Com. v. Moore, W. ( 2021 )

J-S11044-21
2021 PA Super 202COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
WILLIAM MOORE, III :
:
Appellant : No. 477 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 10, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-CR-0000599-2019
BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
OPINION BY COLINS, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 12, 2021
Appellant, William Moore III, appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed after his convictions at a stipulated bench trial for: persons not to
possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms; firearms not to
be carried without a license; use of or possession with intent to use drug
paraphernalia; and possessing instruments of crime (“PIC”).1 After careful
review, we vacate Appellant’s PIC conviction and affirm the judgment of
sentence in all other respects.2
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32), and 18
Pa.C.S. § 907(a), respectively.
2 On May 3, 2021, this Court issued a memorandum decision vacating
Appellant’s judgment of sentence and remanding for a new suppression
hearing in light of our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v.
Alexander, 243 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2020), and our decision in Commonwealth
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The trial court set forth the following factual background:
Agent Richard Castagna testified that he was conducting mobile
surveillance on November 27, 2018 near Farnsworth Avenue and
Miller Avenue in the City of Clairton due to a recent rash of
shooting incidents and drug complaints. At the time of
[Appellant]’s arrest, Agent Castagna was a detective for the City
of Clairton Police Department. At the time of trial, Agent Castagna
was a narcotics agent for the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s
Office. While he was conducting surveillance, he observed a black
automobile driving up Miller Avenue and turn onto Farnsworth
Avenue without its turn signal activated. Agent Castagna then
initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle on Madison Avenue. Prior to
actually stopping the vehicle, Agent Castagna observed
[Appellant] place a backpack (later described as a blue Kenneth
Cole Reaction bookbag) behind the driver’s seat. Agent Castagna
approached the passenger side of the vehicle and Officer Tallie[3]
approached the driver’s side. Both law enforcement officers
smelled a strong odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle.
Both occupants of the vehicle were removed from the vehicle and
patted down for officers’ safety. The driver, Kelsey Gori, was
cooperative and admitted that she had been smoking marijuana.
She removed a baggie of marijuana from her bra and gave it to
Officer Tallie. The passenger in the vehicle was [Appellant]. Upon
being removed from the vehicle and being patted down,
[Appellant] refused to identify himself. The officers began
searching the vehicle. The officers also observed marijuana
“roaches,” or burnt marijuana cigarettes, in the vehicle. Soon,
[Appellant]’s mother and brother arrived on the scene of the traffic
stop. [Appellant] started to walk away from the site of the traffic
stop. He was ordered not to leave. [Appellant] became irate and
began yelling at the police officers that they could not search his
backpack. He told the officers at least three times that they could
not search the backpack. [Appellant]’s mother also yelled at the
police officers that they could not search the backpack.
[Appellant]’s mother was also detained at the scene. As the
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v. Shaw, 246 A.3d 879 (Pa. Super. 2021). However, upon consideration of
the Commonwealth’s subsequent application for reargument, we entered an
order granting panel reconsideration, withdrawing our prior decision, and
directing that the parties file substituted briefs.
3 Officer Tallie’s first name does not appear in the certified record.
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officers approached the backpack, [Appellant] left the scene of the
traffic stop and entered a residence [on] Madison Avenue.
Officer Tallie then searched the backpack. Inside the backpack
was a .45 caliber Springfield Armory pistol, marijuana,
ammunition, . . . and ripped baggies used for drug sales.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/15/20, at 1-3. The trial court also concluded that the
backpack contained “a knife with a 14-inch blade[.]” Id. at 3.
Appellant filed a motion to suppress, and on July 18, 2019, the trial
court conducted a hearing on the suppression motion. After accepting briefs
and hearing additional oral argument, the trial court denied Appellant’s
suppression motion on October 16, 2019. The trial court concluded that
officers had probable cause to search Ms. Gori’s vehicle because “Agent
Castagna and Officer Tallie both smelled marijuana emanating from the
vehicle[,] observed ‘roaches’ of marijuana in the vehicle[,]” and had taken
possession of marijuana from Ms. Gori that she had concealed on her person.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/15/20, at 5. The trial court further determined that the
probable cause to search the vehicle also authorized the search of Appellant’s
backpack within the car, but that, in any event, there existed independent
probable cause to search the bag based upon Appellant’s actions at the scene,
including his uncooperativeness and demands that the bag not be searched.
