Com. v. Rountree, D. ( 2021 )


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  • J-S09011-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                           :
    :
    :
    DOMINIC ROUNTREE                          :
    :
    Appellant              :    No. 1596 EDA 2020
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 16, 2020
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0011647-2015
    BEFORE: OLSON, J., McCAFFERY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                                FILED JULY 23, 2021
    Appellant, Dominic Rountree, appeals pro se from the order entered on
    July 16, 2020, dismissing his first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction
    Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9646. We affirm.
    As the PCRA court summarized, “[o]n September 21, 2015, [Appellant]
    shot and killed his brother, Jacquell Rountree (the “decedent”), at [a residence
    they shared with other family members] in Philadelphia.” PCRA Court Opinion,
    10/6/20, at 1. We adopt and incorporate the summary of facts set forth in
    our prior disposition of Appellant’s direct appeal. See Commonwealth v.
    Rountree, 
    2018 WL 1477205
     (Pa. Super. 2018) (unpublished memorandum).
    J-S09011-21
    On November 7, 2016, a jury found Appellant guilty of third-degree
    murder and possession of an instrument of crime (PIC).1 On January 6, 2017,
    the trial court sentenced Appellant to 18 to 36 years’ incarceration for his
    third-degree murder conviction, followed by five years’ probation for the PIC
    conviction. Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court
    denied on February 28, 2017. This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of
    sentence on March 27, 2018.           See Rountree, supra.2   On September 4,
    2018, our Supreme Court denied further review. See Commonwealth v.
    Rountree, 
    193 A.3d 344
     (Pa. 2018).
    Thereafter, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition on November 20,
    2018. Appellant’s petition asserted that the Commonwealth introduced false
    evidence to the jury through Commonwealth Exhibit C-36.           Exhibit C-36,
    ____________________________________________
    1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502 and § 907, respectively.
    2 On direct appeal, Appellant challenged his conviction as against the weight
    of the evidence due, in part, to a discrepancy between the testimony of Dr.
    Khalil Wardak, which stated that the bullet entered the decedent from the
    back right-side and traveled through decedent’s body before lodging in his left
    chest, as shown in Commonwealth Exhibit C-35, and Commonwealth Exhibit
    C-36, a demonstrative body chart which showed the bullet entering the back
    right-side and stopping in the right chest. Appellant’s counsel raised the
    discrepancy and argued that it raised reasonable doubt and supported his
    self-defense theory. The jury rejected Appellant’s theory and found him guilty
    of third-degree murder. See Rountree, 
    2018 WL 1477205
    , at *3 and*6
    (noting that discrepancies are resolved by the fact-finder and that this
    discrepancy did not controvert the “significant and uncontradicted evidence
    that the bullet entered the decedent in his back”). This discrepancy, as will
    be discussed below, forms the basis of Appellant’s current PCRA appeal.
    -2-
    J-S09011-21
    referred   to   as   the   “body   chart,”   was   a   demonstrative   exhibit   the
    Commonwealth showed to the jury to aid Assistant Medical Examiner Dr. Khalil
    Wardak in illustrating his testimony regarding the autopsy findings of the
    decedent’s gunshot wounds. Appellant claims Exhibit C-36 incorporated false
    evidence because it noted the bullet’s stopping point in the right chest,
    contrary to Dr. Wardak’s testimony or Commonwealth Exhibit C-35 (the
    autopsy report) which noted the bullet’s stopping point in the left chest.
    Appellant claims the Commonwealth knew that Exhibit C-36 included false
    evidence but placed it before the jury despite this knowledge. Appellant also
    claims that the Commonwealth suborned perjured testimony from Dr. Wardak
    because of the discrepancy between his testimony and the illustration of
    Exhibit C-36. Appellant maintains that the Commonwealth failed to correct
    the inaccuracies contained within Exhibit C-36 and that this failure constituted
    egregious prosecutorial misconduct. Appellant also claims that counsel was
    ineffective in failing to object to Exhibit C-36.         Appellant further faults
    appellate counsel for failing to challenge Exhibit C-36 on direct appeal.
    Appellant’s petition concluded that the prosecutorial misconduct here was so
    egregious that he is entitled to invoke double jeopardy to bar reprosecution.
    PCRA counsel was appointed on February 15, 2019. On November 18,
    2019, Appellant filed a motion to proceed pro se and, on December 2, 2019,
    PCRA counsel filed a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner,
    
    544 A.2d 927
     (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
     (Pa.
