In the Int. of: S.D., Appeal of: J.D. and C.T. ( 2021 )

J-A08041-21
2021 PA Super 126IN THE INTEREST OF: S.D., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: J.D. AND C.T., PARENTS :
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: No. 2142 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered October 16, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Juvenile Division
at No(s): 6 OCA 2020, CP-45-DP-0000062-2017
IN THE INTEREST OF: L.D., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: J.D. AND C.T., PARENTS :
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: No. 2143 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered October 16, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Juvenile Division
at No(s): 5 OCA 2020, CP-45-DP-0000061-2017
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED June 21, 2021
Appellants, J.D. (“Father”) and C.T. (“Mother”), filed these consolidated
appeals from the orders entered October 16, 2020 in the Monroe County Court
of Common Pleas, granting the petition of Children and Youth Services ("CYS”
or “the Agency”) to involuntarily terminate Father’s and Mother’s parental
rights to their minor, dependent daughters, S.D., born in June 2015, and L.D.,
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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born in May 2016 (collectively, the “Children”), pursuant to the Adoption Act,
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Father and Mother also
appeal the trial court’s order changing the Children’s permanency goal from
reunification to adoption. Upon review, we are constrained to quash the
appeals due to Father and Mother’s failure to comply with the Supreme Court’s
directive in Commonwealth v. Walker, 646 Pa. 456, 185 A.3d 969 (2018).
We briefly summarize the facts and the procedural history of this case.
The Children and their four older half-siblings (through Mother) came to the
attention of CYS in May 2017 as a result of referrals related to general neglect
and Mother’s substance abuse, as well as law enforcement obtaining a warrant
for Father and conducting a raid resulting in Father’s and Mother’s arrests on
May 9, 2017. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 8/24/20, at 12-15.
CYS filed dependency petitions and the Children were adjudicated
dependent on May 24, 2017.1 Id. at 44. At the time of adjudication, the
Children’s permanency goals were reunification with Father and Mother.
Throughout the three years following the adjudication, the trial court
conducted regular permanency review hearings and maintained the Children’s
placements and goals. On November 6, 2019, the trial court entered an order
changing the Children’s permanency goal to adoption on the dependency
dockets (CP-45-DP-0000061-2017 and CP-45-DP-0000062-2017).
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1 While not subject to these appeals, the Children’s four half-siblings through
Mother were also adjudicated dependent.
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On February 11, 2020, CYS filed petitions for the termination of Father’s
and Mother’s parental rights. These petitions were placed on the adoption
dockets (5 OCA 2020, 6 OCA 2020). Subsequent to delay due to COVID-19,
the trial court conducted hearings on August 24, 2020, September 14, 2020,
and September 24, 2020.
On October 16, 2020, the trial court entered separate orders on the
adoption docket terminating Father’s and Mother’s parental rights to S.D. and
L.D. pursuant to subsections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). On November
12, 2020, Father and Mother jointly filed separate notices of appeal for each
termination order, but listed both the adoption and dependency dockets.
Father and Mother also filed concise statements of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On January 11, 2021,
this Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte.
On appeal, Father and Mother raise the following issues for our review:
1) Did [CYS] fail to present clear and convincing evidence that
termination of biological parents’ parental rights met the
statutory requirements under 23 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 2511(a)(2), (5),
and (8)?
2) Did the [c]ourt make an error of law and abuse its discretion
when it determined that terminating biological parents’
parental rights would serve the needs and welfare of the child
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) without clear and
convincing evidence?
3) Did CYS fail to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it
made reasonable efforts to assist in reunification of L.D. and
S.D. with biological parents prior to seeking termination of
biological parents’ parental rights?
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Father’s and Mother’s Brief at 11 (suggested answers omitted).
As an initial matter, we must address the fact that Father and Mother
filed single notices of appeal (pertaining to each child) that listed two separate
docket numbers (dependency and adoption). As noted above, the trial court
terminated Father’s and Mother’s parental rights to the Children on the
adoption docket and changed the Children’s permanency goal from
reunification to adoption on the dependency docket.