Id.
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Appellant proceeded to a stipulated bench trial, where he was convicted
of the aforementioned charges.4 On March 10, 2020, the trial court sentenced
Appellant to a 5 to 10 year term of imprisonment, followed by 3 years of
probation, on the persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or
transfer firearms charge. No further punishment was imposed on his
remaining convictions. Appellant then filed a timely notice of appeal.5
Appellant now presents the following issues for our review:
I. Did the trial court err in denying the suppression motion
because police did not have probable cause or exigent
circumstances to conduct a warrantless search of the car and the
closed backpack in the back seat of the car?
II. Was the evidence . . . insufficient to sustain the conviction
for [PIC], as the Commonwealth did not prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that there was a knife in the backpack or that
[Appellant] had an intent to use a knife criminally?
Appellant’s Substituted Brief at 5 (suggested answers, trial court disposition,
and unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Appellant first challenges the denial of his suppression motion.
In reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, our role is to
determine whether the suppression court’s factual findings are
supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn
from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth
prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the
evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for
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4 Appellant was also charged with, but found not guilty of, resisting arrest or
other law enforcement. 18 Pa.C.S. § 5104.
5 Appellant filed his concise statement of errors complained of on appeal on
May 29, 2020. On July 15, 2020, the trial court issued its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
opinion.
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the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context
of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual
findings are supported by the record, we are bound by these
findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are
erroneous. Where, as here, the appeal of the determination of
the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the
suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an
appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression
court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions
of law of the [trial court] are subject to our plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Yim, 195 A.3d 922, 926 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations and
internal brackets omitted). Furthermore, our scope of review from a
suppression ruling is limited to the evidentiary record created at the
suppression hearing. Commonwealth v. Fulton, 179 A.3d 475, 487 (Pa.
2018).
Prior to addressing Appellant’s arguments on the merits of the trial
court’s suppression ruling, we first address the Commonwealth’s contention
that Appellant has waived any potential claim under the new rule applicable
to automobile searches announced by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth
v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2020). Alexander was decided during the
pendency of this appeal and overruled the Court’s prior ruling in
Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014), which had held that the
search-and-seizure provision of Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution provides no greater protection than does the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution with regard to warrantless searches of
automobiles. Id. at 125 (Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court). The
Court in Gary thus concluded that, in line with United States Supreme Court
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decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment, the only prerequisite for a
warrantless search of a motor vehicle is probable cause to search, with no
exigency required beyond the inherent mobility of a motor vehicle. Id. at
138.
In Alexander, our Supreme Court concluded that the Pennsylvania
Constitution affords greater protection to our citizens than the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, noting that “[t]he long history
of Article I, Section 8 and its heightened privacy protections do not permit us
to carry forward a bright-line rule that gives short shrift to citizens’ privacy
rights.” 243 A.3d at 207-08. Our Supreme Court thereby re-affirmed and
reinstated the pre-Gary line of cases that required police to have both
probable cause and exigent circumstances before conducting a warrantless
search of an automobile. Id. at 181, 201, 207-09. The Supreme Court
instructed that courts “will have to decide, just as they did pre-Gary, whether
exigent circumstances justified warrantless searches in discrete scenarios,
with a focus on the particular facts.” Id. at 208.
The Commonwealth argues that Appellant cannot claim that the search
of his backpack found within Ms. Gori’s vehicle was constitutionally infirm
under Alexander as he did not raise the issue in the trial court or in his
concise statement of errors filed pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 1925(b).
While acknowledging that the application of the automobile exception under
Gary was the subject of the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth asserts
that Appellant did not directly challenge the holding of Gary or argue that
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exigent circumstances existed either at the suppression hearing or in the Rule
1925(b) statement. The Commonwealth directs our attention to this Court’s
decision in Commonwealth v. Grooms, 247 A.3d 31 (Pa. Super. 2021),
where we found that the appellant had waived any claim pursuant to
Alexander where he only disputed the existence of probable cause and did
not raise the issue of exigent circumstances or challenge the continuing
validity of Gary in the trial court. Id. at 37.
