Com. Henderson, A. ( 2021 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ARTHUR LAMONT HENDERSON :
:
Appellant : No. 973 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered June 23, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0001873-2012,
CP-02-CR-0001874-2012
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and COLINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: JULY 1, 2021
Arthur Lamont Henderson, pro se, appeals two orders entered on June
23, 2020, by the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his
motion to compel various case-related documents from that county’s
department of court records. We affirm.
Briefly, a jury found Henderson guilty of rape, robbery, and other related
offenses. Henderson was correspondingly sentenced to between sixty-one and
one hundred twenty-two years of incarceration. Following sentencing,
Henderson filed timely post-sentence motions, which were denied. This Court
affirmed his judgment of sentence, and our Supreme Court denied any further
review. See Commonwealth v. Henderson, 116 A.3d 699, 1155 WDA 2013
____________________________________________
 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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(Pa. Super., filed December 23, 2014), appeal denied, 125 A.3d 1199 (Pa.
2015).
After exhausting his direct appeals, Henderson timely filed a pro se
petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). See Pa.C.S.A. §§
9541-9546. Succeeding the appointment and subsequently permitted
withdrawal of counsel, the PCRA court found no merit to his petition and
dismissed it without a hearing. Ultimately, our Court affirmed the dismissal of
his petition, finding no validity to any of the eleven issues he raised on appeal.
See Commonwealth v. Henderson, 137 WDA 2017 (Pa. Super., filed
February 5, 2018).
Two years following the dismissal of his first PCRA petition, Henderson
filed a motion to compel, which was directed at the Allegheny County
Department of Court Records and requested certain documents related to his
own case. Henderson filed this motion after first pursuing a “right to know”
request against that department and then, after receiving no response,
appealing his request to Pennsylvania’s Office of Open Records. The Office of
Open Records denied Henderson’s appeal, indicating that, given the nature of
the sought documents, it did not have jurisdiction. The court, in denying his
motion to compel, indicated that “[t]he filings requested by the defendant are
either public record or do not exist.” Order of Court, 6/23/2020 (denying the
motion in two separate orders covering both docket numbers). Henderson
appealed this two-order decision, and the relevant parties have complied with
their respective obligations under Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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On appeal, Henderson contends the court abused its discretion and/or
violated his due process rights when it denied him the materials he sought
under his motion to compel. See Appellant’s Brief, at 3.
Preliminarily, we note that Henderson’s case includes two docket
numbers and two corresponding orders denying his motion to compel.
However, Henderson filed a singular notice of appeal, listing both docket
numbers. This erroneous action violates the main thrust of Commonwealth
v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), and would normally compel quashal.
Although Walker dealt with a singular appeal from an order encompassing
distinct docket numbers, our Supreme Court reinforced the notion that when
“one or more orders resolves issues arising on more than one docket or
relating to more than one judgment, separate notices of appeals must be
filed.” 185 A.3d at 976 (identifying and endorsing the “bright-line mandatory
instruction to practitioners” contained within Pa.R.A.P. 341’s Official
Comment).
While Henderson’s appeal violates Walker, our Court in
Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157 (Pa. Super. 2019), identified
an exception. If the actions of the PCRA court “amount to a breakdown in
court operations … we may overlook the defective nature of [a]ppellant’s
timely notice of appeal rather than quash[.]” 219 A.3d at 160 (specifically
addressing the situation where a PCRA court’s order describes an appellant’s
right to file a “notice of appeal” instead of the plural “notices” when the case
involves more than one docket number). In other words, if there is
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misinformation presented to a defendant or if the court misleads a defendant
as to his or her appellate rights, this Court may overlook the rigid dictates of
Walker. See Commonwealth v. Larkin, 235 A.3d 350, 354 (Pa. Super.
2020) (en banc).
To consider whether there has been a breakdown in court operations,
we must first categorize Henderson’s motion to compel. Because “the PCRA
provides the sole means for obtaining collateral review, and … any petition
filed after the judgment of sentence becomes final will be treated as a PCRA
petition,” Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 591 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(citation omitted), we are constrained to treat his motion to compel as a PCRA
petition.
Understandably, given the distinct nature of his request, neither the
PCRA court nor the Commonwealth treated Henderson’s motion as a PCRA
petition. The record reflects that there has been no adherence to Pa.R.Crim.P.
907, which outlines procedure for dismissing a PCRA petition without a
hearing. In fact, as best can be discerned, the two orders denying his motion
to compel provide no indication of Henderson’s right to appeal or time limits
to do so. While Stansbury addresses the situation where the court has
affirmatively misstated the incorrect way to perfect an appeal, it would follow
that by not providing Henderson with any indication of his appellate rights in
violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, it would constitute a breakdown in the court’s
operations. Therefore, we decline to quash Henderson’s appeal on that basis,
but our procedural and jurisdictional inquiry does not end there.
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In treating Henderson’s motion to compel as a PCRA petition, we utilize
an abuse of discretion standard to review a PCRA court’s denial of discovery.
See Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d 470, 486 (Pa. 2014). Before reviewing
the merits of his claim, however, we must ascertain whether his request for
relief is timely.
A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must be
filed within one year of the date the petitioner's judgment of
sentence became final, unless he pleads and proves one of the
three exceptions outlined in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(1). A
judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review by this
Court or the United States Supreme Court, or at the expiration of
the time for seeking such review. 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(3).
The PCRA's timeliness requirements are jurisdictional; therefore,
a court may not address the merits of the issues raised if the
petition was not timely filed. The timeliness requirements apply to
all PCRA petitions, regardless of the nature of the individual claims
raised therein. The PCRA squarely places upon the petitioner the
burden of proving an untimely petition fits within one of the three
exceptions.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16–17 (Pa. 2012) (citations and
footnote omitted).
Henderson’s judgment of sentence became final approximately five
years ago, after our Supreme Court denied his petition to review his direct
appeal, and Henderson sought no further review from the United States
Supreme Court. Henderson filed his motion to compel in 2020–well beyond
the PCRA’s one-year deadline to file a timely petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(1). Accordingly, Henderson’s petition–his second–is facially untimely,
and without him pleading and proving a timeliness exception, we are without
jurisdiction to consider its merits. See id.
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To overcome the PCRA’s time-bar, a petitioner must allege and prove
that: 1) governmental interference prevented the petitioner from failing to
raise a claim; 2) the petitioner discovered previously unknown facts that would
have supported a claim, but could not be uncovered at the time even through
due diligence; or 3) there has been a newly-recognized constitutional right.
See id. Through the most generous reading of his motion to compel along
with his other filings, Henderson simply does not plead nor prove any of the
PCRA’s three exceptions.
Henderson’s motion indicates his familiarity with the PCRA. In fact,
Paragraph 11 of his motion identifies that “the records/documents requested
were related to future filings pertaining to § 9545(b)(1)(ii) requirements.”
Motion to Compel, 5/7/20, ¶11. However, Henderson does not establish why
or for what purpose he is seeking those documents.
As Henderson has failed to plead and prove an exception to the PCRA’s
time-bar, we are without jurisdiction to consider the merits of his appeal and
must therefore affirm the court’s orders denying his motion to compel.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/1/2021
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