In the Int. of: G.M.K., Appeal of: Clinton Co. CYS ( 2021 )

J-A07001-21
2021 PA Super 121IN THE INTEREST OF: G.M.K., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: CLINTON COUNTY :
CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES :
:
:
: No. 1220 MDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered September 17, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-18-DP-0000036-2015
BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED: JUNE 14, 2021
Clinton County Children and Youth Services (“CCCYS” or the “Agency”)
appeals from the September 17, 2020 order returning legal and physical
custody of G.M.K. to his maternal uncle, M.K. (“Maternal Uncle”), effective
September 26, 2020, after G.M.K. was discharged by a treatment facility
against medical advice due to violent behavior. After review, we affirm.
G.M.K. was born in October 2009. His mother was incarcerated in
Colorado and had not been involved with the family since 2015. His father is
unknown. Since he was six months old, G.M.K. has been raised by his
maternal grandmother and Maternal Uncle, either jointly or separately. The
child was first adjudicated dependent on September 16, 2015, due to his
physical aggression, defiance, and lack of coping skills. Thereafter, he was
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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diagnosed with a litany of conditions including Conduct Disorder, Disinherited
Attachment Disorder of Childhood, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder,
Child or Adolescent Antisocial Behavior, Mood Dysregulation Disorder and
Autism Spectrum Disorder. Physicians rated his disability as moderate to
severe, prescribed medication, behavioral health services, and therapeutic
support staff.
G.M.K. remained in the legal and physical custody of Maternal Uncle,
and over the next one and one-half years, the juvenile court conducted regular
permanency review hearings. Maternal Uncle’s compliance with the
permanency plan ranged between substantial and full. However, during the
summer of 2016, the mental health professionals treating G.M.K placed him
at Penn Highlands Dubois Behavioral Health Center for several months. Legal
and physical custody continued to reside with Maternal Uncle and G.M.K.
returned to his care during the winter of 2016. On June 26, 2017, the juvenile
court terminated its supervision of G.M.K.. However, it “directed the Agency
to continue to provide and implement services for the family.” Juvenile Court
Opinion, 10/7/20, at 5.
Approximately six months later, the Agency filed a second dependency
petition asserting that G.M.K. had threatened to commit suicide and displayed
behavioral problems that required him to transfer from public school to the
Northwest Human Services School. Following an evidentiary hearing, the
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juvenile court adjudicated G.M.K. dependent on January 31, 2018.1 “The
Order maintained legal and physical custody with the maternal uncle and
directed the services presently ongoing be maintained.” Id.The child’s condition continued to deteriorate and, following a
subsequent hospitalization and the appointment of the guardian ad litem as a
medical decision-maker, G.M.K. was transferred to a therapeutic foster home
on May 7, 2018. The following day, the court entered an order that, inter alia:
granted contact between Maternal Uncle and G.M.K. as directed by Denise E.
Feger, PhD, who administered the child’s mental health program, and denied
the Agency’s request to prohibit Maternal Uncle’s contact with G.M.K. The
court also “appointed the Agency as Medical Decision[-]Maker.” Id. at 7.
After the child continued to regress in the therapeutic foster home, on
June 14, 2018, the court “reluctantly” transferred G.M.K. to Southwood
Treatment Center, a residential treatment facility. Id. at 8. On August 22,
2018, the court returned the medical-decision-making rights over G.M.K. to
Maternal Uncle. G.M.K.’s aggressive and violent behavior decreased during
the fall of 2018 but the Agency recommended against returning G.M.K. to
Maternal Uncle’s care because there had been an insufficient number of home
visits while the child was hospitalized. The juvenile court “implemented a
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1 As outlined in the body of this opinion, the ensuing two-year history of
G.M.K.’s mental health treatment is marked by both significant progress and
tragic regression. It is also marred by the persistent adversarial tension
between the Agency and Maternal Uncle.
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schedule of ‘home visits’” that would “culminate in [G.M.K.]’s return to
[M]aternal [U]ncle’s care and residence in March, 2019.” Id. at 9.
