In the Int. of: P.L.R. a Minor ( 2023 )

J-A27014-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: P.L.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: A.A.R., MOTHER :
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: No. 946 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered June 9, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County Juvenile Division at
No(s): 2022-00015,
CP-18-DP-0000037-2014
IN THE INTEREST OF: P.L.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: A.A.R., MOTHER :
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: No. 947 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered June 7, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 2022-00015
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 22, 2023
A.A.R. (Mother) appeals from the orders, entered in the Court of
Common Pleas of Clinton County, terminating her parental rights with respect
to her child, P.L.R. (Child) (born 1/13), and changing the permanency goal
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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from reunification to adoption.1 Counsel has filed a petition to withdraw
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and
Commonwealth v. McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981).2 Due to Mother’s
consistent failure to comply with court-ordered objectives to address long-
standing safety concerns that prevent her from capably parenting Child, we
affirm. We also grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.
Clinton County Children and Youth Social Services Agency (CYS) first
became involved with Child in 2014 following a report that J.W.B (Father)3
had abused child. Following an investigation by CYS, Child was placed in the
custody of his maternal grandmother on May 6, 2015. Pursuant to court order,
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1 Mother’s counsel has complied with the dictates of Commonwealth v.
Walker, 185 A.3d 960 (Pa. 2018), by filing two separate notices of appeal—
one on the dependency docket (946 MDA 2023) and one on the adoption
docket (947 MDA 2023). Walker, 185 A.3d at 976 (“Where . . . one or more
orders resolves issues arising on more than one docket or relating to more
than one judgment, separate notices of appeals must be filed.”); see also In
re M.P., 204 A.3d 976, 981 (Pa. Super. 2019) (applying Walker holding to
children’s fast track appeals). But see Commonwealth v. Young, 265 A.3d
462, 477 n.19 (expressly overruling holding in Walker that failure to file
separate appeals requires appellate court to quash appeal). Mother’s appeals
were consolidated sua sponte by our Court on July 27, 2023. See Order,
7/27/23; see also Pa.R.A.P. 513.
2 See In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Super. 1992) (extending Anders
briefing requirements to termination of parental rights appeals involving
indigent parents represented by court-appointed counsel).
3 Father’s rights were also terminated; however, he is not a party to the
present appeal. At the time of the termination hearing, Mother and Father
were living together, but Mother testified they had not been in a relationship
for approximately two years. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 4/12/23, at 53,
99-100.
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Mother and Father were to have supervised visits with Child. Child remained
in the custody of maternal grandmother until maternal grandmother died on
or about October 9, 2020. After maternal grandmother’s death, the court
granted custody of Child to maternal grandfather and maintained the
conditions requiring Mother’s and Father’s visits to be supervised.
In October of 2021, CYS received a report that maternal grandfather
had been permitting Father to have unsupervised visits with Child, including
overnight visits during which Father and Child shared a bed, in violation of a
court order dated December 4, 2020. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 4/12/23,
at 10-11 (Caseworker Jennifer Weaver testifying that December 4, 2020 order
required Father’s visits be arranged and supervised by CYS). Following that
report, CYS obtained legal and physical custody of Child pursuant to a shelter
care order. See Shelter Care Order, 10/21/21. Child was immediately placed
in foster care and on December 1, 2022, moved to his current foster home.4
On December 3, 2021, following a hearing, the court adjudicated the
Child dependent. Mother was incarcerated at the time of Child’s adjudication
and, pursuant to the court’s order, Mother was to continue to have weekly
one-hour supervised visits with Child, Zoom video visits while incarcerated,
and longer in-person visits following her release. See Order, 12/3/21, at ¶ 7.
Prior to the hearing, CYS submitted a permanency plan for Child to the court.
Mother’s goals were to schedule and attend supervised visits with Child, have
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4 Maternal grandfather died on or about November 6, 2022.
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appropriate conversations and interactions with Child, follow court orders,
follow the recommendations of CYS, maintain contact with CYS and notify of
any phone or address changes, sign requested releases of information, and
participate in a drug and alcohol evaluation and follow recommendations of
said evaluation. See Child Permanency Plan, 11/30/21, at 3. Mother had
additional objectives while incarcerated, including maintaining her bond with
Child through Zoom visits and practicing positive parenting skills. Id. at 8.
