Jones, Q. v. Cobbs, D. ( 2021 )

J-S15035-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
QUENTIN JONES AND DENEEN JONES : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL : PENNSYLVANIA
REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE ESTATE :
OF IRENE ABBEY :
:
Appellants :
:
:
v. : No. 1045 WDA 2020
:
:
DARLENE COBBS AND PITTSBURGH :
CARE PARTNERSHIP, INC. :
Appeal from the Order Entered September 3, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at
No(s): GD--18-007848
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: JUNE 11, 2021
Quentin Jones and Deneen Jones (Plaintiffs), individually and as
personal representatives for the Estate of Irene Abbey (Decedent), appeal
from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court)
granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants Darlene Cobbs and
Pittsburgh Care Partnership, Inc. (collectively, Defendants) in a motor vehicle
negligence action. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.
This case arises out of an accident that occurred on April 14, 2017, in
the City of Duquesne, when Ms. Cobbs lost control of a shuttle van that she
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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was driving for her employer, Pittsburgh Care Partnership, Inc., and crashed
it into at least one parked car and a building. At the time, Ms. Cobbs was
transporting senior citizens from a Pittsburgh Care Partnership, Inc. day
facility to their residences. Two senior citizens, Decedent and Nathaniel White,
were riding in the van when the accident occurred, and they and Ms. Cobbs
were injured and hospitalized as a result of the accident. Decedent passed
away subsequent to the accident.
On June 19, 2018, Plaintiffs commenced this survival and wrongful
death action against Defendants, seeking damages for the injuries that
Decedent suffered in the accident and for her death, which Plaintiffs alleged
was caused by those injuries. In their answer, Defendants admitted that the
accident occurred and Decedent was a passenger in the van at the time, but
alleged that that Ms. Cobbs suffered a sudden medical event that caused the
collision and asserted the defense of sudden medical emergency. Defendants’
Answer and New Matter ¶¶6-7, 64. During discovery, Plaintiffs took the
depositions of the only living witnesses who were in the van at the time of the
accident, Mr. White1 and Ms. Cobbs.
Mr. White testified that for several minutes before the accident, Ms.
Cobbs was mumbling, repeating herself, and shaking and bobbing her head
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1 Mr. White also filed a personal injury action against Defendants that was
consolidated with this action. Mr. White’s action was settled in April 2020 and
he is not a party to this appeal.
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while she was driving. White Dep. at 26-34, 37, 52-54, 66-68. Mr. White
testified that he asked Ms. Cobbs if she was all right and that after she did not
respond, he asked her to pull the van over. Id. at 34, 55. He testified that
Ms. Cobbs then pulled the van over and stopped and he unbuckled his seat
belt and got up to check on her, but that when he got up, the van started up
again and crashed into the car that was in front of it. Id. at 34-38, 54-55.
Ms. Cobbs testified that she was told by the doctors treating her after
the accident that she had had a seizure and that she had no memory of the
accident or of anything that happened in the week before the accident. Cobbs
Dep. at 29, 34-35, 54-57, 87-89, 94, 107-10, 112-15, 119-22. Ms. Cobbs
admitted, however, that she had hypertension and diabetes for years before
the accident, that she knew that those conditions, if not properly monitored
and controlled, could cause a seizure or stroke and affected her ability to safely
drive, and that she had a mini-stroke in 2005 when her blood pressure was
elevated. Id. at 59-67, 70-84, 88-89, 93.2
On July 20, 2020, Defendants moved for summary judgment on the
ground that Ms. Cobbs suffered a seizure at the time of the accident and that
the sudden medical emergency defense therefore barred liability. Plaintiffs,
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2 Ms. Cobbs’ medical records were produced in discovery and are referenced
in her deposition, but it appears that neither party submitted any medical
records or medical evidence to the trial court in connection with the summary
judgment motion and no medical records or medical opinions appear in the
trial court record.
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in response, did not dispute that Ms. Cobbs suffered a medical event at the
time of the accident, but argued that there were material issues of facts as to
the suddenness and foreseeability of the medical event that precluded
summary judgment based on the deposition testimony of Mr. White and Ms.
Cobbs. By order entered September 3, 2020, the trial court granted
Defendants’ motion and entered judgment in Defendants’ favor on the ground
that liability was barred by the sudden medical emergency defense, concluding
that there was no evidence from which a jury could find that Ms. Cobbs knew
or should have known that she was suffering a seizure prior to the accident.
