Com. v. Kufrovich, J. ( 2021 )

J-S10035-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JESSICA KUFROVICH :
:
Appellant : No. 1046 MDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 10, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-54-CR-0002053-2016
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED JUNE 09, 2021
Jessica Kufrovich (Kufrovich) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County (trial court)
following her conviction of Driving Under the Influence of a Controlled
Substance (DUI), Driving While Operating Privilege is Suspended or Revoked
(DUS)1 and related summary traffic offenses. We affirm Kufrovich’s
convictions but vacate the judgment of sentence of incarceration for the DUS
offense only. We affirm the judgment of sentence in all other respects.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(d)(2) and 1543(b)(1.1)(i).
J-S10035-21
I.
A.
The underlying facts are not in dispute. On July 14, 2016, at
approximately 8:45 a.m., Captain David Stamets and Officer Joshua Pastucka
of the Shenandoah Police Department responded to a report of a van hitting
a road sign and attempting to flee. Captain Stamets effectuated a traffic stop
of the van and spoke with the driver, Joseph Zendrosky (Zendrosky), who was
Kufrovich’s then-boyfriend.
The police officers heard an engine revving loudly in the distance and a
Pontiac driven by Kufrovich quickly approached the scene. Kufrovich was
driving at an excessive speed in the wrong lane of the roadway and she struck
several potholes in her path. Kufrovich parked nearby in a no-parking zone
and began screaming out of her car window at Zendrosky. Captain Stamets
instructed Kufrovich to move her vehicle because she was blocking the
roadway and she moved up a few feet to allow traffic to pass.
Officer Pastucka testified that Kufrovich “exited her vehicle [and] was
acting in a very paranoid, agitated state.” (N.T. Trial, 6/24/20, at 22).
Kufrovich was “very talkative” and was “moving around quite a bit” with
“exaggerated reflexes, moving her fingers, twitching [her] arms, very
exaggerated muscle contractions.” (Id.). When Kufrovich began to approach
the police officers, Captain Stamets asked that she stay back in her vehicle.
She complied and Officer Pastucka observed her “agitation, the paranoia,
-2-
J-S10035-21
pacing around, talkativeness” and “she appeared to be talking to herself.”
(Id. at 23).
Officer Pastucka observed that Kufrovich had bruising and what
appeared to be fresh track marks from a syringe injection inside her right
elbow joint. When he asked her about the marks, Kufrovich explained that
she was recovering from an opiate addiction and that she had injected a “hot
shot” of warm water for the sensation. (Id. at 26). Kufrovich’s pupils were
constricted and she remained paranoid and fixated on Zendrosky. A search
of Kufrovich’s identification and registration information indicated that her
driver’s license was suspended and had expired and that the Pontiac belonged
to Zendrosky and its insurance had expired.
Officer Pastucka concluded that based on his observations and law
enforcement experience and training, Kufrovich was likely under the influence
of methamphetamine and heroin. He opined that her exaggerated reflexes,
talkativeness, paranoia and agitation were consistent with methamphetamine
use and that her constricted pupils indicated use of an opioid.
Captain Stamets likewise testified “it was very obvious that [Kufrovich]
had exaggerated reflexes, like her arms were flailing around. Her mouth was
very dry. She was talking very fast. She was very excited.” (Id. at 53).
Captain Stamets explained that he has been involved in training to identify
signs of alcohol/drug use since 2014 and that he is an instructor for
standardized field sobriety testing and is a drug recognition expert.
-3-
J-S10035-21
Kufrovich agreed to submit to field sobriety tests and her extremely
accelerated movement and facial tremors indicated to Captain Stamets that
she was under the influence of a stimulant. Kufrovich also had “a substantial
amount of white powder” in her left nostril and she admitted that “she snorted
methamphetamine that morning with her boyfriend.” (Id. at 59-60; see also
id. at 67). Kufrovich showed signs of impairment during several sobriety tests
and Captain Stamets noted that she appeared to have both old and new
injection marks on her arm. After Kufrovich failed the field sobriety tests, she
refused to submit to a blood draw to test for DUI. Captain Stamets opined
that based on his experience and training after observing Kufrovich’s
demeanor and erratic driving, she was under the influence of
methamphetamine “which is exactly what she stated she used.” (Id. at 68).
B.
