Com. v. Royster, D. ( 2021 )

J-S07037-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
DEREK LEE ROYSTER :
:
Appellant : No. 642 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 5, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0000931-2018
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., DUBOW, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: JUNE 7, 2021
Appellant, Derek Lee Royster, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury trial
convictions for two counts each of aggravated assault and recklessly
endangering another person (“REAP”), and one count each of voluntary
manslaughter, attempted homicide, and carrying a firearm without a license.1
We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows:
On…November [27,] 2017, Miranda Engle was contacted
by…Appellant and asked if she knew of anyone who wanted
to purchase drugs, specifically cocaine. After the call, Engle
and Megan Bowlen along with Marquell Bailey, Joel Grooms,
and Devin Fitzgerald set up a plan to steal the cocaine
from…Appellant. Engle arranged a meeting to purchase an
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(4), 2705, 2503(a)(1), 901(a), and 6106(a)(1),
respectively.
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eight ball of cocaine from…Appellant at an empty apartment
located at 61 Pershing Court, Uniontown, Fayette County,
Pennsylvania. That night the two women were waiting in
the living room of the apartment when…Appellant arrived.
Marquell Bailey and Devin Fitzgerald were hiding in another
room of the apartment. The only light in the apartment
came from the second floor. …Appellant placed some
cocaine on a coffee table for the women to sample. Bowlen
then pretended she couldn’t find her money[;] the women
and [Appellant] went upstairs to locate her money. When
no money was found upstairs, the three returned to the
living room. While…Appellant stood by the door, Engle
sprayed mace in his direction. Bailey entered the room and
punched…Appellant once in the face. …Appellant then
pulled his gun and repeatedly fired it at Bowlen, Bailey, and
Engle. Engle and Fitzgerald fled the apartment. Bailey,
despite being shot twice in the chest, managed to exit the
rear door of the apartment before collapsing. …Appellant
fled the apartment through the front door.
Bowlen went across the street and called an ambulance for
Bailey. She also informed Engle that Bailey had been shot.
Both women returned to the apartment and Engle began
performing CPR until the ambulance arrived. After the
ambulance arrived, the two women left the scene. Bailey
died from the gunshot wounds. When contacted by the
police later that evening, the women went to the police
station and informed them that…Appellant had shot Bailey.
…Appellant was subsequently arrested in Wilkinsburg.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed August 17, 2020, at 2-3 unpaginated) (internal
citations omitted).
The Commonwealth charged Appellant on May 16, 2018, with four
counts of aggravated assault, three counts of REAP, and one count each of
criminal homicide, attempt to commit criminal homicide, and possession with
intent to deliver. The Commonwealth also filed an amended criminal
information on August 29, 2018, adding one charge of carrying a firearm
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without a license. On September 25, 2018, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial
motion, which included a petition for habeas corpus relief alleging that “[t]he
Commonwealth cannot sustain its burden to establish a prima facie case as to
the charge[s] lodged against [Appellant].” (Omnibus Pretrial Motion at 1
unpaginated). Specifically, in his brief in support of granting habeas corpus
relief, Appellant attacked the Commonwealth’s charges of criminal homicide,
aggravated assault, and possession with intent to deliver. Following several
hearings, the court ultimately denied Appellant’s motion on October 18, 2019.
Significantly, at the November 21, 2018 hearing, the following exchange
occurred:
[Defense Counsel]: [Appellant]’s position, Your Honor, is
that the Commonwealth proposes that there was a robbery
and that my client was attacked and was in the process of
being beaten and maced.
The Court: So you’re raising self-defense.
[Appellant]: No. Fuck, no. Stop playing with me. You
trying to sell me out, bro. No. No, we’re not raising no self
defense.
[Defense Counsel]: I’m not raising self defense.
(N.T. Hearing, 11/21/18, at 19).
