Teffeteller, J.E. v. Teffeteller, T.T. ( 2021 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JODIE E. TEFFETELLER, N/K/A JODIE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
E. PAYNE : PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
: No. 1196 MDA 2020
THOMAS T. TEFFETELLER :
Appeal from the Order Entered August 17, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Civil Division at
No(s): 2010-1232
BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JUNE 09, 2021
Appellant, Jodie E. Teffeteller, N/K/A Jodie E. Payne (“Wife”), appeals
from the August 17, 2020 Order entered in the Cumberland County Civil
Division, which, inter alia, limited the amount of money that Appellee, Thomas
T. Teffeteller (“Husband”), was required to pay towards the college education
of the parties’ adult son pursuant to their Marital Settlement Agreement
(“MSA”) and Addendum to MSA Dated August 17, 2010 (“Addendum”). Upon
review, we conclude the terms of the MSA and Addendum are unambiguous.
The trial court, therefore, erred when it considered extrinsic evidence to
determine the parties’ intent and modified, rather than enforced, the MSA and
Addendum. Accordingly, we vacate the Order and remand.
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The following procedural and factual history is relevant to this appeal.
Wife and Husband were married for almost seventeen years until their divorce
on January 11, 2011. The parties have two adult children. The subject of the
parties’ current dispute is payment of college expenses for their twenty-three-
year-old son, Cooper Teffeteller, who is pursuing a career in architecture. The
parties entered a MSA on August 17, 2010. In relevant part, the MSA
provided:
E. COLLEGE EXPENSES. Husband shall be responsible for
seventy-five percent (75%) of the cost of the children’s college
education, including tuition, room, board, books, application fees,
testing, activity fees, reasonable transportation expenses, costs
related to PSAT, SAT testing and any other miscellaneous
expenses associated with the children’s attendance at college. At
such time as each child may consider college, the parties agree to
confer with each other and the child relative to their college
choices and to discuss their respective obligations in this regard.
Wife’s Exhibit 1, MSA, at ¶ 8(E). On May 17, 2012, the parties entered an
Addendum which stated, in relevant part:
4. College Expenses. The parties acknowledge that paragraph
8(E) of the parties’ [MSA] dated August 10, 2017, is hereby
amended to the extent that Husband shall be responsible for the
cost of each of the children’s college education, including tuition,
room, board and meal plan in an amount not to exceed 75% of
the then current rate of a full-time-out-of-state undergraduate
tuition at Penn State University at University Park, after
consideration of any scholarships or grants. With respect to each
child, in the event there is a remaining balance with respect to the
cost of the child’s college education, consisting of tuition, room,
board, and meal plan, the parties shall divide same in proportion
to their respective net incomes.
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Wife’s Exhibit 2, MSA Addendum, at ¶ 4. Both the MSA and Addendum were
incorporated but not merged into the parties’ January 11, 2011 Divorce
Decree.
In the Fall of 2016, Cooper began attending Harrisburg Area Community
College (“HACC”) for architecture as part of its accreditation affiliation
program with Drexel University. Cooper attended HACC for approximately 2½
years, and Father contributed to expenses associated with HACC, as well
expenses that Cooper incurred while spending a summer in Italy and taking a
class there. In the Summer of 2019, Drexel University accepted Cooper into
its part-time architecture program. Cooper subsequently enrolled and began
classes in the Fall of 2020, with an anticipated graduation date in May of 2024,
eight years after Cooper initially began pursuing an architecture degree.
Husband contributed financially to Cooper’s first two semesters at Drexel
University.
On May 7, 2020, Wife filed a Petition to Enforce Marital Settlement
Agreement and Addendum and Request for Counsel Fees, averring, inter alia,
that Husband refused to pay further costs for Cooper’s education at Drexel
University and requesting that the court order Husband to remit payment
pursuant to the MSA and Addendum. Wife also requested that the court order
Husband to pay her counsel fees. On May 18, 2020, Husband filed an Answer
with New Matter averring, inter alia, that at time the MSA and Addendum were
drafted, the parties intended for Father to contribute financially to four years
of Cooper’s college education, that he could not afford to pay for eight years
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of college education, and that Cooper and Wife refused to discuss Cooper’s
college choices and the parties’ obligations as required by the MSA and
Addendum. Wife responded, asserting that neither the MSA nor Amended
MSA included language that required Cooper to attend school full-time or
placed a time limit on Cooper’s education.
On August 10, 2020, the trial court held a hearing. The trial court heard
testimony from Wife, Cooper, and Husband. On August 17, 20201, the trial
court entered an Order that, inter alia, ordered Husband to pay for Cooper’s
tuition room, board, meal plan, parking and books for the 2020-21 school year
at Drexel University up to but not including the Fall 2021 quarter, and denied
Wife’s request for $297 in parking reimbursements. Order, 8/14/20, at ¶1-2.
The court ordered that any remaining balance of Cooper’s college education
should be divided between the parties, with Husband paying two-thirds and
Wife paying one-third of all college educations costs. Id. at ¶ 3. Finally, the
court denied Wife’s request for counsel fees. Id. at ¶ 6.
