Com. v. Williams, A. ( 2021 )

J-S02018-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ANTHONY WILLIAMS :
:
Appellant : No. 1249 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 6, 2020,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County,
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0001093-2019.
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: Filed: May 27, 2021
Anthony Williams appeals, pro se, from the judgment of sentence
imposed following his conviction for receiving stolen property.1 We affirm.
The trial court set forth the relevant factual and procedural history as
follows.
The Whitehall Township Police received a report of a break-
in on February 4, 2019. Homeowners discovered that their home,
located at 3118 S. Ruch Street, Whitehall, Lehigh County, was
burglarized. The victims, Steven and Samantha Rothdeutsch,
reported the incident to police upon their discovery and informed
police the break-in must have occurred while they were away
during the daytime hours between 8:15 a.m. and 5:30 p.m.
Stolen items included an Apple MacBook Pro, a Nikon model 05300
camera, and various jewelry. Lieutenant James Lucas and
Sergeant Mark Mazzitelli of the Whitehall Township Police
Criminal-Investigative-Division began an investigation. A few
days later, on February 6, 2019, the victims relayed that they had
located an Apple MacBook Pro being sold on Craigslist.org, which
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a).
J-S02018-21
they believed to be their stolen property. On that same day, Det.
Mazzitelli discovered that a Nikon model 05300 camera had been
sold to Pawn America located at 923 Hamilton Street in the city of
Allentown.
Pawn America records showed that the Nikon camera was
sold by . . . Williams on the same day as the break-in on February
4, 2019. When [Williams] pawned [the camera,] he was required
to provide identification and [his] photo was taken at the time of
the sale. Det. Mazzitelli confirmed that the camera sold at Pawn
America matched the serial numbers of the missing camera.
During the trial, the court noted that [Williams] remarked to the
jury that the picture taken by Pawn America of him was a beautiful
picture.
Det. Mazzitelli, shielding his identity, contacted the seller of
the Apple MacBook Pro through Craigslist.org and arranged a
purchase to initiate a buy-bust operation. Det. Mazzitelli was in
contact with the seller multiple times. An arrangement was made
to meet at Dunkin Donuts, located at the intersection of MacArthur
Road and Jordan Parkway, to complete the transaction. Lt. Lucas
and other officers traveled with Det. Mazzitelli to provide
assistance.
On February 6, 2019, at approximately 5:05 p.m.,
[Williams] arrived at Dunkin Donuts in his black 2010 Dodge
Journey. [Williams] was immediately detained. [Williams] was
informed that he was being arrested for the stolen merchandise.
Lt. Lucas testified that [Williams] began to make statements and
offer explanations. Lt. Lucas interrupted [Williams] and said he
would speak with him back at headquarters, but if he was going
to continue to talk, then he would need to provide [Williams] with
his Miranda[2] warnings. [Williams] continued and Lt. Lucas
Mirandized [Williams] verbally while standing in the Dunkin
Donuts parking lot. . . .
****
[Williams] was not provided with a written form on scene to
waive his Miranda rights. [Williams] informed police that the
item he wished to sell, the Apple MacBook Pro, was located in his
____________________________________________
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
-2-
J-S02018-21
vehicle. Police asked permission to retrieve the computer and
[Williams] gave consent. The computer was recovered from the
front passenger seat and matched the serial number of the
missing computer. Upon retrieving the laptop, the police asked
for further permission to search the vehicle. [Williams] gave
additional permission to search his car. [Police observed a
crowbar and gloves in Williams’ vehicle.] In an abundance of
caution the police also obtained a search warrant to search the
vehicle. [Williams] was transported back to Whitehall Township
Police Headquarters.
At headquarters, [Williams] was audio and video recorded
and consented to an interview with police. [Williams] wanted to
speak with police and the police recall that he was very talkative.
Before the interview, [Williams] admitted (1) he was provided with
his rights, (2) stated that he did not wish to go over his rights
again, and (3) informed police he understood his rights. This
occurred less than an hour after Lt. Lucas provided [Williams] with
Miranda warnings on scene. Ultimately, [Williams] admitted to
his involvement in the burglary of the residence at 3118 S. Ruch
Street.
[Police charged Williams with several offenses, but later
withdrew all charges other than receiving stolen property.
Williams filed a counseled omnibus pretrial motion seeking to
suppress the statements he made to police, as well as information
that police obtained from his phone. Following a hearing, the trial
court denied suppression.]
At trial, [Williams elected to represent himself with the
public defender acting as stand-by counsel. Williams] took the
stand to testify in his defense. [Williams] informed the jury about
his life and upbringing and introduced past contact with authority
and police. [Williams] explained his previous experiences with
police and how that shaped him. [Williams] readily admitted to
the jury that he told police multiple stories and then attempted to
explain why he lied to police. [Williams] informed the jury that he
was convicted of burglary in the past but that is not the type of
individual he is anymore. [Williams] had the opportunity to tell
the jury about books that he had written and published and a
business that he started. [Williams] portrayed himself as a
businessman selling things to different people online. [Williams]
attempted to portray a persona of a newly reformed law-abiding
-3-
J-S02018-21
citizen. He testified that he works helping people and that he
works hard.