Unfortunately, the anticipated reunification never materialized.
G.M.K.’s condition declined, and the court ultimately abandoned its schedule
of home visits and maintained G.M.K.’s placement at Southwood. It reasoned,
G.M.K. “had decompensated at Southwood after the extensive home visitation
schedule was implemented and had been ongoing for several months.” Id.
Significantly, the relationship between Maternal Uncle and the Agency
continued to deteriorate during this period. As reported by the juvenile court,
The Agency accused Maternal Uncle of using alcohol and
marijuana while transporting [G.M.K.] for visits. [Maternal Uncle]
submitted to a drug test administered by the Agency[,] which was
negative for all substances. The Agency also requested a
Behavioral Health Evaluation of Maternal Uncle due to the
Agency’s allegations that [his] “ongoing outbursts” toward Agency
personnel and [his] refusal to discuss [G.M.K.]’s medication
management with Southwood staff.
Id. (cleaned up). Shortly after this setback, the juvenile court appointed a
psychologist who had previously had contact with G.M.K., Robert Meacham,
to review the matter and provide fresh recommendations to the court. Id. at
9-10.
Following the appointment of Mr. Meacham, Maternal Uncle’s situation
improved. With the Agency’s assistance, Maternal Uncle made preparations
to relocate to McKean County, Pennsylvania to utilize family support in
parenting G.M.K. The juvenile court noted Maternal Uncle’s continued concern
for his nephew’s wellbeing, as exemplified by his frequent contact with G.M.K.
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and his participation in a ten-week anger management course. As described
by the juvenile court, Maternal Uncle had been “working diligently and
effectively in this therapeutic process and has been making significant strides
and improvements in managing his anger.” Id. at 10.
As a result of these improvements, on May 20, 2019, G.M.K. was
released from Southwood and again placed in the legal and physical custody
of Maternal Uncle. However, G.M.K. regressed several weeks later and was
returned to Southwood due to his physically violent behavior. The court
transferred him to the Beacon Light STAR Program (“Beacon Light”) one
month later. Throughout this period, the Agency was adamant that it was not
appropriate to return G.M.K. to Maternal Uncle’s residence in the child’s
condition at that time. Six months later, at the request of the Agency, the
juvenile court “reluctantly” suspended Maternal Uncle’s contact with G.M.K.
for eight weeks because the Agency alleged that he was a trigger for G.M.K.’s
violent behavior. Id. at 12. On March 17, 2020, the juvenile court lifted the
no-contact condition in order to permit telephone contact between G.M.K. and
his uncle.
Shortly after his contact with G.M.K. was reinstated, Maternal Uncle filed
a petition to remove G.M.K. from Beacon Light due to concerns related to
COVID-19. Despite the court’s concerns, it maintained G.M.K.’s placement at
Beacon Light but directed the facility to draft a list of services that G.M.K.
would need if it became necessary to discharge the child to home during the
pandemic. The facility balked at this directive because it had not
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recommended discharge. As the trial court later articulated, “Beacon Light’s
response to this [c]ourt’s direction was a symptom of this [c]ourt’s later
struggles with this facility.” Id. at 13-14.
Fortunately for G.M.K., the Agency was able to provide the requested
information to the juvenile court independently and, in June 2020, “the court
directed the Agency to continue planning for [G.M.K.]’s discharge to [the]
home of the maternal uncle.” Id. at 14. In September 2020, Beacon Light
provided the juvenile court notice of its intent to discharge G.M.K. without a
discharge plan and against medical advice, due to his physical and violent
behavior.
The following week, after an extrajudicial meeting to discuss G.M.K.’s
impending discharge from Beacon Light and potential future placement, see
N.T., 9/15/20, at 3-5, the juvenile court conducted a status hearing via Zoom
due to COVID-19. Maternal Uncle was present remotely and represented by
counsel. G.M.K., who was initially present remotely, was represented by a
guardian ad litem, who supported placement with Maternal Uncle.2 Id. at 3-
4, 34. Among other witnesses, the court heard from Dr. Ernesto Roederer,
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2 Notably, the guardian ad litem argued in support of return to Maternal Uncle.