Wife timely appealed. Both Wife and the trial court complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL
Wife raises the following issues for our review:
A. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by arbitrarily
modifying the terms of the parties’ [MSA] and [Amended MSA],
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1 The Order is dated August 14, 2020, but the lower court clerk did not enter
it on the docket until August 17, 2020.
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which terms were clear and unambiguous, and where there
was no fraud, misrepresentation, or duress.
B. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law by failing to
consider the parties’ [MSA] and Addendum thereto as a
contract, subject to enforcement, but not modification by the
[c]ourt, in contradiction to the Court’s holding in Bianchi v.
Bianchi, 859 A.2d 511 (Pa. Super. 2004)?
C. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by modifying the
terms of the parties’ [MSA] and Addendum thereto with respect
to the parties’ financial obligations with respect to their son’s
college-related expenses, despite neither party raising a claim
or counterclaim for the modification thereof?
D. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
consider that the terms of the parties’ [MSA] and Addendum
thereto are part of a comprehensive settlement and bargained-
for resolution regarding the equitable distribution of the parties’
marital estate and thus, should be viewed as a whole and any
modification of a portion thereof constitutes an error of law,
impacting the overall terms of the parties’ resolution in
connection with their divorce matter?
E. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to find
that Appellee breached the terms of the parties’ [MSA] and
Addendum, and thus, denying [Wife] an award of counsel fees
pursuant to the terms of the parties’ [MSA] and Addendum and
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 3502(e)?
Wife’s Br. at 6-7.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
It is well-settled that “the law of contracts governs marital settlement
agreements.” Vaccarello v. Vaccarello, 757 A.2d 909, 913 (Pa. 2000).
Under the law of contracts, a trial court must ascertain the intent of the parties
when interpreting a marital settlement agreement. Kripp v. Kripp, 849 A.2d
1159, 1163 (Pa. 2004). “When the terms of a contract are clear and
unambiguous, the intent of the parties is to be ascertained from the document
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itself. When, however, an ambiguity exists, parol evidence is admissible to
explain or clarify or resolve the ambiguity[.]” Id. (internal citation omitted).
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law and this Court’s standard
of review is de novo. Id. at 1164 n.5. Consequently, this court is not bound
by the trial court’s interpretation. Kraisinger v. Kraisinger, 928 A.2d 333,
339 (Pa. Super. 2007).
The Terms of the MSA and Addendum are Clear and Unambiguous
In her first two issues, Wife avers that the trial court erred when it
modified, rather than enforced, the terms of the MSA and Addendum. Wife
argues that the terms of the MSA and Addendum were clear and unambiguous,
and, therefore, the trial court impermissibly considered parol, or extrinsic,
evidence to determine the parties’ intent and, consequently, change the terms
of the MSA. Id. at 23. We agree.
As stated above, when “the words of a contract are clear and
unambiguous, the intent of the parties is to be ascertained from the express
language of the agreement itself.” Bianchi v. Bianchi, 859 A.2d 511, 515
(Pa. Super. 2004). In determining the intent of the parties, “the court looks
to what they have clearly expressed, for the law does not assume that the
language was chosen carelessly.” Stamerro v. Stamerro, 889 A.2d 1251,
1258 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). “If left undefined, the words of a
contract are to be given their ordinary meaning.” Kripp 849 A.2d at 1163.
“A court may not modify the plain meaning of the words under the guise of
interpretation.” Crispo v. Crispo, 909 A.2d 308, 313 (Pa. Super. 2006).
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Additionally, “this Court must consider such contracts without reference
to matters outside of the document, and we must ascertain the parties’
intentions when entering into the contract from the entire instrument.” Id.The parties are bound “without regard to whether the terms were read and
fully understood and irrespective of whether the agreements embodied
reasonable or good bargains.” Sabad v. Fessenden, 825 A.2d 682, 688 (Pa.
Super. 2003) (citation omitted). “[A] contract is not rendered ambiguous by
the mere fact that the parties do not agree upon the proper construction.”
Metzger v. Clifford Realty Corp., 476 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. Super. 1984) (citation
omitted). Simply put, in a written contract, “the intent of the parties is the
writing itself.” Kripp 849 A.2d at 1163.
Moreover, while a trial court may interpret a marital settlement
agreement as it would a contract, “it has neither the power nor the authority
to modify or vary the agreement unless there is conclusive proof of fraud or
mistake.” Crispo, 909 A.2d at 313. “The standard of enforceability of a
contractual agreement is [] clear: absent fraud, misrepresentation, or duress,
spouses should be bound by the terms of their agreements.” Id. (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
Instantly, the trial court determined that “the contract is ambiguous as
to the parties’ intentions” and considered parol evidence to conclude that once
Husband paid $106,900 towards Cooper’s college education, Husband met his
contractual obligation under the terms of the MSA, and any remaining college
expense balance should be divided in proportion to the parties’ respective
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incomes. Trial Ct. Op., dated 11/23/20, at 7-8. The trial court explained its
rationale as follows:
The cost of four years’ worth of tuition to obtain an undergraduate
degree for a full-time out-of-state undergraduate student at Penn
State University in 2019/2020 equates to $142,056. Applying the
75% cap to that amount equals $106,542. Wife avers that
Husband is obliged by contractual agreement to pay eight full
years of college expenses resulting in payments upwards of
$270,000. This court cannot permit such an absurd result.