In June 2018, our Supreme Court filed its decision in Walker,
disapproving of the practice of filing a single notice of appeal from one or more
appealable orders on more than docket number. See generally Walker, 646
Pa. 456, 185 A.3d 969. The Court clarified that the 2013 amendment to the
official comment to Pa.R.A.P. 341(a) provides a “bright line requirement for
future cases … ‘[w]here … one or more orders resolves issues arising on more
than one docket or relating to more than one judgment, separate notices of
appeals must be filed.’” Id. at 468, 185 A.3d at 976 (quoting Pa.R.A.P. 341,
Official Note).
In Walker, the Commonwealth filed a single notice of appeal from the
trial court’s order that disposed of four separate suppression motions filed by
four defendants at four different docket numbers. The Supreme Court found
that “[g]iven the clarification provided by the amendment to the Official Note,
the proper practice under Rule 341(a) is to file separate appeals from an order
that resolves issues arising on more than one docket. The failure to do so
requires the appellate court to quash the appeal.” Walker, 646 Pa. at 469,
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185 A.3d at 977. The Walker court held that its ruling would apply
prospectively to any notice of appeal filed after its June 1, 2018 ruling. Id. at
469-70, 185 A.3d at 977.
Thereafter, in an appeal involving the termination of parental rights, this
Court interpreted Walker to require quashal when an appellant files a single
notice of appeal from both the dependency docket and adoption docket as
separate notices of appeal are required for discrete challenges to the
permanency goal change order and termination order. In the Matter of
M.P., 204 A.3d 976, 981 (Pa.Super. 2019).
This Court also has found that the holding in Walker is subject to
exceptions:
This Court has declined to quash a defective notice of appeal when
the defect resulted from an appellant's acting in accordance with
misinformation from the trial court, deeming the situation a
breakdown in court operations. See Commonwealth v. Larkin,
[235 A.3d 350] (Pa.Super. 2020) (en banc)[.] In Larkin, an
appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal seeking relief relating to
more than one docket after the order informing appellant of his
appellate rights provided “Petitioner has [30] days from the date
of this order to file an appeal.” [Larkin, 235 A.3d at 354]
(emphasis in original). An en banc panel of this Court held that
this Court may “overlook the requirements of Walker where ... a
breakdown occurs in the court system, and a defendant is
misinformed or misled regarding his appellate rights.” Id. ...
In the Int. of K.M.W., 238 A.3d 465, 469 (Pa.Super. 2020) (en banc).
In K.M.W., a mother filed a timely single notice of appeal from the
decree that both terminated her parental rights on the adoption docket and
changed her child’s permanency goal to adoption on the dependency docket.
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Mother argued that her appeal should not be quashed pursuant to Walker as
(1) she only intended to appeal the termination on the adoption docket, (2)
included both docket numbers to mirror the trial court’s caption, and (3) no
party suffered prejudice. Id. at 469-70.
This Court rejected the mother’s claim that she solely intended to
challenge the termination order on the adoption docket as she raised an issue
on appeal challenging the trial court’s goal change on the dependency docket
when she argued that CYS had not provided adequate reunification services
prior to filing the petition to terminate her parental rights. Id.
However, this Court declined to quash the mother’s appeal due to a
breakdown in court operations that occurred when the trial court informed the
mother that she could “seek relief from this Court by filing a singular appeal
from multiple lower court docket numbers.” Id. at 470 (emphasis added).
Even though quashal was not necessary due to the breakdown in court
processes, the en banc panel in K.M.W. acknowledged that this Court
previously held that in a children’s fast track case that, “we should overlook a
technical defect in a Notice of Appeal and avoid the ‘extreme action of
dismissal’ when the defect does not prejudice any party.” Id. at 470 n.2
(quoting In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d, 745, 747 (Pa.Super. 2009) (declining to
quash appeal when appellant failed to comply with procedural rules requiring
an appellant to file a concise statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925 along with
the notice of appeal)).
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Nevertheless, this Court noted in K.M.W. that the decision in Walker,
in requiring quashal of an appeal that fails to comply with Rule 341, did not
provide an exception for children’s fast track cases. K.M.W., 238 A.3d at 470.
This Court asked the Supreme Court to consider creating an exception to the
Walker holding to excuse a technical violation of Rule 341 in a children’s fast
track case when the violation “does not prejudice the parties, and does not
hamper our ability to review the appeal.” Id. at 470 n.2.