During permanency review hearings held on January 3, 2022, April 4, 2022,
June 3, 2022, September 22, 2022, December 23, 2022, and March 21, 2023,
Mother’s compliance and progress was initially moderate in January, but
minimal at each hearing that followed.
Mother has acknowledged she suffers from addiction and substance
abuse problems. Since Child’s birth, Mother has attended inpatient treatment
on at least six different occasions in 2015, 2016, 2021, and 2022. Mother has
been unable to maintain her sobriety for a significant amount of time while
Child has been in placement. Mother has also been incarcerated for significant
periods of time since CYS’s involvement. From the date of Child’s placement
until the date of the termination hearing, Mother had been incarcerated for
more than 300 days.
Throughout Child’s placement, Mother has had supervised visits with
Child. Those visits were held at either CYS’s offices or at the correctional
facility where Mother was incarcerated. Due to COVID restrictions, many of
the visits while Mother was incarcerated were Zoom video visits. Mother
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averaged two visits (video or in-person) per month during the period between
Child’s shelter care hearing and the date of the filing of the termination of
parental rights petition.
In December 2022, Pursuant to court order, Mother’s visits with Child
were suspended due to Child exhibiting negative behaviors during and
following visits with Mother.5 The court directed Mother to meet with a
psychologist to implement a plan to re-engage with Child. However, Mother
failed to follow through with additional meetings required to create and
implement a successful plan.
Child has been diagnosed with autism, attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD), and oppositional defiant disorder. Child also has an
individualized education plan (IEP) through Child’s school. Mother has not
participated in an active manner with either Child’s treatment for Child’s
diagnoses or IEP.
On December 30, 2022, CYS filed petitions seeking to terminate
Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. On April 12, 2023, the trial court held
a termination hearing6 at which Mother, two CYS caseworkers, and Child’s
foster mother testified. On June 7, 2023, the trial court entered an order
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5 Father has not participated in any supervised visits with Child since Child
came into care.
6 At the termination hearing, Child was represented by Johanna M. Berta,
Esquire, for Child’s legal interests, and W. Jeffrey Yates, Esquire, guardian ad
litem, for Child’s best interests. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a).
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terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§
2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b) of the Adoption Act7 and an order changing
the permanency goal from reunification to adoption. The trial court also issued
an opinion the same day, stating its reasons for termination.8 See Trial Court
Opinion, 6/7/23, at 11-16.
Mother filed timely notices of appeal. On September 5, 2023, counsel
filed a petition for leave to withdraw and a brief with our Court, pursuant to
Anders/McClendon, supra.9
In In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Super. 1992), our Court stated:
Counsel appointed to represent an indigent parent on a first
appeal from a decree involuntarily terminating his or her parental
rights, may, after a conscientious and thorough review of the
record, petition this court for leave to withdraw representation if
he or she can find no issues of arguable merit on which to base
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7 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938.
8 At the conclusion of the termination hearing, the trial court took the matter
under advisement and issued a schedule for the parties to file briefs and
responses as appropriate. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 4/12/23, at 115.
9 Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4):
If counsel intends to seek to withdraw in a criminal case pursuant
to Anders/Santiago or if counsel intends to seek to withdraw in
a post-conviction relief appeal pursuant to Turner/Finley,
counsel shall file of record and serve on the judge a statement of
intent to withdraw in lieu of filing a [Rule 1925(b)] Statement.
Pa.R.A.P. 1925 (c)(4). See In the Interest of J.T., 983 A.2d 771 (Pa. Super.
2009) (where Anders procedure from criminal proceedings has been applied
to parental termination cases, parent’s counsel acted appropriately by
following Rule 1925(c)(4) in appeal from decision terminating parental rights
to child).
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the appeal. Given the less stringent standard of proof required
and the quasi-adversarial nature of a termination proceeding in
which a parent is not guaranteed the same procedural and
evidentiary rights as a criminal defendant, the court holds that
appointed counsel seeking to withdraw representation must
submit an Anders brief.
Id. at 1275. Moreover, we held that “any motion to withdraw representation,
submitted by appointed counsel, must be accompanied by an advocate’s brief,
and not the amicus curiae brief delineated in [Commonwealth v.]
