Com. v. Santiago, T. ( 2021 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
TAISHA LESETTE SANTIAGO :
:
Appellant : No. 636 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 9, 2018,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County,
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0002661-2017.
BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: June 14, 2021
Taisha Lesette Santiago appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed
after a jury convicted her of second-degree-murder, conspiracy to commit
robbery, and two counts of recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”).1
After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court set forth the relevant factual and procedural history as
follows:
On June 29, 2017, [Santiago], and two co-defendants, Jalen
Reynolds and Lashonda Dade, conspired to rob two individuals,
David Tate and Rashaad Jones. [Santiago] set up a meeting with
the victims, Tate and Jones, ostensibly to arrange a sexual
encounter between [Santiago], the two victims and a female.
[Santiago] arranged for Tate and Jones to pick her up at her house
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b), 903, 3701(a)(1)(iii), 2705.
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with the plan of taking her and a female back to Jones’ residence
at 1341/1343 East 20th Street, Erie, Pennsylvania.
In the meantime, co-defendant Dade, with co-defendant
Reynolds as a passenger, drove to Jones’ residence, parked
outside and waited for [Santiago]’s instructions via cell phone.
Tate and Jones exited Jones’ residence and drove away to pick up
[Santiago]. After Tate and Jones left, Reynolds received a
communication from [Santiago], exited Dade’s parked vehicle and
stationed himself outside Jones’ residence. Dade remained inside
the vehicle. Another assailant, David Dalton, arrived and
positioned himself on Jones’ front porch.
Shortly thereafter, Tate and Jones returned to Jones’
residence with [Santiago] and exited Jones’ vehicle. Jones walked
up to his front porch where he encountered Dalton. A struggle
between Jones and Dalton ensued. Reynolds, who was waiting
outside the residence, shot and killed Tate on the sidewalk. Jones
was shot multiple times. Though Jones survived, he underwent
multiple surgeries from the incident and remains symptomatic
from his injuries.
After a five-day jury trial in June 2018, [Santiago] was found
guilty of criminal homicide/murder in the second degree, criminal
conspiracy/robbery (felony, first degree), and two counts of
[REAP]. [Santiago’s liability for second-degree-murder was based
on her conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery.]
Trial Court Opinion, 8/21/19, at 1-2 (citations, footnotes, and unnecessary
capitalization omitted).
On August 9, 2018, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of
life in prison without the possibility of parole, followed by five to ten years of
imprisonment and two years of probation. Santiago did not file a post-
sentence motion. Santiago filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting each conviction. Both Santiago and the
trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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Our standard and scope of review for a sufficiency challenge is well-
established:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test,
we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for
the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and
circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by
means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying
the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the [trier]
of fact while passing upon the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none
of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations
omitted).
In order to establish murder of the second degree, the Commonwealth
must prove that a criminal homicide occurred while the appellant was engaged
as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of a felony. See 18
Pa.C.S.A. 2502(b). In the present case, the felony in question is conspiracy
to commit robbery. A person is guilty of conspiracy to commit a robbery, as
an accomplice or co-conspirator, “as long as the defendant possessed the
requisite mens rea to commit the criminal act and the additional elements of
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accomplice liability or conspiratorial liability are established.”
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 135 A.3d 1097, 1102 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016).
Relevant here, a robbery occurs during the commission of a theft when a
person, “(i) inflicts serious bodily injury upon another; (ii) threatens another
with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate serious bodily injury; (iii)
commits or threatens immediately to commit any felony of the first or second
degree.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(i)-(iii). While Santiago does not dispute that a
murder and a robbery occurred, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the Commonwealth’s theory that she conspired to commit a
robbery.
In order to convict a defendant of criminal conspiracy, the
Commonwealth must establish that: “(1) [he] entered into an agreement to
commit or aid in the commission of a crime; (2) he shared the criminal intent
with that other person; and (3) an overt act was committed in furtherance of
the conspiracy.” Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d 749, 755 (Pa. Super.
2012) (citation omitted). “This overt act need not be committed by the
defendant; it need only be committed by a co-conspirator.” Id.We have further explained:
As conspiracy by its nature is often difficult to prove due
to the absence of direct evidence, cases examining the
sufficiency of the evidence often look to the conduct of the
parties and the circumstances surrounding their conduct
which may create a web of evidence linking the accused to
the alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.