N.T., 9/15/20, at 86-87 (arguing, in relevant part, “I really -- I understand
where the Agency is coming from as far as safety of the community, safety to
[G.M.K.]. But the definition of insanity is trying the same thing multiple times
and expecting a different result. This case is a case study in the failures of
congregate care, in my opinion. There has been little to no progress made at
Beacon Light.”). Subsequent to order of this Court directing he file a brief, he
also submitted a brief to this Court in support of that position and the juvenile
court’s order.
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G.M.K.’s treating psychiatrist at Beacon Light who recommended G.M.K. be
placed at George Junior Republic, and Mr. Meacham who supported
reunification with Maternal Uncle.3 While the agency endorsed Dr. Roederer’s
recommendation, Maternal Uncle supported Mr. Meacham’s recommendation
to return G.M.K. to Maternal Uncle’s custody in McKean County. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the court ordered, among other things, that G.M.K.
be returned to the legal and physical custody of Maternal Uncle upon discharge
from Beacon Light. Id. at 87.
The court subsequently explained its rationale in elevating Mr.
Meacham’s recommendation over that of Dr. Roederer as follows:
Dr. Roederer’s contact with [G.M.K.] was limited to
approximately three (3) or four (4) contacts over the course of
over a year that [G.M.K.] was at Beacon Light. Dr. Roederer’s
testimony consisted of conclus[ory] statements without factual
discussion to support said conclus[ory] statements. Dr. Roederer
had opined at an earlier hearing that the therapy at Beacon Light
was beginning to be effective with this child which proved to be
absolutely not true. However, the Agency utilized Dr. Roederer’s
statement to argue to this [c]ourt to maintain [G.M.K.] at the
Beacon Light facility. This [c]ourt did not believe Dr. Roederer’s
testimony offered at the hearing of September [15], 2020.
Instead[,] this [c]ourt accepted as true and factual, the testimony
of Robert J. Meacham, M.S., Licensed Psychologist. Psychologist
Meacham had been involved in this child’s life for several years,
being utilized by this [c]ourt to attempt to obtain the best possible
treatment for [G.M.K.]. Psychologist Meacham recommended
strongly to this [c]ourt not to place this child at George Junior
Republic and had specific reasons for that recommendation. As
stated above, this [c]ourt believed the facts as presented by
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3 The court additionally heard the testimony of Chelsea Heatley, G.M.K.’s
therapist at Beacon Light, and Jill Yablonski of George Junior Republic.
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Psychologist Meacham and the opinions and recommendations of
Psychologist Meacham.
Juvenile Court Opinion, 10/7/20, at 18.
On September 17, 2020, the court entered the above-captioned order
memorializing its conclusion.4 This timely appeal followed.5 The Agency
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) by attaching a concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal to its notice of appeal, and the juvenile court
authored a cogent opinion addressing those issues.6
The Agency raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the [juvenile] court erred and abused its discretion by
placing the dependent child in the legal and physical custody of
maternal uncle and improperly disregarding the testimony of the
child’s treating psychiatrist that said placement would present a
great safety risk and was against medical advice.
2. Whether the [juvenile] court’s decision to place the dependent
child in the legal and physical custody of maternal uncle was
against the weight of the evidence in that the [juvenile] court
improperly disregarded the testimony of the child’s treating
psychiatrist that said placement would present a great safety risk
and was against medical advice and erroneously concluded that
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4 Pursuant to motion of the Agency, by order dated September 29, 2020, and
entered September 30, 2020, the court clarified its order “to reflect that
medical and educational decision-making rights shall transfer to [Maternal
Uncle], effective September 26, 2020.” Order, 9/30/20, at ¶2.
5 The juvenile court denied the Agency’s application for stay pending appeal.
6 While the juvenile court complained that the Agency’s Rule 1925(b)
statement was too vague, we decline to find waiver because the issues stated
therein were readily discernible, as evidenced by the juvenile court’s thorough
opinion. See Juvenile Court Opinion, 10/7/20, at 18-21. Cf. Lineberger v.