“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); see also Zitney v. Wyeth LLC,
243 A.3d 241, 246 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2020). “Moreover, it is well-settled that
issues that are not set forth in an appellant’s statement of matters complained
of on appeal are deemed waived.” Commonwealth v. Proctor, 156 A.3d
261, 267 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted);
see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).
Where a new principle of law is adopted while a case is pending on direct
appeal, an appellant may be entitled to the retroactive application of the new
rule so long as the issue was properly preserved for the reviewing court.
Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86, 90 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc).
[W]here an appellate decision overrules prior law and announces
a new principle, unless the decision specifically declares the ruling
to be prospective only, the new rule is to be applied retroactively
to cases where the issue in question is properly preserved at all
stages of adjudication up to and including any direct appeal.
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Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Cabeza, 469 A.2d 146, 148 (Pa. 1983))
(emphasis omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Hays, 218 A.3d 1260,
1266-67 (Pa. 2019) (reaffirming Cabeza and rejecting proposed rule that an
argument pertaining to a new rule adopted during the pendency of a direct
appeal is preserved if timely raised at the first opportunity after the adoption
of the rule).
Upon review, we agree with the Commonwealth that Appellant has
waived his argument under Alexander that no exigent circumstances were
present to justify the warrantless search of his backpack. Appellant did
reference the warrant requirement and exigent circumstances in his
suppression motion, alleging that police “performed a search of the vehicle
without a warrant, [p]robable [c]ause, exigent circumstances or consent.”
Motion to Suppress, 5/10/19, ¶4. However, at the suppression hearing,
Appellant did not raise the issue of exigent circumstances, contend that a
warrant was required to search the vehicle, or argue that Gary should be
overruled; instead, he confined his argument to whether the police had
“establish[ed] independent probable cause to search [Appellant’s] bag”
beyond the odor of marijuana in the vehicle and Ms. Gori’s admission that she
had been smoking marijuana. N.T., 7/18/19, at 32. Although the automobile
exception in Gary was mentioned several times by the trial court and the
Commonwealth at the suppression hearing, at no point did Appellant’s counsel
insinuate that the Supreme Court decision was wrongly decided.
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Additionally, Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement wholly failed to raise
either the issue of whether the Commonwealth demonstrated exigent
circumstances to justify the search of Appellant’s bag or the validity of the
automobile exception as adopted by Gary. Appellant’s Rule 1925(b)
statement provided as follows:
The Trial Court erred in denying the suppression motion because
the police did not have independent probable cause to conduct a
warrantless search of the closed backpack in the backseat of a car
in which [Appellant] was a passenger after the police accounted
for the odor of marijuana by discovering roaches in the front
center console and marijuana on the driver. See
Commonwealth v. Scott, 210 A.3d 359 (Pa. Super. 2019). The
illegal search and seizure violated [Appellant’s] rights under
Article 1 Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the 4th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
1925(b) Statement, 5/29/20, ¶4.a. As Appellant did not raise an issue with
respect to exigent circumstances or challenge Gary in his Rule 1925(b)
statement, the trial court did not address the issue in its Rule 1925(a) opinion.
See Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 239 A.3d 1096, 1106 (Pa. Super. 2020)
(noting that the Rule 1925(b) statement “is a crucial component of the
appellate process because it allows the trial court to identify and focus on
those issues the parties plan to raise on appeal”). Appellant also did not raise
an argument pertaining to exigent circumstances in his principal brief on
appeal to this Court but rather first raised the issue in his reply brief, after
Alexander was decided.
