In the Int. of: C.B., Appeal of: A.B. ( 2021 )

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2021 PA Super 189IN THE INTEREST OF: C.B., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: A.B., FATHER :
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: No. 121 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered December 16, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-DP-0001613-2019
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IN THE INTEREST OF: K.B., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: A.B., FATHER :
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: No. 127 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered December 16, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-DP-0001614-2019
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IN THE INTEREST OF: A.B., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: A.B., FATHER :
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: No. 129 EDA 2020
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Appeal from the Order Entered December 16, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-DP-0001615-2019
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IN THE INTEREST OF: C.B., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.B., MOTHER :
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: No. 124 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered December 16, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-DP-0001613-2019
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IN THE INTEREST OF: K.B., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.B., MOTHER :
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:
: No. 125 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered December 16, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-DP-0001614-2019
*****
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.B., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.B., MOTHER :
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: No. 128 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered December 16, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-DP-0001615-2019
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IN THE INTEREST OF: Y.C., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.B., MOTHER :
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: No. 130 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered December 16, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-DP-0001612-2019
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J.,
NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and
McCAFFERY, J.
OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.: Filed: September 23, 2021
A.B. (Father) appeals from the trial court’s orders adjudicating his three
minor children, C.B. (born 1/16), and twins, K.B. and A.B. (born 5/19),
dependent. S.B. (Mother) also appeals from the same orders adjudicating
those minor children dependent, as well as an order adjudicating her other
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child, Y.C.1 (born 9/10), dependent.2 The court also entered an order finding
that K.B. suffered child abuse. Here, medical testimony established that five-
month-old K.B. suffered injuries that were the result of non-accidental trauma
that occurred while Father and Mother (collectively, Parents) were responsible
for K.B.’s welfare. Moreover, neither Father nor Mother could provide an
explanation of how the injuries occurred. Under these facts, the court applied
the evidentiary presumption found at 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6381(d), which
establishes a prima facie case of abuse by the persons who were responsible
for the child when the abuse occurred. Because Mother and Father failed to
rebut that presumption, we are constrained to affirm the orders.3
Mother and Father are the biological parents of C.B., K.B. and A.B.
Mother also has a child, Y.C., whose biological father passed away. Father
and Y.C. have a close, father-son type relationship. Since Parents both work
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1 We will refer to all four children, collectively, as “Children.”
2 We have sua sponte consolidated Father’s and Mother’s appeals, as the
orders appealed and questions involved are the same. See Pa.R.A.P. 513
(consolidation of multiple appeals).
3 On September 2, 2020, a panel of this Court affirmed the trial court’s findings
of abuse with regard to K.B. and the adjudications of dependency and
dispositions with regard to Children. In the Interest of C.B., K.B., A.B., &
Y.C., 121, 124-25, 127-30 EDA 2020 (Pa. Super. filed 9/1/20) (unpublished
memorandum decision). That decision was later withdrawn when the Court
granted Mother’s and Father’s application for reargument on October 9, 2020.
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outside the home, they hired two babysitters (Babysitter #1 & Babysitter #2)4
to take care of Children when they are at work. Y.C.’s paternal grandmother
(Paternal Grandmother)5 also helps care for Children.
K.B. and A.B. attended the Goddard School in October 2019. On the
evening of October 11, 2019, Parents had dinner at the Palm Restaurant in
Philadelphia, while K.B. and A.B. were cared for by Babysitter #1. When
Parents returned home from dinner at approximately 11:30 p.m., Children
were asleep. The next morning, a Saturday, Parents left the house early to
go shopping for winter coats in Delaware for Children; Children stayed with
Babysitter #1 and Babysitter #2 while they were gone. Parents returned
home from shopping around 5:30 p.m., at which time Babysitter #1 went to
her home for a brief period. She returned to Parents’ home around 8:00 p.m.,
resumed her babysitting duties, and stayed the night.6 The following day,
Sunday, October 13, Parents went to New York for the day. Y.C. and C.B.
went to a pumpkin patch with Babysitter #2, while Babysitter #1 watched the
twins at home. Mother testified that she received a picture of the twins in
their car seats from Babysitter #1 at 4:30 p.m. on October 13, 2019, and that
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4 Babysitter #1 took care of the twins, K.B. and A.B., while Babysitter #2 took
care of Y.C. and C.B.
5 Paternal Grandmother is only the grandmother to Y.C., not to any of the
other Children.
6 Mother testified that Babysitter #1 stays overnight on Fridays and Saturdays
to help with the twins.
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there did not appear to be anything wrong with K.B. at that time. Neither
babysitter noticed anything amiss with Children that day, except that K.B. fell
asleep on his right side, which was unusual as he always slept on his back.
Babysitter #2 testified that, when K.B. woke up that evening before Parents
returned home from New York, his cry was not normal and sounded like “a
grunt cry, almost as if he w[ere] hurt.” N.T. Dependency/Abuse Hearing,
12/16/19, at 146-48. Paternal Grandmother,7 Babysitter #1, and Babysitter
#2 were at the house when Parents returned home from New York around
10:10 p.m. Babysitter #1 left to go home about 10 minutes later. Although
K.B. was fussy that evening, it did not concern Mother or Father, since he was
the more difficult of the twins.
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7 Paternal Grandmother stays overnight on Sundays and sleeps on the same
floor of the home as the twins and, according to a social worker, is their direct
caregiver. N.T. Dependency/Abuse Hearing, 12/1619, at 121.