Here, the factual circumstances are not identical to those in Walker as
the trial court issued separate goal change orders as to each child listing their
dependency docket number and entered termination orders as to each child
listing their adoption docket number. See Walker, 185 A.3d at 971 (“where
a single order resolves issues arising on more than one docket,
separate notices of appeal must be filed for each case”) (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, to the extent that Father and Mother wished to challenge
both the termination orders on the adoption docket and the goal change orders
on the dependency dockets, they were required to file a notice of appeal from
each order for each child. See Pa.R.A.P. 341, official comment (“[w]here …
one or more orders resolves issues arising on more than one docket
or relating to more than one judgment, separate notices of appeals must
be filed”) (emphasis added). Consistent with the holding in Walker, the
Supreme Court has confirmed, prospective to its June 1, 2018 decision, the
filing of a notice of appeal that fails to comply with Rule 341 and its Note shall
result in quashal of the appeal. See Walker, supra.
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As such, this Court issued Rules to Show Cause on January 6, 2021 for
Father and Mother to clarify the orders being appealed and to demonstrate
that they were not appealing two separate orders under one notice of appeal
in violation of the official note to Rule 341 and Walker. In response, Father
and Mother indicated that they only intended to challenge the order that
terminated their parental rights, and inclusion of the dependency docket
numbers was in error.
However, we note that in their Rule 1925(b) statement and appellate
brief, Father and Mother claim CYS failed to show it made reasonable efforts
to assist in reunification of the Children with Father and Mother prior to filing
the termination petitions. In making this argument, they cite to portions of
the Juvenile Act.
As noted in K.M.W., this particular argument challenges the trial court’s
decision to change the Children’s permanency goal on the dependency docket.
K.M.W., 238 A.3d at 470. As a result, we reject Father and Mother’s claim
that they only intended to appeal the lower court’s termination order on the
adoption docket and not the goal change order on the dependency docket.
In addition, Father and Mother do not claim that the trial court
mistakenly directed them to file a single notice of appeal to challenge both the
dependency and adoption dockets. In reviewing the record, we find no
evidence that Father and Mother were misinformed or misled regarding their
appellate rights.
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While there are specific rules of criminal procedure (Pa.R.Crim.P. 704,
720) that require the trial court to inform a defendant of his appellate rights,
there is no such requirement on a trial court to provide a similar notification
to parents concerning their appellate rights after entering an order terminating
their parental rights. We decline to impose such a duty on the trial court
without applicable authority. Here, the silence of the trial court with respect
to giving guidance to the parents as to the procedure for filing appeals does
not constitute a breakdown in the court processes. As such, we cannot excuse
Father and Mother’s non-compliance with Rule 341 and Walker due to a
breakdown in court processes.
Moreover, consistent with the decisions in K.M.W. and M.P., we
acknowledge that we have no authority to make an exception in a children’s
fast track case to the precedent in Walker holding that quashal is required
when an appellant fails to file separate appeals pursuant to Rule 341. As this
Court noted in M.P.,
[w]e recognize the harsh – perhaps draconian – consequence of
quashing any appeal, and in particular an appeal involving a
party's parental rights. However, our role as an intermediate
appellate court is clear. “It is not the prerogative of an
intermediate appellate court to enunciate new precepts of law or
to expand existing legal doctrines. Such is a province reserved to
the Supreme Court.” Moses v. T.N.T. Red Star Exp., 725 A.2d
792, 801 (Pa.Super. 1999). It is well-settled that “the Superior
Court is an error correcting court and we are obliged to apply the
decisional law as determined by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania.” Commonwealth v. Montini, 712 A.2d 761, 769
(Pa.Super. 1998).
M.P., 204 A.3d at 981, n. 2.
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While Father and Mother filed a single notice of appeal to challenge
distinct rulings on two separate trial court docket numbers, they were required
to file separate notices of appeal for each docket. Father and Mother filed
their notices of appeal well after Walker and M.P. were issued. The decisions
in Walker and M.P. are controlling precedent, and thus, we are constrained
to quash these appeals.
Appeals quashed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/21/2021
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