On October 8, 2018, Kufrovich filed a motion pursuant to Pennsylvania
Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 claiming that the Commonwealth had violated
her speedy trial rights. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. After a hearing, the trial court
entered an opinion and order denying the motion.
On June 24, 2020, a jury found Kufrovich guilty of DUI and the trial
court found her guilty of DUS and the remaining summary traffic offenses. On
August 10, 2020, the trial court sentenced Kufrovich to a term of not less than
one nor more than five years’ incarceration for the DUI conviction, and a
concurrent term of 90 days’ incarceration and a fine of $1,000.00 for the DUS
-4-
J-S10035-21
offense.2 Kufrovich timely appealed and she and the trial court complied with
Rule 1925. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)-(b).
II.
A.
Kufrovich first argues that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the
charges against her pursuant to Rule 600.3 Kufrovich maintains that she was
____________________________________________
2 The relevant DUS provision provides disjunctive bases for criminal liability
and reads as follows:
A person who has an amount of alcohol by weight in his
blood that is equal to or greater than .02% at the time of testing
or who at the time of testing has in his blood any amount of a
Schedule I or nonprescribed Schedule II or III controlled
substance, as defined in the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No.
64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and
Cosmetic Act, or its metabolite or who refuses testing of blood or
breath and who drives a motor vehicle on any highway or
trafficway of this Commonwealth at a time when the person’s
operating privilege is suspended or revoked as a condition of
acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition for a violation
of section 3802 or former section 3731 or because of a violation
of section 1547(b)(1) or 3802 or former section 3731 or is
suspended under section 1581 for an offense substantially similar
to a violation of section 3802 or former section 3731 shall, upon
a first conviction, be guilty of a summary offense and shall be
sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000 and to undergo
imprisonment for a period of not less than 90 days.
75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(b)(1.1)(i)(emphases added).
3 We review a trial court’s Rule 600 determination for an abuse of discretion.
See Commonwealth v. Morgan, 239 A.3d 1132, 1137 (Pa. Super. 2020).
Our scope of review is limited to the record evidence from the speedy trial
hearing and the findings of the trial court, viewed in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party. See id.-5-
J-S10035-21
incarcerated in Schuylkill County jail during the relevant time period and that
the Commonwealth offered no justifiable reason for failing to timely bring her
to trial.
Generally, under Rule 600, the Commonwealth must bring a defendant
to trial within 365 days of the filing of the criminal complaint. See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). Rule 600 protects a defendant’s speedy trial rights
as well as society’s right to effective prosecution of criminal cases. See
Morgan, supra at 1137. To balance these rights, Rule 600 requires the court
to consider whether the Commonwealth exercised due diligence and whether
the circumstances causing the delay of trial were beyond the Commonwealth’s
control. See id.
For purposes of computing time under Rule 600, periods of delay at any
stage of the proceedings that are attributable to the Commonwealth’s failure
to exercise due diligence are included in the computation of time within which
trial must commence. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1). However, any other
periods of delay are excluded. See id. “Stated in the most general terms,
when the Commonwealth causes delay, the Rule 600 clock continues to tick;
when the defendant causes the delay, the clock stops.” Morgan, supra at
1137 (citation omitted).
In this case, the criminal complaint was filed against Kufrovich on
September 7, 2016, requiring the Commonwealth to bring her to trial by
September 7, 2017, if excludable time is not taken into account. Kufrovich’s
-6-
J-S10035-21
trial was held on June 24, 2020, nearly three years after expiration of the
“mechanical” run date under Rule 600.
However, the trial court’s calculation of Kufrovich’s adjusted Rule 600
run date, which is supported by the record, took into consideration Kufrovich’s
failure to appear for a pre-trial conference on May 26, 2017, resulting in a
bench warrant issued for her arrest. (See Trial Court Opinion, 12/19/18, at
1). Kufrovich was not arrested pursuant to that warrant until August 1, 2018.
Kufrovich explained that during that time period, she voluntarily went
to three different rehabilitation facilities and half-way houses. (See N.T. Rule
600 Hearing, 11/08/18, at 3-4, 9, 15). Kufrovich was under supervision for a
different DUI case at that time and she informed her probation officer of her
residences. However, Kufrovich conceded that she did not notify the District
Attorney’s Office or the Clerk of Courts’ Office of her whereabouts for this
case. (See id. at 10-11, 15). Kufrovich’s probation officer was not called to
testify at the hearing and there is no evidence that he was ever aware that
this case was pending.
