Com. v. McGee, R. ( 2021 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
RODNEY STERLING MCGEE : No. 1032 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered September 10, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Criminal Division
at No(s): CP-63-CR-0002358-1994
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: JULY 7, 2021
The Commonwealth appeals from the order granting the motion filed by
Appellee Rodney Sterling McGee (McGee), and vacating McGee’s sentence for
attempted homicide.1 Because McGee’s motion should have been construed
under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-45, we
reverse and remand.
On November 5, 1994, McGee went on a crime spree; he beat a man to
death, assaulted two people, kidnapped three women, and stole two vehicles.
See N.T., 3/27/96, at 2-3. McGee was charged with criminal homicide,
attempted criminal homicide, two counts of aggravated assault, two counts of
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 2501.
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theft by unlawful taking, and three counts of kidnapping.2 On March 27, 1996,
he entered into a negotiated guilty plea at all counts. In accordance with the
plea agreement, the trial court sentenced McGee to an aggregate 32½ to 65
years in prison. He did not appeal.
The PCRA court summarized the procedural history leading to the
underlying appeal as follows:
On March 27, 1996, [President Judge Thomas D. Gladden]
entered two orders of sentence. In the first, a handwritten
document entitled “Sentence,” Judge Gladden imposed no term of
imprisonment for the attempted murder of Donna Lee Williams,
and he issued a term of 10 to 20 years imprisonment for
aggravated assault of Donna Lee Williams, a felony of the first
degree, among other sentences. See Motion to Correct Illegal
Sentence, Exhibit B. In the second, a typed document entitled
“Order,” Judge Gladden imposed a term of 5 to 10 years
imprisonment for the attempted murder of Donna Lee Williams, a
felony of the second degree, and he imposed a concurrent term
of 10 to 20 years imprisonment for the aggravated assault of
Donna Lee Williams, a felony of the first degree, among other
sentences. See Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, Exhibit C. In
total, Judge Gladden decided to impose a sentence of no less than
thirty-two and one-half years to no more than sixty-five years in
a state correctional institution.
On June 3, 2020, [McGee] filed a pro se Petition for Post
Conviction Relief. On June 1[5], 2020, [the PCRA court] appointed
Corrie Woods as counsel for [McGee]. On August 5, 2020,
[McGee], through counsel, filed a Motion to Correct Illegal
Sentence. He claimed that there was an obvious incompatibility
existing in these two orders, and further, for sentencing purposes,
these two offenses would merge. From this basis, [McGee]
believed that there was an obvious error. This [c]ourt agreed that
an error existed and granted the request. Consequently, Count 2
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2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2501(a), 901(a), 2501(a), 2702(a), 3921(a), and
2901(a)(1).
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of his sentence was dismissed by this [c]ourt on September [10],
2020. The Commonwealth filed an appeal of this decision on
[October 1], 2020.
PCRA Court Opinion, 10/13/20, at 1-2 (some citations and footnotes
omitted).3
The Commonwealth presents two issues for our review:
I. Whether the [PCRA] court erred when it dismissed the count
of attempted homicide based upon a sentence being illegal
when the claim was brought twenty-four (24) years after
sentencing, outside of the jurisdictional time constraints set
by the PCRA.
II. Whether the [PCRA] court erred when it dismissed the count
of attempted homicide based upon evergreen authority to
correct a patent error such as an illegal sentence when the
error was not patent and the authority is not evergreen with
respect to illegal sentences.
Commonwealth Brief at 4.
In both issues, the Commonwealth argues the PCRA court erred by
considering McGee’s motion independent of the PCRA. See Commonwealth
Brief at 9-17. The Commonwealth asserts the “court made an error of law
when it determined the issue of an illegal sentence is not a PCRA issue,” and
“the issue of an illegal sentence is waived if not brought within the time periods
[] set by the PCRA.” Id. at 8 (footnote omitted). We agree.
“Whether a PCRA court has jurisdiction to correct allegedly illegal
sentencing orders absent statutory jurisdiction under the PCRA is a question
of law.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 518 (Pa. Super. 2011)
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3 The PCRA court did not order a Rule 1925(b) concise statement.
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(citation omitted), appeal denied, 47 A.3d 845 (Pa. 2012) (Table).