Therefore, aside from a brief reference to the warrant requirement and
exigent circumstances in his suppression motion, Appellant did not argue to
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the trial court that anything more than probable cause was required to support
the vehicle search. Nor did Appellant include any argument in his Rule
1925(b) statement related to exigency, the lack of a warrant for the vehicle
search, or the Gary automobile exception. This case thus falls in line with
Grooms, where we declined to address whether exigent circumstances
existed to justify a warrantless vehicle search as the appellant “did not contest
the application of the automobile exception announced in Gary” and did not
“address whether exigent circumstances existed to justify the officers’
judgment that obtaining a warrant was not reasonably practicable.” 247 A.3d
at 37 n.9. Instead, the appellant “simply dispute[d] the existence of probable
cause itself,” id. at 37, at the trial court level and therefore, we concluded
that he was limited to his probable cause argument on appeal. Id. at 37 &
n.8; accord Hays, 218 A.3d at 1262, 1266-67 (holding that argument
premised on Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S.Ct. 2160 (2016), was waived
where the defendant only challenged probable cause for vehicle stop in
suppression motion and did not argue that subsequent blood draw was
involuntary).
In arguing that he did not waive his argument that the police’s search
of his bag was not supported by exigent circumstances, Appellant refers us to
the waiver analysis in the Alexander decision itself where this Court rejected
the argument that the appellant was required to specifically argue to the
suppression court that Gary should be overturned in order to preserve that
issue for appeal. Appellant contends that the Alexander Court found that the
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question of whether Gary remained good law was preserved when the
appellant cited Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution to the trial
court, the provision which would ultimately form the basis of the Court’s
decision in Alexander to depart from federal motor vehicle exception to the
warrant requirement. Appellant argues that he also preserved his appellate
arguments here where he cited both the Fourth Amendment and Article I,
Section 8 in his suppression motion and in his Rule 1925(b) statement.
However, on close inspection, we are unpersuaded by Appellant’s
reliance on Alexander’s waiver analysis. In Alexander, the appellant did not
merely cite Article I, Section 8 as here, but he also argued to the suppression
court that the state constitutional provision provided broader protection than
the Fourth Amendment in the context of a vehicle search. 243 A.3d at 193
n.8. Furthermore, the appellant in Alexander argued to the trial court that
the officers should have obtained a warrant before searching the vehicle, id.,
whereas in this matter Appellant’s argument at the suppression hearing was
confined to the issue of whether the search was supported by probable cause.
Moreover, unlike the present case, there is no indication that the appellant in
Alexander failed to preserve his appellate challenge to Gary by omitting the
argument from his Rule 1925(b) statement.6
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6 Appellant also cites Shaw, in which we remanded for further consideration
of exigency of a vehicle search in light of Alexander; however, we did not
address the issue of waiver in Shaw and therefore that opinion offers no
guidance here. In addition, Appellant and the Commonwealth each cite to
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant did not preserve his argument
the warrantless search of his bag was unsupported by exigent circumstances
as required by Alexander. As this argument was waived, we therefore only
address Appellant’s challenge to the denial of his suppression motion related
to the issue of whether the officers possessed probable cause to search Ms.
Gori’s vehicle and his bag.
“The level of probable cause necessary for warrantless searches of
automobiles is the same as that required to obtain a search warrant.” Scott,
210 A.3d at 363 (citations omitted).
Probable cause does not demand the certainty we associate with
formal trials. Rather, a determination of probable cause requires
only that the totality of the circumstances demonstrates a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in
a particular place.
Id. (citation omitted). Probable cause is a practical, “fluid concept [] turning
on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts [and] not
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recent unpublished decisions of this Court that address the preservation of
exigent circumstance challenges to warrantless automobile searches in cases
where Alexander was decided while the case was on direct appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Lowe, No. 600 WDA 2020, 2021 WL 3259388, at *4 n.5
(Pa. Super. filed July 30, 2021) (unpublished memorandum);
Commonwealth v. Aursby, No. 901 EDA 2020, 2021 WL 2826473, at *6
(Pa. Super. filed July 7, 2021) (unpublished memorandum); Commonwealth
v. Greene, No. 545 WDA 2020, 2021 WL 1575456, at *5 (Pa. Super. filed
April 22, 2021) (unpublished memorandum); see also Pa. R.A.P. 126(b)
(noting that unpublished memorandum decisions of the Superior Court filed
after May 1, 2019 may be cited for their persuasive value). While we
acknowledge the differing results this Court has reached with respect to the
waiver of Alexander challenges, we do not find the discussion or analysis in
these unpublished decisions particularly instructive on the facts of this case.