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Father testified at the abuse hearing that early on the morning8 of
October 14, 2019, K.B. let out a loud “scream” that woke up Parents. 9 Id. at
72. Father found K.B. in distress; Mother noticed that when K.B.’s right hand
was touched, he would scream. Paternal Grandmother noticed that K.B. had
swelling on his right arm and hand on the morning of the 14 th as well. That
morning, around 8:00 a.m., Parents took K.B. to Virtua Hospital (Virtua) in
Voorhees, New Jersey, to be evaluated. Virtua is approximately a one-hour
drive from Parents’ home. A series of radiographs known as a “skeletal
survey” showed that K.B. had a broken bone in his upper right arm and a right
shoulder fracture; because there were no signs of healing, an examining
doctor determined that the injuries had been sustained no earlier than seven
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8 Parents’ testimony was inconsistent with regard to when and how Father
discovered K.B. was injured. See N.T. Dependency/Abuse Hearing, 12/16/19,
at 93-95 (DHS social worker, Krista Gilmore, testifying parents were
inconsistent in explaining to her how they discovered K.B.’s injury). According
to Ms. Gilmore, Father told her that Paternal Grandmother notified him of
K.B.’s injury. Id. at 94; see also DHS Report, 11/18/19, at 3. However, at
the dependency/abuse hearing, Father testified he learned about K.B.’s injury
between 6:30 and 7:00 a.m. on Monday morning when K.B.’s scream woke
him up; he then went back to the bedroom to tell Mother about K.B.’s distress.
N.T. Dependency/Abuse Hearing, 12/16/19, at 72-73, 75. Cf. DHS Report,
10/14/19, at 3 (“Father . . . shared that [at] approximately 7 a.m. [h]e heard
[Paternal Grandmother] call them because something was wrong with [K.B.’s]
arm. They ran to the room and noticed the swelling to the arm.”) (emphasis
added).
9 Notably, in the DHS report, Mother did not tell Ms. Gilmore that she was
awoken by K.B.’s screams, in seeming contrast to Father’s testimony at the
abuse hearing. See N.T. Dependency Hearing, 12/16/19, at 72 (“[Mother]
woke up out of her sleep as well, and she heard the scream and she said, ‘No,
that’s not [C.B.]. That’s [K.B.].’”).
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to ten days prior to the imaging. Mother and Father indicated that they had
no idea how K.B sustained these injuries. In the twenty-four hours preceding
the discovery of the injuries, K.B. had been in the care of three individuals in
addition to Mother and Father: Paternal Grandmother, Babysitter #1, and
Babysitter #2.
K.B. was transferred from Virtua to the emergency department of the
Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia (CHOP). At CHOP, Dr. Brian William
Brennan, M.D., a child abuse expert and maltreatment fellow, evaluated K.B.
for suspected child abuse. Doctor Brennan also interviewed Mother at CHOP
regarding K.B.’s family medical history, the last time that K.B. seemed well,
when K.B. last used his arm normally, and when Mother first noticed that K.B.
was not using his injured arm normally. Id. at 13, 15-16. Doctor Brennan
testified that Mother was not aware of K.B. suffering any kind of traumatic
episode to precipitate the injuries, id. at 20-21, and that Mother admitted she
and Father were K.B.’s primary caregivers. Id. at 26. Doctor Brennan also
testified that after evaluating K.B., he concluded that K.B. had no skeletal
abnormalities and discovered nothing in K.B.’s medical history or lab work that
would lead him to believe that K.B.’s bones were more susceptible to breaking
or that he suffered from any kind of nutritional deficiency or metabolic
disorder. See N.T. Dependency/Abuse Hearing, 11/8/19, at 13-14, 28.
According to the additional imaging done at CHOP, Dr. Brennan was able to
discern, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that there were no signs
of healing in either of K.B.’s two fractures, which suggested that the fractures
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were fresh and had occurred within 7-10 days prior10 to the imaging. Id. at
14. CHOP doctors determined that the injuries were caused by some sort of
non-accidental trauma, and that the fractures were highly indicative of an
abusive or inflicted type of injury. Id. at 24. In his expert opinion, Dr.
Brennan testified that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, K.B. was
a victim of child abuse. Id. at 27.
On October 14, 2019, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services
(DHS) received a Child Protective Services (CPS) report (Report) alleging that
five-month-old K.B. had arrived at CHOP with unexplained injuries of a broken
upper right arm and fractures to his right shoulder. Social workers from DHS
spoke to the family at CHOP. Mother and Father were both questioned by
police about K.B.’s injuries; neither parent knew how K.B. sustained his
injuries. Parents also did not report anything negative about K.B.’s caregivers
to DHS or authorities. Mother, Father, Babysitter #1, Babysitter #2, and
Paternal Grandmother were initially listed as potential perpetrators of abuse
on the Report. DHS social worker Krista Gilmore, who investigated the abuse
allegations, determined that K.B. was likely injured between late Sunday
evening on the 13th and Monday morning on the 14th “[b]ased on the
interviews,[11] based on the medical evidence, and based on the fact that
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10 K.B.’s Goddard School records revealed that he was asymptomatic on
Friday, October 11th. Id., 12/16/19, at 12.
11Gilmore testified that she interviewed Mother, Father, Babysitter #1,
Babysitter #2, and Paternal Grandmother.
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everyone said that [K.B.] was fine until Monday morning.” Id., 12/16/19, at
86-87. In Ms. Gilmore’s DHS report, she noted that Paternal Grandmother
“notified [Father] around 7 AM on Monday morning that [K.B.]’s right arm was
red and swollen. [Father] reported that he then notified [Mother] and they
decided to take [K.B.] to the E[mergency] R[oom].” DHS Report, 11/18/19,
at 3. Furthermore, Mother told Gilmore that “[Father] came to her Monday
morning about [K.B.’s] arm [and that she then] got dressed, got [A.B.]
dressed[,] and went to see [K.B.’s] arm. [Then, she and Father] agreed that
she would take [K.B.] to Virtua Hospital while [Father] dropped the rest of the
children off [at] school/daycare.” Id.