McClendon, [434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981)].” Id.; see also In re Adoption of
R.I., 312 A.2d 601, 602 (Pa. 1973) (“[T]he logic behind . . . an individual in
a criminal case being entitled to representation by counsel at any proceeding
that may lead to ‘the deprivation of substantial rights’ . . . is equally applicable
to a case involving an indigent parent faced with the loss of her child.”).
In his Anders brief, counsel raises the following issues for our
consideration:
1. Was there an abuse of discretion by the trial court by finding
facts not in favor of Mother and terminating Mother’s [p]arental
rights under [subsections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b)?]
2. Was there an abuse of discretion by the [t]rial [c]ourt by
finding facts not in favor of Mother and changing the goal from
reunification to adoption[?]
Anders Brief, at 8.
Before reaching the merits of the appeal, we must first address counsel’s
application to withdraw. To withdraw under Anders, counsel must:
(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
determined that the appeal would be frivolous; (2) furnish a copy
of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and (3) advise the
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[appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel
or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy
of the court’s attention.
Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en
banc) (citations omitted); see also In re Adoption of V.G., 751 A.2d 1174(Pa. Super. 2000) (reiterating requirements counsel must satisfy before being
permitted to withdraw in termination appeals).
With respect to the third Anders requirement, that counsel inform the
appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdrawal, this Court has
held that counsel must “attach to [his or her] petition to withdraw a copy of
the letter sent to [the] client advising him or her of their rights.”
Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).
An Anders brief must also comply with the following requirements:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
citations to the record;
(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
supports the appeal;
(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and
(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,
controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the
conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009). Finally, this
Court must “conduct an independent review of the record to discern if there
are any additional, non-frivolous issues overlooked by counsel.”
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Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(footnote omitted).
Here, counsel for Mother filed a petition with this Court, requested leave
to withdraw as counsel in the instant appeal, and represented that he has
made a “conscientious examination of the record [and] determined that any
appeal would be frivolous.” Petition to Withdraw, 9/5/23. Counsel also
attached to the petition a copy of the letter sent to Mother advising her of her
rights to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, or raise issues in response to his
brief. See Millisock, supra. Additionally, counsel filed an
Anders/McClendon brief, in which he complies with the procedures of
Santiago, supra. Accordingly, we find that counsel has complied with the
requirements of Anders, McClendon, and Santiago, and we proceed with
an independent review of the merits. See Flowers, supra.The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. [A] decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have previously
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted). A court must conduct a bifurcated analysis when faced with a
petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights:
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Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in [s]ection 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to [s]ection 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
Instantly, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). In order to affirm the
termination of parental rights, this Court need only agree with the trial court’s
findings under any one subsection of section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843
A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). After review, we conclude that
the record supports termination under subsection 2511(a)(5).
Pursuant to subsection (a)(5), parental rights may be terminated, after
the filing of a petition, when,
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by
the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a
period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the
removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent
cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to
the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the
removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of
time[,] and termination of the parental rights would best serve
the needs and welfare of the child.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5).
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Mother contends that the trial court erred in terminating her parental
rights and abused its discretion in finding: (1) that Father is an indicated
perpetrator of child abuse with regard to Child, (2) that Mother’s testimony
that Father was moving out of state was not credible, and (3) that Mother
“lacks the parental protective capacity to ensure [Child’s] safety” based on
the testimony of CYS caseworkers and Mother. Appellants Brief, at 12-13.
Instantly, the trial court made the following relevant findings:
• Father was determined to be an indicated perpetrator of child abuse
under the Pennsylvania Child Protection Services Law10 on four
separate occasions in 2010, 2014, and 2020.
• The 2010 incident was with respect to Mother, who was sixteen at the
time. Two incidents were with respect to Child.
• Mother continues to reside with Father.
• Mother is aware of the allegations surrounding Father’s indicated
reports.
• Mother testified that the residence she shares with Father is the
residence she would reside in with Child if they were reunited.
• Mother indicated Father would be moving to Ohio and she would be
the sole occupant of the residence. The court did not find this
testimony credible.
• Mother continued to permit Child to have contact with Father and
would continue to do so in the future.
• Mother lacks the parental protective capacity to ensure Child’s safety.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/7/23, at 3-4.
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10 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6303.
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Throughout the time Child has been in placement, Mother has frequently
been either incarcerated or attending inpatient drug and alcohol treatment.