“Accordingly, our scope of review is plenary and our standard of review is de
novo.” Id. (citation omitted).
The PCRA “provides for an action by which persons convicted of crimes
they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences may obtain
collateral relief.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. When an action is cognizable under
the PCRA, the PCRA is the “sole means of obtaining collateral relief and
encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the
same purpose[.]” Id. (emphasis added).
Citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v Holmes, 933 A.2d 57 (Pa. 2007),
McGee argues his motion was properly granted because the PCRA court had
“inherent authority to correct its patent and obvious mistakes evidenced by
nonconformance with the record, common sense, and black-letter law.”
McGee’s Brief at 9. In Holmes, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court created a
narrow exception to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 (“a court upon notice to the parties
may modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry . . . if no appeal
from such order has been taken or allowed”), and recognized a trial court’s
“inherent power to correct patent errors despite the absence of traditional
jurisdiction.” Id. at 65.
The Commonwealth does not dispute the Holmes holding, but
emphasizes “Pennsylvania authority from the Superior Court that indicates
when the one year [PCRA] filing requirement has expired, and no exception is
presented, the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to correct orders, even if
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the error is patent and erroneous.” Commonwealth Brief at 13 (citing
Jackson, 30 A.3d at 523). In Jackson, this Court interpreted Holmes in the
context of an untimely PCRA petition, stating “we have found no authority
wherein the appellate courts of this Commonwealth have recognized a PCRA
court’s inherent jurisdiction to consider a claim filed after the expiration of the
PCRA filing period.” Id. at 519; see also Commonwealth v. Whiteman,
204 A.3d 448, 451 (Pa. Super. 2019). We concluded that while “Holmes []
recognized the limited authority of a trial court to correct patent errors in
sentences absent statutory jurisdiction under section 5505; it did not establish
an alternate remedy for collateral relief that sidesteps the jurisdictional
requirements of the PCRA.” Jackson, 30 A.3d at 521.
Under Jackson, we must agree with the Commonwealth. McGee
concedes “Judge Gilman did not view [him]self as granting relief pursuant to
the PCRA, but, rather, found that the orders contained a mistake and corrected
the mistake.” McGee’s Brief at 13. This was error. McGee commenced this
action when he filed his pro se petition seeking relief under the PCRA. The
court then appointed counsel, who filed the motion on McGee’s behalf. In
Jackson, we explained:
Section 9545 of the PCRA is not amenable to [] equitable
exceptions. Section 9545 expressly states that a PCRA petition
“shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes
final” unless one of the statutory exceptions is pled and proven.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545. Our courts have strictly interpreted this
requirement as creating a jurisdictional deadline. Further, our
courts have interpreted jurisdiction under [S]ection 9545
differently than [S]ection 5505. Unlike [S]ection 5505, [S]ection
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9545 does not merely grant a court authority to consider a PCRA
petition for a limited period of time; it acts to divest a court of
jurisdiction once the filing period has passed. Therefore, when
the one-year filing deadline of [S]ection 9545 has expired, and no
statutory exception has been pled or proven, a PCRA court
cannot invoke inherent jurisdiction to correct orders,
judgments and decrees, even if the error is patent and
obvious.
Our holding is consistent with the policy underlying the
PCRA. The legislature amended the PCRA in 1995 to establish a
strict one-year filing deadline for PCRA petitions. The statute, as
amended, incorporates three exceptions to the one-year filing
deadline. The legislature never intended, nor have our courts
permitted, any equitable exceptions beyond those stated in the
statute itself. Although the one-year deadline is strictly
applied, it nevertheless provides sufficient opportunity to
discover errors in sentences. If an error exists in a
sentence that is clearly erroneous such that a trial court
could modify the order absent statutory authority under
[S]ection 5505, the petitioner is afforded adequate time
under [S]ection 9545 to discover the error during the
course of the direct appeals process or within one year of
the judgment becoming final. Beyond this time-period,
courts are without jurisdiction to offer any form of relief.
Id. at 522-23 (some citations omitted, emphases added).
