Alfieri, K. v. Alfieri, T. ( 2021 )

J-A06017-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
KIMBERLY S. ALFIERI : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
THOMAS M. ALFIERI :
:
Appellant : No. 618 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered May 21, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County Civil Division at No(s):
DR59-11
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED: May 28, 2021
Thomas M. Alfieri (Father)1 appeals from the order, entered in the Court
of Common Pleas of McKean County, denying his petition for modification of
support. After careful review, we find Father’s claims are meritless. We affirm
based on the opinion authored by the Honorable Christopher G. Hauser.
Father and Kimberly S. Alfieri (Mother)2 were married on May 6, 2000.
They are the parents of three children, now ages 14, 17 and 20. The parties
separated in 2011, and the court entered a final decree of divorce on January
____________________________________________
1 Contrary to the briefing requirements set forth in Chapter 21 of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Father has neglected to include in
his brief a Statement of Jurisdiction, see Pa.R.A.P. 2114, or the Order or Other
Determination in Question. See Pa.R.A.P. 2115. “The verbatim text of the
order or other determination under review is added as a principal element of
appellant’s brief[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 2115 - Explanatory Comment.
2 Mother has not filed an appellee’s brief.
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17, 2014. The parties reached an agreement for a 50-50 shared custody
arrangement, which the court adopted as an order on August 3, 2012.
Father is a retired schoolteacher. Mother, formerly a schoolteacher, is
currently a guidance counselor in the Otto Eldred School District. Both parties
have pensions through the Public School Employees’ Retirement System
(PSERS).3
Father’s primary source of income is his pension, although he also earns
a small income from coaching sports. Father had been paying Mother child
support in the amount of $487.30 per month. He retired in May 2019 and, on
October 11, 2019, filed a petition to modify support based on changed
circumstances. The court granted Father’s petition and reduced his obligation
to $25.27 per month. Father filed exceptions, which the trial court denied.
On appeal, Father raises the following issues:
1. Did the family law master and trial court commit error in
calculating [Father’s] gross monthly income by including
pension payments as income for purposes of child support
where the pension had been appraised as an asset and divided
in equitable distribution?
2. Did the family law master and trial court commit error in
concluding that Pennsylvania law permits the double counting
of an asset, which had been divided in equitable distribution,
to then again be counted as income for purposes of child
support?
3. Did the family law master and trial court commit error in
considering non-marital portions of [Father’s] pension for
purposes of child support calculations, where the non-marital
____________________________________________
3 The marital portion of Husband’s pension was valued at $149,789.38; the
marital portion of Wife’s pension was valued at $46,098.68.
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portions of the pension were expressly considered by the
[c]ourt in the equitable distribution award pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(8)?
4. Did the family law master and trial court commit error in failing
to even consider or to award [Father] child support where it is
not disputed that [Mother] has a higher income than [Father]
and the parties have a 50-50 custody schedule?
5. Did the family law master and trial court commit error in
holding that it had no authority to award child support to
[Father] because he had not filed a separate support
complaint?
6. Did the family law master and trial court commit error in failing
to follow Pa.R.C.P. 1910.5. and Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-4(c)(2)
which state that a child support order may be entered against
either party without regard to which party initiated the action?
Appellant’s Brief, at 1-2.
When evaluating a support order, this Court may only reverse the
trial court’s determination where the order cannot be sustained on
any valid ground. We will not interfere with the broad discretion
afforded the trial court absent an abuse of the discretion or
insufficient evidence to sustain the support order. An abuse of
discretion is not merely an error of judgment; if, in reaching a
conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the law, or the
judgment exercised is shown by the record to be either manifestly
unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will,
discretion has been abused.
Mencer v. Ruch, 928 A.2d 294, 297 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quoting D.H. v. R.H.,
900 A.2d 922, 927 (Pa. Super. 2006)). To the extent the issues involve
interpretation and application of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which are
questions of law, we employ a de novo standard of review and plenary scope
of review. Hanrahan v. Bakker, 186 A.3d 958, 966 (Pa. 2018).