[Williams’] testimony about the incident in question
appeared somewhat disorganized but appeared to the court as
another admission. [Williams] admitted that he was at the scene
of the burglary while with his friend “G.” [Williams] was driving
with “G” as a passenger when they stopped in the victim[s’]
neighborhood to pass out flyers. [Williams] noticed that “G” was
bringing items out of a home to his car. At some point, he noticed
firearms in his vehicle under a blanket and saw “G” coming out of
the house with a television. [Williams] testified that he rebuked
his friend and had his friend take the firearms back into the house.
[Williams] swore he didn't touch anything and left. At some later
time, his friend “G” gave [Williams] a sob story and told him how
he needed money. Apparently, “G” gave [Williams] the camera
and laptop to sell so that he could help him make some money.
[Williams] informed the jury that he would have no reason to think
that the camera and laptop given to him by “G” were stolen.
The court provided significant leeway to [Williams’]
testimony over the objection of the Commonwealth. However,
the court did make some attempts to curtail prolonged stories
and/or experiences that were irrelevant.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/22/20, at 3-6 (headings, original footnotes, and
unnecessary capitalization omitted, footnote added)
At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Williams of receiving stolen
property. On June 2, 2020, the trial court sentenced Williams to serve three
to seven years in prison. Williams filed a timely pro-se post-sentence motion
which the trial court denied. Williams thereafter filed a timely pro se notice of
appeal. Both Williams and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
In his pro se brief, Williams raises the following issues for our review.
1. Did the lower court error [sic] in not suppressing the videotape
interview and phone records?
-4-
J-S02018-21
2. Did the trial judge abuse her discretion in denying [Williams’]
right to show reasonable doubt as to an element of the crime,
thereby denying [Williams his] constitutional rights of due
process and the confrontation clause?
3. Did the lower court abuse its discretion in denying [Williams]
the right to use evidence to support his testimony?
4. Did the judge’s remarks concerning the prosecutor’s character
show favor to one side and thus prejudice [Williams], thereby
denying [Williams] a fair trial?
5. Was the multiple remarks and discussions by the trial judge
both in front of and outside the jury a showing of partiality of
the judge and a denial of a fair and impartial trial?
6. Was [Williams] denied his constitutional right to a fair trial by
uniform [sic], armed Sheriff deputies positioning around him
during his questioning of witnesses and though out [sic] trial?
7. Was [Williams] denied due process in violation of
[Pa.R.Crim.P.] 704?
Williams’ Brief at vii (issues reordered for ease of disposition).
Williams initially challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to
suppress the videotaped interview and phone records. In reviewing an appeal
from an order denying suppression, our standard of review is limited to
determining:
whether [the trial court’s] factual findings are supported by the
record and whether [its] legal conclusions drawn from those facts
are correct. When reviewing the rulings of a [trial] court, the
appellate court considers only the evidence of the prosecution and
so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted
when read in the context of the record as a whole. When the record
supports the findings of the [trial] court, we are bound by those
facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn
therefrom are in error.
-5-
J-S02018-21
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 116 A.3d 1139, 1142 (Pa. Super. 2015). Our
scope of review is limited to the evidence presented at the suppression
hearing. In re interests of L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1088-89 (Pa. 2013).
Generally, statements made during custodial interrogation are
presumptively involuntary, unless the accused is first advised of his Miranda
rights. Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 782 A.2d 574, 579 (Pa. Super. 2001).
Under Miranda, police officers are required to apprise suspects prior to
questioning that they have the right to remain silent, that any statement made
may be used against them, and that they have the right to an attorney.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. “The defendant may waive effectuation of these
rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”
Id. As our Supreme Court has explained
The determination of whether a confession is voluntary is a
conclusion of law and, as such, is subject to plenary review.
Moreover, the totality of the circumstances must be considered in
evaluating the voluntariness of a confession. The determination
of whether a defendant has validly waived his Miranda rights
depends upon a two-prong analysis: (1) whether the waiver was
voluntary, in the sense that defendant’s choice was not the end
result of governmental pressure, and (2) whether the waiver was
knowing and intelligent, in the sense that it was made with full
comprehension of both the nature of the right being abandoned
and the consequence of that choice.
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 902 A.2d 430, 451 (Pa. 2006).
In assessing voluntariness, a court should look at the following factors:
(1) the duration and means of the interrogation; (2) the physical and
psychological state of the accused; (3) the conditions attendant to the
-6-
J-S02018-21
detention; (4) the attitude of the interrogator; and (5) any and all other
factors which could drain a person’s ability to withstand suggestion and
coercion. See Commonwealth v. Nester, 709 A.2d 879, 882 (Pa. 1998).
