Com. v. Burns, T. ( 2021 )


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  • J-A01031-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,           :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :          PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee             :
    :
    v.                            :
    :
    THOMAS BURNS,                           :
    :
    Appellant            :    No. 3187 EDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 24, 2019
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0003536-2017
    CP-09-CR-0007253-2015
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,           :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :          PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee             :
    :
    v.                            :
    :
    THOMAS BURNS,                           :
    :
    Appellant            :    No. 3188 EDA 2019
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 24, 2019
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0003536-2017
    CP-09-CR-0007253-2015
    BEFORE:        BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                       FILED JULY 07, 2021
    Appellant, Thomas Burns, appeals from the judgment of sentence of
    17 months and 25 days’ incarceration, imposed after his terms of parole
    were revoked at informations 7253-2015 and 3536-2017.            After careful
    review, we affirm.
    *Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A01031-21
    The trial court provided the following procedural background:
    On June 6, 2016, on information 7253-2015, Appellant
    pled guilty to public drunkenness,1 resisting arrest,2 and
    harassment.3     On Count 2, resisting arrest, Appellant was
    sentenced to twenty-four months [of probation]. Appellant’s
    sentencing guidelines for Count 2 were as follows: restorative
    sanctions in the mitigated range, one to nine months in the
    standard range, and twelve months in the aggravated range.
    ______
    1 18 Pa.C.S. § 5505, ([summary]).
    2 18 Pa.C.S. § 5104, ([second-degree misdemeanor]).
    3 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(1), ([summary]).
    On August 29, 2016, by agreement, Appellant was found
    in violation of probation. Appellant’s probation was revoked[,]
    and he was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for not less than
    four months to no more than twenty-three months[,] and given
    credit for time served from August 5, 2016. Appellant was to be
    presumptively paroled after h[e] provided a verifiable and
    acceptable address.       Appellant was effectively paroled on
    December 5, 2016.
    On December 16, 2016, a bench warrant was issued for
    Appellant for a probation violation of absconding. On April 4,
    2017, the bench warrant was rescinded. Appellant was also
    found in violation of parole and his parole was revoked.
    Appellant was sentenced to serve nineteen months and was
    presumptively paroled after serving 180 days misconduct free
    and providing a verifiable and acceptable[ address].
    On April 6, 2018, Appellant was granted parole to a
    verifiable and acceptable address.
    On March 8, 2019, th[e trial c]ourt held a Gagnon I
    hearing[,] and Appellant was to be released after his intensive
    outpatient treatment was verified.[1] On April 1, 2019, Appellant
    was granted [released-on-own-recognizance] bail but not
    1 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 
    411 U.S. 778
     (1973).
    -2-
    J-A01031-21
    released because he was unable to meet his condition of
    verifying outpatient treatment.
    On information 3536-2017, Appellant was charged with
    escape.4    On October 13, 2017, Appellant entered into a
    negotiated guilty plea. Sentencing was deferred for 30 days for
    a mental health evaluation. On March 9, 2018, Appellant was
    sentenced to imprisonment to no less than time served to no
    more than twenty-three months. The special condition imposed
    was that immediate parole would be granted when Appellant
    found a verifiable and acceptable address.             Appellant’s
    sentencing guideline[s] were as followed: nine months in the
    mitigated range, twelve to eighteen months in the standard
    range, and twenty-one months in the aggravated range.
    ______
    4 18 Pa.C.S. § 5121(a), ([third-degree felony]).
    On February 12, 2019, th[e trial c]ourt issued a bench
    warrant for Appellant for absconding. On March 8, 2019, th[e
    c]ourt held a Gagnon I hearing[,] and Appellant was to be
    released after his intensive outpatient treatment was verified.
    On August 14, 2019, a violation hearing was held[,] and
    Appellant was found in violation of parole on informations 7253-
    2015 and 3536-2017[,] and parole was revoked. Sentencing
    was deferred for 30 days[,] and Appellant remained in custody.
    Notes of testimony were not requested in this appeal but from
    th[e trial c]ourt’s notes, sentencing was deferred because[,] on
    December 17, 2018, Appellant was charged with possession of
    drug paraphernalia [at information 0425-2019] and th[e c]ourt
    was waiting to see the disposition in that matter.         … On
    September 16, 2019, Appellant pleaded guilty [at information
    0425-2019] to two counts of disorderly conduct and sentenced
    to pay a fine.
    On September 24, 2019, Appellant was sentenced to
    undergo imprisonment and to serve his back time of 7 months
    and 4 days on criminal information 7253-2015. [Appellant was
    given credit for time served and the trial court directed that his
    parole at that information be closed. N.T., 9/24/2019, at 11.]