Among the circumstances which are relevant, but not
sufficient by themselves, to prove a [criminal] confederation
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are: (1) an association between alleged coconspirators; (2)
knowledge of the commission of the crime; (3) presence at
the scene of the crime; and (4) in some situations,
participation in the object of the conspiracy. The presence
of such circumstances may furnish a web of evidence linking
an accused to an alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable
doubt when viewed in conjunction with each other and in
the context in which they occurred.
Other circumstances which are relevant include post-
crime conduct, such as flight, because it tends to establish
consciousness of guilt. When combined with other direct or
circumstantial evidence, that conduct may provide sufficient
evidence to establish a conspiracy.
Commonwealth v. Jordan, 212 A.3d 91, 97 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019)
(quotation marks, citations, and unnecessary capitalizations omitted.)
Our Supreme Court established that one can be found criminally liable
for another’s conduct, “where the existence of a conspiracy is established, the
law imposes upon a conspirator full responsibility for the natural and probable
consequences of acts committed by his fellow conspirator or conspirators if
such acts are done in pursuance of the common design or purpose of the
conspiracy.” Commonwealth v. Fisher, 80 A.3d 1186 (Pa. 2013). Our
Supreme Court also held that a “defendant, who was not a principal actor in
committing the crime, may nevertheless be liable for the crime if he was an
accomplice of a principal actor.” Commonwealth v. Murphy, 844 A.2d
1228, 1234 (Pa. 2004) (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 306). If an accomplice acts with
the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense and
agrees, aids, or attempts to aid such other person in either planning or
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committing that offense, that accomplice is equally criminally liable for the
acts of another. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 716 A.2d 580 (Pa. 1998).
Santiago asserts that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient
evidence and testimony that she had actual knowledge that a robbery was
going to occur and/or participated in the perpetration of a robbery. Santiago’s
Brief at 9. Santiago argues that a defendant can only be guilty of murder in
the second degree from a conspiracy, “where they are the plotter and actual
leader of the robbery during which a killing occurred, even if the actual killing
was done by an accomplice.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Melton, 178
A.2d 728 (Pa. 1962)).
The trial court held that Santiago’s sufficiency of the evidence claims
regarding the conviction of murder of the second degree conspiracy to commit
a robbery is without merit. The evidence established beyond a reasonable
doubt the elements of second-degree murder; that Santiago, intentionally,
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently caused the death of Tate at 1341/1343
East 20th Street, Erie, Pennsylvania by her complicity in setting up the meeting
with Jones and Tate and the robbery of Jones which culminated in the murder
of Tate. Trial Court Opinion, 8/21/2019, at 20. The trial court reasoned that:
A homicide occurred while [Santiago] was engaged as a
principal or an accomplice in the commission of a felony robbery.
[Santiago] attempted to set up an encounter with Jones on June
27, 2018, and succeeded in setting up an encounter with Jones
and Tate on June 28-29, 2018. [Santiago] communicated to
Reynolds her conversation with Jones about the anticipated
encounter. [Santiago] texted Reynolds plans to set up Jones and
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provided Reynolds with Jones’ address. The record establishes
[Santiago]’s course of conduct continued on June 28th, as she
continued to text Reynolds about the proposed robbery of Jones.
The developing plans included [Santiago]’s instruction to Reynolds
to rob Jones’ residence during Jones’ absence. Reynolds’ texts to
[Santiago] instructing her to inform Jones to pick her up
corresponded with [Santiago]’s messages to Jones to pick her up.
[Santiago] went so far as to send Reynolds a photo of Jones to
enable Reynolds to identify Jones as the target. In the hour
preceding Tate’s murder, [Santiago] and Reynolds exchanged a
dozen phone calls. When the police arrived on the scene, Jones
told officers [Santiago] “set him up.” [Santiago] admitted she was
present when the shooting occurred and she knew Reynolds and
Dade. After the homicide, [Santiago] attempted to communicate
further with Reynolds and Dade as they were taken into custody.