The Commonwealth bears the burden of proof and must demonstrate that the
proper warnings were given, and that the accused manifested an
understanding of these warnings. Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 915 A.2d
1122, 1136 (Pa. 2007).
Williams argues that, at the time he initially encountered police, it was
cold, dark, and raining, and the Dunkin Donuts parking lot was located on the
side of a highway at rush hour. Williams claims that these circumstances
caused him to talk excessively. He additionally claims that two of the officers
continued to ask him questions while Lt. Lucas provided him with Miranda
warnings. Williams contends that, because he was talking excessively and the
other officers were directing questions at him, he did not hear the full Miranda
warnings given by Lt. Lucas. He claims that, had he heard his Miranda rights,
he would have exercised them.
Williams further argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ruling
that Williams’ waiver of his Miranda rights was valid. According to Williams,
in his prior encounters with law enforcement, he was read his Miranda rights
and thereafter signed a written Miranda waiver. He asserts that no such
written Miranda waiver was obtained in this case. Williams contends that
police could have provided him with additional Miranda warnings when they
-7-
J-S02018-21
arrived at the police station, but they failed to do so. Williams also states
that, as a condition of parole, he is required to waive certain rights, and at the
time he encountered police at the Dunkin Donuts, he thought his right to
remain silent was a right that he had waived by being on parole. Williams
asserts that, due to the fact that he did not hear the initial Miranda warnings,
the subsequent interrogation was unconstitutional and should have been
suppressed. Williams further asserts that the trial court should have
suppressed the phone records on the basis that they constitute fruit of the
poisonous tree.
The trial court concluded that Williams’ suppression challenges lacked
merit. The court reasoned:
Here, when the police arrested [Williams] in the parking lot
of Dunkin Donuts he began to immediately offer explanations and
make statements. Lt. Lucas testified that he had to interrupt
[Williams] to provide Miranda warnings. Contrary to common
belief, Miranda warnings are only required prior to custodial
interrogation. See Com. v. Sites, 427 Pa. 486, 492, 235 A.2d
387, 390 (1967). Spontaneous or volunteered statements are not
protected and are admissible without warning. See Com. v.
Baez, 554 Pa. 66, 85, 720 A.2d 711, 720 (1998). We find the
testimony from the police that he was provided with Miranda on
scene credible in light of police practice and procedure. It seems
apparent to this court that [Williams] began to offer spontaneous
explanations and the police orally provided Miranda (which he
acknowledges) to protect any evidence rather than leave the
statements open to scrutiny. The police practiced similar
procedure when they obtained a search warrant even though they
had [Williams’] permission to search the vehicle.
At the pretrial [suppression] hearing, [Williams]
acknowledged police partially informed him about his Miranda
rights but claims police left out information regarding his right to
counsel. After a review of the taped interview, we found that
-8-
J-S02018-21
Detective Mazzitelli reiterated his right to counsel during the
interview and [Williams] still “wanted to be honest and wanted to
talk.” We are mindful that [Williams] is no stranger to the criminal
justice system with a lengthy criminal history. This was apparent
throughout the interview and further supports [Williams’]
acknowledgments that he was aware of and understood his rights.
See Com. v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426, 826 A.2d 831 (2003)
(defendant’s twice stating he understood his Miranda rights, and
answering questions thereafter, sufficiently manifested the intent
to waive his rights).
Therefore, it is clear from the testimony taken at the pretrial
[suppression] hearing and the video and audio recording of the
interview that [Williams] was not under the influence of any
substances or alcohol, that he was aware of his Miranda
warnings, and that he waived those rights knowingly and
intelligently. However, similar to Cohen, [53 A.3d 882 (Pa.
Super. 2012),] we would emphasize that the best practice is for
police officers to obtain written confirmation that a defendant
understands his Miranda rights prior to interrogation. Although
not legally required it would help eliminate any such allegations.
See Com. v. Baez, 2011 PA Super 109, 21 A.3d 1280, 1286
(2011) citing Com. v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426, 447, 826 A.2d 831,
843 (2003) (neither oral confirmation nor written waiver is a
prerequisite for finding that a defendant has expressly waived his
or her Miranda rights).
Trial Court Opinion, 8/28/19, at 6-7 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Based on our independent review, we conclude that the totality of the
circumstances establishes that Williams knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Lt. Lucas testified that, when police
encountered Williams in the Dunkin Donuts parking lot and explained to him
why he was being detained, Williams began to make statements and offer
explanations. N.T., 7/30/19 at 20. Lt. Lucas interrupted Williams and said he
would like to get out of the rain and would speak with Williams back at
headquarters. Id. However, Williams continued to offer unsolicited
-9-
J-S02018-21
explanations as to why he had the computer. Id. Lt. Lucas told Williams that
if he continued to talk, Lt. Lucas would need to provide him with Miranda
warnings since he was in custody. Id. When Williams continued to talk, Lt.
