Longenecker, D. v. Neff, C. ( 2021 )


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  • J-S17045-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    DALE K. LONGENECKER               :          IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :               PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                     :
    :
    :
    CECIL H. NEFF, III, J&S AUTO      :
    SALES, J&S GENERAL AUTO REPAIR, :
    J&S AUTO REPAIR, AND L. BENJAMIN :           No. 1574 MDA 2020
    WENGER                            :
    :
    :
    APPEAL OF: CECIL H. NEFF, III AND :
    J&S AUTO SALES                    :
    Appeal from the Order Entered November 13, 2020
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Civil Division at
    No(s): CI-20-04022
    BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                          FILED JUNE 28, 2021
    Cecil H. Neff, III (Neff)1 appeals from the order of the Court of Common
    Pleas of Lancaster County (trial court) denying his petition to open the default
    judgment entered against him in this action filed by Dale K. Longenecker
    (Longenecker).       Longenecker seeks to recover money he alleges was
    ____________________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1 Although J&S General Auto Repair also appealed the trial court’s order, the
    default judgment was entered against Neff only. (See Trial Court Opinion,
    2/08/21, at 1 n.1; Neff’s Brief, at 5 n.3).
    J-S17045-21
    wrongfully obtained from him by Neff in connection with Neff’s service to his
    vehicle. We affirm.
    I.
    A.
    We take the following background and procedural history from the
    certified record.       Neff owns and operates J&S General Auto Repair.
    Longenecker owns a 2011 Toyota Camry and was 79 years old during the
    relevant time period. In January 2020, Longenecker brought his vehicle to
    Neff’s automobile repair shop for a routine state inspection. He did not believe
    his vehicle was in need of any repairs at that time. However, Neff informed
    him that the engine and transmission needed to be replaced and charged
    $31,502.22 for the repair. Longenecker paid that amount in eight checks to
    gain release of his car. He claims that Neff never performed these extensive
    repairs to his vehicle and that the costs exceeded the then-average price of a
    brand new Toyota Camry.
    On June 12, 2020, Longenecker filed a complaint against Neff asserting
    claims   of   fraud,    negligent    misrepresentation,   rescission   of   contract,
    negligence, violations of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
    Law (UTPCPL),2 conversion, unjust enrichment and civil conspiracy.                An
    employee at Neff’s automobile repair business accepted service of the
    ____________________________________________
    2 See 73 P.S. §§ 201-1.- 201-10.
    -2-
    J-S17045-21
    complaint on July 1, 2020.          The complaint was prefaced with a Notice to
    Defend advising Neff of the requirement to file a responsive pleading within
    20 days and that a default judgment could be entered against him for failure
    to do so. See Pa.R.C.P. 1018.1. Neff did not respond to the complaint.
    B.
    On August 4, 2020, Longenecker filed a praecipe for entry of default
    judgment against Neff for failure to file a responsive pleading3 and judgment
    was entered that day. Neff was provided with notice of entry of the default
    judgment via first-class mail on August 5, 2020. Longenecker then filed a
    motion to assess damages under the UTPCPL, including treble damages, costs
    and attorneys’ fees.
    Neff filed a petition to open the default judgment on September 2, 2020.
    The trial court, after considering multiple submissions by the parties regarding
    their respective positions, entered its order denying Neff’s petition to open the
    default judgment on November 13, 2020. The court concluded that Neff did
    not timely file the petition to open nor did he provide a legitimate reason for
    failing to answer the complaint.          (See Trial Ct. Op., at 3).   Neff timely
    ____________________________________________
    3 Longenecker averred in the praecipe that written notice of his intent to file
    for entry of default judgment was mailed to Neff on July 23, 2020, which was
    at least ten days prior to the filing in accordance with our rules of Civil
    Procedure. See Pa.R.C.P. 237.1(a)(2)(ii).
    -3-
    J-S17045-21
    appealed. He and the trial court complied with Rule 1925. See Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(a)-(b).4
    II.
    Neff contends that he timely filed the petition to open the default
    judgment and that he provided a justifiable excuse for not answering the
    complaint.5 With regard to timeliness, Neff acknowledges that the notice of
    entry of the default judgment was mailed to him on August 5, 2020, and that
    he received it on or about August 7, 2020. Neff asserts that he encountered
    difficulty in retaining counsel because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Neff claims
    that he filed the petition as soon as he was able to engage counsel, who
    submitted it within one month of his receipt of the notice. Neff offers as his
    explanation     for   the   delay    in   answering   the   complaint   the   difficult
    circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic because attorney availability was
    limited. Neff maintains that he consulted or attempted to consult with at least
    ____________________________________________
    4 “It is well settled that a petition to open a default judgment is an appeal to
    the equitable powers of the court, and absent an error of law or a clear,
    manifest abuse of discretion, it will not be disturbed on appeal.” Myers v.
    Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
    986 A.2d 171
    , 175 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation
    omitted).
    5 Neff also claims that the court abused its discretion in finding that he failed
    to provide a meritorious defense to the allegations in the complaint. (See
    Neff’s Brief, at 17). However, the court plainly recognized that Neff did raise
    a meritorious defense in averring that he performed the paid-for repairs with
    Longenecker’s consent. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 3, 5). This issue is, therefore,
    not in dispute.
    -4-
    J-S17045-21
    ten attorneys regarding a defense to Longenecker’s complaint and a possible
    bankruptcy action, and that he was initially unable to find counsel willing to
    represent him.
    Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 237.3 governs the opening of
    default judgments and provides that a court must open the judgment where
    a party files a petition to open within ten days of its entry. See Pa.R.C.P.
    237.3(b)(1). However, when the party fails to file a petition within ten days,
    he must meet the common-law standard for opening a default judgment. See
    