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J-A06017-21
In his first three issues, Father argues the court’s calculation of his
monthly income available for support was in error, as the “pension payments
had been valued previously and divided in equitable distribution.” Appellant’s
Brief, at 7. He claims that counting his pension payments as income available
for support constituted “double dipping,” in contravention of this Court’s
holding in Hess v. Hess, 212 A.3d 520 (Pa. Super. 2019). Id. In his last
three issues, Father argues that since his monthly income is less than
Mother’s, and the parties have a 50-50 custody arrangement, he is entitled to
a child support award and the court’s finding that Father had to file a separate
complaint in support, was error. Appellant’s Brief, at 8.
Father’s argument that the court “double dipped” ignores the fact that
the calculation considered pension payments that were non-marital property.
In Hess, supra, we stated, “this Court has repeatedly held that an asset
awarded in equitable distribution may not be included in an individual’s income
for purposes of calculating support payments.” Hess, 212 A.3d at 524, citing
Miller v. Miller, 783 A.2d 832, 835-836 (Pa. Super. 2001). As the trial court
explained here, Father’s pension was based on forty years of teaching, and
the marital portion of that pension was only ten years. The pension payments
Father receives now “reflect only non-marital assets.” See Trial Court
Opinion, 8/14/20, at 5.
In his final three issues, Father contends that he should not be obligated
to pay support where (1) the parties share custody equally and (2) his income
is lower than Mother’s. He also argues that he is entitled to a child support
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award retroactive to the October 11, 2019, the date that he filed his petition
for modification. See Appellant’s Brief, at 8, 23.
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1910.16-4(c)(2) provides, in
relevant part:
Without regard to which parent initiated the support action, when
the children spend equal time with their parents, the Part II
formula cannot be applied unless the obligor is the parent with the
higher income. An order shall not be entered requiring the parent
with the lower income to pay basic child support to the parent with
the higher income. However, this subdivision shall not
preclude the entry of an order requiring the parent with
less income to contribute to additional expenses pursuant
to Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.16-6.
Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-4(c)(2) (emphasis added). Father neglects to recognize
that his monthly obligation of $25.27 is his contribution to the children’s health
insurance premium, an additional expense under Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6. See
Trial Court Opinion, supra at 9.
With respect to Father’s claim that he is entitled to child support, the
trial court stated Father was required to file a separate child support action.
It was the court’s understanding that “this limitation is imposed by the
Pennsylvania Automated Child Support Enforcement System (PACSES)[,]” and
the hearing officer “could not recommend support for [Father] during that
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proceeding because the software does not allow that.” Id. at 10. Father is
free to file a child support action.4
We affirm based on Judge Hauser’s opinion. The parties are ordered to
attach a copy of that opinion in the event of further proceedings.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/28/2021
____________________________________________
4 Pennsylvania does not charge any filing fees to file for child support. See
https://www.humanservices.state.pa.us/CSWS/program_controller.aspx
(last visited 5/19/21). See also www.childsupport.state.pa.us (last visited
5/19/21).
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Circulated 05/20/2021 09:16 AM
KIMBERLY S. ALl{IERI, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
PIaintiff,
OF McKFsAN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
VS. CIVIL DIVISION
THOMAS M. ALI+IERI, NO. DR-59-11
Defendant. NO. 59 CD 2011
1925(a) OPINION
Thomas Alfieri (hereinafter "Defendant") appeals from the Trial Court's Memorandum
and Order dated May 21, 2020, as well as from aFamily Law Hearing Officer's Support Report
and Recommendations. dated December 18, 2019. Defendant's Statement of Errors Complained
of on Appeal raises twelve (12) issues. Specifically, Delendant claims that the Trial Court and
Hearing Officer erred in the lollowing: calculating Defendant's gross and net montlhly income;
concluding that Defendant should pay support to Plaintiff; including Defendant's pension as
income when calculating support; considering improper portions of the pension when calculating
support; considering pension payments to be separate from the pension asset; considering pension
increases that occurred after separation; misapplying Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.16-4(c)(2); not awarding
Defendant child support; and misapplying Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.5.
11oLugh Defendant's alleged ei -rors are numerous, they are unfoLurdcd. For reasons set forth
below, the Trial Court respectfully requests that its May 20, 2020, Memorandum and Order be
affirmed.
FACTUAL AND PRO CEDURALBACKGROUND
1. Plaintill' is Kinibedy Alfieri, an adult individual residing at 14856 Route 6, Smethport,
PA, 16719. Plaintiff is aschool leacher in the Sinctliport Area School Disixict.