McGee filed his underlying PCRA petition, followed by his motion, nearly
25 years after his judgment of sentence became final.4 It is well-settled that
“any petition filed after the judgment of sentence becomes final will be treated
as a PCRA petition.” Jackson, 30 A.3d at 521. McGee cannot circumvent the
PCRA by invoking the court’s “inherent authority to correct its patent and
obvious mistakes, as evidenced by the record, common sense, and black-
letter law, forever and ever, amen.” McGee’s Brief at 13; see
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4 McGee acknowledges the underlying petition is not his first. See McGee’s
Brief at 2 (“In 2000, he filed an action pursuant to the PCRA, but to no avail.”).
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Commonwealth v. Guthrie, 749 A.2d 502, 503 (Pa. Super. 2000)
(defendant’s “motion to correct illegal sentence” must be treated as a PCRA
petition); Commonwealth v. Kutnyak, 781 A.2d 1259, 1261 (Pa. Super.
2001) (the PCRA is “the exclusive vehicle for obtaining post-conviction
collateral relief . . . regardless of the manner in which the petition is titled.”).
Thus, for the PCRA court to consider the merits of McGee’s motion, McGee had
to plead and prove an exception to the PCRA’s time-bar.5
We reiterate that no court has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA
petition. Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Pa. Super.
2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa.
2003)). A petitioner must file a PCRA petition within one year of the date on
which the petitioner’s judgment of sentence became final, unless the
petitioner can plead and prove one of the three statutory exceptions, i.e.,
governmental interference, unknown facts, or a newly-recognized, retroactive
constitutional right. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A petitioner must file a
petition invoking one of these exceptions “within one year of the date the
claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). If a petition
is untimely, and the petitioner has not pled and proven an exception, “neither
this Court nor the trial court has jurisdiction over the petition. Without
jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to address the
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5 We note Judge Gilman repeatedly referred to himself as the “PCRA court.”
PCRA Court Opinion, 10/13/20, at 5.
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substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468
(Pa. Super. 2007) (quoting Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 522
(Pa. 2006)).
McGee was sentenced on March 27, 1996; he did not appeal, and
therefore his judgment of sentence became final 30 days later, on April 26,
1996. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (judgment of sentence becomes final
“at the expiration of time for seeking the review”); Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(3)
(“If the defendant does not file a timely post-sentence motion, the defendant’s
notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days of imposition of sentence[.]”).
Because McGee filed his petition more than 20 years late, it is facially
untimely, and the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction in the absence of McGee
pleading and proving an exception under Section 9545(b)(1). Our review
confirms McGee “has failed to allege that any of the exceptions would apply[.]”
Commonwealth Brief at 11.
We explained in Jackson:
[E]ven if there was an obvious illegality in Jackson’s sentence,
the PCRA court would not have had jurisdiction to
consider Jackson’s claim. Holmes II recognized the limited
authority of a trial court to correct patent errors in sentences
absent statutory jurisdiction under section 5505; it did not
establish an alternate remedy for collateral relief that sidesteps
the jurisdictional requirements of the PCRA.
Jackson’s “motion to correct illegal sentence” is a petition for relief
under the PCRA. Jackson has petitioned the PCRA court, nearly
20 years after his 1988 judgment of sentence became final, to
reconsider the order because of alleged illegalities. “We have
repeatedly held that ... any petition filed after the judgment of
sentence becomes final will be treated as
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a PCRA petition.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 803 A.2d 1291,
1293 (Pa. Super. 2002). That Jackson has attempted to frame his
petition as a “motion to correct illegal sentence” does not change
the applicability of the PCRA. See Commonwealth v.
Guthrie, 749 A.2d 502, 503 (Pa.Super.2000) (appellant’s
“motion to correct illegal sentence” must be treated
as PCRA petition).
We base this conclusion on the plain language of the PCRA, which
states that “[the PCRA] provides for an action by which ... persons
serving illegal sentences may obtain collateral relief.”
Jackson, 30 A.3d at 521.
Jackson is on point.6 Accordingly, we conclude the PCRA court “made
an error of law when it determined the issue of an illegal sentence is not a
PCRA issue” and vacated McGee’s sentence. See Commonwealth Brief at 8.
Order reversed. Case remanded for reinstatement of McGee’s sentence
at count 2 (attempted homicide). Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/7/2021
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6 As noted above, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Jackson’s petition
for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 47 A.3d 845 (Pa.
2012) (Table).
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