Although Gilmore concluded that Father and Mother are well bonded
with Children and are capable of meeting their needs and keeping them safe,12
she ultimately determined that the report was indicated with regard to Mother,
Father, and Paternal Grandmother as to K.B.’s injuries. Specifically, Gilmore
identified these three individuals as indicated perpetrators of abuse because
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12 In fact, there is no evidence of record that K.B. had sustained any prior
fractures or healed injuries that would suggest he had been abused in the
past. See N.T. Dependency/Abuse Hearing, 12/16/19, at 180 (court noting
K.B. had “no history of medical issues that would cause [him] to have these
substantial injuries”). Cf. In re A.H., 763 A.2d 873 (Pa. Super. 2000) (child’s
treating doctor found healed fracture of child’s left radius, which was inflicted
approximately one to two months prior to current abuse examination, and
fracture of upper humerus of left arm, which was inflicted within two to four
weeks prior to exam).
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“[she] could not place them outside of the location at the time frame . . . that
[DHS] had.” Id. at 80, 120.
Children were taken into protective custody on October 16, 2019. A
shelter care hearing took place on October 17, 2019, after which Children were
ordered to remain in DHS’s custody. At the time of the hearing, Y.C., C.B.
and A.B. had been placed in kinship care with Father’s mother, where the
court permitted Parents to have supervised visits. When K.B. was released
from CHOP, he also was placed in Father’s mother’s care.
DHS filed dependency petitions on October 21, 2019, alleging Children
were “dependent and/or abused pursuant to the Juvenile Act[,] 42 Pa.C.S. §
6302 (Dependent Child [who is without proper care or control]) and/or the
Child Protective Services Law [(CPSL),] 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(b[.]1) [(defining
“Child abuse”)]. On November 6, 2019, the Child Advocate13 filed a motion
for a finding of child abuse as to Mother and Father with regard to K.B. See
23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(b.1). On November 8, 2019 and December 16, 2019, the
court held a consolidated, two-day hearing on the dependency petitions and
motion for finding of child abuse. At the hearings, Dr. Brennan, Ms. Gilmore,
Babysitter #2, Mother, and Father testified.
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13 On October 16, 2019, the court appointed counsel and a guardian ad litem
for K.B. At the dependency/abuse hearings, child advocate, Sarah Henschke,
Esquire, and her supervising attorney and co-counsel, Beth Kahn, Esquire,
represented Children.
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The court found that the testimony narrowed down the timeframe of
when K.B. sustained his injuries to between Sunday evening (October 13th) to
Monday morning (October 14th). N.T. Dependency/Abuse Hearing, 12/16/19,
at 181. Notably, the court pointed out that when Babysitter #2 returned home
with the other children around 7:30 p.m. on the 13 th, she observed K.B.
sleeping on his right side, and “if he’s sleeping on his right side, he could not
have been hurt at that time[.]” Id. Mother also testified that when she and
Father returned home from New York at 10 p.m. on the 13th, K.B. “was turned
on his right side in his Boppy[14].” Id. at 46.15
On December 16, 2019, the trial court entered four orders of
adjudication and disposition for each child. In addition, the court found, by
clear and convincing evidence, that K.B. “suffered injuries of such a nature
that were reckless and would ordinarily not be sustained or exist by reason of
the acts or omissions of the parent,” and that Parents perpetrated the abuse.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/5/20, at 12; N.T. Dependency/Abuse Hearing,
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14 A “Boppy” is an ergonomic pillow used by a caregiver to support infants and
babies while they are being nursed or bottle-fed. See
https://www.boppy.com/products/boppy-classic-feeding-infant-support-
pillow (last visited on 6/2/21).
15 On October 24, 2019, the court held a permanency hearing, keeping
Children’s temporary commitment in place, maintaining supervised visits, and
giving DHS ten days to devise a safety plan for Children and to ultimately
move forward with an adjudicatory hearing. N.T. Permanency Hearing,
10/24/19, at 13-14.
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12/16/19, at 179-86 (trial court finding “clear and convincing evidence that
the parents recklessly committed child abuse”); see also 23 Pa.C.S. §
6303(b.1)(1) (defining child abuse). With regard to K.B. and A.B., the court
also found that clear and convincing evidence existed to declare them
dependent and, accordingly, removed them from Parents’ home “based upon
the findings of abuse, neglect[,] or dependency[,]. . . that it is in the best
interest of [] Child[ren] to be removed from [Parents’] home, . . . that to allow
[] Child[ren] to remain in the home would be contrary to [] Child[ren]’s
welfare, and that [DHS] made [r]easonable [e]fforts to prevent or eliminate
the need for removal of [] Child[ren] from the home.” K.B. Order, 12/16/19,
at 1-2; A.B. Order, 12/16/19, at 1-2; see 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(c). K.B. and
A.B. were ordered to remain in kinship care with Father’s mother, legal
custody of K.B. and A.B. was transferred to DHS, and Parents were given twice
weekly, line-of-sight and line-of-hearing visits at Father’s mother’s home. The
court also permitted visits to be “modified by agreement of the parties.” K.B.
Order, 12/16/19, at 2; A.B. Order, 12/16/19, at 2. The placement goal for
both K.B. and A.B. remained “return to parent or guardian.” Id. Finally,
Parents were referred to “Family School” and were ordered to complete
parenting capacity evaluations, maintain contact with the Community
Umbrella Agency (CUA), and attend all of K.B.’s medical and dental
appointments. Id.
With regard to C.B. and Y.C., the court found by clear and convincing
evidence that they were “without proper care, or control, subsistence, [or]
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education as required by law, or other care necessary for [their] physical,
mental, or emotional health, or morals.” C.B. Order, 12/16/19, at 1; Y.C.
Order, 12/16/19, at 1. The court, however, determined that it would not be
contrary to C.B.’s and Y.C.’s welfare to permit them to remain in the family
home, where “[C]hild[ren are] safe in the current placement setting.” Id. at
1-2. Accordingly, legal custody of C.B. and Y.C. remained with Parents.
Father filed three timely notices of appeal from the dependency orders
and abuse order, as well as a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal. Mother filed four timely notices
of appeal from the dependency orders and abuse order, as well as a court-
ordered Rule 1925(b) statement.16 On appeal, Parents present the following
issues for our consideration:
(1) Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused
its discretion where it determined that [Parents] were[]
perpetrator[s] of child abuse against K.B.
(2) Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law where it
determined that [Children] met the definition of dependent
children.