    id.
     at Explanatory Comment, Illustration 5.    This standard provides that a
    default judgment may be opened if the moving party has 1) promptly filed a
    petition to open the default judgment; 2) provided a reasonable excuse or
    explanation for failing to file a responsive pleading; and 3) pleaded a
    meritorious defense to the allegations contained in the complaint.        See
    Myers, 
    supra at 175
    . The defendant must establish all three of these criteria
    in order for the trial court to open a default judgment based on the equities
    of the case. See 
    id.
    “The timeliness of a petition to open a judgment is measured from the
    date that notice of the entry of the default judgment is received.” Digital
    Commc'ns Warehouse, Inc. v. Allen Investments, LLC, 
    223 A.3d 278
    ,
    285 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). The law does not establish a specific
    time frame within which a petition to open a judgment must be filed to qualify
    as timely. See 
    id.
     Instead, a court must consider the length of time between
    -5-
    J-S17045-21
    notice of the entry of the default judgment and the reason for the delay. See
    
    id.
     In cases where appellate courts have found a prompt and timely filing of
    the petition to open a default judgment, the period of delay has typically been
    less than one month. See 
    id.
    With regard to the second prong, “whether an excuse is legitimate is not
    easily answered and depends upon the specific circumstances of the case.”
    US Bank N.A. v. Mallory, 
    982 A.2d 986
    , 995 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation
    omitted). Our Court has addressed the question of legitimate excuse in the
    context of the party’s explanation for failure to respond to the original
    complaint in a timely manner. See 
    id.
    Instantly, in concluding Neff did not promptly file the petition to open or
    provide a reasonable excuse for failing to file a response to the complaint, the
    trial court stated:
    [Neff] was provided notice of entry of judgment via first
    class mail on August 5,2020. [He] did not file his petition to enter
    default judgment until September 2, 2020 ─ four weeks after
    receiving notice. [Neff] admits being aware of the complaint
    against him and aware of the default, but asserts he was unable
    to obtain legal counsel until September 2, 2020 and was therefore
    unable to file a petition sooner. [Neff] had adequate time from
    receiving notice of the default judgment to hire legal counsel to
    file a prompt petition to open the default judgment. Alternatively,
    [he] could have filed a petition himself. A four (4) week delay
    between notice of the entry of default judgment and filing of the
    petition to open was not prompt.
    *    *    *
    [Neff] states that in the twenty (20) days after the
    complaint was filed, he contacted at least six (6) attorneys to
    schedule a consultation regarding a possible bankruptcy matter
    -6-
    J-S17045-21
    and the present litigation.6 [Neff] argues that he was unable to
    secure representation during that time due to COVID-19 delays in
    scheduling consultations, and the unwillingness of the contacted
    attorneys to take on his case or unavailability of other attorneys
    that he contacted. [Neff’s] failure to file a response to the
    complaint because he could not hire an attorney is not a justifiable
    excuse. [Neff] could have filed a response as an unrepresented
    party pending retaining counsel. Therefore [he] did not present a
    justifiable excuse to this court.
    (Trial Ct. Op., at 4-5) (record citations omitted).
    We find no abuse of discretion in this regard. Neff filed the petition to
    open 28 days after the default was entered and he admits to receiving notice
    well before the 20-day response period expired.              While circumstances
    surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic may have contributed to his difficulty in
    finding representation, it does not explain why he did not take any action
    himself. Furthermore, Neff’s argument indicates that he tied this litigation to
    a separate bankruptcy matter and that certain attorneys were unwilling to
    represent him. In sum, we agree with the trial court that Neff did not promptly
    file the petition to open, nor did he establish an excusable reason for failing
    to respond to the complaint.
    ____________________________________________
    6 Neff’s brief puts the number of lawyers at ten.     (See Neff’s Brief, at 20).
    -7-
    J-S17045-21
    Order affirmed.
    Judge Kunselman Joins the memorandum.
    Judge Stabile Notes Dissent.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/28/2021
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1574 MDA 2020

Judges: Pellegrini

Filed Date: 6/28/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/21/2024