In the Interest: of V.M., Appeal of: G.M. ( 2021 )

J-S24032-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: V.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: G.M., FATHER :
:
:
:
: No. 273 WDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered February 19, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court at
No(s): CP-02-AP-0000015-2020
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: AUGUST 13, 2021
Appellant, G.M. (“Father”), appeals from the order entered on February
19, 2021, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which granted
the petition of Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth, and Families (“CYF”
or the “Agency”) to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights to his
minor, dependent daughter, V.M., born in November 2009 (“Child”), pursuant
to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).1 After a
careful review, we affirm.
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Pursuant to the same order, the court terminated the parental rights of
Mother, L.L.R. a/k/a L.L.L. (“Mother”). Mother did not file a separate appeal,
and she is not a participating party to the instant appeal.
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The trial court has summarized the relevant facts and procedural history
as follows:
[Child] was born [in November 2009]. The child’s mother
is L.L.R., who is also known as L.L.L. On April 30, 2018, [Mother]
was convicted of 3rd degree murder and is serving a sentence of
18-36 years in a state correctional institution. [Mother] has not
visited the child, and child does not wish to visit her mother.
[Mother] has not maintained consistent contact with CYF.
The child’s father is G.M. Father was acknowledged by
acknowledgment of paternity on November 11, 2009. [CYF] was
aware of this family since 2011 due to [Mother]’s unaddressed
substance abuse, mental health, housing, and domestic violence
issues.
The [A]gency became involved with the family again in
November of 2012. The [A]gency learned that L.L.R. was
homeless and requesting the removal of the minor from her care.
The agency implemented in-home services to assist the family.
On March 14, 2013, [Mother] contacted CYF and requested
the child be removed from her care. The child was placed into
foster care on March 15, 2013….CYF filed a Petition for
Dependency on March 25, 2013[,] and the child was adjudicated
dependent on May 8, 2013.
The child was eventually returned to [F]ather’s care on June
27, 2014; however, she was removed from her father’s care on
July 14, 2014. The child’s permanency goal was changed to
Permanent Legal Custodianship [(“PLC”)] and her PLC placement
was finalized on January 23, 2015.[2] The child’s case in Juvenile
Court was closed on January 23, 2015.
On October 29, 2015, the child’s legal custodian filed an
Application to file a Private Dependency, due to the minor’s out-
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2 Paternal step-grandmother, A.L., with whom Child had previously been
placed, served as Child’s permanent legal custodian. N.T., 2/18/21, at 12.
We observe that, in at least one instance, A.L. is alternately referred to as
maternal grandmother. See TPR Exhibit 3, Shelter Care Order, 8/31/18.
While admitted as CYS Exhibit 2 on the record at the termination hearing, this
exhibit is included in the electronic certified record as TPR Exhibit 3, and we
shall refer to it as such.
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of-control behaviors. The petition was withdrawn on November 5,
2015, and the child’s case in Juvenile Court was closed on that
date.
On August 4[], 2018, the child’s legal custodian filed for a
modification of the permanent legal custody order due to the
child’s ongoing out-of-control behaviors. At a review hearing on
August 29, 2018, the legal custodian advised she was no longer
able to care for the child and requested her removal. The minor
was ordered to be placed into foster care.
At a shelter hearing on August 31[], 2018, the child’s new
caregivers advised that they were not willing to be [a] placement
option for the child if Father was to be involved with the minor.
Due to this, the child’s legal custodian advised that she was willing
to care for the child until a new placement was identified.
[Mother] was not a placement option as she was incarcerated in a
state correctional institution for 3rd degree murder. On October
[2]4, 2018, the child was placed into foster care placement for the
final time.[3] She [has] not [been] returned to the care of either
parent since that time.
...
Father was court ordered to obtain drug and alcohol
treatment, to include random urine screens, and individual mental
health treatment on November 20[,] 2019. Father was court
ordered to locate a place in the community to visit with [C]hild on
November 20[], 2019[,] and he failed to do so.
Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 4/15/21, at 4-6 (footnotes added). See N.T,
2/18/21, at 6-10; Stipulations, 2/19/21; TPR Exhibit 3.
____________________________________________
3 Child was again adjudicated dependent. She was placed with T.C. and S.C.,
with whom she had initially been placed on August 29, 2018. TPR Exhibit 3,
Order of Adjudication and Disposition, 10/24/18. On February 21, 2019, the
court appointed T.C. and S.C. as Child’s educational and medical decision-
makers. TPR Exhibit 3, Appointment of Educational and Medical Decision-
Maker, 2/21/19. Subsequently, on February 19, 2020, the court appointed
solely T.C. as Child’s educational and medical decision-maker. TPR Exhibit 3,
Appointment of Educational Decision-Maker, 2/19/20. Significantly, at the
time of the hearing, Child resided solely with T.C. N.T., 2/18/21, at 13.
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Thereafter, CYF filed a petition for the termination of parental rights on
February 5, 2020.4 The court eventually held a hearing on February 18, 2021.
Father was present and represented by counsel, and Child was represented
by counsel from KidsVoice, appointed pursuant to Order dated and entered on
February 19, 2020.5 CYF presented the testimony of Marci Bolger, a CYF
caseworker; and Dr. Patricia Pepe, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist who the
parties stipulated as an expert. Dr. Pepe conducted individual and
interactional evaluations of Child and Father, as well as an interactional
evaluation of Child and her foster father. Dr. Pepe’s report was admitted
without objection as CYS Exhibit 1.6 Additionally, Father testified on his own
behalf.
By order dated February 18, 2021, and entered on February 19, 2021,
the court terminated Father’s parental rights. Thereafter, on February 25,
2021, Father, through appointed counsel, filed a timely notice of appeal, as
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4 The court changed Child’s permanent placement goal from return to parent
or guardian to adoption pursuant to the order of February 19, 2021. TPR
Exhibit 3, Permanency Review Order, 2/19/20. Father did not appeal this
order.
5 Notably, counsel for Child argued in favor of termination of parental rights.
N.T., 2/18/21, at 58-59. Counsel further submitted a brief to this Court in
support of the termination of Father’s parental rights.
6 While admitted as CYS Exhibit 1 on the record at the termination hearing,
this exhibit is included in the electronic certified record as TPR Exhibit 1.
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well as a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
On appeal, Father raises the following issues for our review:
I. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt committed fatal error and/or abused
its discretion in finding [CYF] met their burden of proof and proved
by clear and convincing evidence that the parental rights of
[Father] should be terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§
2511(a)(2), (5), (8)]?
II. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt committed fatal error and/or abused
its discretion in finding [CYF] met their burden of proof and proved
by clear and convincing evidence that the parental rights of
[Father] best meets the needs and welfare of the minor child
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§ 2511(b)]?
Father’s Brief at 5 (suggested answers omitted).
Initially, we note that in matters involving the involuntary termination
of parental rights, our standard of review is as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights
cases requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., [616 Pa. 309, 325, 47
A.3d 817, 826 (2012)]. “If the factual findings are supported,
appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an
error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may be
reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of
manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.”
Id. The trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed
merely because the record would support a different result. Id.
at 827. We have previously emphasized our deference to trial
courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties
spanning multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., [608 Pa. 9, 26-27,
9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010)].
In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 628, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013)). “The trial court
is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise
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free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the
evidence.” In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation
omitted). “[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will
affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.” In re
Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
Moreover, the termination of parental rights is governed by Section
2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, and requires a
bifurcated analysis of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and
welfare of the child.
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the
court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating
parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent.
The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have
defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re
C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of
Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 550 Pa. 595, 601, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (1998)).
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In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). We have long held
that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only agree
with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as
Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en
banc). Here, we analyze the court’s termination decree pursuant to Section
2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
...
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
...
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), and (b) (bold in original).