(3) Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and abused
its discretion when it ordered that it was clearly necessary
to remove K.B. and A.B. from [P]arents’ care.
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16 On January 5, 2020, three days after they filed their notices of appeal,
Mother and Father each filed motions for reconsideration of the court’s
dependency orders and abuse order. However, it appears that the court did
not rule on the motions. See Cheatem v. Temple Univ. Hosp., 743 A.2d
518, 520 (Pa. Super. 1999) (filing of motion for reconsideration does not toll
thirty-day appeal period, unless trial court enters order expressly granting
reconsideration within thirty days of entry of appealable order).
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Substituted Brief for Parents (Redacted), at 3.
Father’s and Mother’s first issues allege that the trial court committed
error when it determined that they were perpetrators of abuse with regard to
K.B. Specifically, they contend that their conduct did not meet the legal
standard for a perpetrator by omission, that there is no evidence of record to
support the conclusion that their conduct was reckless, and that applying the
presumption under section 6381(d) of the CPSL was in error. Id. at 18.
“[Although] dependency proceedings are governed by the Juvenile Act
(Act),17 . . . the CPSL18 . . . controls determinations regarding findings of child
abuse, which the juvenile courts must find by clear and convincing evidence.”
In re L.V., 209 A.3d 399, 417 (Pa. Super 2019) (citations omitted); see also
In the Interest of X.P., 248 A.3d 1274, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2021) (same).
The CPSL “does not provide for legal determinations of abuse; it is mainly a
vehicle for reporting abuse and bringing quickly into play those services
(including court hearings) available through county protective service facilities
for the care of the child.” In the Interest of J.R.W., 631 A.2d 1019, 1022
(Pa. Super. 1993). “[T]he Act and the [CPSL] must be applied together in the
resolution of child abuse complaints under the [CPSL and] reference must be
made to the definition sections of both the Law and the [CPSL] to determine
how that finding [of child abuse] is interrelated.” Id. at 1023.
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17 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6475.
18 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6387.
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“‘As part of [a] dependency adjudication, a court may find a parent [or
caregiver] to be the perpetrator of child abuse[]’ as defined by the . . . CPSL.”
In re S.L., 202 A.3d 723, 728 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation and quotations
omitted). Section 6381 of the CPSL, which governs evidence in court
proceedings, states that “[i]n addition to the rules of evidence . . . relating to
juvenile matters, the rules of evidence in this section shall govern in child
abuse proceedings in court[.]” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6381(a) (emphasis added).
Specifically, section 6381(d) “provides for an ‘attenuated’ standard of
evidence in making a legal determination as to the abuser in child abuse cases
[where] a child has suffered serious physical injury . . . as would ordinarily
not be sustained or exist except by reason of the acts or omissions of the
parent or other person responsible for the welfare of the child.” J.R.W., supra
at 1023; 23 Pa.C.S. § 6381(d).
In In the Interest of N.B.-A., 224 A.3d 661 (Pa. 2020), the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently reiterated the appropriate standard of
proof for a finding of child abuse:
The requisite standard of proof for a finding of child abuse
pursuant to [s]ection 6303(b.1) of the CPSL is clear and
convincing evidence. [A] petitioning party must demonstrate the
existence of child abuse by the clear and convincing evidence
standard applicable to most dependency determinations, 42
Pa.C.S. § 6341(c)[]. Clear and convincing evidence is “evidence
that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the
trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of
the truth of the precise facts in issue.” [] However, in certain
situations, the identity of the abuser need only be
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established through prima facie[19] evidence. As an appellate
court, we are required to accept the findings of fact and credibility
determinations of the trial court, if they are supported by the
record; however, th[is] [C]ourt is not bound by the lower court’s
inferences or conclusions of law.
Id. at 668 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
“The purpose of the CPSL is to bring about quick and effective reporting
of suspected child abuse so as to serve as a means for providing protective
services competently and to prevent further abuse of the children while
providing rehabilitative services for them and the parents.” J.R.W., supra at
1021, citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 6302(b). The CPSL “was created primarily for
reporting suspected child abuse, providing the means for doing so[,] and
establishing the persons responsible for reporting the abuse[.]” Id. See also
23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6311-6320.
Section 6381(d) of the CPSL, found under the subchapter titled
“Miscellaneous Provisions,” establishes a rebuttable, evidentiary
presumption when a child sustains abuse not ordinarily suffered absent acts
or omissions of a parent or other responsible party. Under such
circumstances, “the fact of abuse suffices to establish prima facie evidence of
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19 Prima facie evidence is “[s]uch evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is
sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting
the party’s claim or defense, and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will
remain sufficient.” In the Interest of L.Z., 111 A.3d 1164, 1184 (Pa. 2015),
citing Black’s Law Dictionary 825 (6th ed. abridged 1991).
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abuse by the parent or person responsible.” In the Interest of L.Z., 111
A.3d 1164, 1167 (Pa. 2015).20
To aid the Juvenile Court in determining whether a child has been
abused, “the Legislature deemed it wise and necessary to establish a different
evidentiary standard for finding child abuse by a parent or person responsible
for the child’s care, one in contrast to the overall standard for determining
dependency under the Act.” Id. The J.R.W. Court recognized:
This lessened standard of establishing abuse by the
caretakers [under section 6381(d)], coupled with the clear
and convincing evidence necessary to find dependency, has
been imposed by the Legislature as the standard which the
Juvenile Court must apply in deciding abuse cases. Prima
facie evidence is not the standard that establishes the child has
been abused, which must be established by clear and convincing
evidence; it is the standard by which the court determines whom
the abuser would be in a given case. There is no conflict,
constitutional or otherwise, with the clear and convincing evidence
standard imposed by the Act to establish child abuse. The
Legislature has determined that the likelihood clearly
established abuse has occurred, other than at the hands of
the custodian, is so small that prima facie evidence the
custodian has caused the injury, either by acts or
omissions, is all that is required. We find no defect in this
reasoning. Such a standard provides maximum protection for the
____________________________________________
20 Section 6381(d) provides:
(d) Prima facie evidence of abuse. — Evidence that a child has
suffered child abuse of such a nature as would ordinarily not be
sustained or exist except by reason of the acts or omissions of the
parent or other person responsible for the welfare of the child shall
be prima facie evidence of child abuse by the parent or other
person responsible for the welfare of the child.
