In the Interest of: C.D., Appeal of: CYF ( 2021 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: C.D., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: ALLEGHENY COUNTY :
OFFICE OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND :
FAMILIES :
:
: No. 1223 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered October 15, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
No(s): CP-02-AP-011-2020
IN THE INTEREST OF: C.D., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: ALLEGHENY COUNTY :
OFFICE OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND :
FAMILIES :
:
: No. 1224 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered October 15, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court at
No(s): CP-02-DP-0000807-2017
BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: JUNE 8, 2021
In this consolidated matter, the Allegheny County Office of Children,
Youth and Families (CYF) appeals the trial court’s order denying CYF’s petition
to involuntarily terminate the rights of H.H. (Mother) pursuant to the Adoption
Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. While the court determined CYF established
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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grounds for termination under Section 2511(a), the court found CYF failed to
establish that termination best served the needs and welfare of seven-year-
old C.D. (Child) under Section 2511(b).1 CYF also appeals the trial court’s
subsequent decision to change the goal of Child’s dependency proceedings to
permanent legal custodianship, pursuant to the Juvenile Act. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6351(f).2 After careful review, we affirm.
The facts pertinent to our disposition are these: Child was born in 2013
in Tennessee. He tested positive for illicit drugs at birth, and the local social
services agency removed Child from Mother’s care. While in Tennessee, Child
was placed with Maternal Grandmother and in foster care. The family
eventually relocated to the Pittsburgh area.
The family came to the attention of CYF in the summer of 2017, when
Child was four years old, after Mother had several incidents involving the
police. Following one such incident, Mother was admitted to the hospital
where she tested positive for benzodiazepines and cocaine. CYF obtained an
emergency custody authorization and placed Child into the foster home where
he now resides.
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1 We observe the court also terminated the rights of C.A.D., who was married
to Mother at the time of Child’s birth, but whose biological parentage was ruled
out by genetic testing. CYF also filed a termination petition against the
unknown father, which the court granted. These terminations were not
appealed.
2 Child also appeals the court’s denial of CYF’s termination petition, though
not the goal change. See 1225 WDA 2020. Child’s appeal is separately listed
before this panel.
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Mother stipulated to a dependency adjudication in July 2017. The court
ordered a family service plan to aid Mother’s reunification with Child. The
goals of the reunification plan included, inter alia, housing, mental health
treatment, and visitation; but the primary goal was Mother’s sobriety.
Between July 2017 and August 2020, the court conducted permanency review
hearings approximately every three months.
The trial court found Mother’s overall compliance with the family service
plan to be moderate, and that Mother’s progress ebbed and flowed.
Specifically, Mother completed therapy, obtained housing, and managed her
medication during the dependency case. Because Mother had achieved
sobriety for months at a time, the court ordered substantial visitation,
including overnights and unsupervised visits. At one point, those visits
occurred at least three days per week.
However, Mother’s progress was always impeded by drug relapses. And
apart from her substance abuse issues, Mother’s ability to parent was also
impeded by her mental health issues; she was diagnosed with borderline
personality disorder and bipolar disorder. The court also observed tensions
between Mother and the foster mother, who alleged Child was mistreated by
Mother; the allegation was eventually deemed unfounded. Mother requested
that CYF pursue placement options with Mother’s family in Alabama. The court
ordered CYF to submit an interstate compact to pursue these options, but
Mother’s family ultimately decided not to make themselves a placement
option.
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Child displayed behavioral issues when he was initially placed with the
foster family, but after therapeutic intervention Child did well in their care.
Over the course of the dependency case, the court ordered several evaluations
with psychologist Beth Bliss, Ph.D. Eventually, CYF petitioned for the
involuntary termination of Mother’s rights in January 2020. Meanwhile, with
the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, the visits became virtual. The hearing
was twice continued before the court ultimately held the proceeding on
October 15, 2020, approximately 39 months after the court adjudicated Child
dependent.
At the conclusion of the termination proceeding, the court determined
CYF met its burden under Section 2511(a) of the Adoption Act – the first step
of the bifurcated analysis. However, the court concluded CYF had not
demonstrated that termination would best serve Child’s needs and welfare
under Section 2511(b). In reaching this determination, the court relied largely
upon the expert testimony of Dr. Bliss. The court denied CYF’s termination
petition. Immediately following the termination proceeding, the court
conducted a permanency review hearing pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351. By
agreement of the parties, the court incorporated the testimony of the
termination proceeding into its permanency review. The court then changed
the goal to subsidized permanent legal custodianship. CYF timely filed this
appeal.