Wyeth, 894 A.2d 141, 148 (Pa.Super. 2006) (citation omitted) (“When a
court has to guess what issues an appellant is appealing, that is not enough
for meaningful review.”).
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the court-appointed psychologist strongly recommended
placement with uncle.
3. Whether the trial court’s decision to place the dependent child
in the legal and physical custody of maternal uncle was erroneous
as a matter of law in light of the fact that the court failed to apply
the statuory [sic] requirement that said return be in the best
interest of the safety of the child, given that the [juvenile] court
improperly disregarded the testimony of the child’s treating
psychiatrist that said placement would present a great safety risk
and was against medical advice and erroneously concluded that
the court-appointed psychologist strongly recommended
placement with uncle.
Agency brief at 2-3. Maternal Uncle did not file a brief.
First, we first set forth our standard of review of the juvenile court order:
When reviewing a dependency case, we accept the trial court’s
findings of fact and credibility determinations that are supported
in the record. However, we are not required to accept the court’s
inferences or conclusions of law. In re R.J.T. , 9 A.3d 1179, 1190
(Pa. 2010). We review for an abuse of discretion. In Interest
of L.Z. [111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (Pa. 2015)].
In re N.S., 237 A.3d 546, 550 (Pa.Super. 2020). Phrased differently, “[t]he
trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is
likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the
evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation
omitted). “[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will
affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.” In re
Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
The Agency combines its issues for purposes of its brief and argues that
the court erred and abused its discretion with its order as to G.M.K.’s
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placement and/or custody upon discharge from Beacon Light.7 Agency brief
at 19. In its first two arguments, which we address collectively, the Agency
essentially challenges the court’s determination as to credibility and/or weight
of the evidence.
The Agency maintains that, “[w]hile the [juvenile] court has correctly
identified its latitude of discretion in evaluating the credibility of witnesses,”
the court erred in finding Dr. Roederer not credible in so far as the court’s
determination was not supported by the record. Id. It contends:
The [juvenile] court opinion identifies three reasons that it
did not find Dr. Roederer credible: (1) that his contact with the
child was limited to approximately three (3) or four (4) contacts
over the course of over a year that the child was at Beacon Light;
(2) that his testimony consisted of conclusionary statements
without factual discussion to support said conclusionary
statements; and (3) that he had opined at an earlier hearing that
the therapy at Beacon Light was beginning to be effective with this
child which proved to be absolutely not true. The [juvenile] court
also noted in its opinion a potential fourth reason for its
determination: that, in its view, “progress with the child’s therapy
was promised earlier this year by Beacon Light and Dr. Roederer,
Beacon Light now claims no progress was made, and Beacon Light
no longer desires the child at Beacon Light’s facility. Each of these
bases for the court’s decision, however, are unsupported by the
evidence and the [juvenile] court’s reliance thereon to discount
Dr. Roederer’s credibility was an abuse of its discretion.
Agency brief at 20-21 (emphasis in original) (citations to record omitted).
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7 The Agency combines all issues raised under one heading, suggesting this
was done for “ease of review . . . as they arise out of the same underlying
issues.” Agency brief at 19. While we note with disapproval that the Agency’s
brief fails to comply with the organizational and citation requirements
prescribed by our appellate rules, we decline to take any action as the defects
do not hamper our appellate review.
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Similarly, the Agency asserts that the court likewise erred in basing its
determination on what it found to be a “strong recommendation” by Mr.
Meacham. It argues that Mr. Meacham’s recommendation was, in fact,
qualified, i.e., the discharge to Maternal Uncle would involve uncertain risk
and was feasible only because it served G.M.K. better than the alternative
placement in George Junior Republic, whose COVID-19 protocols would have
impeded the child’s contact with Maternal Uncle. Id. at 25-26.