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readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”
Commonwealth v. Glass, 754 A.2d 655, 663 (Pa. 2000) (quoting Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)).
Appellant’s argument that the police lacked probable cause proceeds in
two parts. First, Appellant contends that the search of Ms. Gori’s vehicle was
unconstitutional under Commonwealth v. Barr, 240 A.3d 1263 (Pa. Super.
2020), appeal granted, 252 A.3d 1086 (Pa. 2021), which held that the odor
of marijuana cannot establish per se probable cause to conduct a search for
contraband following the General Assembly’s 2016 enactment of the Medical
Marijuana Act (“MMA”), 35 P.S. §§ 10231.101-10231.2110. Appellant argues
that the search of Ms. Gori’s vehicle here was illegal as officers did not identify
any evidence to establish probable cause that there was contraband inside the
vehicle aside from the odor of marijuana.
In Barr, Pennsylvania State Police troopers pulled over a car driven by
the defendant’s wife for a Vehicle Code violation and detected the smell of
burnt marijuana upon approaching the vehicle. 240 A.3d at 1269-70. The
troopers announced that they intended to search the vehicle based upon the
probable cause from the odor of marijuana, whereupon the defendant, who
was in the passenger seat of the vehicle, presented a medical marijuana
identification card to the troopers. Id. at 1270-71. After uncovering a firearm
and raw marijuana, the defendant was charged with persons not to possess a
firearm and marijuana possessory offenses. Id. at 1269, 1271-72.
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The trial court in Barr granted the defendant’s suppression motion,
reasoning that—following the passage of the MMA—the plain smell of burnt or
raw marijuana is no longer indicative of an illegal act and therefore the
troopers lacked probable cause to conduct their search of the vehicle. Id. at
1273, 1283. On appeal, this Court agreed with the trial court that the MMA
altered the probable cause analysis with respect to marijuana, but
disapproved of the trial court’s determination that the odor was wholly
irrelevant to a determination of probable cause. Id. at 1283-86. Instead, we
explained that:
The odor of marijuana alone, absent any other circumstances,
cannot provide individualized suspicion of criminal activity when
hundreds of thousands of Pennsylvanians can lawfully produce
that odor [following the passage of the MMA]. What it does
provide to police is a general, probabilistic suspicion of criminal
activity based on the fact that most citizens cannot legally
consume marijuana. Thus, it is a factor that can contribute to a
finding of probable cause, consistent with prior precedent [],
assuming some other circumstances supply more individualized
suspicion that the activity is criminal.
Id. at 1287; see also Grooms, 247 A.3d at 40. As the factual record was
inadequate with respect to the other factual circumstances that may have
contributed to the troopers’ decision to undertake the vehicle search, we
remanded for further proceedings on the suppression motion to determine
whether other factors in addition to the odor of marijuana established probable
cause for the search. Barr, 240 A.3d at 1288-89.
Contrary to Barr, the suppression record here establishes that at the
time the officers initiated their search of Ms. Gori’s vehicle, the officers had
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probable cause to believe that the occupants of the vehicle had engaged in
the unlawful consumption of marijuana. First, unlike in Barr, neither Ms. Gori
nor Appellant produced a medical marijuana identification card, nor did they
indicate that they were certified as patients under the MMA. Rather, upon
being questioned about the odor of burnt marijuana coming from her vehicle
and before any search took place, Ms. Gori admitted to having smoked
marijuana in the vehicle, produced a baggie containing 2.8 grams of fresh
marijuana that had been tucked inside her bra, and indicated that there were
roaches present in the center console of the vehicle. N.T., 7/18/19, at 6-7,
9, 19-20, 24.