Lucas verbally gave him Miranda warnings while standing in the Dunkin
Donuts parking lot. Id. at 21. Lt. Lucas provided the following description of
the Miranda warnings he provided to Williams:
I basically gave him the Miranda warnings that I would
usually give verbally, try to recite it exactly as I know it from our
form. But it’s basically, I wish to inform you that you have an
absolute right to remain silent. That anything you say can and
will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to
talk to an attorney before or have an attorney present with you
during questioning. If you cannot afford to hire an attorney, one
will be appointed to represent you without charge before
questioning, if you so desire. If you do decide to answer any
questions, you may stop at any time you wish. And then we add,
do you understand these rights I explained to you? Which he
acknowledged that he did. And I said, with these rights in mind,
do you wish to talk to us? And he said he did.
Id. Lt. Lucas did not read the Miranda warnings from a card; however, he
stated them from memory, having recited them hundreds, if not thousands of
times. Id. at 22. Lt. Lucas testified that the verbal Miranda warnings he
gave to Williams are exactly what he would have read from a form. Id. at 23,
24. Williams indicated to Lt. Lucas that he understood his Miranda rights,
but still wished to speak with police. Id. at 24.
Detective Mazzitelli testified that he was present and heard Lt. Lucas
verbally provide Miranda warnings to Williams in the Dunkin Donuts parking
lot. Id. at 54. The detective further testified that the Miranda warnings
- 10 -
J-S02018-21
provided to Williams were as Lt. Lucas had described in his testimony. Id.
Detective Mazzitelli stated that, while at the police station he asked Williams
if police could record and videotape the interview, and Williams consented.
N.T., 8/2/19, at 8. When the detective activated the recording, he again asked
Williams for his consent to permit police to record the interview, and Williams
provided his consent on the recording. Id. at 9. As Detective Mazzitelli was
present when Lt. Lucas provided Williams Miranda warnings, the detective
noted on the recording that Williams had been given those warnings, and
asked Williams if he understood that the warnings still applied now that they
were at the police station. Id. Williams indicated on the recording that he
understood. Id. The detective reminded Williams that he had the right to
remain silent, and Williams responded that he was “fully aware of his rights.”
Id. at 9-10.
When the detective asked Williams to confirm that he was still willing to
speak with police, Williams responded, “absolutely.” Id. at 10. During the
interview, Williams consented to showing the detectives certain information
on his cell phone. Id. at 12-13. At no point during the interview did Williams
indicate that he wanted to stop talking to police. Id. at 14. At some point
the audio was turned off at Williams’ request; and, when the audio was turned
back on, Detective Mazzitelli again reminded Williams that he did not have to
speak to police, that he had the right to remain silent and to speak with an
attorney, and that all the rights previously explained to him still applied. Id.
- 11 -
J-S02018-21
at 14-15. Williams again indicated that he understood, and still consented to
speak to the police. Id. at 15.
Given the testimony of both Lt. Lucas and Detective Mazzitelli regarding
the Miranda warnings they provided to Williams, and Williams’ repeated
indications to Lt. Lucas and Detective Mazzitelli that he was aware of his rights
and understood them, we conclude that the suppression record amply
supports the trial court’s determination that Williams knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. While the duration of the
interrogation was lengthy (eight hours), we find no other factors which could
drain a person’s ability to withstand suggestion and coercion, nor does
Williams allege any. See Nester, 709 A.2d at 882. The interview was not
conducted in an unusual manner, and there is no suggestion of impairment or
physical coercion. Moreover, based on the totality of the circumstances,
Williams’ claim on appeal that he did not hear the Miranda warnings provided
by Lt. Lucas is contradicted by the fact that Williams told both Lt. Lucas and
Detective Mazzitelli that he understood his rights but nevertheless wished to
speak with police. Accordingly, Williams’ first issue merits no relief.
In his second and third issues, Williams challenges evidentiary rulings
made by the trial court. Before we address these claims, we must first
determine whether Williams preserved them for our review. In order to
preserve an evidentiary challenge for appellate review, a defendant must
make a timely and specific objection to the evidentiary ruling. See
- 12 -
J-S02018-21
Commonwealth v. Thoeun Tha, 64 A.3d 704, 713 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(holding that an appellant’s failure to raise a contemporaneous objection to
evidence at trial waives that claim on appeal); see also Commonwealth v.
Baumhammers, 960 A.2d 59, 73 (Pa. 2008) (holding that in order to
preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make timely and specific
objection to ensure that the trial court has an opportunity to correct the
alleged error); Pa.R.E. 103(a) (providing that an “[e]rror may not be
predicated upon a ruling that admits or excludes evidence unless . . . a timely
objection . . . appears of record”); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that “[i]ssues
not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal”).
In his second issue, Williams contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying him the right to use certain evidence in support of his
defense. Specifically, Williams challenges numerous rulings where the court
sustained objections lodged by the prosecutor during Williams’ cross-
examination of the burglary victims and police officers. The first objection
arose when Williams was questioning Mr. Rothdeutsch regarding the insurance
claim for fifteen hundred dollars in repairs to a storm door that was damaged
during the burglary. Williams questioned Mr. Rothdeutschs about each aspect
of the claim for repairs to the door (i.e., replacement of a glass pane,
replacement of the door slab, stain and finish, etc.). See N.T., 2/4/20, at
122-125. The prosecutor objected on the basis of relevance. Id. at 125-26.
