
abused its discretion by terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to
§ 2511(a)(5). Termination under this subsection requires that the moving
party prove the following elements:
(1) the child has been removed from parental care for at least six
months; (2) the conditions which led to the child’s removal or
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placement continue to exist; (3) the parents cannot or will not
remedy the conditions which led to removal or placement within
a reasonable period time; (4) the services reasonably available to
the parents are unlikely to remedy the conditions which led to
removal or placement within a reasonable period of time; and (5)
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
In re B.C., 36 A.3d 601, 607 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation omitted).
Father argues that the sole reason for adjudication was the parents’
drug issues, and he has adequately addressed those concerns. See Father’s
brief at 39-40. As to CYF’s concerns about abuse, Father denies any abuse
and contends that, in any event, CYF failed to offer any services to address
potential abuse. Id. at 41-42. He maintains that he “did what he was asked
to do and the improvements he made in his parenting were testified to by the
team.” Id. at 42. Finally, he challenges the court’s conclusions that there
remained concerns regarding environmental issues and stability. Id. at 42-
43. He claims that he has resided in the same home, which a team member
deemed appropriate in January 2022; provided financial documentation to the
team; and consistently visited with the children. Id at 43.
While Father urges us to accept the testimony that favored his assertion
that the environmental issues had been resolved, it was wholly within the
province of the orphans’ court to make credibility determinations regarding
the testimony offered. Those credibility determinations are supported by the
record and must therefore remain undisturbed. See M.G., supra at 73-74;
T.B.B., supra at 394. Accepting these credibility determinations, our review
of the certified record indicates that it was not solely the inability to provide
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financial documentation that supported termination. Rather, it was the failure
to demonstrate the ability to provide safe and stable care for the children, as
evidenced by the housing concerns, Father’s declining to take seriously the
mental health treatment, and lack of evidence of a stable income to support
five children.
Ms. Marshall, who had been assigned to the case since October 2020,
testified that Father’s primary concerns at adjudication were substance abuse,
environmental issues in the home, mental health, and drug testing. See N.T.
Hearing, 4/1/22, at 197. With regard to the environmental issues, as noted
hereinabove, Father’s goals included complying with unannounced and
announced home visits by CYF, maintaining safe appropriate housing, and
performing routine housekeeping.
During Ms. Marshall’s tenure, she attempted to make eight home visits.
In November 2020, there were lice issues, the heavy smell of animal feces
and urine smell, and problems with the toilet, stairwell railing, and one of the
bedroom floors. At the next two visits, both in December 2020, the toilet and
railing issues had been repaired. In January 2021, she was unable to enter
the house due to COVID-19 concerns and lice. In July 2021, a proxy visited
the house but was not permitted inside. Nonetheless, the proxy noted that it
smelled like garbage outside and the front porch was messy. In August 2021,
Ms. Marshall was denied entry into the house but noted a strong smell of
animal feces when the door was opened. Again, in January 2022, she was not
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allowed into the house to conduct a home visit. Her last visit was conducted
on March 24, 2022. See N.T. Hearing, 4/18/22, at 46-47.
During the last visit, which was unannounced, Mother was away from
the home, but returned when called and was inside for a few minutes before
admitting Ms. Marshall and her supervisor into the home. There was a potent
smell of animal feces and urine, feces in the kitchen trash, a dog peeing
sporadically in the house, space heaters throughout the home, including one
on top of a laundry basket filled with clothes, no sink in the only bathroom,
concerns with water damage in the parents’ bedroom, and animal feces in one
of the children’s rooms. See N.T. Hearing, 4/1/22, at 200-203.
Turning to the elements of § 2511(a)(5), Father does not contest that
all five children were removed from his care for a period exceeding six months.
Therefore, the first element is satisfied. As to the second, third, and fourth
elements, the initial placement was based upon concerns about Father’s drug
use, inappropriate parenting, unstable employment, unsafe housing, and the
need for mental health treatment. Once there were allegations and findings
of abuse, that naturally became part of the concerns as to Father’s parenting
and ability to provide a safe home environment. The orphan’s court concluded
that while Father had made progress with regard to his drug treatment and
the methadone program, “he could not remedy the remaining conditions
within a reasonable time[,]” particularly as he “had services close
unsuccessfully or declined [services.]” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/6/22, at 27.
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As the record shows, the children were removed from Father and
Mother for more than parent’s drug use or Father’s overdose. CYF
received a referral several days prior to Father’s overdose. CYF
had prior history with the family and feared Mother would revoke
the safety plan implemented for the children’s welfare. From the
outset, the revised safety plan, dated 10/02/2020, provided
objectives that are not beyond the control of the parent related to
. . . cooperating with agency services, financial stability, providing
proof of income, securing appropriate housing and sleeping
quarters for the children, routine housekeeping, and Methadone
treatment, etc.
