Com. v. McDaniels, A. ( 2021 )


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  • J-A13014-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    ANDRE MCDANIELS                              :
    :
    Appellant               :    No. 2026 EDA 2020
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 19, 2020
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-15-CR-0000266-2018
    BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                               Filed: June 3, 2021
    Appellant, Andre McDaniels, appeals from the judgment of sentence of
    8 to 20 years’ incarceration, imposed after he entered a negotiated guilty plea
    to statutory sexual assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3122.1(b), and corruption of minors
    (COM), 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(ii). On appeal, Appellant seeks to challenge
    the legality of his sentence.         Additionally, Appellant’s counsel, Stuart R.
    Crichton, Esq., seeks to withdraw his representation of Appellant pursuant to
    Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), and Commonwealth v.
    Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
     (Pa. 2009).                 After careful review, we affirm
    Appellant’s judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.
    The facts of Appellant’s underlying convictions are not pertinent to the
    issue he seeks to raise on appeal. We need only note that Appellant was
    ____________________________________________
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A13014-21
    charged with ten counts each of rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse,
    aggravated indecent assault, and statutory sexual assault, as well as single
    counts of endangering the welfare of a child and COM. In exchange for his
    pleading guilty to one count each of statutory sexual assault and COM, the
    Commonwealth withdrew the remaining charges.          The parties agreed that
    Appellant would be sentenced to 8 to 20 years’ incarceration for statutory
    sexual assault, and no further penalty for COM.        Appellant entered this
    negotiated guilty plea on October 21, 2019.      His sentencing was deferred
    pending an evaluation by the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (SOAB) of
    whether Appellant qualifies as a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP). On August
    19, 2020, following an SVP hearing, Appellant was deemed to be an SVP. He
    was sentenced that same day to the agreed-upon term of incarceration.
    On August 26, 2020, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion,
    which was denied. He then filed a timely notice of appeal. When the court
    ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors
    complained of on appeal, Appellant’s counsel responded by filing a Rule
    1925(c)(4) statement of his intent to file an Anders brief and petition to
    withdraw. Accordingly, the court did not issue a Rule 1925(a) opinion in this
    case.
    On March 9, 2021, Attorney Crichton filed with this Court a petition to
    withdraw from representing Appellant. That same day, counsel also filed an
    Anders brief, discussing the following issue that Appellant seeks to raise on
    appeal: “Whether the sentence imposed by the [c]ourt, pursuant to the
    -2-
    J-A13014-21
    negotiated plea agreement, was illegal?”       Anders Brief at 63.       Attorney
    Crichton concludes that this issue is frivolous, and that Appellant has no other,
    non-frivolous claims he could pursue herein. Accordingly,
    this Court must first pass upon counsel’s petition to withdraw
    before reviewing the merits of the underlying issues presented by
    [the appellant]. Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 
    928 A.2d 287
    ,
    290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc).
    Prior to withdrawing as counsel on a direct appeal under Anders,
    counsel must file a brief that meets the requirements established
    by our Supreme Court in Santiago. The brief must:
    (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts,
    with citations to the record;
    (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes
    arguably supports the appeal;
    (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is
    frivolous; and
    (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
    frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
    record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that
    have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
    Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Counsel also must provide a copy of
    the Anders brief to his client. Attending the brief must be a letter
    that advises the client of his right to: “(1) retain new counsel to
    pursue the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any
    points that the appellant deems worthy of the court[’]s attention
    in addition to the points raised by counsel in the Anders brief.”
    Commonwealth v. Nischan, 
    928 A.2d 349
    , 353 (Pa. Super.
    2007), appeal denied, 
    594 Pa. 704
    , 
    936 A.2d 40
     (2007).
    Commonwealth v. Orellana, 
    86 A.3d 877