- 13 -
J-S02018-21
Williams claimed that he was a handyman, and that the damaged glass pane
of the door could have been replaced for sixty dollars. Id. at 126. The trial
court sustained the Commonwealth’s relevancy objection. However, Williams
made no objection to the trial court’s ruling. Id. at 126-27.
The second objection arose when Williams was questioning Mrs.
Rothdeutsch regarding the timeframe in which the list of stolen items was
compiled and sent to the insurance company (i.e., one day or two days after
the burglary). Id. at 163. The prosecutor objected on the basis of relevancy.
Id. The trial court sustained the relevancy objection. However, once again,
Williams made no objection to the trial court’s ruling. Id. at 163-64.
Further objections occurred when Williams was extensively cross-
examining Officer Michael Slivka regarding guns which were located in the
Rothdeutsch residence, but were not taken during the burglary. The
prosecutor twice objected based on relevancy. N.T., 8/5/20. At 37. The trial
court sustained both objections, noting that the guns never left the home and
Williams was not accused of having received them. Id. at 38-39. Williams
made no objection to those rulings. Id. at 37-39.
The next objections occurred when Williams attempted to cross-
examine Detective Mazzitelli regarding his initial search of Williams’ vehicle
and his preliminary suspicion that the crowbar and gloves found in the vehicle
might be related to the burglary. The prosecutor objected on the basis of
relevancy since Williams was not accused of, nor on trial for, the burglary. Id.
- 14 -
J-S02018-21
at 122-23. The trial court sustained the objection. However, Williams did not
object to that ruling. Id. at 123. The prosecutor also objected when Williams
later attempted to cross-examine Detective Mazzitelli regarding his analysis
of the crowbar. Id. at 215. The trial court sustained that objection on the
basis of relevancy. Williams made no objection to that ruling. Id.3
Here, Williams did not raise any objection to the trial court’s evidentiary
rulings he now challenges on appeal. Consequently, he failed to preserve
them for our review. Thus, his second issue merits no relief.
In his third issue, Williams contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in excluding from evidence twelve photographs that he sought to
admit into evidence. Specifically, Williams wanted to introduce photocopies
of articles relating to police conduct in connection with the 1985 MOVE
bombing in Philadelphia, Rodney King’s 1991 beating by police in Los Angeles,
____________________________________________
3 Williams also points to an exchange he had with the trial court in which he
queried how he would ever be able to establish that no burglary had occurred
when the court “restrained” his questioning of Commonwealth witnesses. See
N.T., 8/5/20, at 125-30. In response, the trial court essentially suggested
that, rather than trying to show that a burglary did not occur by casting doubt
on the credibility of Commonwealth witnesses, perhaps Williams should
consider presenting his own evidence or witnesses to establish that a burglary
did not occur, but noting that Williams had no obligation to do so. Id. at 125-
26, 128-29. However, no evidentiary ruling occurred in this exchange. Nor
did Williams raise any objection to the court’s comments so as to preserve
any alleged claim of error. Similarly, Williams points to several instances when
the trial court “interrupted” his cross-examination of Commonwealth
witnesses, and claims that the court did so to disrupt his efforts to put on a
proper defense. Williams’ Brief at 20. Again, Williams did not raise any
objection to those “interruptions” so as to preserve any claim of error.
- 15 -
J-S02018-21
the conviction and sentencing of the individual who murdered the Central Park
jogger, and several photos of Williams. See N.T., 8/6/20, at 68-71. Williams
claims that the photos show him helping ex-offenders, which was relevant to
explain how he met “G.” Williams also argues that the photocopies were
relevant to show his state of mind at the time of his police interview, and why
he provided police with a false confession. Williams further claims that the
photos of him helping ex-offenders was relevant to his belief that he was
helping “G” on the date of the burglary. Williams also challenges the trial
court’s ruling that certain checks paid by customers for his handyman services
in 2018 and 2019 were inadmissible.
The trial court gave Williams ample opportunity to explain why the
photographs were relevant to the case, but ultimately ruled that the
photocopies were inadmissible. Id. at 71-73. Williams did not object to this
ruling. Id. Similarly, when the trial court sustained the prosecutor’s objection
to the admission of checks paid in 2018 and 2019 by Williams’ handyman
customers, Williams failed to raise any objection. Id. at 84-85. As Williams
failed to object to these evidentiary rulings, he failed to preserve them for our
review. See Thoeun Tha, 64 A.3d at 713; see also Baumhammers, 960
A.2d at 73.4 Thus, his third issue warrants no relief.