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With regard to termination of parental rights pursuant to Section
2511(a)(2), we have indicated:
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be
met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused
the child to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and
(3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
or will not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot
be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those
grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa.Super. 2015)
(quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002)). “Parents are
required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption
of full parental responsibilities….[A] parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long
period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of services,
may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” In re A.L.D., 797
A.2d at 340 (quotation marks and quotation omitted).
Instantly, in finding grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights,
including pursuant to subsection (a)(2), the trial court reasoned:
The family plan goals for Father were completion of
domestic violence treatment, mental health treatment, and drug
and alcohol counseling. The [c]ourt made a finding that Father
had ongoing issues with drugs and alcohol from when the case
was previously opened. Father was ordered to be evaluated and
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begin treatment. Father began treatment in October 2020 and
did not complete by the time of the TPR hearing. The [c]ourt
further finds that Father did not submit to his random drug screens
that were ordered on November 20, 2019, at the Permanency
Review Hearing. Ms. Bolger testified that Father did not submit
to random urine screens because he admitted to her that he was
still using marijuana on a regular basis.
Though there was testimony on cross-examination that
Father had sent a picture to Ms. Bolger of a medical marijuana
card that he obtained in January of 2021[, t]hat fact is
unpersuasive to the [c]ourt as Father failed to comply and did not
submit to the drug screens as was ordered by the [c]ourt over a
year prior to obtaining the medical card. Therefore, the [c]ourt
finds that Father did not meet his drug and alcohol goal ordered
by the [c]ourt.
The goal of domestic violence counseling was also an issue
in this case and something the [c]ourt ordered the [f]ather to
address as a family goal. Father testified that he believed he
completed a domestic violence course in 2014. Father began
domestic violence counseling in 2014 at the Women’s Center and
Shelter of Greater Pittsburgh (“WC&S”), but [he] never
successfully completed [the counseling program]. Father told
caseworker Bolger that he completed the domestic violence
counseling, when in fact he did not. Ms. Bolger then reached out
to WC&S to verify and learned that he did not complete [it]. Ms.
Bolger then provided Father with the number of the WC&S so that
he could schedule the classes, which did not occur.
The [c]ourt ordered Father to undergo a mental health
evaluation and treatment. Father did not undergo a mental health
evaluation. Father sent pictures to caseworker Bolger that he was
attending Family Links; [however,] to her understanding, he
received only a drug and alcohol evaluation from the picture he
sent. The [c]ourt heard testimony from Dr. Patricia Pepe, Ph.D.,
a licensed psychologist and expert who performed evaluations in
this case. Dr. Pepe evaluated Father on September 22, 2021. Dr.
Pepe recalled that Father had a violent past and had been
incarcerated in the past for assault. Dr. Pepe testified Father has
been psychiatrically hospitalized at WPIC more than 10 times, but
[he] wasn’t involved in treatment services at the time of the
evaluation. Dr. Pepe diagnosed Father with post-traumatic stress
disorder and a history of antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Pepe
opined that Father had a tendency for persecutory thinking and
paranoid ideation.
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Although Father made an attempt to comply with treatment
by using Family Links, the [c]ourt found that the Family Links
services did not meet the type/level of care prescribed. Further,
it was revealed by Father’s own admission that he didn’t begin his
Family Links therapy until after the TPR was filed in this matter.
The [c]ourt relied heavily on the opinion of Dr. Pepe that Father
struggles to meet his own daily needs. He is still psychiatrically
and behaviorally unfit to provide [Child] the structure she requires
and currently receives through her foster father. The [c]ourt,
therefore, finds that Father did not meet his mental health goals.
The [c]ourt also ordered visitation to occur between the
child and Father. The [c]ourt accepted the testimony of Ms. Bolger
who had records detailing from 2019 the visitations. Initially,
Father made adequate efforts with his efforts to meet this goal.
Father consistently attended his visits March 3, 2019, through May
13, 2019, all but one of the visits, which was canceled by the
foster mother. Father had in-person visits at CYF Offices on June
23, 2019, and June 30, 2019.