A jury trial commenced on March 2, 2020. On March 4, 2020, the jury
found Appellant guilty of two counts each of aggravated assault and REAP,
and one count each of voluntary manslaughter, attempted homicide, and
carrying a firearm without a license. The court sentenced Appellant the
following day to an aggregate term of 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment, and
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granted Appellant three days of credit for time served, explaining:
[Appellant’s] credit time is from November 30, 2017, to
December 3, 2017, the reason being is that although
[Appellant] has been incarcerated since November 30,
2017, he was revoked and resentenced by me at No. [1932]
and 1946 both of 2016, six to twelve months and six to
twelve months consecutively. He has used up and maxed
out on each of those. I am not sure of the date, guessing it
was November 30, 2017—he maxed out on the revocation
on December 4, 2019, which obviously…consumed or used
up a lot of that time. The other thing that is affecting the
credit time, [J]udge Leskinen placed a detainer on him at
case No. 267 of 2014 and Judge Leskinen entered an Order
on May 21 of 2018, indicating that he would not resolve the
detainer until he was sentenced on the homicide charge.
The date of Judge Leskinen’s Order, May 21 of 2018, so he
still needs [defense counsel] to resolve that detainer and
you may want to bring that to his attention to get it
scheduled. All of that said between the two sentences and
the detainer, there is only three days credit and, yes, [the
probation officer] did, as she said to me triple check it, so
she has very intentionally gone over the credit time.
(N.T. Sentencing, 3/5/20, at 6).
Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion on Monday, March 16,
2020, which the court denied on May 22, 2020. On Monday, June 22, 2020,
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, and the court ordered Appellant to
file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant complied on July 13, 2020.
Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:
Whether the habeas corpus [petition] should have [been]
granted and the case dismissed when [Appellant] used
lawful and justifiable force in self-defense and cannot be
criminally liable for the unintentional death of an individual
and attempts to cause bodily injury to others under
Pennsylvania law?
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Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the guilty
verdicts of the jury?
Whether the trial court erred in permitting the police
officer’s testimony about a statement made by [Appellant]
to his attorney during a pretrial proceeding in regard to a
possible defense at trial?
Whether the trial court erred in the calculation and
determination of [Appellant’s] credit for time served when it
imposed sentence on March 5, 2020?
(Appellant’s Brief at 4).
In his first issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his
habeas corpus petition where the Commonwealth failed to present a prima
facie case of the charges against him. Specifically, Appellant attacks the
court’s determination that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence
to support its allegations of criminal homicide and aggravated assault. Rather,
Appellant maintains he cannot be found guilty of these offenses where he
acted in self-defense after Mr. Bailey and his co-conspirators attacked
Appellant in a vacant apartment and Appellant assumed they intended to kill
or injure him. Appellant submits there was ample evidence presented at the
pre-trial hearings to show that he acted instinctively out of fear following the
attack and justifiably employed self-defense, including, inter alia: (1) Ms.
Bowlen’s testimony that Appellant was maced and punched in the face while
Mr. Bailey and his co-conspirators attempted to rob Appellant, and Appellant
pulled out his gun and fired several shots in response; and (2) Detective Doug
Yohouse’s testimony that, upon picking Appellant up, Appellant spontaneously
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claimed “it was self-defense.” (Id. at 12). Appellant further maintains there
was no evidence showing he was the initial aggressor or that he acted
intentionally/knowingly. Appellant concludes “[t]he habeas corpus should
have been granted and the charges…dismissed.” (Id. at 16). We disagree.
Our standard of review of a trial court’s grant or denial of a pre-trial
habeas corpus motion is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.
Commonwealth v. Price, 189 A.3d 423, 427 (Pa.Super. 2018), appeal
denied, 650 Pa. 653, 201 A.3d 157 (2019) (citing Commonwealth v.
Dantzler, 135 A.3d 1109, 1112 (Pa.Super. 2016) (en banc)). As this Court
explained in Dantzler:
A pre-trial habeas corpus motion is the proper means for
testing whether the Commonwealth has sufficient evidence
to establish a prima facie case. To demonstrate that a prima
facie case exists, the Commonwealth must produce
evidence of every material element of the charged
offense(s) as well as the defendant’s complicity therein. To
meet its burden, the Commonwealth may utilize the
evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and also may
submit additional proof.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Furthermore,
In reviewing a trial court’s order granting [or denying] a
defendant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, we “must
generally consider whether the record supports the trial
court’s findings, and whether the inferences and legal
conclusions drawn from those findings are free from error.”
