Shipton, D. v. Comfort Suites Scranton ( 2021 )


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  • J-A07016-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    DOREEN SHIPTON                               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant               :
    :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    COMFORT SUITES SCRANTON                      :   No. 1150 MDA 2020
    Appeal from the Order Entered August 6, 2020
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Civil Division at
    No(s): 2014-4960
    BEFORE:      BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                                  FILED JULY 23, 2021
    Appellant, Doreen Shipton, appeals from the trial court’s Order granting
    summary judgment in favor of Appellee Hotel, Comfort Suites Scranton, on
    the basis that the hotel could not be liable for injuries Appellant suffered in a
    fall on its property. After careful review, we reverse and remand.
    On May 11, 2013, Appellant suffered injuries when she slipped and fell
    on a wet floor as she exited a hot tub on Appellee Hotel’s property. At the time
    of her fall, Appellant and her family were staying as guests at the hotel.
    Appellant initiated litigation on September 5, 2014. On March 13, 2020,
    Appellee Hotel filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The court held argument
    on Appellee Hotel’s Motion on July 21, 2020. The court granted summary
    ____________________________________________
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A07016-21
    judgment in Appellee’s favor on August 6, 2020, finding that the dangerous
    condition posed by the wet floor was “open and obvious” to Appellant.
    Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration on September 2, 2020,
    which the court denied on September 9, 2020. In the interim, on September
    4, 2020, Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court. Both Appellant
    and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:
    1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt committed an error of law by
    granting Appellee[ Hotel’s] Motion for Summary Judgment and
    concluding that the dangerous condition present on Appellee[
    Hotel’s] property was open and obvious.
    2. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt committed an error of law by failing
    to conclude that Appellee [Hotel] should have anticipated the
    harm to Appellant despite its open and obvious nature.
    Appellant’s Br. at 4. Appellants issues are interrelated and, therefore, we will
    address them together.
    We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment for an error of law
    or abuse of discretion. Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 
    997 A.2d 1152
    , 1159
    (Pa. 2010). Our inquiry solely involves questions of law and, therefore, our
    review is de novo. Reinoso v. Heritage Warminster SPE LLC, 
    108 A.3d 80
    ,
    84 (Pa. Super. 2015).
    A trial court may grant summary judgment “only in those cases where
    the record clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact
    and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
    Summers, supra at 1159 (citation and quotation omitted); see also
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    J-A07016-21
    Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2(1). “When considering a motion for summary judgment, the
    trial court must take all facts of record and reasonable inferences therefrom
    in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Summers, supra at 1159
    (citation omitted). “If there is evidence that would allow a fact-finder to render
    a verdict in favor of the non-moving party, then summary judgment should
    be denied.” Reinoso, supra at 85 (citation omitted).
    Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A governs Appellant’s issues. It
    holds that “[a] possessor of land is not liable to [its] invitees1 for physical
    harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is
    known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm
    despite such knowledge or obviousness.” Restatement (Second) of Torts §
    343A. Relevant to the instant appeal, comment f to Section 343A explains that
    “[t]here are[] cases in which the possessor of land can and should anticipate
    that the dangerous condition will cause physical harm to the invitee
    notwithstanding its known or obvious danger. In such cases the possessor is
    not relieved of the duty of reasonable care which he owes to the invitee for
    his protection.” Id. at cmt. f.
    In the instant case, soon after arriving at the hotel, Appellant and her
    family went to the hotel’s pool room, which included the hot tub. Trial Ct. Op.,
    at 1. Once at the pool room, and before getting into the hot tub, Appellant
    noticed the wet floor around the hot tub. N.T. Deposition of Doreen Shipton,
    ____________________________________________
    1 The parties agree that Appellant was an invitee on Appellee Hotel’s property
    at the time of the incident.
    -3-
    J-A07016-21
    11/7/17, at 44-45 (“Shipton Deposition”). She explained that “[i]t wasn’t a
    pool of water, but you could tell it was damp . . . you could tell the floor was
    wet.” Id. A warning sign, hung on the wall by the hot tub, stated: “CAUTION
    Floors are Slippery When Wet.” Id. at 55. The sign was “[i]n close proximity
    to the swimming pool/hot tub[.]” Trial Ct. Op., at 3.
    From this evidence, the trial court determined that the wet floor around
    the hot tub was obvious to Appellant and, therefore, Appellee Hotel could not
    be liable for Appellant’s injuries. Id. at 6-7. The trial court failed to consider
    whether the following evidence, proving Appellee Hotel’s actual knowledge of
    the danger condition around the hot tub, was sufficient to impose liability
    under Section 343A.
    Appellant testified at deposition that, several days after she fell, she
    spoke to a hotel manager, who told her “that they’ve had other people that
    have fell [sic] at that hotel before and that they tried doing something to the
    floor [around the hot tub], treating it.” Shipton Deposition, at 59. She further
    explained that the manager “said that they had had problems in the past with
    people, you know, with the floor, falling, and they’ve tried to rectify this matter
    by treating the floor.” Id. at 61. Appellant explained that the floor was made
    of ceramic tile. Id. at 62.
    Appellee Hotel’s insurance claim file, which it produced in discovery, is
    consistent with Appellant’s recollection of her conversation with the hotel
    manager. The file includes several claims notes demonstrating that another
    patron had fallen near the same hot tub six months earlier. Three particular
    -4-
    J-A07016-21
    notes related that “there is a similar claim where a guest is getting out of the
    hot tub and slips and fall[s]. [Date of loss]: 11-30-12[,]” “the area of the hot
    tub . . . is the same as it was back in November when another guest had fallen
    almost in the exact same area[,]” and “a similar claim [occurred] in Nov 2012.
    According to the insured the area of both accident[s] is the same and nothing
    changed[.]” Claim File Notes, dated 5/24/13, 6/25/13, and 6/28/13.
    Viewed in the light most favorable to Appellant, a jury could reasonably
    conclude from the above evidence that Appellee Hotel had actual knowledge
    of the issue and, therefore, it should have anticipated that it would cause harm
    to Appellant. Thus, a question of fact exists regarding Appellee Hotel’s
    potential duty to Appellant under Section 343A. As a result, the trial court
    erred by granting summary judgment in Appellee Hotel’s favor.
    Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 7/23/2021
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1150 MDA 2020

Judges: Dubow

Filed Date: 7/23/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/21/2024