    , 879-80 (Pa. Super. 2014). After
    determining that counsel has satisfied these technical requirements of Anders
    and Santiago, this Court must then “conduct a simple review of the record to
    ascertain if there appear[s] on its face to be arguably meritorious issues that
    -3-
    J-A13014-21
    counsel, intentionally or not, missed or misstated.”       Commonwealth v.
    Dempster, 
    187 A.3d 266
    , 272 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc).
    In this case, Attorney Crichton’s Anders brief substantially complies
    with the above-stated requirements. Namely, he includes a summary of the
    relevant factual and procedural history, he refers to portions of the record that
    could arguably support Appellant’s claim, and he sets forth his conclusion that
    Appellant’s appeal is frivolous. He also explains his reasons for reaching that
    determination, and supports his rationale with citations to the record and
    pertinent legal authority. Additionally, Attorney Crichton states in his petition
    to withdraw that he has supplied Appellant with a copy of his Anders brief,
    and he attaches a letter directed to Appellant in which he informs Appellant of
    the rights enumerated in Nischan. Accordingly, counsel has complied with
    the technical requirements for withdrawal. We will now independently review
    the record to determine if Appellant’s issue is frivolous, and to ascertain if
    there are any other, non-frivolous claims he could pursue on appeal.
    According to Attorney Crichton, Appellant seeks to argue “that the
    sentence imposed was illegal” because “he was entitled to a sentence within
    the standard [range] sentencing guideline[s].” Anders Brief at 6. As counsel
    notes, Appellant’s statutory sexual assault offense is graded as a felony of the
    first degree. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3122.1(b) (“A person commits a felony of the
    first degree when that person engages in sexual intercourse with a
    complainant under the age of 16 years and that person is 11 or more years
    older than the complainant and the complainant and the person are not
    -4-
    J-A13014-21
    married to each other.”). Thus, the statutory maximum term of incarceration
    for that offenses is 20 years’ imprisonment.              See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(1).
    Because Appellant’s sentence of 8 to 20 years’ incarceration is within the
    statutory maximum, it is not illegal. See Commonwealth v. Infante, 
    63 A.3d 358
    , 363 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“[A] sentence that exceeds the statutory
    maximum is illegal.”) (citation omitted; emphasis added).
    We also note that Appellant cannot claim that his sentence is excessive,
    as it was consistent with the terms of his negotiated plea agreement. Our
    Court has declared that, “when the plea agreement contains a negotiated
    sentence which is accepted and imposed by the sentencing court, there is no
    authority to permit a challenge to the discretionary aspects of that sentence.”
    Commonwealth v. Morrison, 
    173 A.3d 286
    , 290 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation
    omitted).
    Accordingly,     we   agree     with    Attorney   Crichton   that   Appellant’s
    sentencing claim is frivolous. Additionally, our review of the record reveals no
    other, non-frivolous claims that Appellant could raise herein.1 Thus, we affirm
    his judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.
    ____________________________________________
    1 We observe that in the post-sentence motion filed by Attorney Crichton, he
    asserted that Appellant wished to argue “that the [c]ourt erred in designating
    him as a[n SVP],” and “that he was pressured by counsel to sign the Guilty
    Plea Colloquy.” Post-Sentence Motion, 8/26/20, at 2 (unnumbered). We
    reprimand counsel for failing to discuss these claims in his Anders brief.
    Nevertheless, we conclude that they are frivolous. First, Appellant waived his
    challenge to his SVP designation by failing to offer any elaboration on why or
    how the court erred in deeming him an SVP. Second, Appellant’s claim that
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -5-
    J-A13014-21
    Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/3/21
    ____________________________________________
    counsel pressured him into pleading guilty challenges the effectiveness of
    counsel’s representation. In Commonwealth v.
    Holmes, 79
     A.3d 562, 576
    (Pa. 2013), our Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior holding in
    Commonwealth v. Grant, 
    813 A.2d 726
     (Pa. 2002), that, absent certain
    circumstances not present in this case, claims of ineffective assistance of
    counsel should be deferred until collateral review under the Post Conviction
    Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. Consequently, it would be
    frivolous for Appellant to raise his ineffectiveness claim, or his waived SVP
    challenge, in this direct appeal.
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2026 EDA 2020

Judges: Bender

Filed Date: 6/3/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/21/2024