23 Pa.C.S. § 6381(d).
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child victim or other children in the community who might be
subject to similar abuse if the alleged abuser was not identified
and permitted free access to the victim or other vulnerable
children. It is not equivalent to a finding of guilt in a criminal
proceeding which could result in deprivation of freedom. Thus[,]
the [L]egislature has balanced the needs of society and children
for protection against the abuser’s possible patterned behavior
and his/her right to freedom unless found guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.[21]
____________________________________________
21 Once the Juvenile Court has made a determination that child abuse has
occurred, by clear and convincing evidence, a “founded report” may be lodged
with the Department of Public Welfare [DPW] determining that the parents
are the persons responsible for the abuse.” J.R.W., supra at 1025. Under
the CPSL, “[t]he perpetrator of the abuse is notified of the report and his/her
right, within 45 days, to seek expungement of the report[.]” G.V. v. Dep’t
of Pub. Welfare, 52A.3d 434, 447-47 (Pa. Commw. 2012), citing 23 Pa.C.S.
§§ 6338(a), 6341(a); 55 Pa. Code §§ 3490.40, 3490.45, 3490.105a(a).
Specifically, under section 6341(a)(1), “[a]t any time, the secretary may
amend or expunge any record in the Statewide database . . . upon good
cause shown and notice[.]” 23 Pa. C.S. § 6341(a)(1) (emphasis added).
“Good cause shall include, but is not limited to, the following: (i) Newly[-
]discovered evidence that an indicated report . . . is inaccurate or is being
maintained in a manner inconsistent with this chapter[;] or (ii) A
determination that the perpetrator in an indicated report of abuse no
longer represents a risk of child abuse and that no significant public
purpose would be served by the continued listing of the person as a
perpetrator in the Statewide database.” Id. at § 6341(a)(1)(i), (ii)
(emphasis added). In cases where a report is not expunged and the adult
perpetrator’s Social Security number and date of birth are not known, the
indicated reports must be expunged when the child is 23 years of age. 23
Pa.C.S. § 6338(b); 55 Pa.Code § 3490.39(a). If the adult perpetrator’s Social
Security number and date of birth are known, certain information on the
perpetrator is indefinitely maintained in a sub-file in the ChildLine Registry.
G.V., supra, at 447. Finally, “[a]fter a hearing and a determination that a
claim of abuse has a substantial basis, the [DPW] shares the information only
with persons and agencies performing investigative and child protective
functions, a child’s examining or treating physician, a guardian ad litem, a
court, federal auditors, and a prospective adoptive parent.” See R. v. Dep’t
of Pub. Welfare, 636 A.2d 142, 151 (Pa. 1994); see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 6340
(Release of information in confidential reports).
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Id. at 1024 (emphasis added). See L.Z., 111 A.3d at 1184 (“The Legislature,
however, carved out a very limited exception to these more stringent
evidentiary standards, allowing for the possibility of identifying the perpetrator
of abuse based on prima facie evidence in cases where the abuse is “of such
a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained or exist except by reason of the
acts or omissions of the parent[.]”).
Under section 6381(d), a parent or other responsible caregiver may
rebut the prima facie presumption with evidence:
[d]emonstrating that the parent or responsible person did not
inflict the abuse, potentially by testifying that they gave
responsibility for the child to another person about whom they had
no reason to fear or perhaps that the injuries were accidental
rather than abusive. The evaluation of the validity of the
presumption would then rest with the trial court evaluating the
credibility of the prima facie evidence presented by . . . [DHS]
. . . and the rebuttal of the parent or responsible person.
L.Z., 111 A.3d at 1185. See id. at 1176 n.15 (section 6381(d) presumption
may be rebutted with evidence that parent or responsible person was absent
at time of injury and not otherwise responsible for injury by failing to secure
proper care for child). A parent does not actually have to be physically present
with the child at the time of the abuse for the presumption to apply to that
parent. Id. at 1185-86.
Instantly, the trial court deemed Father and Mother perpetrators of child
abuse, concluding that “the record established prima facie evidence that
[Parents were two] of the perpetrators of child abuse as to [K.B.] under 23
Pa.C.S.[] § 6381(d), since [Parents were two] of the three primary caregivers
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for [K.B.] during the period when [K.B.] could have been injured.” Trial Court
Opinion, 3/3/20, at 12. Thus, the court applied the rebuttable presumption
under section 6381(d).
With regard to the trial court’s culpability finding that the abuse had
been inflicted “recklessly,” we recognize that this determination was
superfluous.22 See 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(b.1) (defining term “child abuse” under
CPSL as “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly doing” one of many acts
delineated under subsection). Under section 6381 of the CPSL, a petitioning
party is not required to establish that the parent or caregiver perpetrated the
abuse “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly.”23 Rather, in section 6381
cases, “the fact of abuse suffices to establish prima facie evidence of abuse
by the parent or person responsible,” permitting petitioners to “prove their
case with only the physical evidence of injuries that would not
____________________________________________
22 See N.T. Dependency/Abuse Hearing, 12/16/19, at 179-86.
23 Likewise, a petitioning party need not prove separately that such abuse
“[c]aus[ed] bodily injury to a child through any . . . failure to act,” 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 6303(b.1)(1), otherwise known as perpetrator by omission. Under section
6381(d), prima facie evidence of abuse is established, and we presume the
actors are the perpetrators of that abuse, unless rebutted. Here, the trial
court did not make a finding that Mother and Father were perpetrators by
omission under section 6303(b.1)(1). Rather, when the court mentioned the
term, it was merely referring to the fact that the section 6381(d) presumption
applies when a child has suffered abuse “of such a nature as would” not
normally occur “except by reason of the omissions of the parent or other
[responsible person].” Id. (emphasis added). See also L.Z., 111 A.3d at
1184 (inclusion of word “omissions” in section 6381(d), encompasses
situations where parent or responsible person is not present at time of injury
but is, nonetheless, responsible due to his or her failure to provide protection
for child).