CYF presents the following issues for our review:
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1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
discretion when it denied CYF’s petition to involuntarily
terminate the parental rights of Mother pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) after CYF proved by clear and
convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s
parental rights would best serve the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of [] Child.
2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
discretion in changing the permanency goal to
permanent legal custodianship in this case, after CYF
proved by clear and convincing evidence that the goal of
adoption is best suited to [Child’s] safety, protection and
physical, mental and moral welfare?
CYF’s Brief at 4 (capitalization adjusted).
We begin with the termination question, mindful of our well-settled
standard of review of such cases:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights
cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact
and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
supported by the record. If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial
court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A
decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only
upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court's
decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
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Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in section 2511(a). Only
if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court
engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to section
2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the
child[.]
In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
Here, the trial court found that statutory grounds for termination existed
under Section 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8). Mother did not appeal that finding,
and thus the first step of the bifurcated analysis is undisputed. The issue here
is whether CYF met its burden under Section 2511(b), which states in relevant
part:
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
[…].
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
This Court has explained that:
[S]ection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of
parental rights would best serve the developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child.
In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005),
this Court stated, “Intangibles such as love, comfort,
security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the
needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed
that the trial court must also discern the nature and status
of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect
on the child of permanently severing that
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bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of
a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer
that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63
(Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-
effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of
the particular case. Id. at 763.
In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Concerning the bond, the question is not merely whether a bond exists,
but whether termination would destroy this existing, necessary and beneficial
relationship. See C.M.K., 203 A.2d at 264 (citation omitted); see also In re
K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (Observing the “immutable
psychological truth” that “[e]ven the most abused of children will often harbor
some positive emotion towards the abusive parent.”); and see K.Z.S., 946
A.2d at 764 (holding there was no bond worth preserving where the child had
been in foster care for most of the child’s life, which caused the resulting bond
to be too attenuated). We add, the court is not required to use expert
testimony to resolve the bond analysis but may rely on the testimony of social
workers and caseworkers. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super.
2010). Finally, we emphasize that “[w]hile a parent’s emotional bond with
her and/or her child is a major aspect of the § 2511(b) best-interest analysis,
it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the court when
determining what is in the best interest of the child.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d
95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).
In the instant matter, the court noted two primary reasons for denying
termination under Section 2511(b): the court found compelling the expert
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testimony of Dr. Bliss, who did not recommend termination; and the court
found lacking the evidence offered by CYF in favor of termination.
Dr. Bliss testified that the foster home provided Child with a safe,
positive placement, where Child’s needs were met. She also stated that
removing Child from the foster home would cause the same negative effects
as severing the parental bond between Mother and Child. Dr. Bliss ultimately
opined that termination would not be in Child’s interests, and she
recommended permanent legal custodianship. See N.T., 10/15/20, at 78-79.
She explained why the best situation for Child would be to stay in the foster
parents’ care, while having ongoing contact with Mother:
So with children, obviously we don’t know what will happen,
but we know what research shows can happen to children.
So with children who have a strong bond or attachment and
that is severed, whether that be through death or
termination of parental rights or a parent leaving and never
having contact with the child again, it can do multiple things.
It can have impact on future behavioral issues, emotional
issues. There is that sense of parental rejections or
potential internal blame for that. In addition to that, it can
have impact on how they attach or relate to people later in
life. That is much more the case for younger children, but
with [Child] he has a strong positive bond with [Mother]
and she was initially his primary attachment. He’s obviously
formed a strong primary attachment now to [the] foster
parent as well. But severing that relationship could impact
his ability to attach or relate to others later in his life.
Id. at 89 (emphasis added).
Dr. Bliss testified that Child turned to Mother for comfort and “as his
secure home base, which you’ll see in children with attachments.” Id. at 93;
see also id. at 70. She also testified that Child was protective of Mother. Id.
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at 70. Dr. Bliss explained how she witnessed the strength of the parental
bond: “My opinion is that their bond is strong enough and in place enough.
[…] It’s there. It’s stable. It’s consistent. It hasn’t been impacted by the fact
that they weren’t having in-person visits [due to Covid-19 precautions].” Id.
at 92.
Thus, relying on the testimony of Dr. Bliss, the court explicitly found
that the bond between Child and Mother was positive, and that Mother was a
source of comfort and security for Child. The court also found that this bond
was so beneficial, that its severance would be destructive. Although Mother’s
inability to parent meant that she might not be able to serve Child’s physical
needs, the court found the bond between them served Child’s emotional
needs, which are also necessary to development and welfare.