2. Defendant. is Thornas Alfieri, an adult individual residing at 1106 W. -Main Street,
Sinctliport, PA, 16719. Defendant is a retired school teacher. He taught in the
Smcthport Area School District for approximately forty (40) years.
3. The panties married in 2000 and had three children together, C.A., P.A., and J.A. The
parties separated in 2011 and divorced in 2014, and their marital assets were
subsequently divided.
4. Included among those assets were both parties' pensions. During the equitable division
of assets, Plaintiff was awarded aportion of Defendant's pension in the foi nrz of alump
sum aniount, based on the portion of Defendant's pension that was considered marital
property. The then-present value of Defendant's pension fund was $369,303. The
Hearing Officer calculated that $149,789 was the increase in value of the pension
during the marriage. The Hearing Officer added to that the value of Defendant's Aspire
.and Anerican Funds accouunts, as well as Plaintif's pension, 403H, and American
Hinds accounts which had been increased during the marriage. Plaintiff was then
awarded fifty percent (50%) of that total. The amount Plaintiff received from
Defendant's pension was $64,000.
5. Defendant continued to work as ateacher for several years after the division, and retired
at the close of the 2018-2019 school year.
6. Plaintiff continues to teach at this time.
7. The parties share physical custody of all three children equally.
8. Now that he is retired, Defendant's primary source of income is his pension. He
recognizes a sniall amount of other income from other sources, such as coaching
various sports teams, but the pension accounts for the majority of his monthly carvings.
175Q
9. Defendant argues that his pension payments should not be considered in calculating
child support. He also argues that since Plaintiff is still worl``ing and now has ahigher
salary, she. should be paying support to biro.
10. Defendant filed aPetition to Modify Child Support on October 11. 2019, alleging that
circumstances had changed such that his support obligations should be revised. Hearing
was held on the matter, and Defendant was ordered to pay Plaintiff S25.27 per month
in snppo -t.
11. Defendant then filed Fxceptions to the Hcaring Officer's Support Report and
Recommendations, and the Trial Court heard argument from Defendant on the matter.
TAtimately, the Trial Court found his Exceptions to be without merit and accepted the
recommendations of the Hearing Officer. Defendant now appeals.
DISCUSSION
The Trial Court incorporates hcre.in as if it had been fully set forth its Memorandum and
Ordcr, dated May 20, 2020, attached beneath. Because several of Defendant's matters cuiiiplained
of are based upon the Sarno fundarnuntal argument, the Trial Court kvill discuss them together.
I."The family law master and trial court erred in concluding that Defendant's gross
monthly income for the purpose of child support is $4,735."
2. "The family law master and trial court erred in concluding that Defendant's net
monthly income for the purpose of child support is $3,704.00."
3. "Tire family law master and trial court erred in concluding that Defendant should
pay child support to Plaintiff in the amount of $25.27 per month, where Defendant's
inennic is less than Plaintiff's."
4. "The family law master and trial court erred in including Defendant's pension
payments as income for purposes of calculating child support where the pension has
been appraised as an asset and divided in equitable distribution."
All four of these alleged errors are based upon the fact: that the Hearing Officer and Trial
C'ouil considered Defendant's pension payments when calculating child support. Defendant's
inco7ic was calculated as follows: $4,402.00 + (($2,390.00 + $1,156.00 + $450.00)!12) =-
176 a
$4,735.00. This equation represents Defendant's monthly pension ($4,402.00) plus the annual
income from the various sports lie coaches—golf ($2,390.00), basketball ($1,156.00), and various
others ($450.00)--divided to get amonthly amount of $333. Thus, Defendant's gross monthly
income is $4,735.00.