Furthermore, the finding of abuse raises safety concerns
regarding the children. The parent’s consistent denials that
anything happened regarding the finding of abuse is concerning.
During the period that the children have been out of the home,
Father started probation for fighting. Mother reported that an
argument escalated to the point that her mother threatened to file
a protection from abuse order against her. A service provider
closed out services and recommended anger management
because Father was inappropriate, and a permanency review
report noted reports of Father and Mother fighting inside and
outside of the home.
The children were removed from the home for more than six
months. They have been removed for almost twenty months at
this time. Parents certainly made progress with regard to the
Methadone program as required by the family service plan cited.
The parents could not remedy the remaining conditions within a
reasonable time. Given that Father has had services close
unsuccessfully or declined, it is not likely that available services
will remedy the remaining conditions that led to the removal or
placement of the children. . . . [T]he court believes termination
serves the best interests of the children who require permanency.
There was testimony that the children enjoy their visits with their
parents and are bonded to them. Despite this the court believes
termination is in the children’s best interests. The safety and well-
being of the children is of paramount concern to the court. The
children are all together in a safe environment with [their foster
mother], whom they call “mom-mom,” and they are receiving
therapy. The children have exhibited troubling behaviors, which
suggests trauma. R.A., as young as she is, has been observed
placing her finger in her anus. B.W. has expressed suicidal
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ideation and anxiety. B.W. and Ed.A. have been observed trying
to bite each other on the buttocks and on their penises. Ed.A. has
also engaged in fecal smearing. A.A. was born with a club foot
that requires special care and appointments.
Id. at 26-28 (cleaned up).
Although Father addressed his drug addiction and should be
commended for that, significant concerns remained as to whether Father could
readily provide care for any of the children given the condition of the home,
his failure to prove a stable income, and disengagement with mental health
treatment, particularly in light of the findings of abuse.
[T]he statute implicitly recognizes that a child’s life cannot be held
in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity
necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot
and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence
and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the
future.
In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa.Super. 2006). Therefore,
we conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion in finding
statutory support for termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(5) as to B.W., Ed.A.,
R.A., El.A., and A.A.
Turning to § 2511(b), we again set forth the guiding principles.
[C]ourts should consider the matter from the child’s perspective,
placing her developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
welfare above concerns for the parent.
Accordingly, the determination of the child’s particular
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare must
be made on a case-by-case basis. We have observed the law
regarding termination of parental rights should not be applied
mechanically but instead always with an eye to the best interests
and the needs and welfare of the particular children involved.
Thus, the court must determine each child’s specific needs.
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Moreover, the child’s emotional needs and welfare include
intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability. As
further guidance, we have identified factors, i.e., specific needs
and aspects of the child’s welfare, that trial courts must always
consider. The court must consider whether the children are in a
pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster
parents. And, if the child has any bond with the biological parent,
the court must conduct an analysis of that bond, which is not
always an easy task.
Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105–06 (Pa. 2023) (cleaned up).
This Court has emphasized that “the extent of the bond-effect analysis
necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” In re
Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 2010) (cleaned up). In
weighing the bond considerations pursuant to § 2511(b), “courts must keep
the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 269
(Pa. 2013). “Children are young for a scant number of years, and we have an
obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts
fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.A court cannot “toll the well-being and permanency” of a child indefinitely in
the hope that a parent “will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities
of parenting.” In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1007 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc)
(citation omitted).
The certified record supports the orphans’ court’s conclusion that
termination was in the best interests of all five children as it relates to Father.
Notably, the GAL for all five children advocated in favor of termination as being
in their best interests. See Appellees’ brief at 27-28 (arguing that termination
is in the best interests of the children). The court acknowledged the bond
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between the children and Father, and that Father has made progress towards
some of his goals. However, the court held that it “cannot and will not
subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a
parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.” Orphans’ Court Opinion,
6/6/22, at 29 (quoting R.J.S., supra at 513). As the children are together,
safe, and bonded with their foster mother, the court concluded that it was in
their best interests to terminate Father’s parental rights so that the children
could achieve permanency. Id.
As detailed hereinabove, the facts as found by the orphans’ court are
supported by clear and convincing evidence. Its conclusions are free from
legal error and, in our review, are not manifestly unreasonable, or the subject
of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. See C.M., supra at 359. In light of
our deferential standard of review, we find no abuse of discretion, and affirm
the decrees terminating Father’s parental rights as to B.W., Ed.A., R.A., El.A.,
and A.A.
Decrees affirmed.
P.J.E. Stevens joins this Memorandum.
Judge McCaffery files a Dissenting Memorandum.
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Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/14/2023
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