    -3-
    J-S09011-21
    Super. 1998) (en banc).           PCRA counsel’s no-merit letter explained that
    Appellant’s petition rested on a discrepancy between Exhibit C-36, and Exhibit
    C-35 and Dr. Wardak’s testimony. PCRA counsel explained that Appellant’s
    claim lacked merit because (1) the issue was previously litigated when this
    Court addressed the issue and deemed it a minor discrepancy, and (2) the
    claim “ignores the overwhelming and uncontradicted evidence (including the
    body chart) indicating the bullet entered the decedent’s right mid[-]back,
    thereby undermining [Appellant’s] claim of self-defense.”        PCRA Counsel
    No-Merit Letter, 12/2/19, at 2.
    On February 7, 2020, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to
    dismiss Appellant’s petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant filed a
    response on February 25, 2020, asserting that he raised genuine issues of
    material fact and that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. The PCRA
    court formally dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition on July 16, 2020.3 This
    appeal followed.4
    ____________________________________________
    3 In dismissing the PCRA petition, the PCRA court also permitted PCRA counsel
    to withdraw. This was reflected on the docket, but not within the original
    order. The PCRA court filed an amended order on September 8, 2020, solely
    to include language allowing PCRA counsel to withdraw.
    4 Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal on July 30, 2020.   Appellant
    then timely complied with the PCRA court’s order directing him to file a concise
    statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
    On October 6, 2020, the PCRA court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(a).
    -4-
    J-S09011-21
    On appeal pro se, Appellant presents the following issues for our review,
    which have been accurately consolidated and reordered by the PCRA court:
    1. [Was] [t]rial [c]ounsel [] ineffective for failing to object to the
    admission of Commonwealth Exhibit [C-36], the body chart/body
    diagram, which [Appellant claims] to be a falsified legal
    document[?]
    2. [Was] [a]ppellate [c]ounsel [] ineffective for failing to raise
    meritorious claims in the direct appeal 1925(b) [s]tatement[?]
    3. Whether [Appellant] is entitled to [d]ouble [j]eopardy []
    protections   due   to    egregious-pervasive   prosecutorial
    misconduct[?]
    4. [Whether the trial court erred in admitting Brittney Clark’s
    inculpatory testimony when it included three inconsistent
    statements?5]
    [5. Whether Appellant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing
    before the PCRA court?]
    PCRA Court Opinion, 10/6/20, at 2-3 (footnote omitted).
    Our Supreme Court previously determined:
    Under [the] standard of review for an appeal from the denial of
    PCRA relief, [an appellate court] must determine whether the
    ruling of the PCRA court is supported by the record and is free of
    legal error. Commonwealth v. Washington, 
    927 A.2d 586
    , 593
    (Pa. 2007). The PCRA court's credibility determinations are
    binding on [an appellate court] when they are supported by the
    record. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    966 A.2d 523
    , 532, 539
    (Pa. 2009). However, [an appellate court] applies a de novo
    standard of review to the PCRA court's legal conclusions.
    Commonwealth v. Rios, 
    920 A.2d 790
    , 810 (Pa. 2007).
    To be eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner must plead and prove
    by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her conviction or
    sentence resulted from one or more of the circumstances
    ____________________________________________
    5 We reorder Appellant’s fourth issue to         better clarify Appellant’s unfocused
    and rambling claim.
    -5-
    J-S09011-21
    enumerated in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). These circumstances
    include a violation of the Pennsylvania or United States
    Constitution and ineffective assistance of counsel which “so
    undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable
    adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(i), (ii). Furthermore, a petitioner must
    establish that the claims of error raised in the PCRA petition have
    not been previously litigated or waived and that “the failure to
    litigate the issue prior to or during trial, during unitary review or
    on direct appeal could not have been the result of any rational,
    strategic or tactical decision by counsel.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3)
    and (4); Washington, supra, at 593.
    Commonwealth v. Paddy, 
    15 A.3d 431
    , 441–442 (Pa. 2011) (original
    brackets omitted).
    In his first claim, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective. As
    our Supreme Court explained:
    To prevail [on] a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
    petitioner must overcome the presumption that counsel is
    effective by establishing [] the following three elements, as set
    forth in Commonwealth v. Pierce, 
    527 A.2d 973
    , 975–976 (Pa.