Defendant's monthly deductions total $1,030.70. When calculated, Defendant's net
monthly income is $3,704.30. There is no mathematical error in either of these calculations. The
amount that Defendant was ordered to pay, $25.27, is aresult of health insurance premiums for
the children. It is not basic child support, and Defendant would be obligated to pay aportion of the
health insurance premium regardless of his support obligation, as Plaintiff provides health
insurance for the children and pays the premiums. Defendant is not required to pay basic. child
support under Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.16-4(a)(1). Instead, Defendant's obligation arises under
Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.16-6, which states, in relevant part, "If abasic support order is inappropriate
under the [acts of the case, the trier-of-fact may allocate between the parties the additional
expenses." Regarding health insurance premiums, the Rule stages, "Me trier-of-fact shall allocate
the health insurance premiums paid by the parties, including the premium attributable to the party
paying the premium, provided that astatutory duty of support is owed to the party or child cohered
by the health insurance." Pa. R.C.P. No. 1910.16-6(b). The Hearing Officer calculated $25.27 as
Defendant's portion of the insurance premiums.
Defendant relies on a"double dipping" argument to support his position. He argues that
since his pension was previously considered during the division of marital property, that it cannot
be considered now for the purposes of support payments. In support of this position, Defendant
cites .Miller v. Miller, 783 A.2d 832 (Pa. Super. 2001). Lr that case, the Superior Court stated that,
"Money received from the sale of assets awarded in equitable distribution may not be included in
177q
an individual's income for purposes of calculating suppoil payments." Id at. 835. However, The
Superior Court, in the very next sentence, also states, "The single caveat to this rule is that any
gain realized in the sale of the asset may, indeed must, be included in the calculation of the
income." Id. Defendant continued to work for several years after the divorce and division of
properly. During that time, his pension benefits continued to increase. The pension asset that
Defendant has now is not the same as what it was at the,, tune of the division.
For example, in the .Miller case, the assets in question included an amount of timber. Id at
833. The timber was appraised and awarded to the husband, who was then to find abuyer and split
the proceeds with his wife. lei at 834. Once the husband successfully sold the timber, the wife
sought to modify their child support arrangement in recognition of the income he had received
from the sale. Id. Under those circumstances, the wife was asking the court to consider the same
asset twice, once for equitable division and again for child support. The case at hand does not
follow dies scenario. Instead, it is snore. like stocks. If acouple had 100 shares of stock in alumber
company, and it was to be divided such that each party received 50, and the wile sold hers for the
value they possessed at the time of the division, then that income could not be considered again
for child support. If the husband chose to keep his, then the dividends paid by the stock would
constitute income that could be considered for child support. Similarly, if lie were to sell them
several years later and recognize aprofit greater than the worth they had at the time of the division,
that profit would be subject to child support. The Superior Court in 1lfiller gives asimilar example.l
Defendant also relies on Mess ),. Mess, 212 A.3d 520 (Pa. Super. 2019) for the assertion
that pension fiends accrued during the marriage are considered marital property, subject to
',See rtlrAer at 836 n.6 (stating that "[t]n the event Husband sold the rental property for more than the value given it
in the Agreement, the gain realized would be attributable to him as income. Similarly, if the proceeds from the timber
sale had exceeded the appraised value set out in the Agreement, the increase would be attributable to Husband as
income."),
equitable distribution. While this is true, Defendant taught school for approximately 40 years. Ile
was married to Plaintiff for approximately 10 years. The portion of his pension that was subject to
equitable distribution Nvas far from the majority. Both parties' pensions were subject to the
equitable distribution of marital property during the parties' separation and divorce. That occurred
nearly adecade ago. Defendant's pension payments now reflect only non-marital assets. Thus,
they are income that has not already been divided during equitable distribution.
5. "The family law master and trial court erred in concluding that double counting or
double dipping, asituation where an asset divided in equitable distribution is again
counted for child support, is permissible under the laws of Pennsylvania."
This alleged error is nothing more than apurposeful misstatement ofthe Hearing Officer
and Trial Court's findings. It is settled law in Pennsylvania that assets awarded in equitable
distribution are not subject to calculations for child support. Miller at 835. The Trial Court explains
unequivocally in its Memorandum and Order that the amounts held in his pension prior to the
marriage and subsequent to the marriage account for substantially all of the asset. At no point has
the Trial Court allowed "double dipping" or condoned it as permissible under Pennsylvania law.