Thus, at the time Detective Castagna and Officer Tallie began their
search, they were aware that Ms. Gori and potentially other individuals had
recently smoked marijuana in the vehicle and remnants of the smoked
marijuana were present in the form of the roaches. Significantly, while the
vaporization of marijuana is permitted under the MMA, 35 P.S. §
10231.303(b)(2)(iv), and the odor of vaporized marijuana may be consistent
with the smell of burnt marijuana, see Grooms, 247 A.3d at 39 n.10; Barr,
240 A.3d at 1286 n.10, the MMA provides that it is unlawful to “[s]moke
medical marijuana.” 35 P.S. § 10231.304(b)(1). As there was indicia that
the marijuana was not consumed in accordance with the MMA, the officers
here were in possession of the kind of “other circumstances” absent in Barr
that “suppl[ied] more individualized suspicion that the activity is criminal” and
contributed to a finding of probable cause that the vehicle contained
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contraband. 240 A.3d at 1287; cf. id. at 1286 n.10 (finding as unpersuasive
the Commonwealth’s argument that the smell of burnt marijuana indicated
that marijuana had been smoked in violation of the MMA as the trial court had
credited the expert testimony at the suppression hearing that vaporized
marijuana produced a similar smell). Therefore, we do not find that the
officers’ decision to search Ms. Gori’s vehicle was improper under Barr.
In the second part of his probable cause challenge, Appellant argues
that, even if officers could look inside Ms. Gori’s vehicle, they did not have
independent probable cause to search Appellant’s backpack within the vehicle
in light of our decision in Scott. Appellant contends that, as in Scott, officers
fully accounted for the smell of burnt marijuana when they found roaches in
the center console and when Ms. Gori gave officers the baggie containing 2.8
grams of marijuana. Appellant asserts that officers could only proceed further
in their search and open his closed backpack in the back seat if they had
probable cause to believe that there was more contraband to be found in the
bag. As officers articulated no reason to believe that there was contraband
inside of his bag, Appellant maintains that the search was constitutionally
infirm and the contents of the search must be suppressed.
In In re I.M.S., 124 A.3d 311 (Pa. Super. 2015), this Court recognized
that as our Supreme Court in Gary had adopted the federal warrantless
automobile search exception, courts in this Commonwealth should also follow
United States Supreme Court precedent that authorizes officers to search any
container in a vehicle so long as they have probable cause to search the
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vehicle generally. Id. at 317 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295(1999)); see also Commonwealth v. Runyan, 160 A.3d 831, 837 (Pa.
Super. 2017) (under I.M.S., “if [the o]fficer [] had probable cause to search
the vehicle at issue for contraband he was also permitted to search any
container found therein where the contraband could be concealed, including
[the defendant’s] purse”). However, in Scott, this Court narrowed the
authority of law enforcement to search a closed container within a vehicle
where the potential illegal activity that afforded the officer probable cause to
engage in the search had been accounted for by contraband already collected
during the vehicle search.
In Scott, officers stopped the defendant’s vehicle for a Vehicle Code
violation and, upon their approach on foot, smelled the odor of burnt
marijuana and saw smoke emanating from the vehicle. 210 A.3d at 361. The
officers also observed the defendant put a blunt in the center console of the
vehicle. Id. The defendant was removed from the vehicle and nothing was
discovered on his person when he was patted down. Id. The officers then
searched the main compartment of the vehicle, discovering the blunt in the
center console, a jar containing what was believed to be marijuana in the front
passenger door, and a black ski mask. Id. The officers proceeded to search
the trunk of the vehicle where they found a loaded revolver. Id.The defendant in Scott was charged with firearm offenses and moved
to suppress the search of the trunk of the vehicle, which the trial court
granted. Id. at 361-62. This Court agreed with the trial court that, under the
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circumstances presented in that case, “the odor of burnt marijuana and small
amount of contraband recovered from the passenger compartment of the
vehicle did not create a fair probability that the officer could recover additional
contraband in the trunk.” Id. at 365. We noted that there was no indication
of the smell of fresh marijuana emanating from the trunk, and the odor of
burnt marijuana was consistent with the contraband discovered in the main
passenger area of the vehicle. Id. at 364. Furthermore, while the defendant
did make a furtive movement towards the center console at the time of the
stop, there was no indication that the defendant had attempted to, or even
had the ability to, access the trunk. Id. at 365. We finally noted the omission
of any testimony that the officers involved had specialized training to support
the belief that additional contraband might have been present in the trunk.