Not only did the trial court find the testimony of Dr. Bliss to be
persuasive, but the court also determined, by contrast, that CYF failed to meet
its evidentiary burden. See T.C.O., 12/14/20, at 18. The court noted CYF did
not offer any witness testimony to contradict Dr. Bliss’s expert opinion. The
caseworker did not testify to his observations between Child and Mother or
between Child and the foster parents. CYF did not call other witnesses who
might have testified about the bond. No one asked the foster parent about
the foster family’s relationship with Child, or what they observed between
Child and Mother. No one called Child’s therapist to testify about the
relationship Child had with Mother and the foster parents. See id at 25-26.
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On appeal, CYF concedes that the reason the court denied the
termination of parental rights petition was based on the bond between Mother
and Child. CYF does not dispute that bond. See CYF’s Brief at 19. Rather,
CYF argues that Child’s need for permanency and security, which could only
be achieved through adoption, should outweigh concerns about the severance
of the bond. See id., 17, 19.
CYF explains that Dr. Bliss’s recommendation against termination was
predicated on the understanding that Child and Mother would have ongoing
contact. However, CYF maintains that ongoing contact is far from guaranteed,
given Mother’s struggles with addiction and mental health. Thus, if the foster
parents felt compelled to stop unhealthy contact between Mother and Child,
then the primary reason against termination would be undermined.
Along the same lines, CYF explains that Dr. Bliss’s recommendation was
also based on Child’s need for finality, that prolonged litigation would
adversely affect Child’s stability and permanency. Id. at 20 (citing N.T. at
78). CYF warns that Mother had a basic misunderstanding of the case, that
she wrongly believed she would soon be able to care for Child. And thus,
because permanent legal custodianship allows Mother to petition the court for
reunification, litigation involving Child will not necessarily cease. CYF
concludes the court should have recognized that Mother and the foster family
could have entered into an open adoption agreement under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2731, thereby providing Child with ongoing contact with Mother.
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We understand CYF’s arguments. If either of those hypotheticals ever
come to pass, then Child might be left without the ongoing contact imagined
by the permanent legal custodianship, while also being left without the
permanency afforded by termination. In this worst-of-both-worlds situation,
it might appear that termination was the better choice after all. But that would
only be apparent in hindsight. In essence, CYF’s alleged error is that the trial
court did not hedge for the future. We fail to see how this could be a basis
for reversal.
For instance, in In re Adoption of G.L.L., 124 A.3d 344 (Pa. Super.
2015), we were not persuaded by unknown, future possibilities when
reviewing the trial court’s denial of the termination petition. There, the
psychologist did not recommend reunification. Instead, the psychologist
recommended continuing the relationship between the mother and child
through an open adoption. G.L.L., 124 A.3d at 348. The trial court concluded
termination did not serve the child’s interests under Section 2511(b). On
appeal, we noted that parties could not effectuate an open adoption until after
the termination. We affirmed the trial court, holding “we do not find that the
uncertainty of an open adoption is appropriate or relevant in a termination
analysis under Section 2511(b).” Id. (citing In re K.H.B., 107 A.3d 175, 184
(Pa. Super. 2014)).
Importantly, we also observe that discretion is not abused merely
because the record also supports a different outcome. See J.M, 991 A.2d at
324. Put simply, the court’s decision was not “manifestly unreasonable.” See
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id. The court’s bond determinations were supported by the record, and the
court did not err when it concluded CYF provided insufficient evidence to
support its petition. CYF’s first issue is without merit.
Next, we consider CYF’s second appellate issue: whether the trial court
erred by changing the goal from reunification to permanent legal
custodianship. Like termination decisions, we review goal changes for an
abuse of discretion:
We must accept the facts as found by the trial court unless
they are not supported by the record. Although bound by
the facts, we are not bound by the trial court's inferences,
deductions, and conclusions therefrom; we must exercise
our independent judgment in reviewing the court's
determination, as opposed to its findings of fact, and must
order whatever right and justice dictate. We review for
abuse of discretion. Our scope of review, accordingly, is of
the broadest possible nature. It is this Court's responsibility
to ensure that the record represents a comprehensive
inquiry and that the hearing judge has applied the
appropriate legal principles to that record. Nevertheless, we
accord great weight to the court's fact-finding function
because the court is in the best position to observe and rule
on the credibility of the parties and witnesses.
In re W.M., 41 A.3d 618, 623 (Pa. Super. 2012)(citations omitted); see also
In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010).