G. "Tljc family law master and trial court erred in considering non-inarital portions o£
Defendant's pension for purposes of child support calculations, where the non -
marital portions of the pension were expressly considered by the Court in the
equitable distribution award pursuant to 23 Pa-C.S.A. §3502(8),"
The equitable division of marital property is subject to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §3502, which states
in relevant part:
(a) General rule.--Upon the request of either party in an action for
divorce or annulment, the court shall equitably divide, distribute
or assign, in kind or otherwise, the marital property between the
parties without regard to marital misconduct in such percentages
and in such manner as the court deerns just after considering all
relevant factors. The court may consider cacti. rnarltal asset or
group of assets independently and apply adifferent percentage
to each marital asset or group of' assets. Factors which are
relevant to the equitable division of marital property include the
following: (8) The value of property set apart to cacti party.
174 a
The statute is intended to set li.rrth various factors acourt may consider when determining hov,,to
equitably distribute assets.' Defendant argues that considering the factors listed in the statute
constitutes an error if those same factors are then considered for the purpose of child support. If
the value of the property sct aside is afactor to be considered in equitable distribution, it does not
mean that somehow that factor is an actual part of the distribution. Other factors considered under
23 Pa.C.SA. §3502 include sources of'income and economic circumstances of both parties. Based
upon Defendant's logic, if acourt wnsider:s the relevant factors during the equitable distribution
of assets, then it is must be prevented from considering those factors in the context of child support.
However, that is not the case and would lead to serious complications to say the least.
7. "Tile family law master and trial court erred in concluding that the pension payments
Defendant is currently receiving is not the same pension asset that was divided in
equitable distribution, but is simply earnings and gain on the pension award
Defendant received at that time."
Dcfendatlt's alleged error is difficult to conceptualize. The Trial Court did not find that
Defendant's current pension payments are nothing more than earnings and gran on the pension
benefits awarded during the division of property. Instead, the Trial Court found that Defendant's
pensiola, which is now comprised of substantially, if not all, non-marital property that was not
subject to equitable distribution, has increased in value since the division occurred. This increase
occurred after the asset had been subject to equitable distribution. FLixtlt.et7naore, Defendant is
I The till] list. of factors are: (1) the length of the II] iage; (2) any prior marriage of either party; (3) the age, health,
Station, amount and sources of incorne, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the
parties; (4) the contribution by one party to the education, training or inercased earning power of the other party; (5)
the opporimity of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets and income; (G) the sources of hiconre of bolh
parties, including, but not lirn ited to, rnedical, redreinenl, insurance or other benefits; (7) the contribution or dissipation
of each pally in the acquisition, preservatiuu, rlepreciatiun or appeciation of Elie rrrasital property, hicludiug thu
contribution of aparty as hornemakcr; (8) the value of the property set apart to each Marty; (9) the standard of living
of the patties established during the rnacriage; (10) the econornic circumstances of each party at the time the division
of property is to become effective; (10.1) the Federal, State and local tax ramifications associated with each asset to
be divided, distributed or assigned, which ramifications need not be immediate and certain; ((10.2) the expense of
sale, transfer or liquidation associated with aparticular asset, which expenses need not be unmediate and certain; and
(I l) whether the party will be serving as the custodian of any dependent nibror children
receiving an income frnm the pension payments, The substantial majority of that pension was
accumulated during the 30 years that Defendant worked as ateacher and was not married to
Plaintiff'.Even il'some small part of the pension asset as it exists now could be attributed to marital
property, it would be miniscule and therefore harmless, Furthermore, assuming that there is some
very small portion of Defendant's pension that was considered for equitable distribution, it would
be virtually impossible to separate it from the remainder of the pension at this point. The division
occurred nearly adecade ago, and ascertaining the income of that spmilic portion and removing it
from Defendant's current pension payments would be impossible.
S. "The family law piaster and trial court erred in holding that Defendant's entire
pension payments should be counted as income because he worked for seven years
after the equitable distribution award, where both Plaintiff's and Defendant's PSFRS
pensions would have increased in value at approximated the sanic ratc."
Defendant seemingly argues that since Plaintiff's pension has also increased over the last
seven years, lie should not have to consider his pension income. It is true that Plaintiff's pensio11
has also increased in value since equitable distribution occurred. However, the value of plaintiff's
pension asset is currently not pertinent to child support: allocations. She is still teaching and
therefore is not receiving pension payments. If Plaintiff were to retire tomorrow, her salary would
cease and she would instead have incoiuc in the form of apension. The amount of that pension
would then become equally relevant to the allocation of child support. However, Plaintiffs pension
is not currently her income.