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ordinarily be sustained but for the action [or inaction] of the parents
or responsible persons and the implausible statements of the parents
and responsible persons.” L.Z., supra at 1167, 1185 (emphasis added). See
J.R.W., supra at 1024 (“[The] likelihood clearly established abuse has
occurred, other than at the hands of the custodian, is so small that prima facie
evidence that the custodian has caused the injury, either by acts or
omissions, is all that is required” under section 6381(d)) (emphasis added).
See also S.L., supra at 728 (“In situations where a perpetrator of abuse is
unknown, a parent’s culpability may be established by prima facie evidence
pursuant to [section] 6381(d).”); J.R.W., supra at 1023 (explaining section
6381(d)’s reduced evidentiary standard of prima facie evidence establishing
abuse by caretakers “coupled with the clear and convincing evidence
necessary to find dependency,” is standard “[j]uvenile [c]ourt must apply in
deciding abuse cases”).
In N.B.-A., supra, the Supreme Court reversed our en banc Court’s
holding, which had applied the section 6381(d) presumption and found that a
mother had committed child abuse by omission. There, a mother took her
six-year-old daughter to the emergency department at CHOP, reporting that
child had been experiencing vaginal discharge for three days. Mother
indicated she had no concerns that child may have been sexually abused.
Mother told CHOP staff that she and child lived with child’s maternal
grandmother and that no males lived with them. After a physical examination,
child was discharged from CHOP, with instructions to take baths and maintain
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good hygiene. The results of lab tests later revealed that child was suffering
from a sexually-transmitted disease; mother was asked to return to CHOP
with child for additional testing. Mother consistently denied that any males
lived in the home with her and child; however, child told CPS caseworkers that
three males lived with them, a stepfather and two of mother’s stepsons.
Mother and one stepson later tested positive for the same sexually-
transmitted disease that child had. DHS obtained an order for protective
custody and child was adjudicated depended and placed in foster care. One
month later, stepbrother was identified as the perpetrator of sexual abuse
against child.
The trial judge, the Honorable Lyris F. Younge, did not find mother
credible and ultimately entered an order finding that she was a perpetrator of
sexual abuse under section 6303(b.1), concluded that aggravated
circumstances existed pursuant to section 6302(2), and found that DHS was
not required to continue to make reasonable efforts at reunification. Id. at
665-66. On appeal, our Court reversed the finding of aggravated
circumstances, but affirmed the juvenile court’s finding that mother was a
perpetrator of child abuse under sections 6303(b.1) and 6381(d) of the CPSL.
In reaching its decision to reverse this Court, the Supreme Court concluded
that:
[T]he Superior Court . . . err[ed] in applying the [s]ection 6381(d)
presumption . . . [where] there was no evidence presented in th[e]
case that [m]other perpetrated the abuse . . . [and] there was no
evidence presented that [m]other knew or should have known
that [c]hild was being abused, sexually or otherwise, as [the
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examining doctor] testified that [c]hild did not present any
physical signs of injury or abuse when she initially examined her,
and such testimony was consistent with the medical records from
CHOP, which indicated that [c]hild did not have any signs of
physical injury or abuse, aside from the vaginal discharge reported
by [m]other.
* * *
Accordingly, we hold that the [s]ection 6381(d) presumption is
not applicable where there is no evidence that the parent or other
person responsible for the welfare of the child knew or should have
known of the abuse or risk of abuse and disregarded it. As DHS
failed to offer any evidence that [c]hild’s abuse was of such
a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained or exist
except by reason of the acts of omissions of the parent or
other person responsible for the welfare of the child, the
Superior Court erred in applying the [s]ection 6381(d)
presumption.
Id. at 674, 675 (emphasis added). Moreover, there was no evidence that
child ever reported being sexually abused; in fact, child continually denied
that she had been sexually abused. Finally, because DHS presented no
evidence that mother knew or should have known that stepson posed a risk
to child, but ignored that risk, the Court concluded “we cannot find that the
abuse in this case was of a type that would ordinarily not occur except for the
acts or omissions of the child’s caretaker.” Id. at 675.
The instant case is distinguishable from the facts of N.B.-A. Unlike the
child in N.B.-A., here, K.B. was an infant when the abuse occurred, and, thus,
incapable of describing or denying that abuse. The most notable distinction,
however, is Dr. Brennan’s determination that K.B.’s fractures were non-
accidental and “most likely the result of inflicted trauma.” N.T.
Dependency/Abuse Hearing, 11/8/19, at 24. In his expert medical opinion,
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K.B.’s injuries were inflicted intentionally and caused by force being applied to
his arm in a “yanking-type” motion—injuries that would have caused him
substantial or severe pain. Id., at 22, 31-32. Under such circumstances, the
trial court found that abuse had been proven by clear and convincing evidence.
In L.Z., supra, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court provided additional
guidance on applying the section 6381(d) presumption — specifically, in cases
that involve multiple caregivers responsible for the care and protection of an
abused child and when the evidence fails to demonstrate definitively which
individual inflicted the abuse. In L.Z., the Court reviewed whether our Court
erred in not applying the presumption in such cases “where the record fails to
establish that the child was in the parent’s care at the time of the injury.” Id.
at 1176 (citation omitted). The child in L.Z., who was 21 months old, was
brought to the hospital by his mother and maternal aunt24 to be treated for a
deep cut that extended nearly halfway around the base of his penis. Hospital
doctors also observed a dark bruise around the buckle area (above the
jawbone and below the cheekbone) on both of child’s cheeks. The bruises
were somewhere between a day and a week old at the time child arrived at
the hospital. Child also suffered from severe diaper rash and a yeast infection.
