Com. v. Garcia, S. ( 2021 )


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  • J-S16027-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    SAMUEL GARCIA                                :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1959 EDA 2020
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 14, 2020
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0014282-2014
    BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                  FILED SEPTEMBER 21, 2021
    Samuel Garcia appeals from the order denying his Post Conviction Relief
    Act (“PCRA”) petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Garcia claims that the
    PCRA court erred in denying his PCRA petition because he raised meritorious
    claims that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. He also alleges that
    the PCRA court erred in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing. We
    affirm.
    Before proceeding to trial, Garcia litigated a Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 motion
    arguing that the Commonwealth failed to act with due diligence to bring his
    case to trial. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 600(A), filed 7/26/16. Following a
    hearing, the trial court denied the motion and Garcia proceeded to trial.
    ____________________________________________
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S16027-21
    On August 21, 2016, the trial court found Garcia guilty of attempted
    murder, aggravated assault, possession of an instrument of crime (“PIC”),
    simple assault, and recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”).1 The trial
    court sentenced Garcia to 15 to 30 years’ incarceration for attempted murder
    and a consecutive term of two and one-half to five years’ incarceration for
    PIC.2 We affirmed the judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Garcia, No.
    2271 EDA 2017, 
    2019 WL 1307403
     (Pa.Super. March 21, 2019) (unpublished
    memorandum).
    Garcia filed the instant timely PCRA petition on June 21, 2019. The PCRA
    court appointed counsel who then filed an amended petition. The court issued
    notice of intent to dismiss the petition under Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 and ultimately
    dismissed the petition. See Order, filed 9/14/2020. This timely appeal
    followed.
    Garcia raises the following issues:
    I.       Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA petition when
    clear and convincing evidence was presented to establish that trial
    court was ineffective for failing to protect [Garcia’s] constitutional
    right to a jury trial, as well as his constitutional right to a speedy
    trial[?]
    II.      Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA petition when
    clear and convincing evidence was presented to establish that
    ____________________________________________
    1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901, 2502, 2702(a)(1), 907, 2701, and 2705, respectively.
    2 The attempted murder conviction merged with the aggravated assault
    conviction and the PIC conviction merged with both the simple assault and
    REAP convictions.
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    appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge both the
    sufficiency and weight of the evidence on direct appeal[?]
    III.     Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA petition when
    clear and convincing evidence was presented to establish violations
    of [Garcia’s] constitutional rights to a speedy trial, a trial by jury,
    effective representation of counsel, and due process[?]
    IV.      Whether the PCRA court erred by failing to grant an evidentiary
    hearing[?]
    Garcia’s Br. at 9.
    When reviewing the denial of a PCRA petition, we determine “whether
    the PCRA court’s conclusions are supported by record evidence and are free
    of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    950 A.2d 294
    , 299 (Pa. 2008).
    In his first issue, Garcia argues that the PCRA court erred in denying his
    claim that trial counsel was ineffective. He claims that counsel failed to protect
    his constitutional right to a jury trial and a speedy trial. Garcia’s Br. at 14. He
    maintains that “[t]he trial record is silent and offers no documentation to
    establish that a written jury trial waiver form was signed by [Garcia] or that
    an oral colloquy was performed[.]” 
    Id.
     He also argues that trial counsel did
    not protect his right to a speedy trial by filing a Rule 600 motion that was void
    of case law and provided no legal authority to aid the trial court in deciding on
    the motion. 
    Id.
    Counsel is presumed effective. To overcome this presumption, a
    petitioner must plead and prove that: “(1) the legal claim underlying the
    ineffectiveness claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel’s action or inaction
    lacked any reasonable basis designed to effectuate petitioner’s interest; and
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    (3) counsel’s action or inaction resulted in prejudice to petitioner.”
    Commonwealth v. Mason, 
    130 A.3d 601
    , 618 (Pa. 2015). Prejudice is
    proven where the petitioner shows that but for counsel’s actions, there is a
    reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would have been different.
    