The evidence sufficiently established Reynolds committed
an armed robbery planned with [Santiago] during which Tate was
killed. Immediately after the shots were fired, a neighbor saw a
sedan go west. Minutes later, police officers observed the sedan
a few blocks from where the murder occurred. When the officers
stopped and approached the vehicle, Reynolds was “sweating
profusely” even though it was 68 degrees and breezy. Reynolds’
identification and his sweatshirt containing disposable gloves
bearing his DNA were recovered from the vehicle.
The record established Dade drove Reynolds to the robbery
site, Jones’ residence. Reynolds and Dade waited in the car as
[Santiago] arranged for Jones and Tate to leave Jones’ residence
to pick her up. Reynolds and [Santiago] were in communication
as [Santiago] waited to be picked up, and as [Santiago], Jones
and Tate made their way back to Jones’ residence. Dade testified
Reynolds exited the vehicle and approached Jones' residence.
Seconds after the victims arrived, Dade and neighbors heard
gunshots. Reynolds returned to the car and admitted to Dade he
thought he killed both Jones and Tate.
****
The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, together with all reasonable inferences from the
evidence, established beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of
conspiracy/robbery. The foregoing testimony clearly proved
[Santiago], with the intent of promoting or facilitating the
commission of a robbery, agreed with Reynolds and/or Dade to
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engage in conduct which constituted a robbery or an attempt or
solicitation to commit a robbery, and in furtherance thereof, set
up a meeting to initiate a planned robbery of Tate and/or Jones at
Jones’ residence. As discussed herein, there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to conclude [Santiago] agreed with Reynolds
to engage in conduct which constituted a robbery or an attempt
or solicitation to commit robbery. The jury reasonably concluded
the elements of the crime were met. The evidence was sufficient
to convict [Santiago] of conspiracy/robbery. This claim is
meritless.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/21/19, at 21-22 (citations and unnecessary
capitalization omitted).
We agree with the trial court that the evidence was sufficient to convict
Santiago of second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit robbery.
Santiago agreed with Reynolds to rob Jones and Tate. In furtherance of this
crime, Santiago contacted Reynolds to inform him of her location and when
she would arrive with the victims. Reynolds and Dade arrived at the scene
and hid, awaiting the arrival of Santiago with the victims. Santiago also lured
Jones to take her to his residence, where the planned robbery was to occur.
Santiago’s claims to the contrary are meritless. Santiago relies on
Commonwealth v. Melton, 178 A.2d 728 (Pa. 1962) and asserts that “the
Commonwealth failed to present evidence and testimony that would prove
that the Appellant was either the plotter and/or the actual leader of the
robbery that took place.” Santiago’s brief at 9. However, Jones had stated
to Officer Behr that Santiago had “set him up for a little bit of weed.” N.T.
Trial, Day 1 at 130. Thus, the Commonwealth presented evidence to refute
Santiago’s claim that she was not involved in this robbery. The jury was free
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to believe this evidence. Her claim of sufficiency regarding the robbery and
conspiracy convictions therefore fails.
Santiago also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for her REAP
convictions. Again, she claims she lacked the requisite state of mind for this
crime. A person commits REAP, a misdemeanor of the second degree, “if he
recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another person in
danger of death or serious bodily injury." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705. The relevant
mens rea, to prove REAP, “is a conscious disregard of a known risk of death
or great bodily harm to another person.” Commonwealth v. Merrttacelli,
54 A.3d 940, 950 (Pa. Super. 2012).
The trial court found the evidence sufficient. The testimony here,
clearly proved [Santiago] recklessly engaged in conduct placing
Jones and Tate in danger of death or serious bodily injury in
setting up a planned armed robbery of Jones during which Tate
and Jones were shot. Tate died at the scene from one of the
gunshot wounds. Jones sustained serious and permanent injuries
from the gunshot wounds inflicted upon him during the incident.
[Santiago] consciously disregarded a known risk of death or great
bodily harm to Tate and Jones through her complicity with
Reynolds in planning the robbery.
The jury reasonably concluded the elements of this crime
were met. The evidence was sufficient to convict [Santiago] of
both counts of [REAP].
Id. at 22 (citations and unnecessary capitalization omitted).
We agree the Commonwealth produced sufficient evidence to show
Santiago acted with conscious disregard when she placed Jones and Tate in
danger of death or bodily harm. Thus, this claim also fails.
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In sum, because the evidence was sufficient to establish that Santiago
committed the crimes for which she was convicted, we affirm the judgment of
sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/14/2021
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