Com. v. Young, W. ( 2021 )


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  • J-S05041-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    WILBERT YOUNG                                :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1222 EDA 2020
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 10, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0008182-2018
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                          FILED: JUNE 4, 2021
    Wilbert Young appeals from the judgment of sentence following his
    convictions for Attempted Rape, Indecent Assault, and Indecent Exposure.1
    He challenges the weight of the evidence. We affirm.
    The trial court stated the facts giving rise to Young’s convictions as
    follows:
    In October 2018, the victim, . . . and her husband were
    living in the same apartment building as [Young]. One day,
    the victim went to [Young’s] apartment to borrow a food
    item. [Young] greeted the victim at the door of his
    apartment, exposed his penis, and stated, “Oh, we’re going
    to have sex tonight.” He then pulled the victim into the
    bedroom of his apartment. With his penis still exposed,
    [Young] pushed the victim onto the bed and “started to kiss”
    her “all over” her face. He pinned the victim down onto the
    bed by placing his knees on the victim’s lower body and
    ____________________________________________
    1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 3121(a), 3126, and 3127, respectively.
    J-S05041-21
    rubbed his hands all over from her shoulders down to her
    waist. The victim resisted by punching [Young] in the face
    multiple times. After the victim punched him five to ten
    times, [Young] moved off of her. The victim immediately left
    the apartment, and [Young] said, “Bitch, you crazy, get the
    fuck out of my apartment.”
    Three weeks later, because she was “so mad” and “so
    angry,” the victim told her husband about what [Young] did
    to her. On October 25, 2018, the victim and her husband
    went to a police station and reported the incident.
    [The victim’s husband] testified that the victim told him
    about this incident. Upon learning what had occurred, [the
    victim’s husband] went to [Young’s] apartment. After Mr.
    Jones explained what his wife told him, [Young] did not deny
    the incident occurred but instead responded, “I was just
    playing with her.”
    Philadelphia Police Officer Denise Turner testified that, on
    October 25, 2018, when the victim and [her husband]
    arrived at the Sixth District’s police station, [] she prepared
    an incident report. This police report, which was entered into
    evidence as C-5, corroborated the testimony of the victim.
    Trial Court Op. (“TCO”), filed 11/10/20, at 1-2 (citations omitted).
    The jury found Young guilty of the above offenses and the trial court
    sentenced him to an aggregate term of seven to 14 years’ incarceration.
    Young filed a post-sentence motion that challenged the weight of the
    evidence. The motion was denied by operation of law and this timely appeal
    followed.
    Young raises one issue:
    Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying [Young] a
    new trial where the verdict was against the weight of the
    evidence as the complainant’s testimony was so tenuous,
    vague and uncertain, that the guilty verdict was manifestly
    unreasonable and shocks the conscience?
    -2-
    J-S05041-21
    Young’s Br. at 3 (answer of trial court omitted).
    A weight claim is for the trial court in the first instance. See
    Commonwealth v. Stiles, 
    143 A.3d 968
    , 980 (Pa.Super. 2016). The trial
    court may sustain a weight challenge and grant a new trial only “when the
    jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice
    and the award of a new trial is imperative so that right may be given another
    opportunity to prevail.” Commonwealth v. Clay, 
    64 A.3d 1049
    , 1055 (Pa.
    2013). “The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact who is
    free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the
    credibility of the witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Champney, 
    832 A.2d 403
    ,
    408 (Pa. 2003) (quoting Commonwealth v. Small, 
    741 A.2d 666
    , 672 (Pa.
    1999)). We review the trial court’s rejection of a challenge to the weight of
    the evidence for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Windslowe, 
    158 A.3d 698
    , 712 (Pa.Super. 2017).
    Young claims that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence
    because of the victim’s “wildly differing accounts” of the crime. Young’s Br. at
    9. Young notes multiple inconsistencies between the victim’s testimony at
    trial, her police statement, and her testimony at the preliminary hearing. Such
    alleged inconsistencies include the time when the assault occurred, the
    sequence of events leading up to the assault, where Young touched the victim
    during the assault, and whether Young struck the victim. Id. at 4, 5, 6. He
    also argues that the victim did not promptly report the assault and that the
    -3-
    J-S05041-21
    victim’s husband testified that he did not believe her when she initially told
    him what happened.
    While the parties and the court agree that there were inconsistencies in
    the victim’s testimony, the trial court and the Commonwealth assert that they
    were not significant. The trial court found that the inconsistences “were
    insignificant in light of the totality of [the victim’s] testimony as well as its
    corroboration by other witnesses.” TCO at 6. The court also noted that the
    uncorroborated testimony of a victim is sufficient to support a sexual assault
    conviction. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Izurieta, 
    171 A.3d 803
    , 807
    (Pa.Super. 2017)). It also pointed out that the jury as fact finder was free “to
    believe the testimony of the victim as well as to disregard any inconsistencies
    between the victim’s statements to police and her testimony at trial.” 
    Id.
    We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
    Young’s weight claim. The jury sitting as fact finder was free to believe all,
    part, or none of the victim’s testimony, and reconcile any inconsistencies. The
    victim testified that she suffered from epilepsy, which sometimes caused her
    to forget. N.T., Trial, 7/19/19, at 16. Furthermore, as the trial court noted,
    there was corroboration by way of other witnesses, including the victim’s
    husband. Although the victim’s husband testified that he did not believe her
    when she first told him about the assault, he also testified that he believed
    her once he confronted Young. The evidence was not so tenuous, vague, and
    uncertain that the trial court’s rejection of Young’s weight challenge
    constituted an abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm.
    -4-
    J-S05041-21
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/4/21
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1222 EDA 2020

Judges: McLaughlin

Filed Date: 6/4/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/21/2024