… Notably, the Commonwealth does not have to prove the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, the
evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth so that inferences that would support a
guilty verdict are given effect.
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Price, supra (citing Commonwealth v. Santos, 583 Pa. 96, 876 A.2d 360,
363 (2005)).
The Crimes Code defines the criminal homicide and aggravated assault,
in relevant part, as follows:
§ 2501. Criminal Homicide
(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of criminal
homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or
negligently causes the death of another human being.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501(a).
§ 2702. Aggravated assault
(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of
aggravated assault if he:
* * *
(4) attempts to cause or intentionally or
knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a
deadly weapon[.]
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(4).
Instantly, in denying Appellant’s request for habeas corpus relief, the
trial court reasoned:
As to the charges of Criminal Homicide, the Commonwealth
need only prove that [Appellant] intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly, or negligently caused the death of another
person. The use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the
body i[s] sufficient to establish a specific intent to kill.
[Appellant]’s use of a firearm to shoot Bailey in the chest is
supported by medical evidence [as having caused] Bailey’s
death. Therefore, the Commonwealth has established a
prima facie case as to [Criminal Homicide].
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As to the charges of Aggravated Assault, the Commonwealth
presented evidence that [Appellant] attempted to cause or
intentionally or knowingly did cause bodily injury with a
deadly weapon. The use of the weapon against [Bailey,]
and [Appellant] pointing the gun at the other persons in the
apartment and firing the weapon several times is sufficient
to establish that he attempted to harm them and establishes
a prima facie case against [Appellant] on these charges.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed October 18, 2019, at 3).2 We agree with the trial
court’s analysis.
Here, the Commonwealth did not need to prove Appellant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt at the pre-trial stage. See Price, supra. Rather, the
Commonwealth only had to present a prima facie case to justify taking the
charges to trial. See id. The Commonwealth presented, inter alia, the
following evidence at the preliminary hearing: (1) Ms. Bowlen’s testimony that
Appellant shot Mr. Bailey in the chest; (2) Ms. Bowlen’s testimony that
Appellant shot at her but missed as she jumped behind a couch; (3) Ms.
Bowlen’s testimony that Appellant fired “between two and seven” gun shots
into the apartment; and (4) Mr. Bailey’s death certificate indicating that his
cause of death was homicide. (N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 4/17/18, at 4-10).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth
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2 In its denial of Appellant’s request for habeas corpus relief, the court also
addressed the charges of possession with intent to deliver and firearms not to
be carried without a license. Appellant has not challenged the court’s findings
concerning these charges in his brief on appeal. Therefore, we need not
address them here. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119; Commonwealth v. Hakala, 900
A.2d 404 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 589 Pa. 737, 909 A.2d 1288(2006) (stating failure to develop argument on appeal results in waiver).
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presented a prima facie case to support the charges of criminal homicide and
aggravated assault.3 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2501(a); 2702(a)(4); Price,
supra. Therefore, the court properly denied Appellant’s request for habeas
corpus relief.
In his second issue, Appellant argues the Commonwealth presented
insufficient evidence at trial to support the guilty verdicts. Concerning his
conviction for voluntary manslaughter, Appellant asserts he acted in self-
defense after being blinded by mace and punched in the face. Appellant
emphasizes that he was not the initial aggressor. Rather, Appellant contends
he responded with force because he believed he was in imminent danger of
death or serious harm. Appellant further avers that he had no duty to retreat
and, even if he did, the circumstances prevented him from doing so where the
attack took place in a matter of seconds, the area in which the attack occurred
was cramped and dark, and the door through which he could exit was closed.
Additionally, Appellant avers the Commonwealth did not present any expert
testimony or any other evidence as to “the dynamics of being punched in the
face after being sprayed with mace.” (Appellant’s Brief at 18). Specifically,
Appellant contends the Commonwealth failed to present any evidence
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3 Although Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Fowlin, 551 Pa. 414, 710
A.2d 1130 (1998), Fowlin differs from the instant case in that three of the
men who attacked Fowlin were armed with handguns and one of the men drew
his gun during the confrontation. In the instant case, there was no evidence
that Mr. Bailey or any of his co-conspirators were armed with anything other
than mace.