Unfortunately, Father’s visitation became inconsistent and
the location of the visits continued to be an obstacle. From August
18 through November 9, 2019, nearly three months later, [F]ather
had no visits with the child. Father scheduled the visits on a
Saturday, which conflicted with dance classes for the child on that
day of the week. Visitations then ceased from December 17,
2019, to October 16, 2020, because Father did not identify a
public location for the visits to occur, which he acknowledged as
his failed responsibility. Father incredibly testified that the reason
the visits didn’t occur was due to a miscommunication with the
caseworker.
Ms. Bolger testified that this [c]ourt ordered [sic] to conduct
a home assessment of Father’s residence. The [c]ourt accepted
the testimony of Ms. Bolger that Father’s residence was
unacceptable to have home visits as there were holes in the ceiling
and Playboy magazines strewn across the coffee table. Father
later remedied his housing issues and visitations resumed.
Although Father identified suitable housing for himself, the [c]ourt
noted that Father expressed a great deal of concern about his
apartment location because “it’s in the midst of drug traffic and
violence” when interviewed by Dr. Pepe. Father admitted that he
tends not to go outside because he frequently heard gun shots in
the neighborhood area. It is the [c]ourt’s opinion that the housing
goal has not been met and the home is not safe for [Child].
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Father has never independently parented [Child] for an
adequate amount of time to demonstrate parental responsibility.
CYF has been involved with the family since 2011 for the very
same issues the [c]ourt heard about throughout the life of this
case. The child returned to Father in 2014 under court supervision
and the case was closed in 2015. During this time frame[,] there
was conflicting evidence as to whom [sic] actually cared for the
day[-]to[-]day needs of the child. Unfortunately, CYF needed to
reopen the case because Father was still not in a position to care
for [Child,] and, to date[, he] has not rectified the circumstances
that caused CYF to become involved with the family in the first
place.
The [c]ourt finds that Father did not meet his goals. It is,
therefore, the opinion of the court that CYF met their burden by
clear and convincing evidence that Father did not remedy the
issues that led to the removal of [Child] and that termination of
Father’s parental rights is in the best interests of [Child] pursuant
to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8)].
T.C.O. at 7-11 (citations omitted).
Father, however, argues that CYF failed to present clear and convincing
evidence to establish grounds for termination pursuant to subsection (a)(2).
He asserts that he remedied the conditions related to Child’s dependency.
Father’s Brief at 11-12. Noting concerns related to substance abuse, mental
health, and domestic violence, Father states:
[Father] contends that he remedied the issues that led to
dependency and that he is capable of caring for [Child]. [Father]
is engaged in mental health and drug and alcohol treatment and
Family Links. The only drug that [Father] uses is marijuana, [for]
which he had a medical marijuana card that permits his usage.
[Father] contends that he completed domestic violence classes in
2014 and that he has not been involved in any domestic violence
incidents since taking the classes. [Father] contends that he can
meet the needs of [Child] as he has housing sufficient to raise
[Child] in and would ensure that she continues in her therapy if
returned to him.
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Id. at 12.
A review of the record supports the trial court’s finding of grounds for
termination under Section 2511(a)(2). The record reveals that Father failed
to complete his goals aimed at reunification and lacked the ability to parent
Child. As such, CYF expressed continuing concerns related to Father.
When asked about CYF’s concerns as to Father’s ability to parent,
caseworker Marci Bolger testified, “[Father] has never parented [Child]. The
case was closed out as a PLC in 2015, and[,] when it reopened, [Father] still
was not in a position to care for [Child]. He has not rectified the circumstances
that ha[ve] made the safety concerns not there [sic].” N.T., 2/18/21, at 19.
Likewise, regarding Father, Dr. Patricia Pepe testified, “I don’t see him as
having the individual stability or parental responsibility at this time to parent
[Child].” Id. at 33. Dr. Pepe continued, “I had concern about [Father], you
know, even though he’s made tremendous progress, his capacity to parent
[Child].” Id. at 34. She referenced Father’s self-acknowledged concerns with
his housing,7 as well as issues related to persecutory thinking and paranoid
ideation. Id. at 36. As such, Dr. Pepe recommended adoption as being in
Child’s best interests. Id. at 40.