Trial Court Order, 9/3/20; Trial Court Opinion at 7-8.
Plaintiffs timely appealed. In this appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment both because the sudden medical
emergency defense is an affirmative defense on which Defendants bore the
burden of proving the suddenness and unforeseeability of the seizure and
because there was evidence from which a jury could find that the seizure was
not sudden and unforeseen. We agree that both of these grounds bar
summary judgment here.
Our standard of review of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
is de novo and the scope of review is plenary. American Southern
Insurance Co. v. Halbert, 203 A.3d 223, 226 (Pa. Super. 2019). Summary
judgment may be granted only where there is no genuine issue of any material
fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense or where,
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after the completion of relevant discovery, the party who will bear the burden
of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts sufficient to prove all
elements of the cause of action or defense. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2; US Coal Corp.
v. Dinning, 222 A.3d 431, 437-38 (Pa. Super. 2019); Renna v. PPL Electric
Utilities, Inc., 207 A.3d 355, 367-68 (Pa. Super. 2019). In considering
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact or sufficient evidence of the
elements of a cause of action or defense, we must view the record in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, and must resolve all doubts against
the moving party. US Coal Corp., 222 A.3d at 437; Renna, 207 A.3d at 367;
Shiner v. Ralston, 64 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2013). Summary judgment
cannot be granted in favor of a party who bears the burden of proof based on
its own oral testimony or the testimony of witnesses other than the opposing
party and its experts, even if that testimony is uncontradicted, because the
credibility of such testimony is for the jury. Xtreme Caged Combat v. Zarro,
247 A.3d 42, 51 (Pa. Super. 2021); Shiner, 64 A.3d at 6.
The sole basis on which Defendants sought summary judgment and on
which the trial court granted summary judgment was the sudden medical
emergency defense. Pennsylvania law recognizes the sudden medical
emergency defense, which negates negligence and precludes liability where a
motor vehicle accident is caused by the defendant’s sudden and unforeseeable
incapacitation or loss of consciousness. Shiner, 64 A.3d at 4-5. The sudden
medical emergency defense, however, is an affirmative defense as to which
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the defendant has the burden of proving both that the accident was caused
by incapacitation or unconsciousness and that the incapacitation or
unconsciousness was sudden and unforeseen. Id. at 4-7.
It was therefore Defendants’ burden to prove not only that the accident
was caused by Ms. Cobbs having a seizure, but also that it was undisputed
that she had no prior symptoms while driving or reason to know that she could
experience a sudden seizure or loss of ability to control the van that she was
driving. There was no admission by Plaintiffs that Ms. Cobbs’ seizure came on
so suddenly that she could not safely park the van and no admission that Ms.
Cobbs was unaware that she had a medical condition that put her at risk of a
having a seizure. Because Defendants, not Plaintiffs, bear the burden of proof
on this issue and a jury would be free to disbelieve Defendants’ assertions,
summary judgment could not be granted in Defendants’ favor on the sudden
medical emergency defense, even if there were no evidence in the summary
judgment record refuting Defendants’ contention that the seizure was sudden
and unforeseen. Shiner, 64 A.3d at 5-7.
Moreover, there was evidence submitted by Plaintiffs in response to the
summary judgment motion from which a jury could find that Ms. Cobbs had
notice that she was impaired with sufficient time to safely pull the van over
and put it in park before she lost control. Mr. White testified that Ms. Cobbs
was acting strangely, mumbling, repeating herself, and shaking and bobbing
her head, for two to four minutes while she was driving and still capable of
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competently operating and parking the van. White Dep. at 26-38, 52-57, 66-
68. Indeed, there was no evidence that the seizure came on without any
warning. Ms. Cobbs testified that she could not remember the accident or
anything leading up to it in the day or even the week before. Cobbs Dep. at
29, 34-35, 88-89, 94, 107-10, 112-15, 119-22. In addition, Ms. Cobbs
admitted that she knew long before the day of the accident that she had
medical conditions that could cause a seizure or stroke. Id. at 59-67, 70-84,
88-89, 93.
Because it was Defendants’ burden to prove that Ms. Cobbs’ seizure that
caused the accident was sudden and unforeseen and the evidence in the
summary judgment record would not require a jury to find that her seizure
was sudden and unforeseen, there were genuine disputes of material fact that
precluded summary judgment. Shiner, 64 A.3d at 5-7. We therefore
conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
Defendants and reverse.
Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this Memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/11/2021
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