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regarding the type and strength of the mace used, or what effects it could
have had on Appellant under the circumstances.
Similarly, concerning his convictions for aggravated assault, Appellant
submits the evidence was insufficient to show that he acted intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly. Rather, Appellant maintains the evidence supported
his claim of justifiable self-defense, where he was attacked by Ms. Engle and
Mr. Bailey.
Regarding his conviction for firearms not to be carried without a license,
Appellant avers that to prove this offense the firearm must be “concealed on
the person when the person did not possess a license.” (Id. at 20). Appellant
argues that while there is evidence that he possessed and used a firearm,
there was no testimony from the arresting officer, Ms. Bowlen, or Ms. Engle,
or any other evidence that the firearm was “concealed.” Rather, Appellant
emphasizes that the testimony showed Appellant simply pulled the gun out of
his waistband. Additionally, Appellant highlights that no gun was recovered
from the scene. Appellant concludes the evidence was insufficient to sustain
the guilty verdicts, and he is entitled to relief. We disagree.
Preliminarily, as a general rule, issues not raised in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement will be deemed waived for appellate review. Commonwealth v.
Castillo, 585 Pa. 395, 888 A.2d 775 (2005). A Rule 1925(b) statement that
is not specific enough for the trial court to identify and address the issues the
defendant wishes to raise on appeal may also result in waiver.
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Commonwealth v. Reeves, 907 A.2d 1 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied,
591 Pa. 712, 919 A.2d 956 (2007).
When a court has to guess what issues an appellant is
appealing, that is not enough for meaningful review. When
an appellant fails adequately to identify in a concise manner
the issues sought to be pursued on appeal, the trial court is
impeded in its preparation of a legal analysis which is
pertinent to those issues. In other words, a Concise
Statement which is too vague to allow the court to identify
the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no
Concise Statement at all.
Id. at 2.
Additionally, “when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on
appeal, [an appellant’s Rule 1925(b)] statement must specify the element or
elements upon which the evidence was insufficient in order to preserve the
issue for appeal.” Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 281 (Pa.Super.
2009), appeal denied, 607 Pa. 690, 3 A.3d 670 (2010). “Such specificity is of
particular importance in cases where [an appellant] was convicted of multiple
crimes each of which contains numerous elements that the Commonwealth
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.Instantly, Appellant failed to raise his sufficiency of the evidence claim
with any specificity in his Rule 1925(b) statement. Appellant’s statement
merely provides: “The evidence was legally insufficient to support the guilty
verdicts of the jury.” (Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement at 1). The Rule
1925(b) statement did not identify which convictions Appellant sought to
challenge or which elements of those convictions the Commonwealth failed to
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prove. Thus, Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is waived
for purposes of our review. See Gibbs, supra; Reeves, supra.In his third issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred in permitting
Officer Jamie Holland to read at trial a statement that Appellant made during
the November 21, 2018 pretrial hearing. Specifically, Appellant alleges the
court erred in allowing Officer Holland to read the following:
The Court: so, you’re raising self defense
[Appellant]: no, fuck no, stop playing with me, you’re
trying to sell me out bro, no. We’re not raising self defense.
[Appellant]: they have no physical evidence to say I’ve
done anything illegal other than the statement of two
junkies who have conflicting testimony.
(Appellant’s Brief at 21) (citing N.T. Trial, 3/3/20, at 103). Appellant avers
this statement contrasts sharply with the statement he made to Detective
Yohouse, in which Appellant stated he was the “victim” and acted in “self-
defense.” (Appellant’s Brief at 21). Appellant asserts that the
Commonwealth’s introduction of Officer Holland’s testimony was for the
purpose of “diffus[ing] the possibility” that the jury would receive a self-
defense instruction. (Id. at 22). Appellant also emphasizes that he made the
pretrial hearing statement to his attorney out of anger, and it was simply
overheard by others. Appellant maintains the prejudice of introducing his
pretrial hearing statement outweighs any probative value. Appellant further
alleges that defense counsel did not stipulate to the transcript of the
November 21, 2018 hearing. Appellant concludes the court erred by admitting
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the officer’s testimony, and he is entitled to relief. We disagree.