In rejecting the Agency’s arguments, the juvenile court succinctly
surmised as follows: “The answer to the Agency’s argument on the first two
(2) allegations . . . is that this [c]ourt did not believe Dr. Roederer or any of
the Agency’s evidence that was in conflict with Psychologist Meacham.”
Juvenile Court opinion, 10/7/20, at 19. We discern that the Agency’s
challenge to this determination is actually asking this Court to re-weigh the
evidence and/or re-assess the credibility of the witnesses. This we cannot do.
In accordance with the applicable standard of review, the juvenile court’s
determinations regarding credibility and weight of the evidence are not to be
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion or lack of support in the record. See
In re N.S., supra at 550; see also In re S.J.-L., 828 A.2d 352, 355
(Pa.Super. 2003).
Instantly, the certified record supports the juvenile court’s
determinations as to credibility and the weight of the evidence. First, the
Agency’s factual assertions regarding Dr. Roederer’s level of interaction with
G.M.K. are utterly ineffectual. While Dr. Roederer noted two additional
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contacts since the four initial contacts between G.M.K.’s admission in August
2019 and April 2020, and indicated that his partner, Dr. Craig Richman, “sees
the kiddos between the time,” Dr. Roederer nevertheless confirmed that he
delegated treatment authority to the team that provided the actual treatment,
and he was advised of “critical” information. N.T., 9/15/20, at 63-64, 66.
This testimony does not establish that the juvenile court disregarded any
significant facts. Likewise, as it relates to Dr. Roederer’s prior indication that
Beacon Light’s treatment was effective, the fact that he later accurately
identified a period of regression does not undermines the trial court’s
reference to the doctor’s initial statement in rendering its credibility
determination in favor of Mr. Meacham. Id. at 32, 47-50, 66.
Furthermore, when questioned by the guardian ad litem as to his
recommendation, Mr. Meacham supported his position with a persuasive
explanation.
[W]e have to do something. He can’t just stay at Beacon Light.
And my recommendation would be that we do what we can. I’m
not so sure that we have any option at this point. If I understand
what happens from what we were told on Friday, George Junior
Republic is not willing to accept [G.M.K.] under a continued path
toward reunification. One. Two, I don’t believe we’ve found any
other facility that would take him. So that leaves us with three,
return home with the possibility if we could get a couple of
overnights in, that Beacon Light would extend the stay there a
week or two or so that we could get a couple of visits in. To me,
that seems to be our only course of action. And I say that with all
recognition of the risks involved.
N.T., 9/15/20, at 26. Thus, while noting a “guarded prognosis,” Mr. Meacham
indicated no guaranteed outcome even if G.M.K. were to remain
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institutionalized. Id. at 15. In addition, he highlighted the involvement and
support of extended family in McKean County, a distinguishing factor from
when G.M.K. was previously returned to his uncle’s care. Id. at 10-11, 14-
15, 23. Mr. Meacham further referenced successful restraint training. Id. at
16, 22-23.
The forgoing testimony belies the Agency’s contention that Mr.
Meacham’s recommendation was tentative. The record bears out that Mr.
Meacham’s position was qualified only by the reality that Beacon Light placed
G.M.K. in an untenable situation and that both alternative placement options
involved risks. At no point in his testimony did the psychologist equivocate
from his preference to place the child with Maternal Uncle for the reasons
described above. As the certified record supports the juvenile court’s
assessment of the experts’ relative credibility and the weight of the evidence,
we do not disturb it. In re M.G., supra at, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004).
Finally, the Agency contends that the court erred in its application of
§ 6351 in excluding evidence that related to G.M.K.’s safety. See Agency
brief at 27-29. In short, it argues: “In this case, the [juvenile] court opinion
erroneously disregarded competent testimony as to the safety of the child, in
an effort to accelerate permanency, and its decision therefore did not
appropriately apply the safety component of a Section 6351 dispositional
analysis.” Id at 27 Invoking Dr. Roederer’s favorable testimony, the agency
specifically contended that the juvenile court “failed to appropriately balance
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the safety interest of G.M.K. with the other interests in the context of
reunification and it was in that fashion that it did not adhere to the
requirements set forth in Section 6351.” Id. at 28. It reasoned that, unless
G.M.K.'s safety could not be assured at Maternal Uncle's residence, placement
was not appropriate. The agency concluded: “Had the [juvenile] court
properly considered this evidence regarding [G.M.K.]’s safety interest, it . . .
would have ordered [G.M.K.]’s continued maintenance in a Residential
Treatment Facility such as George Junior Republic while ordering as intensive
efforts as possible under the COVID-19 mitigation framework to facilitate
reunification.” Id. at 29.