The Juvenile Act provides the trial court with the criteria for its
permanency plan for the subject child. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(e), (f), (f.1),
and (g). Pursuant to Section 6351(e), the trial court must hold permanency
review hearings to determine the disposition that is best suited to the safety,
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protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child. Section
6351(f)-(f.1) prescribes the pertinent inquiry for the trial court:
(f) Matters to be determined at permanency
hearing.— At each permanency hearing, a court shall
determine all of the following:
(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of
the placement.
(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of
compliance with the permanency plan developed for the
child.
(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating the
circumstances which necessitated the original
placement.
(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current
placement goal for the child.
(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the
child might be achieved.
(6) Whether the child is safe.
[…]
(f.1) Additional determination.—Based upon the
determinations made under subsection (f) and all relevant
evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall determine
one of the following:
[…]
(3) If and when the child will be placed with a legal
custodian in cases where return to the child's parent,
guardian or custodian or being placed for adoption is not
best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental
and moral welfare of the child.
[…]
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f)(1-5); (f.1)(3).
After a court renders a determination under Section 6351(f.1), the court
shall order “continuation, modification or termination of placement or other
disposition which is best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental
and moral welfare of the child.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(g). In doing so, the court
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must not elevate the interests of the parents above the best interests of the
child; the parent’s rights are secondary. See In re M.T., 101 A.3d 1163, 1172
(Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). We have also said the court should
consider the bond between the child and his parents, foster parents, and
siblings when deciding whether to change the goal. M.T., 101 A.3d at 1175(citation omitted).
Here, the trial court conducted a permanency review hearing, made the
appropriate inquiries, concluded that adoption would not best suit Child, and
ordered the goal to be changed to permanent legal custodianship. The court
defended its position by citing the strong, positive bonds Child has with both
his Mother and his foster parents. See T.C.O. at 30. The court recognized
that neither reunification, nor adoption would be appropriate, leaving
permanent legal custody as the only viable option. See id.On appeal, CYF argues generally that a permanent legal custodianship
was not in Child’s best interests. CYF provides hardly any relevant legal
authority to support its claim, other than the fact that adoption is generally
favored over permanent custody. Beyond this, CYF directs our attention to
the previous testimony of Dr. Bliss (which was incorporated into the
permanency review hearing).
During CYF’s examination of Dr. Bliss, the psychologist testified that
adoption is generally the best form of permanency. In recommending
permanent legal custodianship, Dr. Bliss opined that Child’s ongoing contact
with Mother was paramount. But in response to CYF’s probing, Dr. Bliss
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conceded that she would be “okay” with termination, so long as post-adoption
contact between Mother and Child would be guaranteed, i.e., by an Act 101
agreement. See N.T. at 80; See generally CYF’s Brief at 24-27.
CYF wants us to infer that, when the trial court relied on Dr. Bliss’s
testimony, the court elevated Mother’s interests above the Child’s interests.
After all, Mother supports the court’s decision to order permanent legal
custodianship, and Mother apparently rebuffed repeated requests to entertain
a post-adoption agreement. But we are not persuaded.
It is not the purview of the Superior Court to reweigh evidence and the
credibility determinations of the trial court in order to find an abuse of
discretion. In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. We will not ignore the trial court’s
observation that Mother wanted what is best for the child, and for him to be
safe and happy. See T.C.O., at 19-20; see also N.T. at 47. Nor can we
reweigh the portion of Dr. Bliss’s testimony that was adverse to CYF’s position,
in favor of her response to CYF’s question about the circumstances under
which she would be okay with termination.
Moreover, we underscore the deference owed to a dependency court, in
particular:
[W]e are not in a position to make the close calls based on
fact-specific determinations. Not only are our trial judges
observing the parties during the hearing, but usually, as in
this case, they have presided over several other hearings
with the same parties and have a longitudinal understanding
of the case and the best interests of the individual child
involved. Thus, we must defer to the trial judges who see
and hear the parties and can determine the credibility to be
placed on each witness and, premised thereon, gauge the
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likelihood of success of the current permanency plan. Even
if an appellate court would have made a different conclusion
based on the cold record, we are not in a position to reweigh
the evidence and the credibility determinations of the trial
court.
In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190.
In sum, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
concluded CYF failed to meet their burden that termination would best serve
the Child’s interest under Section 2511(b). We also conclude the court did
not abuse its discretion when it changed the goal to permanency legal
custodianship, after approximately 39 months of dependency proceedings.
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/8/2021
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