“The admissibility of evidence is at the discretion of the trial court and
only a showing of an abuse of that discretion, and resulting prejudice,
constitutes reversible error.” Commonwealth v. Ballard, 622 Pa. 177, 197-
98, 80 A.3d 380, 392 (2013), cert. denied, 573 U.S. 940, 134 S.Ct. 2842, 189
L.Ed.2d 824 (2014).
The term “discretion” imports the exercise of judgment,
wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion,
within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for the
purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge. Discretion
must be exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to
prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions.
Discretion is abused when the course pursued represents not
merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is
manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or
where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill will.
Commonwealth v. Goldman, 70 A.3d 874, 878-79 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal
denied, 624 Pa. 672, 85 A.3d 482 (2014). “To constitute reversible error, an
evidentiary ruling must not only be erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial
to the complaining party.” Commonwealth v. Lopez, 57 A.3d 74, 81
(Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 619 Pa. 678, 62 A.3d 379 (2013).
Instantly, Appellant repeatedly spoke in place of his defense counsel
throughout the pretrial hearing on November 21, 2018. While the
Commonwealth objected to Appellant’s involvement in the hearing, as he was
represented by counsel, the court permitted Appellant to ask and answer
several questions. Nothing in the record differentiates the instant statement
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concerning Appellant’s denial of self-defense from any of the other
interjections Appellant made throughout the hearing. Appellant cannot now
take issue with the inclusion of this particular statement in the transcripts of
the hearing, nor can he claim the statement was a private communication with
his attorney where he openly answered the court’s question. Furthermore,
while his defense counsel objected to the introduction of the statement at trial,
counsel stipulated to the authenticity of the hearing transcript. (See N.T.
Trial, 3/3/20, at 96-103). Under these circumstances, we see no abuse of
discretion in the court’s allowing Officer Holland to read Appellant’s statement
from the preliminary hearing. See Ballard, supra.In his fourth issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred in calculating
his credit for time served. Appellant contends that he was incarcerated for
the instant matter on November 30, 2017, sentenced on March 5, 2020, and
never met the requirements for bail. Despite this lengthy period of
incarceration, Appellant complains that he only received three days of credit
(from November 30, 2017 to December 3, 2017) toward the instant case for
time served. Appellant outlines the court’s reasoning for why he received so
little credit for time served as follows:
The court explained that…Appellant was revoked and
resentenced (by the same judge) on two (2) older cases,
No. [1932] of 2016 and No. 1946 of 2016, to 6-12 months
on each case, running consecutively. …
Additionally, on yet another older case, No. 264 of 2014,
Judge Leskinen placed a detainer on…Appellant and would
not lift the detainer until he was sentenced on the homicide
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charge. Judge Leskinen’s order was dated May 21, 2018.
The trial court ran the March 5, 2020 sentence concurrent
with Judge Leskinen’s case. …
(Appellant’s Brief at 23-24).
Appellant, however, contends the court erred in applying the time he
spent in prison for the instant matter to his revocation sentences and detainer
where, inter alia, (1) “the new case did not cause the technical violations of
the older cases;” (2) “[Appellant] was incarcerated on the new charge prior to
the revocation hearings;” (3) Appellant never met the requirements to be
released on bail; and (4) nothing in the record explained the effect the
violation sentences or detainer would have on the credit for time served on
the homicide case. (Id. at 26-27). Appellant concludes he should receive
credit from November 30, 2017 until March 5, 2020 toward the instant case,
as he contends that all time served should be credited to his new case and not
to the detainer or revocation sentences. We disagree.
Appellant’s claim implicates the legality of his sentence. See
Commonwealth v. Dixon, 161 A.3d 949 (Pa.Super. 2017) (stating challenge
to court’s failure to give credit for time served implicates legality of sentence);
Commonwealth v. Edrington, 780 A.2d 721 (Pa.Super. 2001) (maintaining
legality of sentence claims cannot be waived, where reviewing court has
proper jurisdiction). “If no statutory authorization exists for a particular
sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to correction. An illegal sentence
must be vacated.” Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 850 A.2d 1268, 1271
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(Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Kinney, 777 A.2d 492, 494
(Pa.Super. 2001)). “In evaluating a trial court’s application of a statute, our
standard of review is plenary and is limited to determining whether the trial
court committed an error of law.” Stevenson, supra at 1271.