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7 As to Father’s description of his neighborhood, Dr. Pepe testified, “He had
expressed a great deal of concern about his apartment because he said it’s in
the midst of drug traffic and violence. So, he tends not to go outside, and
frequently hears shooting in the area, and generally described his
neighborhood as being dangerous.” Id. at 32-33.
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We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering
termination under Section 2511(a)(2). The record substantiates the
conclusion that Father’s repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or
refusal has caused Child to be without essential parental control or subsistence
necessary for her physical and mental well-being. See In re Adoption of
M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1272. Moreover, Father cannot or will not remedy this
situation. See id. As we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law, we do
not disturb the trial court’s findings.
As this Court has stated, “[A] child’s life cannot be held in abeyance
while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting
responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s
need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope
for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa.Super.
2006).
As noted above, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we
need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section
2511(a) before assessing the determination under Section 2511(b), and we,
therefore, need not address any further subsections of Section 2511(a). In
re B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384.
We next determine whether termination was proper under Section
2511(b). As to Section 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are
met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the
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developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child.” 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The emotional needs and
welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to include
“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In
re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M.
[a/k/a E.W.C. & L.M. a/k/a L.C., Jr.], [533 Pa. 115, 123, 620
A.2d 481, 485 (1993)], this Court held that the determination of
the child’s “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the
emotional bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost
attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at
791. However, as discussed below, evaluation of a child’s bonds
is not always an easy task.
In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 628, 71 A.3d at 267. “In cases where there is no
evidence of any bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer
that no bond exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily
depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d
753, 762-63 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
When evaluating a parental bond, “[T]he court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citations
omitted).
Moreover,
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
aspect of the Section 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and
should also consider the intangibles, such as the love,
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comfort, security, and stability the child might have
with the foster parent….
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219 (quoting In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d
95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and quotation omitted).
In determining that termination of Father’s parental rights favors Child’s
needs and welfare under Section 2511(b), the trial court stated:
This [c]ourt conducted a parent-child bond analysis in this
case. The [c]ourt is not required to use expert testimony and may
rely upon the evaluation of social workers and caseworkers as
well. The extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends
on the circumstances of the particular case.
The court analyzed the absence of any significant bond
between [Child] and Father. The parent-child relationship is non-
existent. The [c]ourt accepted the opinion of Dr. Pepe that[,]
while [Child] and Father enjoy each other, “there is no primary
bonding with him.” There was conflicting testimony that [Child]
briefly stayed with Father in 2014, but[,] according to Dr. Pepe’s
interactions with [Child], she learned from her that the two never
lived together. Further, according to Dr. Pepe’s own observations
of Father and [Child], it did not appear to her that the two were
having visits with one another prior to Father’s six-month lapse in
visits. Ultimately, Dr. Pepe opined that she just doesn’t believe
that Father is capable to handle his own daily needs let alone
provide the structure for [Child]. Furthermore, [Child] does not
consider Father a priority in her life due to a lack of having any
relationship with him because of their past. The [c]ourt agrees.
There is no doubt that severing the parental rights of Father would
be in the best interests of [Child].
The [c]ourt also examined the established bond between the
foster father, [T.C.,] and [Child] in making its decision to
terminate the parental rights of Father. It was clear to the [c]ourt
that the foster father provided a stable environment that fostered
the love and emotional support the child requires.
[Child] had her own psychiatric issues and was at one time
hospitalized. She exhibited out of control behaviors. According
to Dr. Pepe, the child suffered these traumas due to her moves
from different homes. [Child] has moved five times and according
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to Dr. Pepe, “she’s really ready for permanency.” Dr. Pepe noted
the “tremendous progress” she has made. Dr. Pepe noted the fact
that [Child] has gone from being out of control to now being on
the high honor roll in school. And[,] although [Child] had
previously been diagnosed by Dr. Pepe with trauma and stressor
related issues, she no longer exhibits these symptoms. Dr. Pepe
expressed her opinion that [Child] is positively expressive, mature
for her age, and a delightful young lady.
