Hart, J. v. Phila. Inquirer ( 2021 )

J-S13017-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JOHN HART : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, PBC :
:
Appellee : No. 2034 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered August 31, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No(s): No. 200501614
BEFORE: OLSON, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: JUNE 11, 2021
Appellant, John Hart, appeals from the order entered in the Philadelphia
County Court of Common Pleas, dismissing the action he commenced by filing
a praecipe to issue writ of summons against Appellee, Philadelphia Inquirer,
PBC. We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.
[Appellant] commenced this action against [Appellee] by
filing a [pro se praecipe for] writ of summons on May 26,
2020. Contemporaneously with the filing of the writ of
summons, [Appellant] filed a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis. Ninety-seven days later, on August 31, 2020, a
review of the docket showed no complaint had been filed.
Accordingly, by order dated, and docketed, August 31,
2020, this case was dismissed consistent with Pa.R.C.P.
240(j)(2).
On September 11, 2020, [Appellant] filed a motion to vacate
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S13017-21
in which he requested [that the trial c]ourt vacate its August
31, 2020 order because he believed the Courts of Common
Pleas remained closed due to the COVID-19 Pandemic and
that such closure relieved him of his obligation to file a
complaint. [Appellant] further alleged he now has sufficient
funds to permit him to pay the requisite filing fees. The
motion to vacate sought three forms of relief from [the trial
c]ourt: 1) vacate the August 31, 2020 order dismissing his
case, 2) dismiss his request to proceed in forma pauperis,
and 3) allow his case to proceed while he pays any
necessary filing fees.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed November 3, 2020, at 1-2) (internal citations,
footnote, and some capitalization omitted).
Before the court ruled on the pro se motion to vacate, Appellant timely
filed a pro se notice of appeal on September 28, 2020. On October 2, 2020,
the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of
matters complained of on appeal. Despite the filing of a notice of appeal, the
court also dismissed the pro se motion to vacate as moot on October 9, 2020.
On October 22, 2020, Appellant timely filed his pro se Rule 1925(b) statement.
Appellant’s current counsel entered his appearance in this Court on December
28, 2020.
Appellant now raises the following issues for our review:
Whether the trial court erred in 1) dismissing the writ of
summons and 2) denying the motion to vacate the order
dismissing the writ on mootness grounds during a
pandemic, where Appellant was proceeding pro se, after
numerous orders were entered extending various applicable
deadlines, and without adequately considering that the
motion to vacate was filed immediately after Appellant
received notice of the dismissal, in which Appellant brought
to the trial court’s attention that the statute of limitations
had expired on the action, thereby precluding any judicial
-2-
J-S13017-21
review of Appellant’s claims?
(Appellant’s Brief at vi).
On appeal, Appellant acknowledges that Rule 240 “provides the trial
court with discretion to dismiss an action for failure to file a complaint after
ninety days, but it does not require the trial court to do so.” (Id. at 1).
Appellant insists the trial court should not have dismissed his action under the
circumstances, where the “courts have issued numerous … COVID-19 related
suspension and tolling orders during the last year.”1 (Id. at 1-2). Moreover,
Appellant emphasizes it was “difficult enough for an attorney to comply with
all of the various” judicial emergency orders, but Appellant “was acting pro
se.” (Id. at 3).
Appellant also claims the court should not have denied his motion to
vacate as moot. Appellant relies on Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3) for the proposition
____________________________________________
1 On March 16, 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared “a general,
statewide judicial emergency until April 14, 2020, on account of COVID-19.”
In re General Statewide Judicial Emergency, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 228 A.3d
1281, 1281 (2020). The Order authorized the president judges in the
individual judicial districts to “suspend time calculations for the purposes of
time computation relevant to court cases … as well as time deadlines[.]” Id.The Supreme Court extended the judicial emergency in several supplemental
orders, directing that the emergency shall cease on June 1, 2020. See In re
General Statewide Judicial Emergency, ___ Pa. ___, 234 A.3d 408(2020). Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s directives, the President Judge of
Philadelphia County issued an order explaining that “courts are physically
closed to the public due to the health crisis created by COVID-19,” but
Philadelphia’s “electronic filing system is open for the filing and docketing of
all legal papers.” First Judicial District Administrative Order, No. 29 of 2020,
filed 4/8/20.
-3-
J-S13017-21
that his filing of a notice of appeal did not render the motion moot; rather, the
court retained jurisdiction to rule on the motion, which effectively “served as
a motion for reconsideration asking the trial court to rescind its prior order
and permit Appellant to file a complaint.” (Id. at 6). Based upon the
foregoing, Appellant concludes this Court must reverse the order dismissing
the action and remand for the filing of a complaint. We disagree.
“Initially, the matter before us requires that we interpret a Pennsylvania
Rule of Civil Procedure.” Roth v. Ross, 85 A.3d 590, 592 (Pa.Super. 2014).
“This presents a question of law, for which our standard of review is de novo
and our scope of review is plenary. Therefore, we are not constrained by the
interpretation provided by the trial court.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Rule 240 governs actions commenced by writ of summons as follows:
Rule 240. In Forma Pauperis
* * *
(j)(1) If, simultaneous with the commencement of
an action or proceeding or the taking of an appeal, a party
has filed a petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis,
the court prior to acting upon the petition may dismiss the
action, proceeding or appeal if the allegation of poverty is
untrue or if it is satisfied that the action, proceeding or
appeal is frivolous.