9. "The family law ivaster and trial court cried by misapplying Pa.R.C.P. 1910.1G-
4(c)(e). »
10. "The family law master and trial court erred in failing to award Defendant child
support where it is not disputed that Plaintiff has ahigher income than Defendant
and the parties have a50-50 custody schedule."
11. "The family law master and trial court crred in holding that it had no authority to
award child support to Defendant because he had not riled a separate support
complaint."
12. "The family law master and trial court erred in failing to follow Pa.H.Civ.P. 1.910.5
and Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.16-4(e)(2) which states that a child support order pray be
entered against either party without regard to which party initiated the action."
The final four errors all relate to the Hearing 011icer and Trial Court's application of
Pa.R.C.P. No.1910.1 f-4(c)(2) and Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.5. Defendant essentially believes that he
was entitled to receive child support payments from Plaintiff, and believes that failure to award
those payments was amisapplication of the Rules. P'a.R.C.P. No. 1910.16-4(c)(2) states:
Without regard to which parent initiated the support action,
when the children spend equal time with their parents, the Part II
formula cannot be applied unless the obligor is the parent with the
higher income. An order shall not be entered requiring the parent
with the lower income to pay basic child support to the parent with
the higher income. However, this subdivision shall not preclude the
entry of an order requiring the parent with less income to contribute
to additional expenses pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.16-6. Based
upon the evidence presented, the trier of fact may enter an order
against either party without regard to which party initiated the
action. If the parties share custody equally and the support
calculation results in the obligee receiving a larger share of the
parties' combined income, then the court shall adjust the support
obligation so that the combined nronthly net income is allocated
equally between the two households. In those cases, spousal support
or alimony pendente lite shall not be awarded.
The Hearing Officcr made note of Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.16-4(c)(2), acknowledging that Defendant,
as the party with lower inconrc, could not be rcquircd to pay support. However, the $25.27 is
Defendant's portion of the children's insurance premium, an additional expense under Pa.R.C.P.
No. 1910.16-6. Defendant is still obligated to pay additional expenses, even when he. has alesser
income than Plaintil',
Defendant also argues that under Pa.R.C.1'. No.1910.16-4(c)(2), the hearing Officer had
the authority to enter an order upon tither party, regardless of who brought the action. Defendant
filed apetition to modify his support obligations based on the fact that he had retired. In order to
pru-sue aclaim against Plaintiff, lie will need to file aseparate action. The rule states that "the trier
of fact may enter an order against either party without regard to which party initiated the action."
Pa.R.C.I'. No.I 910.16-4(c)(2) (emphasis added). It should not be interpreted as requiring
necessarily the hearing Officer to enter an order without further action to correct the record. The
Hearing Officer stated in her Supplemental Deport and Recommendations that she was unable to
recommend support for Defendant in that proceeding, but stated that he could file acomplaint in
which lie was the plaintiff in order to pursue child support from Plaintiff. It is the Court's
understanding that this limitation is imposed by the Pennsylvania Automated Child Support
Enforcement System (PACSF.S) system; the Hearing Officer could not recommend support 1br
Defendant during that proceeding because the software does not allow that. However, Defendant
is free to file aseparate support claun at any time.
CONCLUSION
After a portion of his pension was divided during the equitable distribution of property,
Defendant believed that it would be unable to he considered for child support purposes. However-,
that division occurred nearly adecade ago, and the portion of his pension that was affected was a
small one. The income that Defendant receives from his pension is not the same asset that was subject
to the equitahle distribution of assets in 2011. Furthermore, if Defendant wishes to now seek child
support from Plaintiff, he may do so by filing a child support. action.
I-or tlic xeasons stated above, the Trial Court respectfully requests that its Memorandum and
Order dated May 20, 2020, be affirmed.
RE,SPLCTFULLY SUBMITTED:
Certit'icationz(NA PLO
N c.
i hereby certify the within to be a
true & correct copy thereof as filed
in the office of the Prothonotary of
Vc: gtan Collies, Pprinsylvania. CHRISTOPHLIZ G. HAUSLR, J.
I • C:d •^i
Prothonotary r• r•
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