Id.While we are cognizant of Smith, we conclude that the trial court did
not err in finding that Appellant’s actions here provided independent probable
cause to justify the search of Appellant’s closed backpack for contraband
irrespective of the marijuana already recovered at the scene. Upon being
asked to exit the vehicle to be patted down, Appellant initially became “very
irate” with officers, refused to identify himself, and told officers that they could
not pat him down. N.T., 7/18/19, at 6, 21, 25. As the search of the vehicle
was progressing, Appellant initially walked away from the traffic stop and then
returned and “yell[ed]” at the officers that they could not search his bag. Id.
at 7-8, 28-29. In addition, a large crowd formed around the car, among them
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Appellant’s mother who also insisted that officers could not search Appellant’s
bag, leading to her being detained because she was interrupting the police
investigation. Id. at 8-9. When officers began to search the area of the
vehicle where his bag was, Appellant retreated inside a nearby residence
located at 1501 Madison Avenue despite being instructed to remain on the
scene. Id. at 9, 28.
Furthermore, Detective Castagna testified that, while he was following
Ms. Gori’s vehicle prior to the traffic stop, he saw the individual in the front
passenger seat—later determined to be Appellant—move the backpack from
his lap or between his legs to the area behind the driver’s seat of the vehicle.
Id. at 8, 27, 29. Moreover, in contrast to Smith, Appellant’s backpack was
located in the backseat of the vehicle behind the driver’s seat, not in an
inaccessible trunk area. Accordingly, in light of the indicia that marijuana had
recently been smoked in the vehicle, the accessible location of the backpack,
the fact that Appellant had moved the backpack just prior to the traffic stop,
and Appellant’s defensive demeanor and flight from the scene indicating
consciousness of guilt, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that the officers
here were in possession of information that there was a “fair probability that
contraband” would be found in Appellant’s backpack. Scott, 210 A.3d at 363(citation omitted).
As we have concluded that the trial court properly denied Appellant’s
suppression motion, we turn to his second appellate issue where he challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to his PIC conviction. Appellant
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argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that a knife, the instrument of crime that he was charged with possessing,
was found in Appellant’s backpack. In the alternative and assuming the
Commonwealth established the existence of the knife, Appellant argues that
the Commonwealth failed to prove that he intended to use the knife for a
criminal purpose.
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presents a question of law
and is subject to our plenary review under a de novo standard.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 234 A.3d 576, 581 (Pa. 2020). When reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether the evidence
admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, were sufficient to prove every
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. “The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.”
Commonwealth v. Wallace, 244 A.3d 1261, 1274 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(citation omitted).
Under Section 907(a) of the Crimes Code, “[a] person commits a
misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses any instrument of crime with
intent to employ it criminally.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a). To convict an individual
of PIC, “the Commonwealth has the burden of proving two elements: (1)
possession of an object that is an instrument of crime and (2) intent to use
the object for a criminal purpose.” Commonwealth v. Brockington, 230
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A.3d 1209, 1213 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). An “instrument of
crime” is defined as “[a]nything specially made or specially adapted for
criminal use” or “[a]nything used for criminal purposes and possessed by the
actor under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful uses it may
have.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(d).