Child’s injuries were determined to be consistent with abuse and
inconsistent with several explanations given by mother and aunt. Aunt
____________________________________________
24 Maternal aunt and mother lived together and were both child’s primary
caregivers.
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claimed that child caused his own injuries by tugging on his penis during a
diaper change. Mother, who acknowledged at the hospital that she and aunt
were child’s primary caretakers, claimed that she had been visiting a
paramour for the two days prior to the hospital visit and had not seen child
since that time. Concluding that the child’s injuries were non-accidental,
hospital staff filed a report with DHS. A report was also prepared by CPS;
aunt was indicated as a perpetrator of abuse in the CPS report.25 Child was
placed in protective custody. DHS filed dependency and aggravated
circumstances petitions.
At an adjudicatory hearing, a doctor testified that child’s cheek bruises
were “common abuse injur[ies;]” a medical director of the hospital’s pediatric
inpatient unit, who also examined child, opined that child was abused. Id. at
1167. Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order adjudicating
child dependent, found it was in his best interest to be removed from mother’s
home, and, significantly, found that child was a victim of abuse and that
mother was the perpetrator of such abuse. Finally, the court concluded that
aggravating circumstances existed and, therefore, that DHS did not need to
make further efforts to reunify child with mother.
In her Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial judge stated that she found clear
and convincing evidence establishing that child was without parental care and
that child’s injuries would not have occurred “but for [m]other’s omissions as
____________________________________________
25 A general protective services report was substantiated against mother for
lack of supervision and for child suffering from a yeast infection.
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his primary caretaker.” Id. at 1169. On appeal, mother claimed that the
court erred in finding that she was responsible for child abuse; our Court
affirmed the dependency adjudication, but vacated the court’s determination
that mother was the perpetrator of the abuse. Our Court granted the guardian
ad litem’s petition for reargument en banc and, consistent with our panel
decision, affirmed the dependency adjudication and vacated the perpetrator
of abuse determination. Notably, in reaffirming the panel’s decision to vacate
the finding that mother was the perpetrator of child’s abuse, the en banc panel
held that section 6381(d) does not permit a court to designate a parent as a
perpetrator of abuse “where the record fails to establish that the child was in
the parent’s care at the time of the injury.” In re L.Z., 91 A.3d 208, 216 (Pa.
Super. 2014), rev’d, 111 A.3d 1164 (Pa. 2015).
In reversing our Court, the Supreme Court came to the following
conclusions regarding section 6381(d)’s rebuttable presumption: (1) there is
no requirement that a parent be physically present at the time of the injury;
and (2) the inclusion of the word “omissions” in section 6381(d), encompasses
situations where the parent or responsible person is not present at the time
of the injury but is, nonetheless, responsible due to his or her failure to provide
protection for the child. L.Z., 111 A.3d at 1184. In so holding, the Court
recognized that abuse cases, like the present, often involve “multiple
caregivers . . . that circle the wagons,” and “children [that] may be too young
. . . to describe the abuse,” and, thus, “CYS agencies are left to prove [these]
case[s] with only the physical evidence of injuries that would not ordinarily be
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sustained but for the action of the parents or responsible persons and the
implausible statements of the parents or responsible persons.” Id. at 1185.
Here, the medical evidence presented by DHS demonstrated that, like
child’s injures in L.Z., K.B.’s injuries were neither accidental nor self-inflicted
and were of such a nature that they would not ordinarily be sustained except
by reason of the acts or omissions of the parent or other person responsible
for K.B.’s welfare. The trial court reasonably concluded, based upon testimony
from caseworker Gilmore, that K.B.’s injuries occurred sometime after
Babysitter #1, K.B.’s sitter, left for the evening on the 13th and when he awoke
on the 14th. In addition, the trial judge concluded, based on the expert
medical testimony, that, because K.B.’s injuries were so substantial and would
have caused him considerable pain, K.B. had not yet sustained his injuries
when he was sleeping on his side when Parents returned home at 10 p.m. on
the 13th. See In the Interest of R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010) (Court
required to defer to trial court’s credibility findings if they are supported by
evidence of record). Accordingly, the record corroborates that K.B. was a
victim of child abuse, by clear and convincing evidence, where expert medical
evidence established K.B. suffered non-accidental trauma. Moreover, we
concur with the trial court that the section 6381(d) prima facie presumption
of abuse was established with regard to Mother and Father. See In re S.L.,
202 A.3d 723, 729-30 (Pa. Super. 2019) (section 6381(d) presumption
properly applied to mother where: child suffered non-accidental injuries;
mother among adults responsible for child when injuries occurred; and mother
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denied knowing how child injured); see also In re J.R.W., supra at 1023(presumption protects those innocent victims of abuse who are “too young . .
. to describe their abuse” and necessary in cases where “agencies [are left] .
. . to prove their case with only physical evidence of injuries that would not
ordinarily be sustained but for the action of the parents or responsible
persons”).
Moreover, Mother and Father failed to rebut the presumption by
presenting evidence or testimony at the abuse hearing establishing that K.B.
was not in their care when he suffered his injuries.26 While Paternal
Grandmother may have routinely stayed overnight on Sundays on the same
floor as the twins, neither Mother nor Father presented evidence that they
relinquished all control of their parental duties with regard to K.B. to Paternal
Grandmother at the time Child sustained his non-accidental injuries. In fact,
Dr. Brennan testified that Mother admitted that she and Father were K.B.’s
primary caretakers. N.T. Dependency/Abuse Hearing, 11/8/19, at 26.27
The significant fact remains that Mother, Father, and Paternal
Grandmother were all in the home and had equal access to K.B. at the time
____________________________________________
26 Parents did not note any concerns in medical records about their childcare
providers to CHOP medical staff. See N.T. Dependency/Abuse Hearing,
11/8/19, at 27. See also 23 Pa.C.S. § 6381(d) (parent or responsible person
may rebut presumption through testimony establishing that they gave
responsibility for the child to another person about whom they had no reason
to fear); L.Z., 111 A.3d at 1185 (same).