The [c]ourt finds this to be true due to the positive affect
the foster home provides the child. The [c]ourt weighed heavily
the testimonial evidence about [Child]’s relationship with [her
foster father]. The [c]ourt finds [foster father] to be a highly
responsible adult and father figure equipped to provide the love
and support that [Child] desires and needs. [Foster father], who
is employed as a school resource officer, is extremely supportive
of [Child]. He encourages and motivates [Child]. All of this has
made for a positive structure for her positive behavioral
functioning.
[Child] refers to foster father [] as “T.T.” Dr. Pepe observed
and testified that [Child] and [foster father] have a very nice
relationship. The two share a lot of activities and interests. Dr.
Pepe opined that [Child] is extremely attached to [foster father].
[Child] told Dr. Pepe that she wants to stay with “T.T.” for the rest
of her days[,] or at least until college. Further, it was Dr. Pepe’s
opinion that [foster father] has been very supportive, encouraged
[Child], and exhibits excellent parenting skills. It was clear to Dr.
Pepe that [Child] views [foster father] as her permanent
psychological parent.
Additionally, the [c]ourt weighed the expert testimony of Dr.
Pepe[,] who opined that she has no concerns that foster father
would be able to meet [Child]’s needs. [Child] would be
devastated if she had to leave her foster father’s home. The
[c]ourt agrees with Dr. Pepe’s opinion that it would be
“destructive” for [Child]. [Child] has made such a move forward,
psychologically and behaviorally[,] since being in her current
foster home. Furthermore, from a psychological viewpoint,
permanency is a priority, and[,] therefore[,] severing the ties with
the biological father would not have a detrimental effect on the
child.
Therefore, the evidence established that termination will be
able to provide [Child] with much needed stability and
permanence at her age[,] and this [c]ourt concludes that the
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developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of
Child would be best served by terminating Father’s parental rights
under 2511(b).
T.C.O. at 11-15 (citations omitted).
Father, however, argues that his relationship with Child should not be
severed. He highlights that Dr. Pepe indicated that both Father and Child
desire to maintain a relationship with one another and that this is an important
relationship to maintain. Father’s Brief at 17. He further notes that his failures
are not relevant to this assessment. Id.As to Section 2511(b), we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion. In describing Child’s relationship with her foster father, Ms. Bolger
stated, “My observation would be [that there is a] great parent/child
relationship. [Child] looks to [her foster father] for basically everything.”
N.T., 2/18/21, at 23. Similarly, Dr. Pepe testified, “Well, they have a very
nice relationship, very trusting. I mean, he’s extremely supportive of her,
encouraging, motivating towards her, really has developed a positive structure
so she can exhibit positive behavioral functioning.” Id. at 29. While Dr. Pepe
recognized a relationship existed between Father and Child, Dr. Pepe “didn’t
see a strong parent and child relationship or a primary bond.” Id. at 34. See
id. at 33, 37. Dr. Pepe explained that Father and Child did not have a “closely
connected relationship.” Id. at 41-42. Rather, Dr. Pepe noted that Child
viewed her foster father as “her primary and psychological parent.” Id. at 31.
As such, Dr. Pepe opined that severing any bond between Father and Child
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would not have a detrimental effect on Child. Id. at 42. Conversely, Child
would be “devastated” if she were removed from her foster father. Id. at 40.8
Hence, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare favor
termination of parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). See T.S.M., 620
Pa. at 628, 71 A.3d at 267.
While Father may profess to love Child, a parent’s own feelings of love
and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights.
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. Child is entitled to permanency and stability.
As we have stated, a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that
[a parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.”
Id. at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and
rearing of his child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental
duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or
her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M.,
856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of
discretion and conclude that the trial court properly terminated Father’s
parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).
____________________________________________
8 Significantly, Ms. Bolger, Dr. Pepe, and counsel for Child all additionally
reported that Child desired to be adopted and remain with her foster father.
Id. at 23-24, 30-31, 56-57.
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Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/13/2021
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