    1987): (1) the underlying legal claim has arguable merit; (2)
    counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her action or inaction;
    and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice because of counsel's
    ineffectiveness. Commonwealth v. Dennis, 
    950 A.2d 945
    , 954
    (Pa. 2008). With regard to the second, reasonable basis prong,
    “[an appellate court should] not question whether there were
    other more logical courses of action which counsel could have
    pursued; rather, [] must examine whether counsel's decisions had
    any reasonable basis.” Washington, supra at 594.                [An
    appellate court may] conclude that counsel's chosen strategy
    lacked a reasonable basis only if Appellant proves that “an
    alternative not chosen offered a potential for success substantially
    greater than the course actually pursued.” Commonwealth v.
    Williams, 
    899 A.2d 1060
    , 1064 (Pa. 2006) (citation omitted). To
    establish the third, prejudice prong, the petitioner must show that
    there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
    proceedings would have been different but for counsel's
    ineffectiveness. Dennis, supra at 954. [Our Supreme Court has]
    stress[ed] that boilerplate allegations and bald assertions of no
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    J-S09011-21
    reasonable basis and/or ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy a
    petitioner's burden to prove that counsel was ineffective.
    Paddy, 15 at 442–443 (original brackets omitted).
    The PCRA court determined:
    [Appellant’s] first claim is that the trial counsel was ineffective for
    failing to object to the admission of [Exhibit C-36], the body
    chart/body diagram, which [Appellant claims] to be a falsified
    legal document.
    [Appellant’s] assertion that [Exhibit C-36] is a falsified legal
    document stems from a discrepancy between Exhibit [C-]36,
    [Exhibit C-35] and the testimony of Dr. Wardak.
    Exhibit [C-]36 is a [demonstrative exhibit of a] body chart which
    depicts a marking made by Dr. Wardak indicating an entrance
    wound to the right mid-back of the decedent and a marking
    indicating that the bullet was recovered from the right side of the
    decedent’s chest. [By contrast,] Exhibit [C-]35 is the Medical
    Examiner’s report which reads that the decedent was shot in the
    right-mid back and that the bullet was recovered from the left
    side of the decedent’s chest. Dr. Wardak testified that the
    decedent was shot in the right mid-back, and that the bullet was
    recovered from the left side of the decedent’s chest. In fact, Dr.
    Wardak testified that the path of the bullet was right to left and
    back to front. The marking on the body chart indicating that the
    bullet was recovered from the right side was clearly an inadvertent
    error of no evidentiary value.
    *     *      *
    [Appellant’s] claim lacks merit. Notwithstanding the inadvertent
    error on the body chart, the evidence remains that [Appellant]
    admitted to shooting his brother. Although [Appellant] claimed
    that he acted in self-defense, the eyewitness testimony and the
    location of the entrance wound ([on]the back) proved otherwise.
    Since the error contained on [E]xhibit [C-]36 was of no moment,
    trial counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to object to its
    admission.
    PCRA Court Opinion, 10/6/20, at 6 (emphasis in original).
    -7-
    J-S09011-21
    After a thorough review of the record, we concur with the PCRA court’s
    assessment. During Appellant’s direct appeal, we noted that it is up to the
    fact-finder to resolve discrepancies in the evidence and that the evidentiary
    value of this discrepancy was minimal balanced against “the significant and
    uncontradicted evidence that the bullet entered the decedent [through] his
    back.”   Rountree, 
    2018 WL 1477205
    , at *6, citing Commonwealth v.
    Hilliard, 
    172 A.3d 5
    , 14 (Pa. Super. 2017). On collateral review, Appellant
    still does not contest that he shot the decedent or that the bullet entered the
    decedent through his back.     Where the bullet was located when retrieved
    during autopsy has no bearing on Appellant’s self-defense claim given the
    undisputed material fact that Appellant shot the decedent multiple times,
    including a fatal gunshot wound which entered through the decedent’s back.
    Therefore, Appellant’s underlying claim lacks merit and fails to establish a
    prejudicial effect on the outcome of his trial, as required to establish an
    ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.     The PCRA court correctly
    dismissed Appellant’s first claim.
    In his second issue, Appellant claims his appellate counsel was
    ineffective for failing to raise meritorious claims during his direct appeal.
    Appellant asserts that his appellate counsel “failed to raise at least [s]ix (6)
    meritorious issues, precluding adequate review[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 12.
    Appellant, however, fails to articulate what issues appellate counsel neglected
    to raise. Therefore, he has waived this issue. Commonwealth v. Sarvey,
    -8-
    J-S09011-21
    
    199 A.3d 436
    , 452 (appellant waives claim where he relies on supposition and
    bald assertions).      Assuming arguendo that Appellant’s claim asserts that
    appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the supposed discrepancy
    found in Exhibit C-36, this argument also fails for the reasons set forth in issue
    one.