In addressing this issue concerning the authority to order G.M.K.’s
return to the legal and physical custody of Maternal Uncle, the juvenile court
reasoned:
This [c]ourt has found that [M]aternal [U]ncle is best able to
provide care, shelter and supervision and that the action to return
[G.M.K.] to [M]aternal [U]ncle is best suited to the safety,
protection, and physical, mental and moral welfare of [G.M.K.].
In deciding whether placement of the child remains
necessary, this [c]ourt must consider and did consider and assess
the child’s vulnerability, parental capacity and any safety threat.
Return should not be based upon compliance with a Permanency
Plan, but progress and mitigation of any safety threats. It is not
necessary that a parent or guardian complete all programs or
goals, but that the risk to the safety of the child is removed or
mitigated. [See] Pennsylvania Dependency Benchbook 3rd
Edition (2019) Section 13.6.1.
In this case, [M]aternal [U]ncle has been rated to have
complied with the permanency plan and progressed in alleviating
the reasons for placement at every Permanency Review Hearing
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as fully, substantially or moderately. Maternal [U]ncle has been
involved and completed counseling and has completed restraint
training. [G.M.K.] has been in congregate care for a substantial
portion of [his] life. Although progress with [G.M.K.]’s therapy
was promised earlier this year by Beacon Light and Dr. Roederer,
Beacon Light now claims no progress was made, and Beacon Light
no longer desires [G.M.K.] at Beacon Light’s facility. Psychologist
Meacham opined that it was time to have [G.M.K.] returned home.
New substantial family supports were in place and [M]aternal
[U]ncle had completed processes to provide a safer environment
for [G.M.K.] at home.
....
[G.M.K.] has been in congregate care for a substantial
time[-]period. [G.M.K.] has not progressed. The [A]gency had
worked significantly with [M]aternal [U]ncle in providing services
and resources to [M]ternal [U]ncle. Maternal [U]ncle has
relocated to McKean County at the urging of the Agency where
multiple family supports are available.
Maternal [U]ncle has been involved in counseling, therapy
and other programs suggested by the Agency. Maternal [U]ncle
has completed restraint training as urged by the Agency. Maternal
[U]ncle has complied with the Agency’s many requests. [G.M.K.]
suffers from a mental health disorder. [G.M.K.] had successfully
completed a program at Southwood but had floundered at Beacon
Light after more than one (1) year at Beacon Light. Placing
[G.M.K.] at George Junior Republic (GJR) would be a substantial
step back for this child[,] as GJR would isolate [G.M.K.] for two
(2) weeks upon admission, would not permit on[-]ground visits by
[G.M.K.]’s family[,] even for family counseling/therapy sessions,
and not permit off-campus visits with family. At Beacon Light,
[G.M.K.] had been receiving on-campus and off-campus visits
with [M]aternal [U]ncle and other family supports. Further, GJR
would not accept [G.M.K.] unless the placement was for at least
six (6) months. These directives of GJR are all a major step back
for [G.M.K.,] who at the time of the decision was less than eleven
(11) years old.
This [c]ourt viewed the placement of [G.M.K.] at GJR as
possibly causing [G.M.K.] significant trauma; not only due to
being housed in a new facility but also due to the ongoing
restrictions that were to be imposed at GJR.
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Juvenile Court Opinion, 10/7/20, at 18-22.
As it relates to the disposition of dependent children the Juvenile Act
provides:
§ 6351. Disposition of dependent child.
