Com. v. Brooks, T. ( 2023 )

J-S41022-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
TYLER RAYMOND BROOKS :
:
Appellant : No. 477 WDA 2023
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 6, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-26-CR-0000716-2022
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: December 21, 2023
Appellant, Tyler Raymond Brooks, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered on April 6, 2023. We affirm.
The trial court ably summarized the underlying facts of this case:
On September 4, 2021, John Voyten, who works as a
volunteer with the Farmington Volunteer Fire Department,
testified that he was eating lunch at Braddock's Restaurant
when he received a call to respond to the roadway outside
Braddock's for an unresponsive male. When he left the
restaurant, he observed a vehicle against the guardrail. In
the vehicle, he observed an unresponsive male in the driver's
seat draped over the steering wheel with the vehicle
transmission in drive. Voyten testified that the vehicle was
taken out of drive. Voyten stated that as [Appellant] was
unresponsive to his attempts to arose him, he "knew he was
in some type of overdose." Voyten administered a sternum
rub to [Appellant] which revived him. EMS then arrived and
provided care to [Appellant].
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Mark Dunham, an emergency medical technician [(“EMT”)]
with the Fayette County Emergency Medical Services, arrived
on the scene and observed a first responder administering a
sternum rub. Dunham testified that [Appellant] became
conscious but was initially “pretty incoherent.” [Appellant]
refused to get out of the vehicle and stated that “he was on
house arrest and he needed to get out of the area.”
[Appellant] then placed the vehicle in drive and attempted to
drive away. At that point the EMTs attempted to prevent him
from driving by placing the car’s transmission back in park.
Dunham took hold of [Appellant’s] other hand. [Appellant]
then grabbed Dunham's thumb, bent it back, and broke it in
two places. The other responders blocked [Appellant’s]
vehicle from leaving with their vehicles. [Appellant] backed
into one of the vehicles.
Dunham testified that he had a hard cast on his hand for six
to eight weeks and had exercises to do once the cast was off
to get the dexterity back in his hand. Dunham was able to
continue to work as a teacher but was off work as an EMT for
eight weeks. Dunham testified that the dexterity in his hand
is still a little off.
Pennsylvania State Trooper [Joshua] Spyra [(“Trooper
Spyra”)] testified that he observed that [Appellant] had to
lean on items as he walked and that his pupils were very
constricted. [Trooper Spyra] did not have [Appellant]
perform any field sobriety tests as [Appellant] was unsteady
on his feet and [Trooper Spyra] didn't know if he was injured.
[Trooper Spyra] ultimately placed [Appellant] under arrest.
When [Trooper Spyra] requested that [Appellant] submit to
chemical testing, he refused to be tested.
[Trooper Spyra] transported [Appellant] to the State Police
Barracks. A video of [Appellant’s] actions in the back seat of
the vehicle was played for the jurors. The video showed
[Appellant] place a piece of paper between the seat cushions.
After transporting an individual, [Trooper Spyra] testified
that he routinely checks the back seat of his patrol vehicle.
He located a white powdery substance inside a folded paper
between the backseat cushions. The Greensburg Lab report
identified the powder with a net weight of .16 grams
containing Fentanyl . . . and Ketamine. . . .
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[Appellant’s] counsel raised two objections during trial. His
first objection was to the comment from [witness Mark
Dunham,] that [Appellant] was on house arrest, alluding to a
prior criminal record. At sidebar, [Appellant’s] counsel
requested a mistrial. The [trial court] . . . denied the request
as [it] did not believe that the statement seriously prejudiced
[Appellant] and thought a curative instruction would have
cured the fault. However, [Appellant’s] counsel chose not to
have a curative instruction.
[Appellant’s] counsel's next objection was to the statement
by the witness, Voyten, that he believed [Appellant] had
overdosed. Counsel objected to the lack of a foundation, and
that the witness was not a medical expert. The [trial court]
responded that the [Commonwealth] had laid a foundation
after the statement had been made.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/22/23, at 1-3 (citations omitted).
Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of aggravated assault,
simple assault, harassment, possession of a controlled substance, and driving
under the influence (“DUI”).1 On April 6, 2023, the trial court sentenced
Appellant to serve an aggregate term of two to ten years in prison for his
convictions. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. He raises two claims to
this Court:
[1.] Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to grant
defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial based upon testimony
elicited by the Commonwealth concerning the prior criminal
history of [Appellant]?
[2.] Did the trial court err in failing to grant defense counsel’s
objection to testimony that [Appellant] overdosed at the time
of the incident without any foundation or expert testimony to
support this conclusion?
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(3), 2701(a)(1), and 2709(a)(1), 35 P.S.
§ 780-113(a)(16), and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2), respectively.
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Appellant’s Brief at 7.
Both of Appellant’s claims implicate the trial court’s evidentiary rulings.
We have explained:
Our standard of review for a trial court's evidentiary rulings
is narrow, as the admissibility of evidence is within the
discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only if the
trial court has abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion
is not merely an error of judgment, but is rather the
overriding or misapplication of the law, the exercise of
judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
bias, prejudice, ill will or partiality, as shown by the evidence
of record.
Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 35 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations
omitted). “To constitute reversible error, an evidentiary ruling must not only
be erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party.”
Commonwealth v. Lopez, 57 A.3d 74, 81 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quotation
marks and citations omitted).
First, Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied his request for a mistrial, after a Commonwealth witness implied that
Appellant had a prior criminal record.
Mark Dunham, an EMT with the Fayette County Emergency Medical
Services, testified that, on the afternoon of September 4, 2021, he “was
working out of Fayette EMS” when he received a 911 call to aid an
unresponsive male in the area of Braddock’s Inn. N.T. Trial, 4/4/23, at 16-17.
He testified that, when he arrived on scene, he encountered Appellant, awake,
in the driver’s seat of a vehicle. Id. at 17-18. The Commonwealth questioned
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Mr. Dunham on what Mr. Dunham initially observed and how Mr. Dunham
began to approach Appellant. See id. at 17-21. Mr. Dunham then testified
as follows:
[The Commonwealth]: So as you spoke with [Appellant] and
you testified that he was then able to start answering
questions, is that correct?
[Mr. Dunham]: Yes.
[The Commonwealth]: What do you do next?
[Mr. Dunham]: Um, then we basically tried to get him out of
the car um, by just saying, hey why don’t you come over to
the ambulance, let us check you out if everything’s okay, sign
a refusal, we’ll be out of your way. Still, like I said, at that
point, he was starting to become more coherent but still was
not completely, you know, what I would call, with it, as far
as answering all questions appropriately, that kind of thing.
Our goal normally is to get them the ambulance where we
can work in a more private setting, as far as, getting basic
vitals and that kind of stuff. Um, he stated no, he wasn’t
gonna do that. He stated that he was on house arrest and
he needed to get out of the area.
Id. at 21.
Appellant immediately objected to the testimony regarding him being
on house arrest and Appellant requested a mistrial. See id. at 21 and 47.
The trial court denied the request for a mistrial, but offered to provide a
curative instruction to the jury; Appellant, however, asked that the trial court
not provide the curative instruction. Id. at 47.
On appeal, Appellant now claims that the trial court erred when it denied
his request for a mistrial. This claim fails.
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We apply the following principles in reviewing an order that denies an
application for a mistrial.
A mistrial is an extreme remedy that is appropriate “only
where the incident upon which the motion is based is of such
a nature that its unavoidable effect is to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial by preventing the jury from weighing
[the evidence] and rendering a true verdict.”
Commonwealth v. Bryant, 67 A.3d 716, 728 (Pa. 2013).
“It is within the trial court's discretion to determine whether
a defendant was prejudiced by the incident that is the basis
of a motion for a mistrial.” Commonwealth v. Caldwell,
117 A.3d 763, 774 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (citations
omitted). When a trial court gives adequate cautionary
instructions to the jury, it is not necessary for the court to
declare a mistrial. Bryant, 67 A.3d at 728. “The law
presumes that the jury will follow the instructions of the
court.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 786 A.2d 961, 971 (Pa.
2001).