____________________________________________
4 We found only one instance where Williams made an objection. After the
trial court ruled that the photocopies were inadmissible, he asked if the
photocopies could nevertheless be made part of the record. N.T., 8/6/20, at
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
- 16 -
J-S02018-21
In fourth issue, Williams contends that he was denied a fair trial due to
comments made by the trial court regarding the prosecutor’s character during
jury instructions. Initially, we must determine whether Williams preserved
this issue for our review.
In this Commonwealth, the failure to raise a timely and specific objection
to the trial court’s jury instructions will result in waiver of the claim on appeal.
See Commonwealth v. Neff, 860 A.2d 1063, 1071 (Pa. Super. 2004); see
also Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(C) (providing that “[n]o portions of the charge . . . may
be assigned as error, unless specific objections are made thereto before the
jury retires to deliberate).
Similarly, a party seeking recusal or disqualification on the basis of
judicial bias or impartiality “must raise the objection at the earliest possible
moment, or that party will suffer the consequence of being time barred.”
Commonwealth v. Stafford, 749 A.2d 489, 501 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). The failure to timely move for a
judge’s recusal after the facts allegedly establishing bias come to a
defendant’s attention renders the judicial bias claim waived. See
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 790 (Pa. Super. 1998)
____________________________________________
67. The trial court granted his request. Id. Williams then objected to that
ruling. Id. at 68. Notably, Williams has not raised any claim of error regarding
that ruling.
- 17 -
J-S02018-21
Instantly, the record reflects that Williams did not raise any objection to
the trial court’s instructions in the court below. Nor did Williams move for
recusal of the trial court judge based on judicial bias or impartiality. Thus,
because Williams failed to raise his claim of judicial bias at the earliest possible
opportunity, it is waived. Id.; see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).5 Therefore, his
fourth issue warrants no relief.
In his fifth issue, Williams claims that he was denied a fair trial because
of comments made by the trial court both in and out of the presence of the
jury which reflected bias toward the prosecution. In making this claim,
Williams points to many of the unchallenged evidentiary rulings previously
addressed and determined to be waived. Williams additionally points to a
lengthy exchange he had with the trial court regarding the proper process and
procedures to be used when showing witnesses photographs and admitting
them into the formal evidentiary record. See N.T., 2/4/20, at 188-204. At
one point, the judge became so frustrated at having to explain something
____________________________________________
5 Williams concedes that he did not object to any of the trial court’s comments,
but nevertheless claims that the issue is not waived pursuant to
Commonwealth v. Hammer, 494 A.2d 1054 (Pa. 1985) (holding that the
failure of trial counsel to object to questioning of a testifying defendant by the
judge will not, under all circumstances, render the allegation of judicial
impropriety unavailable for appellate review). Here, unlike in Hammer, the
trial court did not participate in the examination of a testifying defendant (i.e.,
Williams). Nor does Williams allege that the trial court expressed an opinion
regarding his credibility or the plausibility of the events he related. Id. at
1061. Thus, Hammer is factually and legally distinguishable.
- 18 -
J-S02018-21
three times to Williams that she began yelling, noting that Williams was driving
her “insane.” Id. at 203. See N.T., 8/4/20, at 203-04.
Williams also points to the trial court’s ruling to sustain an objection
made by the prosecutor when Williams asked Mr. Rothdeutsch if he was a
police officer or had any connection with the police. N.T., 8/4/20, at 117.
Williams further points to an admonition by the trial court that Williams refrain
from testifying while cross-examining witnesses. N.T., 8/5/20, at 138.
Williams additionally points to an exchange that took place outside the
presence of the jury when he attempted to make an offer of proof as to why
he wanted to call Officer Lyndsay Yetter as a witness. Id. at 187-192.
Williams indicated that he intended to elicit testimony from Officer Yetter that
the Rothdeutchs’ home did not look like a normal burglary scene because the
burglar left items of value behind. Id. at 191. The court indicated that, while
Williams could direct questions to Officer Yetter, the prosecution could object
to those questions at the appropriate time. Id. at 191-92. The trial court
additionally stated that she wondered why Williams did not take the
prosecutor’s offer for a plea, and noted that he was “a guy who’s dragging the
Commonwealth, the jurors, the judge, and everybody else through some kind
of alternate universe.” Id. at 192.
Williams next points to a comment made by the court to the prosecutor
when making a ruling in Williams’ favor, recalling that
[t]here’s a certain person, and I shall not say who, who said, you
know, Judge, part of what Mr. Williams does is he pushes it,
- 19 -
J-S02018-21
pushes it, pushes it until a person gets so frustrated that they
throw their hands up in the air and give him exactly what he wants
because he’s just pushing and pushing and pushing. And do you
know what? It worked. Congratulations. It won't happen again.
Let's go.
Id. at 207-08.
Williams next points to the trial court’s interjection, during Williams’
cross-examination of a Commonwealth witness, to inquire of the witness as
to whether there was any indication on the document being discussed as to
who input the information. Id. at 230.
Williams points to another interruption by the trial court of his cross-
examination of a police officer, when the trial court asked the witness three
questions in an apparent effort to move the questioning along. Id. at 299-
300.