Therefore, we find that the testimony and the evidence of record
supports a finding that [] Husband’s payments exceeded 75% of
the current rate of a full-time-out-of-state undergraduate tuition
at Penn State University Park as stated in the MSA and Addendum.
Having determined Husband met his initial college expense
obligations, the Addendum requires that the parties divide any
remaining college expense balance . . . in proportion to their
respective net incomes.
Id. We disagree.
Upon review, we conclude that the language of the MSA and Addendum
is clear and unambiguous, and the trial court’s interpretation of the parties’
intent is incorrect. In Paragraph 8 of the MSA, the parties expressly state that
“Husband shall be responsible for seventy-five percent (75%) of the cost of
the children’s college education[.]” Wife’s Exhibit 1, MSA, at ¶ 8(E)
(emphasis added). In their amendment to Paragraph 8 of the MSA the parties
agreed, in relevant part, that Husband’s obligation is “not to exceed 75% of
the then current rate of a full-time-out-of-state undergraduate tuition at Penn
State University at University Park, after consideration of any scholarships or
grants.” Wife’s Exhibit 2, MSA Addendum, at ¶ 4. Neither the MSA nor the
Addendum put a limit on the amount of years that Husband is required to
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contribute to a child’s college education. Rather, the MSA and the Addendum
define only the limits of the amount Husband is required to contribute each
year. In particular, the Addendum language “then current rate” highlights the
parties’ intent to define the parameters of Husband’s annual obligation. Those
words clearly do not express an intent to limit Husband’s obligation to a four-
year lump sum as the trial court concludes.
Further, the MSA and Addendum unambiguously state that Husband is
required to pay for a “college education” and the parties did not expressly
include or exclude specific undergraduate degrees from that obligation.
College education is varied, with some degrees requiring less than four years
and some degrees requiring more. If the parties intended to limit the amount
of years that Husband was required to pay, they would have expressly done
so in the MSA or, in particular, when they agreed to modify previously agreed
upon terms in the Addendum.
This Court must assume that the parties chose the language in the MSA
and Addendum carefully, and we must look to what the parties have clearly
expressed. Courts may not modify the terms of the agreement under the
guise of interpretation. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the terms of
the MSA and Addendum are clear and unambiguous; the trial court, therefore,
erred when it considered extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent.
Further, we agree with Wife that the trial court erred when it modified,
rather than enforced, the MSA and Addendum absent a showing of fraud or
duress. Accordingly, we vacate the Order and remand for the trial court to
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enforce the terms of the MSA and Addendum in accordance with this
Memorandum. In light of our disposition, we decline to address Wife’s third
and fourth issues.
Attorney’s Fees
In her final issue, Wife avers that the trial court abused its discretion
when it failed to award her attorney’s fees pursuant to Paragraph 9 of the
Addendum and 23 Pa.C.S. § 3502(e). Wife’s Br. at 43, 45-46. Wife argues
that Husband breached the MSA and Addendum when he unilaterally stopped
making the payments required by both and, therefore, she was entitled to
attorney’s fees. Id. at 46
The Addendum states, in relevant part:
9. Breach. It is expressly stipulated that if either party fails in
the due performance of any of his or her material obligations
under this Addendum, the other party shall have the right, at his
or her election, to sue for damages for breach thereof, to sue for
specific performance, or to seek any other legal remedies as may
be available, and the defaulting party shall pay the reasonable
legal fees for any services rendered by the non-defaulting party’s
attorney in any action or proceeding to compel performance
hereunder.
Wife’s Exhibit 2, MSA Addendum, at ¶ 9. Section 3502 provides, in relevant
part, that if “a party has failed to comply . . . with the terms of an agreement
as entered into between the parties, after hearing, the court may, in addition
to any other remedy available under this part . . . award counsel fees and
costs[.]” 23 Pa.C.S. § 3502(e)(7).
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The plain language of the Addendum provides for the award of
attorney’s fees if an enforcement proceeding must be brought because either
party breaches the MSA and Addendum. The trial court did not award
attorney’s fees, concluding that “both parties share some responsibility over
the reasons that these issues had to be brought before the [c]ourt.” Order,
8/17/20, at ¶ 6. In light of our conclusion that the trial court erred in its
interpretation of the MSA and Addendum, an award of attorney’s fees may be
appropriate upon remand.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the terms of the MSA and Addendum are unambiguous
and we, therefore, conclude that the trial court erred when it considered
extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent and modified, rather than
enforced, the MSA and Addendum. The MSA and Addendum clearly and
unambiguously put a limit on the amount of money that Husband is required
to contribute to the children’s college expenses each year, without limiting the
number of years that Husband is required to contribute. Accordingly, we
vacate the Order and remand for the trial court to enforce the terms of the
MSA and Addendum in accordance with this Memorandum and to award
attorney’s fees, if appropriate.
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Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/9/2021
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