See N.T. Termination Hearing, 4/12/23, at 21-23. As of the date of filing the
termination petition, approximately fourteen months after Child came into
care, Mother only had nine one-hour in-person visits and twenty-five one-hour
video visits with Child. At no time did Mother progress to unsupervised or
visits for more than one hour. Mother’s parental duties continued even while
incarcerated. See In re Burns, 379 A.2d 535, 540 (Pa. 1977) (affirmative
parental duty applies even while parent incarcerated; duty requires parent
maintain “continuing interest in child and [make] a genuine effort to maintain
communication and association with child”); see also In the Interest of
K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“Parental rights are not
preserved by waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s
parental responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her physical
and emotional needs.”).
Additionally, at the court’s permanency review hearings,11 Mother’s
compliance and progress was initially moderate, but, over time, it declined
and was only minimal. See, e.g., N.T. Termination Hearing, 4/12/23, at 55,
57 (caseworker testifying during December 2022 and March 2023 permanency
review hearings Mother’s progress was minimal). Since Child was adjudicated
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11 The court held permanency review hearings onJanuary 3, 2022, April 4,
2022, June 3, 2022, September 22, 2022, December 23, 2022, and March 21,
2023.
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dependent and placed in foster care, more than one and one half years ago,
Mother has only minimally complied with her plan objectives to be reunited
with Child. See id. at 56-58.
Critically, despite her awareness of the risks posed by Father, Mother
has not taken affirmative steps to ensure the safety of Child. Mother has not
created a safe and stable environment for Child. See In re S.C., 247 A.3d
1097, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2021) (affirming child’s right to safe, stable, and
healthy home environment). Rather, Mother has continued to reside at the
same address as Father and has been in and out of drug rehabilitation and
correctional facilities.
We also note that Mother’s visits with Child were suspended on
December 23, 2022, one week prior to CYS filing its petition to terminate
parental rights. The court suspended Mother’s visits in response to reported
negative behaviors by Child that appeared to be in reaction to visits with
Mother.12 Robert J. Meacham, M.S., a licensed psychologist, suggested that
Mother’s visits be suspended and that a plan be implemented to gradually
reintroduce parent-child communication. See N.T. Termination Hearing,
4/12/23, at 28, 39, 57. Mother did not pursue such a plan. Id. at 59, 100.
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12 Child was reported to be defecating and urinating in Child’s pants, digging
in Child’s rectum, and smearing feces in the days before and after visits with
Mother. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 4/12/23, at 26-27; see also
Meachum’s Memorandum, 12/22/22.
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On the other hand, Child has a close and established bond with foster
mother, with whom Child has resided since December 2022. Foster mother
meets Child’s emotional, physical, and mental needs. Foster mother provides
Child with a safe and stable home and is involved with Child’s IEP and
behavioral needs. Foster mother has also enrolled Child in various activities
and sports. Accordingly, based on the record, we find that the trial court
properly terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(5).
See In re C.B., 230 A.3d 341, 348 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“Termination of
parental rights under [s]ection 2511(a)(5) requires that: (1) the child has
been removed from parental care for at least six months; (2) the conditions
which led to removal and placement of the child continue to exist; and (3)
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the
child.”) (citation omitted).
We also find that the court properly concluded that termination of
Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best interests pursuant to section
2511(b).13 Testimony at the termination hearing demonstrated that Mother
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13 Section 2511(b) states as follows:
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical[,] and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The
rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing[,] and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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does not meet Child’s emotional, educational, developmental, or daily needs.
Mother has failed to participate in addressing Child’s negative behaviors,
supporting Child’s IEP, or addressing Child’s autism and other diagnoses.
Mother also failed to meet Child’s daily needs.14 Mother is aware of Child’s
diagnoses and education plan at school, but she has not attended meetings
about Child’s plan since Child entered CYS’s care in 2021. See N.T.
Termination Hearing, 4/12/23, at 97.
Rather than increasing over time, Mother’s visits were suspended
following instances of Child defecating and smearing feces on the wall before
and after visits with Mother. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 4/12/23, at 39-
40. Child would also regularly ask about visits with maternal grandfather and
exhibited the most excitement towards those visits prior to maternal
grandfather’s passing. Id. at 40. While Mother was incarcerated, Child
struggled to interact with Mother during visits, had trouble paying attention,
was “antsy” and got distracted. Id. at 93-94. Child exhibited this behavior
during both in-person and Zoom visits with Mother.