The trial court explained its rationale for denying the Rule 600 motion
as follows:
[Kufrovich] failed to appear on May 26, 2017 and was not
apprehended until August 1, 2018, 453 days later. If all that time
is excluded, the Commonwealth had until December 4, 2018 to
bring [Kufrovich] to trial. . . .
[Kufrovich] filed her motion to dismiss on October 8, 2018.
At that time, she had already been attached for trial during the
October Term of Court, which would have been prior to the
-7-
J-S10035-21
adjusted run date. The filing of her motion prevented her case
from going to trial in October. The Commonwealth acted diligently
in opposing her motion. Therefore, the time necessary to hear
and dispose of her motion is excludable time.
(Trial Ct. Op., 12/19/18, at 3-4).
Accordingly, because the delay in bringing Kufrovich to trial was caused
by her own failure to inform the offices of the District Attorney and Clerk of
Courts of her multiple changes in residence and by her filing and litigation of
the Rule 600 motion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
Kufrovich’s right to a speedy trial was not violated.
B.
Kufrovich next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her
DUI conviction.4 Kufrovich acknowledges that the testimony of an expert
____________________________________________
4 A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presents a question of law and
is subject to plenary review.
In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must
determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all
elements of the offense. Additionally, we may not reweigh the
evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact
finder. The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it
links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
The factfinder is free to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence presented.
Commonwealth v. Vela-Garrett, 2021 WL 1586404 at *2 (Pa. Super. filed
Apr. 23, 2021) (citations omitted).
-8-
J-S10035-21
witness is not mandatory to establish impairment but argues that evidence of
her impairment and inability to drive safely is lacking in this case. Kufrovich
contends that her driving during the incident was not erratic and she
characterizes the police officers’ testimony regarding her drug use as
conjecture where there were no test results to corroborate their assertions.
As noted, Kufrovich was convicted of driving under the influence of a
drug or combination of drugs to a degree that impaired her ability to safely
drive. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2). In Commonwealth v. Griffith, 32 A.3d
1231 (Pa. 2011), our Supreme Court determined that expert testimony is not
required to establish that the defendant’s inability to drive safely was caused
by ingestion of a drug. See id. at 1238. The Court recognized that although
such testimony may be helpful or possibly necessary to establish causation
under some circumstances, it is not a mandatory in all cases. See id.The trial court rejected Kufrovich’s sufficiency claim because the
evidence clearly established her subsection 3802(d)(2) violation finding:
. . . The Commonwealth presented the credible testimony of two
officers who were present during the incident. They testified as
to [Kufrovich’s] body tremors, [her] accelerated rate of speech,
and how [she] sped towards the stop in which the officers were
engaged in. Officer Stamets testified as to [Kufrovich’s] failure to
complete the field sobriety tests in a satisfactory manner and how
[she] refused to take a blood test. [He] further testified that
[Kufrovich] admitted to him she snorted [methamphetamine] that
morning and he observed signs of a stimulant, as well as white
powder on her nose.
(Trial Ct. Op., 9/18/20, at 4).
-9-
J-S10035-21
We agree with the trial court that the evidence presented at trial was
sufficient to establish Kufrovich was under the influence of a drug or
combination of drugs to a degree that impaired her ability to safely drive. Two
experienced police officers closely observed her behavior, demeanor,
unsteadiness and inability to perform field sobriety tests, all of which led them
to request that she submit to a blood draw. The police officers testified
consistently with one another that based on their training and experience,
they believed that Kufrovich was under the influence of methamphetamine.
Kufrovich also had a white substance in her nostril and she admitted to
snorting methamphetamine on the morning of the incident. Although the
Commonwealth was unable to corroborate the police officers’ observations
and Kufrovich’s own admission with test results because she refused to submit
to a blood draw, the evidence of her impairment was nevertheless substantial
and sufficient to support her DUI conviction.
C.
Kufrovich next contends the Commonwealth failed to establish that she
drove with a blood alcohol content (BAC) of at least 0.02 percent or under the
influence of a controlled substance, as it relates to her DUS conviction.5
Kufrovich argues that because the police officers failed to secure a search
____________________________________________
5 Kufrovich’s argument is inartfully framed and the trial court appropriately
interpreted it as a sufficiency of the evidence claim, as she challenges the
elements of DUS.