(a) General rule.--If the child is found to be a dependent child
the court may make any of the following orders of disposition best
suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental, and
moral welfare of the child:
(1) Permit the child to remain with his parents, guardian,
or other custodian, subject to conditions and limitations as
the court prescribes, including supervision as directed by
the court for the protection of the child.
(2) Subject to conditions and limitations as the court
prescribes transfer temporary legal custody to any of the
following:
(i) Any individual resident within or without this
Commonwealth, including any relative, who, after
study by the probation officer or other person or
agency designated by the court, is found by the court
to be qualified to receive and care for the child.
(ii) An agency or other private organization licensed
or otherwise authorized by law to receive and provide
care for the child.
(iii) A public agency authorized by law to receive and
provide care for the child.
....
42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(a) (emphasis added).
Concerning permanency planning, the juvenile court is directed as
follows:
(e) Permanency hearings.--
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(1) The court shall conduct a permanency hearing for the
purpose of determining or reviewing the permanency plan
of the child, the date by which the goal of permanency for
the child might be achieved and whether placement
continues to be best suited to the safety, protection
and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6351 (e) (emphasis added)
Instantly, the evidence corroborates the court’s decision to return legal
and physical custody to Maternal Uncle as best suited to the safety, protection,
and physical, mental, and moral welfare of G.M.K. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(a);
see also In re Adoption of T.B.B., supra at 394. Despite the Agency’s
assertions to the contrary, this determination included the paramount
consideration of G.M.K.’s continued safety in Maternal Uncle’s care.
In recommending the return of legal and physical custody to Maternal
Uncle, Mr. Meacham, the psychologist who had worked with G.M.K. since he
was four or five years old, expressed apprehensions as to re-
institutionalization. N.T., 9/15/20, at 12-13. He noted that, despite the
extended amount of time G.M.K. has spent institutionalized, there is a lack of
knowledge as to what triggers his behaviors. Id. at 12. Mr. Meacham stated,
“My biggest concern about re-institutionalization is that [G.M.K.] has spent a
great number of years of his primary formative years in an institutional
setting. And at this point, we just don’t know, despite the best efforts of
anybody that has served him, to what extent the trigger [is] for some of his
behaviors. We would have some concern about the Agency having him
continue in placement.” Id. at 12. Mr. Meacham additionally recognized the
inability to form attachments in an institutional setting. Id. at 13.
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Moreover, Mr. Meacham stressed that G.M.K. would be returning to a
different environment than previously experienced with Maternal Uncle, one
with extended family and community support, as well as successful restraint
training.8 Id. at 10-11, 14-16, 22-23. More importantly, Mr. Meacham
observed that it would be a “vastly different setting than [G.M.K.] is currently
not thriving in now.” Id. at 15. Importantly, Mr. Meacham had no concerns
relating to Maternal Uncle’s supervision. Id. at 24-25. He stated:
Well, I think anything could happen. It could go very, very well.
And there could be a situation where [G.M.K.] becomes
oppositional, defiant, and physically aggressive. I think that -- I
don’t -- I know that he would be adequately supervised. I think
we’ve certainly sent that message to [Maternal Uncle] and the
family members up there. They know him. They’ve met with him
several times over the least several months. So I’m not concerned
about the supervision. It’s simply how he would respond to
structure and being told no.
Id. at 25.
As the certified record, including Mr. Meacham’s expert opinion,
supports the juvenile court’s decision to place G.M.K. with Maternal Uncle with
the agency’s continued supervision, we discern no abuse of discretion. While
the juvenile court did not expressly invoke § 6351(a) and (e) in rendering its
decision, it is clear from the court’s statement of rationale that the decision
was grounded upon those precise concerns. The agency’s arguments to the
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8 Mr. Meachum noted the importance of instituting services to support G.M.K.
and Maternal Uncle and set forth the specifics of such services. See N.T.
9/15/20, at 10-12.
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contrary are unavailing. Accordingly, for all of the forgoing reasons, we affirm
the juvenile court’s order.
Order affirmed.
Judge Dubow joins the opinion.
P.J.E. Stevens concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 06/14/2021
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