Williams claims that the trial court “testified” on the third day of trial,
citing pages thirty-nine to sixty-four of the notes of testimony. Our review
reveals, in those pages of the transcript, Williams was cross-examining
Detective Mazzitelli. At times, the trial court interjected to clarify certain
points, correct documentation, or to ask the detective questions in order to
facilitate proper questioning. See N.T., 8/6/20, at 39-64.
Williams claims that the trial court also disrupted his testimony and
bullied him on several occasions. Williams Brief at 23 (citing N.T., 8/6/20, at
65, 66, 81, 82, 84, 85). Our review of these portions of the transcript reflects
that Williams wanted to introduce certain photocopies, including the
- 20 -
J-S02018-21
aforementioned articles relating to police conduct in connection with the 1985
MOVE bombing in Philadelphia, Rodney King’s 1991 beating by police in Los
Angeles, the conviction and sentencing of the individual who murdered the
Central Park jogger, and several photos of Williams. See N.T., 8/6/20, at 68-
71. The trial court gave Williams ample opportunity to explain why the
photographs were relevant to the case, but ultimately ruled that the
photocopies were inadmissible. Id. at 71-73.
The other portions of the transcript to which Williams refers concerns
the trial court’s comments while he was testifying. Id. at 81-85. At one point,
the prosecutor objected to Williams testimony regarding an event which
occurred when he was ten years old, and the trial court admonished Williams
to “rein it in.” Id. at 81. The prosecutor also objected when Williams began
to tell the jury about a book he had written called “A Guide to the Supreme
Life” which he had written in connection with a company he founded, called
Supreme Life Consultants. Id. at 83. The trial court directed Williams to
“advance the story a little bit.” Id. The trial court also sustained the
prosecutor’s objection when Williams sought to admit copies of checks paid
by customers for whom he provided handyman services in 2018 and 2019.
Id. at 84-85.
In each of these instances wherein Williams claims that the trial court
interrupted him, disrupted his case, or bullied him, he failed to raise any
objection or request recusal. Thus, Williams has waived any claim of error
- 21 -
J-S02018-21
regarding these comments and rulings. See Stafford, 749 A.2d at 501; see
also Johnson, 719 A.2d at 790. Thus, his fifth issue entitles him to no relief.
In his sixth issue, Williams claims that he was denied a fair trial due to
the presence of uniformed sheriff’s deputies beside him in the courtroom. He
asserts that two or three deputies sat or stood less than a foot away from him
at all times throughout the trial. Williams notes that he placed an objection
on the record, asserting that the close proximity of uniformed deputies would
cause the jury to perceive him as dangerous.
“[I]t is well-settled under common law and constitutionally as incident
to a fair trial without prejudice that defendants appear free from shackles or
other physical restraints.” Commonwealth v. Jasper, 610 A.2d 949, 955
(Pa. 1992). Nevertheless, there are exceptional circumstances when the
employment of such techniques is an acceptable practice where such
“restraint [is] reasonably necessary to maintain order.” Id. Exceptional
circumstances have been found where the court has reason to believe that an
unrestrained defendant might attack others. Id.Here, Williams does not allege that he was handcuffed or shackled in
the jury’s presence. Instead, he complains only that uniformed sheriff’s
deputies were near him at all times throughout the trial. Our research has
revealed no case law that would prohibit a defendant from merely being
flanked by uniformed deputies throughout trial. Moreover, the trial court
explained that “the Sheriff’s Department was on alert during the trial
- 22 -
J-S02018-21
regarding the safety of the courtroom due to [Williams’] own actions that
flagged him as a safety risk. While [Williams] was awaiting trial in in the
Lehigh County Jail[,] he was charged with Felony Aggravated Assault for
allegedly attacking a correctional officer.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/22/20, at 11.
Thus, exceptional circumstances clearly warranted the presence of sheriff’s
deputies near Williams throughout the trial. Accordingly, Williams’ sixth issue
merits no relief.
In his seventh issue, Williams claims that dismissal is warranted because
his sentencing was delayed in violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 704. Rule 704 provides
that, “[e]xcept as provided by Rule 702(B), sentence in a court case shall
ordinarily be imposed within 90 days of conviction . . ..” Pa.R.Crim.P.
704(A)(1). When reviewing a trial court’s order disposing of a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 704:
[W]e defer to the trial court’s judgment on this issue of
alleged undue delay and shall reverse only for an abuse of
discretion. We have long held that mere errors in judgment do
not amount to abuse of discretion; instead, we look for manifest
unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such
lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous. In addition, a trial
court abuses its discretion if the law is overridden or misapplied.
****
[O]ur scope of review is limited to the evidence on the
record of the Rule 704 evidentiary hearing and the factual findings
of the trial court. Also, we must view the facts found in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party.