- 10 -
J-S10035-21
warrant to obtain a blood draw, there is no evidence demonstrating the
required minimum BAC or that she had ingested drugs. However, her
contention ignores that a specific blood alcohol concentration is not needed
for the Commonwealth to obtain a DUS conviction.
The relevant subsection of the DUS statute, 1543(b)(1.1), provides for
“a fine of $1,000 and a ninety-day minimum term of imprisonment, applicable
when the motorist drove with a DUI-related suspended license and has a blood
alcohol concentration of at least .02%, or any amount of a controlled
substance in his blood, or refuses testing of blood or breath.”
Commonwealth v. Eid, 2021 WL 1683279, at *3 (Pa. filed Apr. 29, 2021)
(emphasis added).
Here, it is plain from the record that Kufrovich drove with some amount
of a controlled substance in her blood where two experienced police officers
testified to the obvious signs of her drug use and she freely admitted to
snorting methamphetamine that morning. Because such evidence was
sufficient, we affirm Kufrovich’s DUS conviction.6
____________________________________________
6 The trial court appears to have based its decision on the language of the
DUS statute providing that the Commonwealth is not required to prove a BAC
of at least 0.02 percent where a defendant refused blood or breath testing.
(See Trial Ct. Op., 9/18/20, at 5). Although our rationale differs from the trial
court, we may affirm the conviction on any basis. See Commonwealth v.
Doty, 48 A.3d 451, 456 (Pa. Super. 2012).
We further note that our Supreme Court has stated, in light of the United
States Supreme Court’s holding in Birchfield v. North Dakota,136 S.Ct.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
- 11 -
J-S10035-21
D.
Finally, because this issue is apparent from the record, we will sua
sponte address the legality of Kufrovich’s sentence for the DUS conviction.
See Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 242 A.3d 667, 673 (Pa. Super. 2020)
(“The legality of a criminal sentence is non-waivable, and this Court may raise
and review an illegal sentence sua sponte.”).7
As noted, Kufrovich was sentenced in accordance with the DUS statute
to a term of 90 days’ incarceration and a fine of $1,000.00. In Eid, supra,
our Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of this sentencing
provision:
In order to afford sufficient notice for due process purposes,
a sentencing statute must specify the range of available sentences
with sufficient clarity. . . . We hold that the absence of a maximum
term renders the pertinent DUS sentencing provision
unconstitutionally vague and inoperable for the time being. We
leave it to the General Assembly to remedy this impediment, if it
so chooses, either by amending the statute to provide for a
maximum term of imprisonment or by expressly permitting flat
sentencing within a range not to exceed that maximum sentence.
____________________________________________
2160 (2016), that a defendant’s conviction “pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.
§ 1543(b)(1.1)(i) would be unlawful to the extent that his punishment was
predicated solely upon his refusal to consent to a warrantless blood test.” Eid,
supra at *4. The Court citied Birchfield, which distinguished blood draws
from breath tests as more invasive and held: “Because breath tests are
significantly less intrusive than blood tests . . . a breath test, but not a blood
test, may be administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk
driving.” Birchfield, supra at 2185. We, therefore, do not rely on Kufrovich’s
refusal to submit to a blood test alone to affirm her DUS conviction.
7 Because the legality of a sentence raises a question of a law, our scope of
review is plenary and our standard of review is de novo. See id.
- 12 -
J-S10035-21
Id. at *10 (citations omitted). The Court upheld the defendant’s DUS
conviction and the imposition of a $1,000.00 fine for the DUS violation but
vacated the incarceration portion of his sentence for that offense. See id.
Because the 90-day incarceration provision of Kufrovich’s sentence for
the DUS offense is illegal, we vacate that portion of her sentence only. We
affirm her convictions and the judgement of sentence in all other respects,
including the $1,000.00 fine for the DUS violation. Because we are able to
vacate the DUS sentence of imprisonment without disturbing the overall
sentencing scheme, as the 90-day term was to run concurrently with the DUI
sentence, we need not remand. See Commonwealth v. Thur, 906 A.2d
552, 569, appeal denied, 946 A.2d 687 (Pa. 2008).
Convictions affirmed. Judgment of sentence vacated as to the term of
incarceration for the DUS offense only. Judgement of sentence affirmed in all
other respects. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/9/2021
- 13 -