(2) If the petitioner commences the action by
writ of summons, the court shall not act on the petition for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis until the complaint is
filed. If the complaint has not been filed within ninety
days of the filing of the petition, the court may
dismiss the action pursuant to subdivision (j)(1).
Pa.R.C.P. 240(j)(1), (2) (emphasis added).
-4-
J-S13017-21
Additionally, Rule 1701 governs a trial court’s authority to proceed in a
matter after the filing of a notice of appeal:
Rule 1701. Effect of Appeal Generally
(a) General rule.—Except as otherwise prescribed by
these rules, after an appeal is taken or review of a
quasijudicial order is sought, the trial court or other
government unit may no longer proceed further in the
matter.
(b) Authority of a trial court or other government
unit after appeal.—After an appeal is taken or review of a
quasijudicial order is sought, the trial court or other
government unit may:
(1) Take such action as may be necessary to preserve
the status quo, correct formal errors in papers relating to
the matter, cause the record to be transcribed, approved,
filed, and transmitted, grant leave to appeal in forma
pauperis, grant supersedeas, and take other action
permitted or required by these rules or otherwise ancillary
to the appeal or petition for review proceeding.
* * *
(3) Grant reconsideration of the order which is the
subject of the appeal or petition, if:
(i) an application for reconsideration of the
order is filed in the trial court or other government unit
within the time provided or prescribed by law; and
(ii) an order expressly granting reconsideration
of such prior order is filed in the trial court or other
government unit within the time prescribed by these
rules for the filing of a notice of appeal or petition for
review of a quasijudicial order with respect to such order,
or within any shorter time provided or prescribed by law
for the granting of reconsideration.
Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a), (b)(1), (3).
-5-
J-S13017-21
Instantly, Appellant filed his praecipe to issue writ of summons and
motion to proceed in forma pauperis on May 26, 2020. No further action
occurred until August 31, 2020. At that time, the trial court inspected the
docket, saw that Appellant had not filed a complaint, and dismissed the action
pursuant to Rule 240(j)(2). Under the applicable standard and scope of
review, the court did not err in dismissing the action where Appellant failed to
file a complaint within ninety (90) days of the filing of the request to proceed
in forma pauperis. See Roth, supra; Pa.R.C.P. 240(j)(2).
Regarding Appellant’s argument that the COVID-19 Pandemic somehow
excuses his failure to file a complaint, the court observed:
The [c]ourt’s electronic filing system operated continuously
throughout the COVID-19 Pandemic. More than a month
before [Appellant] commenced this action, the Philadelphia
Court of Common Pleas Civil Trial Division had resumed
ruling on non-emergency motions. On May 27, 2020, the
Supreme Court declared the Statewide Judicial Emergency
would cease effective June 1, 2020. In August of 2020, the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas announced that
criminal jury trials would resume on September 6, 2020 and
civil non-jury trials would also occur in September.
While this Court does not opine on the genuineness of his
belief, [Appellant’s] belief the Philadelphia Court of Common
Pleas was “not fully operational” was unreasonable in light
of the facts. First, [Appellant] utilized the electronic
filing system on May 26, 2020 to file his Praecipe for
Writ of Summons and his Motion to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis. The day after [Appellant] commenced this
action, the Supreme Court announced the end of the
Statewide Judicial Emergency. By the time [the trial c]ourt
dismissed [Appellant’s] case pursuant to Rule 240(j) on
August 31, 2020, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas
had announced the resumption of trials. Accordingly,
although [Appellant] may have believed the COVID-19
-6-
J-S13017-21
Pandemic somehow relieved him of his obligation to file a
complaint and prosecute this action, such a belief was
manifestly unreasonable; the fact [Appellant] is proceeding
pro se is of no moment.
(Trial Court Opinion at 3-4) (emphasis added) (internal citations and footnote
omitted). We agree with the court’s analysis, and we reiterate that Appellant’s
status as a pro se litigant conferred no special benefits upon him. See
Norman for Estate of Shearlds v. Temple University Health System,
208 A.3d 1115, 1118-19 (Pa.Super. 2019), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 141
S.Ct. 301, 208 L.Ed.2d 53 (2020) (stating “any person choosing to represent
himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his
lack of expertise and legal training will be his undoing”).
To the extent Appellant also relies upon Rule 1701(b)(3) for the
proposition that the court should not have classified his motion to vacate as
moot, this subsection of the rule allows a court to grant reconsideration of an
order that is the subject of the appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3). Here, the
court specifically determined that dismissal of the action was proper, and the
arguments in Appellant’s motion to vacate did not warrant relief. (See Trial
Court Opinion at 2, 4). As such, Rule 1701(b)(3) was not applicable to the
court’s disposition. Rather, Rule 1701(b)(1) permitted the court to dismiss
the motion to vacate as moot, where the court’s action effectively preserved
the status quo pending appeal. Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief
on any of his claims, and we affirm the order dismissing the action.
-7-
J-S13017-21
Order affirmed.
Judge Pellegrini joins this memorandum.
Judge Olson concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/11/21
-8-