Commonwealth v. Leap, 222 A.3d 386, 392 (Pa. Super. 2019). “When
dealing with a motion for mistrial due to a reference to past criminal behavior,
the nature of the reference and whether the remark was intentionally elicited
by the Commonwealth are considerations relevant to the determination of
whether a mistrial is required.” Commonwealth v. Kerrigan, 920 A.2d 190,
199 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quotation omitted).
Applying these standards, several factors support the trial court's
decision to reject Appellant's request for a mistrial. First, the testimony of
Messrs. Dunham and Voyten and Trooper Spyra established overwhelming
evidence supporting Appellant's convictions for aggravated assault, simple
assault, harassment, possession of a controlled substance, and DUI. Second,
Mr. Dunham made only a passing reference to Appellant’s house arrest when
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describing why Appellant would not leave his car to enter the ambulance. Mr.
Dunham uttered the comment on his own when the prosecutor asked the
open-ended question “What do you do next?”. The Commonwealth did not
solicit information about Appellant's prior criminal history. Finally, the trial
court offered to provide a curative instruction to the jury, but Appellant chose
not to have the curative instruction read.
Under the circumstances before us, we cannot conclude that the
unavoidable effect of Mr. Dunham’s statement was to deprive Appellant of a
fair trial by preventing the jury from weighing the evidence and rendering a
true verdict. See Bryant, 67 A.3d at 728. Appellant’s first claim on appeal
thus fails.
Next, Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it
overruled his objection to John Voyten’s testimony that Appellant “was in
some type of overdose.” Appellant’s Brief at 13.
During trial, volunteer firefighter John Voyten testified that, on the
afternoon of September 4, 2021, he was eating lunch in Braddock’s Inn
Restaurant when he “received a call on [his] phone, through the 911 service,
that [there was] an unresponsive male on the side of the road . . . in front of
Braddock’s Restaurant.” N.T. Trial, 4/4/23, at 35. Mr. Voyten testified that
he exited the restaurant and saw Appellant unconscious, in the driver’s seat
of a vehicle. Id. at 36. He testified that he then began to perform a sternum
rub on Appellant. Asked why he performed the sternum rub on Appellant, Mr.
Voyten testified:
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Well, I knew he was unresponsive, he was in some type of
overdose. He was not, you know, in a normal state as far as.
..
Id. at 37.
Appellant objected to Mr. Voyten’s testimony regarding him being “in
some type of overdose.” Id. at 38. The trial court overruled the objection.
Although Appellant now claims that the trial court erred when it overruled his
objection to Mr. Voyten’s testimony, we conclude that the trial court’s ruling
was within its discretion. Indeed, as the trial court ably explained:
Witness Voyten testified that he has worked as a volunteer
firefighter for [20] years. While being questioned by the
prosecutor, in response to a question about why he began
administering the sternum rub, the witness responded that “I
knew he was unresponsive, he was in some type of overdose.
He was not, you know, in a normal state.” [Appellant’s
counsel] objected and the [trial court] overruled the
objection, but stated he would discuss it further during the
recess.
When questioned by the prosecutor if he had seen other
persons in similar situations, Voyten testified that he had
seen people in that condition previously, and so he began the
sternum rub to begin treatment to bring him back to
consciousness. Voyten explained the purpose of the sternum
rub. He testified that a sternum rub brings the blood flow
back into the heart. Voyten went on to explain that if you do
not have Narcan, if you rub hard enough on the sternum at
the heart area, it brings blood back in. The sternum rub will
save your life, it will bring you back.
It is well settled in Pennsylvania law that an individual can
give an opinion about intoxication or drunkenness.
Commonwealth v. Ragan, 652 A.2d 925 (Pa. Super. 1995).
Intoxication is evidence that would be familiar to a volunteer
firefighter who assists at accident scenes with all kinds of
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wrecks and in fact, intoxication is one opinion that any person
can give. The [trial court] determined that the witness used
the information to explain his actions to the jury, his
statements about his observations of [Appellant’s] condition
were made to explain his subsequent treatment of
[Appellant]. As a long time first responder and firefighter, he
had the technical knowledge to make the statement under
the circumstances.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/22/23, at 6-7 (citations omitted).
We agree with the trial court’s able explanation and thus conclude that
Appellant’s second claim on appeal fails.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
12/21/2023
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