27 While a social worker may have classified Paternal Grandmother as a direct
caregiver to K.B., see supra, at 6 n.7, there is no record evidence that
Paternal Grandmother was K.B.’s sole caregiver at the time he was injured.
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he was injured.28 In such cases, “[t]he evaluation of the validity of the
presumption . . . rest[s] with the trial court evaluating the credibility of the
prima facie evidence presented by the [] agency and the rebuttal of the parent
or responsible person.” L.Z., 111 A.3d at 1185 (emphasis added). Simply
put, we do not find that Parents’ countervailing rebuttal evidence was
“substantial” enough to rebut the presumption and, thus, reverse the trial
court’s determination.29 Id. at 1180 (section 6381(d) presumption “can be
rebutted, like other statutory presumptions, with countervailing competent,
substantial evidence”) (emphasis added). See also In re S.G., 922 A.2d 943,
947 (Pa. Super. 2007) (trial court, not appellate court, is charged with
responsibilities of evaluating credibility of witnesses and resolving any
conflicts in testimony; when trial court’s findings are supported by competent
____________________________________________
28 Moreover, it is of little moment that Mother took Child immediately to the
hospital after discovering his injuries. Such post-injury evidence does not
rebut the presumption. See In the Interest of A.C., 237 A.3d 553 (Pa.
Super. 2020) (Mother’s actions following child’s injury—such as seeking
medical attention, staying at hospital with child, providing doctors with
thorough history, and asking appropriate questions—did not rebut section
6381(d) presumption).
29 The trial court’s determination of Parents’ credibility undoubtedly involved
assessing their inconsistent testimony with regard to when and how they
discovered K.B.’s injuries. See L.Z., supra; see also supra, at 7 nn.8-9; In
the Interest of A.C., supra at 563 (trial court did not abuse its discretion by
giving weight to testimony of doctor and DHS social worker over that of Mother
to find section 6381(d) presumption not rebutted and determining Mother was
perpetrator of child’s abuse).
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evidence of record, we will affirm even if record could also support opposite
result).
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court properly
found that Mother and Father were perpetrators of abuse under section
6381(d).30 The presumption is the only means that a court has to ensure that
an infant, like K.B., will remain safe when, under his Parents’ care, he has
been abused and the identity of the perpetrator cannot be established. In
essence, it forces caregivers either to come forward with the identity of the
perpetrator of abuse or be assigned fault where it was their responsibility to
care for the child and keep the child safe. As emphasized by our Supreme
Court in L.Z., “when a child is in the care of multiple parents or other persons
responsible for care, those individuals are accountable for the care and
____________________________________________
30 We believe the trial judge did an exemplary job in what was, no doubt, a
very difficult case. The trial judge noted that his conclusion that the section
6381(d) presumption applied in the matter “doesn’t mean that [K.B.’s]
parents are bad parents either. It just means that somehow the child got hurt
in such a way that nobody can explain [it].” N.T. Dependency/Abuse Hearing,
12/16/19, at 179. He applied the presumption appropriately, made sure that
the family goal remained reunification, ordered that Mother and Father’s older
children remain in their care and custody, and ensured that Mother and Father
would attend appropriate parenting classes and receive necessary
evaluations, while permitting the twins to remain in kinship care with Father’s
mother, who supervised twice-weekly visits with Parents. In short, the judge
made it very clear that he wanted this family to be able to get through this
ordeal and reunite as a unit. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 6302(b) (one of many purposes
of CPSL is to “stabilize and protect the integrity of family life where[]ever
appropriate”); see also In the Interest of A.C., supra at 566 (Court noted
despite trial court finding Mother perpetrator of child abuse, it still maintained
goal of reunification with parents).
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protection of the child whether they actually inflicted the injury or failed in
their duty to protect the child.” L.Z., 111 A.3d at 1185. See id. at 1184 (the
plain language of section 6381(d) “neither mentions nor focuses upon the
parent or responsible person’s physical presence at the time of the injury[;
t]he inclusion of ‘omissions’ encompasses situations where the parent or
responsible person is not present at the time of the injury but is nonetheless
responsible due to his or her failure to provide protection for the child”).
Father’s and Mother’s next issues concern the trial court’s adjudication
of Children as dependent.31 Specifically, they contend that because they are
not responsible for K.B.’s injuries, the trial court’s dependency determination
is erroneous. Having already determined that Father and Mother were both
properly found to be perpetrators of abuse to K.B., this issue is moot. See In
re R.P., 957 A.2d 1205, 1213 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating where trial court
finds one sibling dependent due to abuse, court may determine other siblings
____________________________________________
31 Our scope of review in child dependency cases “is limited in a fundamental
manner by our inability to nullify the fact-finding of the lower court.” In re
Read, 693 A.2d 607, 610 (Pa. Super. 1997). We accord great weight to the
hearing judge’s findings of fact because he is in the best position to observe
and rule upon the credibility of the witnesses. Id. “Relying on this unique
posture, we will not overrule the findings of the trial court if they are supported
by competent evidence.” Id. See also In the Interest of X.P., supra at
1276 (well-settled standard of review in dependency cases “requires an
appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of
the trial court if they are supported by the record, but does not require the
appellate court to accept the [trial] court’s inferences or conclusions of law”).
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also dependent, even if they have not been abused).
Finally, Father and Mother argue that the trial court erred in determining
that it was clearly necessary to remove K.B. and A.B. from their care where
that determination “was made based on the abuse to K.B.” and where
“[n]either Mother nor Father are responsible for this injury.” Father’s Brief,
at 19; Mother’s Brief, at 19. Again, as we have affirmed the court’s finding of
abuse perpetrated by Father and Mother with regard to K.B., this issue is
moot. See In re R.P., supra.
Orders affirmed.
President Judge Panella, President Judge Emeritus Bender, Judge
Stabile, Judge Nichols, Judge Murray and Judge King join this Opinion.
Judge McLaughlin files a Concurring Statement.
Judge McCaffery files a Dissenting Opinion.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/23/21
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