We agree with Appellant that the Commonwealth did not show that he
was in possession of an instrument of crime. In Count IV of the information,
the Commonwealth alleged that Appellant committed the PIC offense by
“possess[ing] one or more instruments of crime, namely, a 14 inch blade
knife, with intent to employ it [] criminally. . . .” Information, 3/4/19. At the
non-jury trial, the parties stipulated to the trial record as consisting of the
testimony from the suppression hearing, three crime laboratory reports, a
Pennsylvania State Police license and certification form, a certification of
Appellant’s prior convictions, a search warrant for the house Appellant fled to
after the firearm was discovered, and a video recording reflecting the events
at issue. N.T., 3/10/20, at 7-8, 10-11. The recovery of the knife was not
mentioned at the suppression hearing, nor do any of the laboratory reports or
any of the other exhibits reference the knife. Similarly, the video recording
submitted into evidence does not show the knife recovered from Appellant’s
backpack.7
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7 The affidavit of probable cause supporting the criminal complaint does
indicate that a knife was found in Appellant’s backpack following the search.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The Commonwealth acknowledges that the knife was not mentioned in
the stipulated suppression motion testimony or exhibits, see Commonwealth’s
Substituted Brief at 50, yet points to the oral argument of Appellant’s counsel
during the bench trial where the knife was referenced. The Commonwealth
asserts that trial counsel was arguing that Appellant was unaware of the
firearm in the bag and he had only claimed ownership and protested the
search of the bag based upon the knife and marijuana that was also found
inside of it. N.T., 3/10/20, at 17-19. The Commonwealth also notes that, at
a different point during the bench trial, counsel stated to the trial court that it
was not presenting argument to the trial court on the PIC count. Id. at 14.
The Commonwealth thus argues that the arguments of Appellant’s advocate
“were in the nature of a concession to the elements of the crime about which
he now complains on appeal,” and therefore this Court should reject
Appellant’s sufficiency claim. Commonwealth’s Substituted Brief at 60.
We do not find that Appellant, through the actions of his trial counsel,
conceded that he was in possession of an instrument of crime. “[I]t is well-
settled that arguments of counsel are not evidence.” Commonwealth v.
Puksar, 951 A.2d 267, 280 (Pa. 2008). The comments by trial counsel
concerning the knife were in the nature of oral argument rather than a
____________________________________________
However, as the Commonwealth acknowledges in its brief, the affidavit of
probable cause was not identified as one of the exhibits on which it relied at
the stipulated bench trial. See Commonwealth’s Substituted Brief at 54 n.18.
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stipulation of the existence of certain facts,8 and therefore, such statements
could not have established a necessary element of the PIC offense.9
Furthermore, while trial counsel informed the trial court that he was not
presenting oral argument as to the PIC charge, this did not act as a waiver of
his sufficiency of the evidence challenge to that charge as a defendant may
wait until an appeal is filed to raise a sufficiency argument for the first time.
See Pa.R.Crim.P. 606(A)(7), Comment; Commonwealth v. Foster, 651
A.2d 163, 165 n.5 (Pa. Super. 1994).
Accordingly, we conclude that the Commonwealth did not submit
sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was in
____________________________________________
8 Indeed, we note that trial counsel did not state in absolute terms that
Appellant was in possession of a knife and instead only expressed that it was
possible that Appellant was aware of the knife or other contraband in the
backpack. N.T., 3/10/20, at 19 (“my client could have been aware of the 14-
inch blade knife which would justify him objecting to the search of the bag”)
(emphasis added).
9 The Commonwealth does not invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel here,
which “prevent[s] parties from abusing the judicial process by changing
positions as the moment requires.” Bienert v. Bienert, 168 A.3d 248, 255
(Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). We would reject such an argument even
if properly raised, however, as judicial estoppel only applies in situations
where a litigant prevails on a contrary theory or argument in a prior phase of
the litigation. See id. (under the judicial estoppel doctrine, “a party to an
action is estopped from assuming a position inconsistent with his or her
assertion in a previous action, if his or her contention was successfully
maintained”) (citation omitted); see also Hospital & Healthsystem
Association of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 77 A.3d 587, 596 n.9
(Pa. 2013) (holding that Commonwealth was judicially estopped from arguing
that it cannot comply with the remedy sought because it prevailed on the
opposite position in opposition to an earlier request for a preliminary
injunction).
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“possession of an object that is an instrument of crime.” Brockington, 230
A.3d at 1213 (citation omitted). We thus vacate Appellant’s PIC conviction,
but otherwise affirm the trial court’s judgment of sentence. Because the trial
court imposed no further penalty for the PIC conviction, this has no effect on
the trial court’s sentencing scheme, and no resentencing is therefore required.
See In the Interest of P.S., 158 A.3d 643, 652-53 (Pa. Super. 2017).
Judgment of sentence affirmed in part and vacated in part. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/12/2021
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