    Next, Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth’s egregious misconduct
    precludes a new trial under the double jeopardy clause.         The PCRA court
    determined that Appellant waived this claim by failing to raise it in his PCRA
    petition or his response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice of intent to
    dismiss. See PCRA Court Opinion, 10/6/20, at 8.         We, however, find that
    Appellant raised it in the conclusion section of his petition and that he cited
    substantial pertinent caselaw regarding double jeopardy in support of his
    claim.   Appellant, however, failed to demonstrate where in the record he
    preserved this claim within his trial proceedings or on direct appeal. Therefore
    this issue is waived. Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, 
    159 A.3d 503
    , 528
    n.23 (Pa. 2017), citing Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e).6
    ____________________________________________
    6 Even if we would find this issue properly preserved, Appellant’s argument
    fails. Appellant cites only the “inadvertent error” and “minor discrepancy”
    involving Exhibit C-36. Minor discrepancies in the Commonwealth’s case are
    not considered false evidence. Commonwealth v. Ali, 
    10 A.3d 282
    , 294 (Pa.
    2010). Moreover, “Appellant has failed to demonstrate entitlement to relief
    [because] Appellant cites only discrepancies . . . and offers nothing to support
    his serious allegation that the prosecution knowingly presented false
    evidence.” Yandamuri, 159 A.3d at 528.
    -9-
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    In his fourth issue, Appellant contests several statements made during
    the testimony of Ms. Clark, the decedent’s girlfriend. Appellant failed to raise
    this claim in his PCRA petition or in his response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907
    notice of intent to dismiss. Therefore, Appellant waived this claim on appeal.
    Commonwealth v. Elliot,
    80 A.3d 415
    , 430 (Pa. 2013) (appellant waived
    issue because he failed to include it in his PCRA petition and failed to obtain
    permission to amend the petition to include the claim); Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(B)
    (failure to state a particular ground in petition precludes Appellant from raising
    that ground in post-conviction collateral proceeding).
    In his final complaint, Appellant asserts throughout his brief that the
    PCRA court erred in dismissing his claim without an evidentiary hearing. Our
    Supreme Court determined:
    […T]he PCRA court has the discretion to dismiss a petition without
    a hearing when the court is satisfied “that there are no genuine
    issues concerning any material fact, the defendant is not entitled
    to post-conviction collateral relief, and no legitimate purpose
    would be served by any further proceedings.”              [See, i.e.,
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 907]. “To obtain reversal of a PCRA court's decision
    to dismiss a petition without a hearing, an appellant must show
    that he raised a genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in his
    favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that the court otherwise
    abused its discretion in denying a hearing.” Commonwealth v.
    D'Amato, 
    856 A.2d 806
    , 820 (Pa. 2004).
    Paddy, 15 A.3d at 442 (original brackets omitted).
    Moreover, this Court explained:
    A PCRA petitioner is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary
    hearing. We review the PCRA court's decision dismissing a
    petition without a hearing for an abuse of discretion. The right
    to an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition is not
    - 10 -
    J-S09011-21
    absolute. It is within the PCRA court's discretion to decline to hold
    a hearing if the petitioner's claim is patently frivolous and has no
    support either in the record or other evidence.
    It is the responsibility of the reviewing court on appeal to examine
    each issue raised in the PCRA petition in light of the record
    certified before it in order to determine if the PCRA court erred in
    its determination that there were no genuine issues of material
    fact in controversy and in denying relief without conducting an
    evidentiary hearing.
    Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    244 A.3d 1281
    , 1287 (Pa. Super. 2021)
    (internal citations and original brackets omitted).
    The PCRA court determined that Appellant failed to raise any issues of
    material fact which were in dispute because Appellant’s claim centered on the
    alleged discrepancy reflected in Exhibit C-36. Based upon our review of the
    certified record and applicable law as set forth above, we agree with the PCRA
    court. Regardless of the trajectory of the bullet once it entered the decedent’s
    body – i.e., whether it was recovered from the left or the right chest area –
    the critical and material fact remained uncontroverted that Appellant shot the
    decedent in the back. Moreover, Appellant failed to allege sufficient facts to
    support his allegation of prosecutorial misconduct. Therefore, this claim too
    did not merit an evidentiary hearing. As such, the PCRA court did not err by
    denying relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
    Order affirmed.
    - 11 -
    J-S09011-21
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 7/23/2021
    - 12 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1596 EDA 2020

Judges: Olson

Filed Date: 7/23/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/21/2024