Credit for time served is governed by statute as follows:
§ 9760. Credit for time served
After reviewing the information submitted under section
9737 (relating to report of outstanding charges and
sentences) the court shall give credit as follows:
(1) Credit against the maximum term and any
minimum term shall be given to the defendant for all time
spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge for which
a prison sentence is imposed or as a result of the conduct
on which such a charge is based. Credit shall include credit
for time spent in custody prior to trial, during trial, pending
sentence, and pending the resolution of an appeal.
(2) Credit against the maximum term and any
minimum term shall be given to the defendant for all time
spent in custody under a prior sentence if he is later
reprosecuted and resentenced for the same offense or for
another offense based on the same act or acts. This shall
include credit in accordance with paragraph (1) of this
section for all time spent in custody as a result of both the
original charge and any subsequent charge for the same
offense or for another offense based on the same act or acts.
(3) If the defendant is serving multiple sentences, and
if one of the sentences is set aside as the result of direct or
collateral attack, credit against the maximum and any
minimum term of the remaining sentences shall be given for
all time served in relation to the sentence set aside since
the commission of the offenses on which the sentences were
based.
(4) If the defendant is arrested on one charge and later
prosecuted on another charge growing out of an act or acts
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that occurred prior to his arrest, credit against the maximum
term and any minimum term of any sentence resulting from
such prosecution shall be given for all time spent in custody
under the former charge that has not been credited against
another sentence.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9760. “[A] defendant shall be given credit for any days spent
in custody prior to the imposition of sentence, but only if such commitment is
on the offense for which sentence is imposed. Credit is not given, however,
for a commitment by reason of a separate and distinct offense.”
Commonwealth v. Clark, 885 A.2d 1030, 1034 (Pa.Super. 2005) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Miller, 655 A.2d 1000, 1002 (Pa.Super. 1995)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Time spent in pretrial incarceration for an
unrelated offense is not one of the enumerated areas under Section 9760. Id.Instantly, in addressing this issue, the trial court reasoned:
…Appellant asserts that [the] trial court erred in calculation
and determination of the credit for time served when it
imposed the sentence. The [c]ourt stands by its
calculations. Although…Appellant was arrested on
November 30, 2017, he only had credit for three days due
to his being revoked and resentenced in his other cases and
a detainer on a third case. …Appellant was arrested on
November 30, 2017 and bail was denied. At the [time] of
his arrest, the [c]ourt had issued bench warrants in Cases
No. 1932 and 1946 of 2016 for…Appellant’s failure to appear
at a revocation hearing on November 11, 2017. On
December 4, 2017, this [c]ourt resentenced…Appellant at
each case to a term of incarceration of six (6) to twelve (12)
months to run consecutively to each other. He maxed out
on each sentence on December 3, 2019. At Case no. 267
of 2014, Judge Steve P. Leskinen scheduled a revocation
hearing for May 22, 2018, when…Appellant failed to appear
for that hearing, Judge Leskinen issued a detainer
for…Appellant. On March 5, 2020, Judge Leskinen revoked
his sentence and resentenced him to forty-five (45) to
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ninety (90) days incarceration with that sentence beginning
on December 3, 2019. As…Appellant’s time incarcerated
was primarily used on these cases, the sentence imposed
was correct.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed August 17, 2020, at 8-9 unpaginated). We agree
with the trial court’s analysis. Here, as the trial court explained, the vast
majority of the time Appellant was incarcerated prior to his sentencing on
March 5, 2020, was absorbed into his unrelated revocation sentences and
detainer, leaving him with only three days of credit toward his sentence for
the instant offenses. See Clark, supra. Thus, the court correctly calculated
Appellant’s credit for time served, and the sentence Appellant received was
not illegal. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9760; Stevenson, supra. Accordingly, we
affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/7/2021
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