Commonwealth v. Neysmith, 192 A.3d 184, 192-93 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
- 23 -
J-S02018-21
The appropriate remedy for a Rule 704 violation without good cause is
discharge; however, the fact that a defendant is sentenced more than ninety
days after conviction is only the first step in determining whether discharge is
appropriate. Commonwealth v. Diaz, 51 A.3d 884, 887 (Pa. Super 2012)
(construing Pa.R.Crim.P. 1405, which was replaced by Rule 704). A defendant
who is sentenced in violation of Rule 704 is entitled to discharge only where
the defendant can demonstrate that the delay in sentencing caused prejudice.
Id. Prejudice should not be presumed by the mere fact of an untimely
sentence. Id. Instead, the trial court should consider: (1) the length of the
delay falling outside of the 90-day period; (2) the reason for the improper
delay; (3) the defendant’s timely or untimely assertion of his rights; (4) any
resulting prejudice to the interest protected by his speedy trial and due
process rights. Id. The court should examine the totality of the
circumstances, as no one factor is necessary, dispositive, or of sufficient
importance to prove a violation. Id.Williams points out that he was convicted on February 6, 2020, and
sentencing was initially scheduled for March 27, 2020. However, his
sentencing date was continued on two occasions, and he was not sentenced
until June 2, 2020, at which time he was sentenced via video. Williams does
not contest the period from March 17, 2020, to April 3, 2020, due to a judicial
emergency brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, he claims that,
excluding this time frame, he was not sentenced until ninety-nine days after
- 24 -
J-S02018-21
his conviction. Williams claims that he requested to be sentenced via video
on April 16, 2020, but that request was denied. He argues that there is no
reason why he could not have been sentenced via video on his original
sentencing date of March 27, 2020.
Williams additionally claims that, due to the delay in his sentencing, he
was unable to file an appeal or request bail pending appeal. He additionally
claims that he had to remain in the “hole,” and was unable to join the general
prison population. Williams’ Brief at 34. Williams further claims that, because
he was unable to request bail, he was unable to help family members during
the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused Williams high anxiety requiring
psychotropic medication.
Williams also claims that unidentified individuals have come forward and
would testify that they were present when “G” came home with the stolen
property and heard Williams agree to take the items to the pawn shop to help
“G.” Williams’ Brief at 34. Williams claims that the delay in sentencing has
prejudiced him because those individuals could be dead or incarcerated by the
time he gets a new trial.6 He further posits that the Rothdeutschs’ insurance
company “which has the evidence of exactly what was allegedly stolen could
loose [sic] or go out of business by the time [Williams] come[s] back, in the
____________________________________________
6 Williams also claims these facts support an after-discovered evidence claim.
Williams’ Brief at 33. Because Williams did not raise this claim below, it is
waived. See generally, Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), supra.
- 25 -
J-S02018-21
event of a new trial.” Id. at 35. He claims that such an event would impair
his defensive theory that no burglary occurred, and the Rothdeutschs
committed insurance fraud.
The trial court considered Williams Rule 704 challenge and determined
that it lacked merit. The court reasoned as follows:
On March 16, 2020, a week before [Williams’] scheduled
sentencing date, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared a
statewide judicial emergency due to COVID-19. This statewide
emergency was extended and maintained on March 18, March 24,
April 1, April 28, and May 27, 2020 to a final extension date of
June 1, 2020. Our Supreme Court established guidelines including
priorities for the performance of critical court functions and
ensuring the parties rights are protected which included: election
matters, emergency bail review, Gagnon I hearings, juvenile
delinquency detention, bench warrant hearings, temporary
protection from abuse orders, emergency petitions for child
custody, emergency petitions for guardianship, civil mental health
reviews, emergency equity civil matters, and any pleading or
motion relating to the public health concerns involving immediate
and irreparable harm. [Williams’] sentencing was not listed as a
priority and was not considered by this court to be one. The court
was aware that [Williams’] faced significant guidelines of
incarceration and that he would not be prejudiced as he was
awaiting another trial in a separate assault case before this court.
[Williams] was sentenced on June 2, 2020,·to a period of
incarceration of 3-7 years conducted via Zoom in accordance with
the court’s schedule in light of the pandemic. The court finds the
pandemic of COVID-19 and subsequent state-wide judicial
emergency to be good cause for the minor setback in his
sentencing date.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/22/20, at 11-12 (footnote and unnecessary
capitalization omitted).
We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in concluding that
Williams’ sentencing was delayed for good cause. Williams’ original
- 26 -
J-S02018-21
sentencing date was scheduled at a time when our nation was just beginning
to grapple with a global pandemic caused by COVID-19. Emergency measures
dictated that all sentencing be deferred until adequate and appropriate safety
measures could be implemented for inmates as well as for court staff and
personnel. Moreover, the length of the delay falling outside of the 90-day
period was minimal. Williams was sentenced ninety-nine days after his
conviction, which is only nine days beyond the ninety-day period provided by
the rule. Thus, Williams’ final issue warrants no relief.
Having found no merit to any of Williams’ issues, we affirm his judgment
of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/27/21
- 27 -