    Id.
     All three prongs must be satisfied for an ineffectiveness claim to be
    successful. Commonwealth v. Dennis, 
    950 A.2d 945
    , 954 (Pa. 2008).
    The substantive claims that underlie Garcia’s ineffectiveness claims lack
    arguable merit. The record belies his assertion that there is no evidence that
    he completed a written jury trial waiver form or that the court conducted an
    oral colloquy. Garcia acknowledged on the record at trial that he completed a
    written jury trial waiver form, and the court also conducted an oral colloquy
    with him regarding his decision to waive his right to a jury. See N.T. 8/31/16
    at 7-10. The trial court asked whether Garcia understood that by signing the
    form that he was waiving his right to a jury trial. Garcia responded, “Yes sir.”
    Id. at 8-9. His claim of ineffective assistance of counsel therefore fails. See
    Dennis, 950 A.2d at 954.
    Garcia also claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to protect
    his right to a speedy trial by filing a Rule 600 motion without referencing case
    law. Rule 600 provides that “[t]rial in a court case in which a written complaint
    is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date
    on which the complaint is filed.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(2)(a). When trial has not
    commenced within that time, a defendant “may file a written motion
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    requesting that the charges be dismissed with prejudice on the ground that
    this rule has been violated.” Pa.R.Crim.P. (D)(1).
    Garcia essentially maintains counsel’s Rule 600 motion was inadequate
    because it did not reference case law that would allegedly have supported it.
    This argument is meritless because at the hearing on the motion, counsel
    presented case law to the court supporting his position that the motion should
    be granted. See N.T., Motion Vol. 1, 8/25/16, at 2. Furthermore, on direct
    appeal, this Court concluded that the trial court did not err in denying Garcia’s
    Rule 600 motion. Garcia, 
    2019 WL 1307403
     at *4. Counsel cannot be
    ineffective when a violation of Rule 600 did not exist. Thus, his ineffectiveness
    claim fails. See Dennis, 950 A.2d at 954.
    Next, Garcia argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
    challenge the sufficiency and weight of the evidence on direct appeal. He also
    claims that counsel failed to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement and that the
    failure to do so “resulted in foreclosure of the essential claims on appeal and
    equates to ineffective representation per se[.]” Garcia’s Br. at 17.
    This claim of ineffectiveness also fails. First of all, counsel filed a Rule
    1925(b) statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, filed 8/14/17. Second,
    Garcia makes the bald claim that appellate counsel failed to challenge the
    sufficiency and weight of the evidence, but he does not develop the claim in
    the argument section of his brief. He does not allege that these challenges
    would have been successful and does not discuss the facts of this case or cite
    to the record regarding the sufficiency or weight of the evidence. “[I]t is an
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    appellant’s duty to present arguments that are sufficiently developed for our
    review. The brief must support the claims with pertinent discussion, with
    references    to   the     record   and   with   citations    to   legal   authorities.”
    Commonwealth v. Kane, 
    10 A.3d 327
    , 331 (Pa.Super. 2010). Without
    further argument on this issue, Garcia has not shown that the underlying claim
    of ineffective assistance has arguable merit and therefore the claim fails.
    Garcia also maintains that the PCRA court erred in denying his petition
    because he presented valid claims of constitutional violations such as his right
    to a speedy trial, a jury trial, effective assistance of counsel, and due process.
    He   argues   that   his    due     process   rights   were   violated     because   the
    Commonwealth did not prove all the elements of the crimes beyond a
    reasonable doubt. See Garcia’s Br. at 19.
    As discussed above Garcia’s claims that he was denied the right to a
    speedy trial and a jury trial are meritless. Additionally, Garcia has failed to
    overcome the presumption that counsel is effective, having failed to prove
    that the underlying claims of trial or appellant counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness
    had arguable merit. Concerning Garcia’s claim that his due process rights were
    violated, the PCRA court concluded that the Commonwealth presented
    sufficient evidence of each crime.
    The record reflects more than sufficient evidence to support
    [Garcia’s] conviction[s]. The most significant piece of
    evidence is a video of the altercation. N.T., Bench Trial,
    8/31/16, at 16. The trial court made a factual determination
    that [Garcia] was the individual in the video that attacked
    the victim. Further, the victim was present at trial to
    describe the altercation as well her significant and
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    debilitating injuries that resulted from the offense. N.T.,
    Bench Trial, 8/31/16, at 30-66 (victim’s testimony and
    cross-examination); id. at 100-102 (discussing victim’s
    medical records). Viewed in the light most favorable to the
    Commonwealth as verdict-winner, this evidence is
    insurmountable.
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Op., filed 12/4/20, at 12-13. Upon a review of the record,
    we conclude that the PCRA court did not commit legal error and its conclusion
    is supported by the record. There was sufficient evidence supporting that
    Garcia committed each crime and therefore his due process rights were not
    violated.
    For his final claim, Garcia alleges that the PCRA court erred in denying
    his request for an evidentiary hearing. He argues that the trial court was
    required to hold an evidentiary hearing before deciding on the merits of his
    claims. See Garcia’s Br. at 20. He maintains that he raised claims that were
    “legitimate, based on fact, and supported by legal precedent.” Id. at 21.
    “‘There is no absolute right to an evidentiary hearing on a PCRA
    petition.’” Commonwealth v. Maddrey, 
    205 A.3d 323
    , 328 (Pa.Super.
    2019), appeal denied, 
    218 A.3d 380
     (Pa. 2019) (citation omitted). We
    therefore review the denial of a request for an evidentiary hearing by
    “‘determin[ing] whether the PCRA court erred in concluding that there were
    no genuine issues of material fact and in denying relief without an evidentiary
    hearing.’” Commonwealth v. Hart, 
    199 A.3d 475
    , 481 (Pa.Super. 2018)
    (citation omitted). Additionally, if “there are no disputed factual issues, an
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    evidentiary hearing is not required.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Commonwealth v. Morris,
    
    684 A.2d 1037
    , 1042 (Pa. 1996)).
    Garcia has not presented any issues of material fact. As explained
    above, his claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel are
    meritless as well as his claim that his constitutional rights were violated.
    Garcia also has not suggested any material question of fact that the PCRA
    court could not resolve without holding an evidentiary hearing. Therefore, we
    conclude that the PCRA court properly denied Garcia’s request for an
    evidentiary hearing and did not err in denying his PCRA petition.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/21/2021
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1959 EDA 2020

Judges: McLaughlin

Filed Date: 9/21/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/21/2024