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efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
14 Following CYS filing the instant termination petition, Mother attempted to
send Child a letter and some gifts. That gift was returned due to insufficient
postage. On April 11, 2023, Mother gave the letter and gift to Lykea Cameron,
caseworker, to deliver to Child. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 4/12/23, at
91.
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Child has been living with foster mother since December 1, 2022. See
id. at 73. Foster mother attends Child’s extracurricular games and practices,
takes Child to the movies, and goes with Child on walks. Id. at 75. Foster
mother expressed that she is a willing adoptive resource for Child and
understands the responsibilities that come with that commitment. Id. at 76.
[Our Supreme] Court [has] directed that, in weighing the bond
considerations pursuant to [section] 2511(b), courts must keep
the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind [because] children are
young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to
see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail[,] the
result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.
Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 836–37 (Pa. Super. 2022) (internal citations,
quotations, ellipses, and original brackets omitted). Further, “common sense
dictates that courts considering termination must also consider whether the
children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with
their foster parents.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268. Accordingly, “the strength of
emotional bond between a child and a potential adoptive parent is [also] an
important consideration” in a “best interests” assessment pursuant to section
2511(b). In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 13 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Additionally, we note that W. Jeffrey Yates, Esquire, guardian ad litem
for Child, recommended during testimony that Mother’s parental rights be
terminated. See N.T. Termination Hearing, 4/12/23, at 107. Specifically, to
support termination, Attorney Yates referred to: Mother’s length of
incarceration; Mother’s multiple stays in drug and alcohol rehabilitation
programs; Child’s negative reaction to contact with Mother; Child adjusting
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well to his foster home; and Child thriving with foster mother. Id. at 109.
Attorney Yates also testified that Child did not speak about positive
interactions with Mother, but was always excited to see maternal grandfather
and appeared to be bonded with maternal grandfather. Id. at 111.
Under such circumstances, we conclude that the trial court properly
terminated Mother’s parental rights under section 2511(b), where Mother’s
continued inability to remedy the conditions leading to Child’s removal is a
critical consideration in determining Child’s developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare. See In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212,
1220 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“Clearly, it would not be in Child’s best interest for
his life to remain on hold indefinitely in hopes that Mother will one day be able
to act as his parent.”) (citation omitted).
In her second issue, Mother contends that the court improperly changed
Child’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption. When reviewing a
goal change order, this Court adheres to an abuse of discretion standard of
review. See In re D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 917 (Pa. Super. 2020). We must
accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations if the
record supports them, but need not accept the court’s inferences or legal
conclusions. Id.Pursuant to [42 Pa.C.S.A.] § 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act, when
considering a petition for a goal change for a dependent child, the
juvenile court is to consider, inter alia: (1) the continuing
necessity for and appropriateness of the placement; (2) the extent
of compliance with the family service plan; (3) the extent of
progress made towards alleviating the circumstances which
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necessitated the original placement; (4) the appropriateness and
feasibility of the current placement goal for the children; (5) a
likely date by which the goal for the child might be achieved; (6)
the child’s safety; and (7) whether the child has been in placement
for at least fifteen of the last twenty-two months. The best
interests of the child, and not the interests of the parent, must
guide the trial court. As this Court has held, a child’s life simply
cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon
the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.
In re A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 1088-89 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
The evidence here reveals that Child has been in placement for more
than one and one half years, and had been in the care and custody of family
members for more than six years prior to placement. Child needs permanency
and Mother does not have the capacity to properly care for Child given her
admitted addiction issues and ongoing cohabitation with Father. Mother has
made, at best, only minimal progress with respect to her objectives and the
record does not suggest that Mother would be able to reunify with Child in a
reasonable amount of time. As such, the trial court properly concluded that
changing Child’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption was in Child’s
best interest. See Interest of D.R.-W., supra; In re A.B., supra.
Finally, after an independent review of the record, we conclude that the
appeal is frivolous and unsupported in law or in fact. There is sufficient,
competent evidence to support the trial court’s factual findings and the court’s
conclusions are not a result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. See
T.S.M., supra. Thus, we grant counsel’s application to withdraw. See In re
V.E., supra.- 18 -
J-A27014-23
Orders affirmed. Counsel’s application to withdraw granted. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/22/2023
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