    Appellant was also sentenced to undergo imprisonment and
    serve his back time of 10 months and 21 days on criminal
    information 3536-2017[, beginning on September 24, 2019].
    -3-
    J-A01031-21
    Appellant could      apply   for   parole   after   serving   120   days
    misconduct free.
    On September 30, 2019, Appellant filed a petition for
    review of revocation, however, the Bucks County Office of the
    Clerk of Courts only clocked in the motion to indicate the date
    and time in which it was filed[,] and the motion was not ruled
    upon by th[e c]ourt.
    Trial Court Opinion, 3/3/2020, at 1–3 (parenthetical numbers and headings
    omitted).
    On October 21, 2019, Appellant pro se filed a single notice of appeal,
    listing both lower court docket numbers. The Bucks County Clerk of Courts
    docketed the notice of appeal to preserve the timeliness of the appeal2 and
    notified Appellant on October 23, 2019, of several deficiencies, which
    rendered his notice incomplete. On November 4, 2019, Appellant corrected
    those deficiencies by pro se filing a second notice of appeal, again listing
    both lower court docket numbers.3
    2 In the parole revocation context, the 30-day appeal period commences on
    the date the sentence is pronounced in open court. See Commonwealth v.
    Duffy, 
    143 A.3d 940
    , 944 (Pa. Super. 2016). Although Appellant timely
    filed a post-sentence motion on September 30, 2019, which the trial court
    did not rule upon, his notice of appeal was still due by October 24, 2019.
    See Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(E) (“The filing of a motion to modify sentence will not
    toll the 30-day appeal period.”).
    3 In accordance with our Court’s practice, this Court issued two orders on
    December 17, 2019, asking Appellant to show cause as to why his notices of
    appeal should not be quashed pursuant to Commonwealth v. Walker, 
    185 A.3d 969
     (Pa. 2018), and Pa.R.A.P. 341(a). Appellant pro se filed several
    responses arguing the merits of his claim on appeal, as well as a petition for
    consolidation of the appeals. On January 3, 2020, this Court referred the
    Walker issue to the merits panel. On January 17, 2020, this Court granted
    (Footnote Continued Next Page)
    -4-
    J-A01031-21
    Thereafter, this Court remanded the matter to the trial court for 60
    days to determine whether the Bucks County Public Defender’s Office still
    represented Appellant and for the trial court to take further action, as
    required, to protect Appellant’s right to appeal. In the meantime, Appellant
    was released on parole. The trial court held a hearing on January 28, 2020,
    which Appellant failed to attend. On January 29, 2020, the trial court issued
    an order, directing the public defender’s office to continue representing
    Appellant and to file a concise statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
    Appellant timely filed a counseled Rule 1925(b) statement, and the trial
    court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion in response.
    (Footnote Continued) _______________________
    Appellant’s request for consolidation, without prejudice for the merits panel
    to quash. The fact that Appellant pro se filed a notice of appeal bearing a
    caption with both trial court docket numbers does not necessarily in and of
    itself require quashal. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    236 A.3d 1141
    ,
    1148 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc). However, the filing of a singular notice of
    appeal, when separate notices of appeal are required at each trial court
    docket number, may implicate non-compliance with Walker.
    Instantly, Appellant filed a single timely, but deficient, notice of
    appeal, which appears in the record for information 7253-2015, and a
    second, corrected notice of appeal, which appears in the record for 3536-
    2017. This Court has held that “fraud or breakdown in the trial court’s
    processes” may excuse the otherwise untimely filing of an appeal and a
    party’s failure to comply with Walker. Commonwealth v. Khalil, 
    806 A.2d 415
    , 420 (Pa. Super. 2002); see also Commonwealth v. Larkin, 
    235 A.3d 350
    , 354 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc). Here, Appellant was never advised of
    his right to appeal or his need to file two notices of appeal. See generally
    N.T., 9/24/2019. In fact, we observe that Appellant was acting pro se in the
    early stages of his appeal despite the public defender’s office still being
    counsel of record, as discussed infra. Thus, we conclude a breakdown
    occurred such that we may overlook the defective nature of Appellant’s
    notices of appeal and we shall proceed to address the merits of Appellant’s
    appeal.
    -5-
    J-A01031-21
    On appeal, Appellant presents a single issue for our review: “Did the
    trial court abuse its discretion by imposing an illegal sentence by sentencing
    Appellant, upon revocation, to serve his back time on the two underlying
    informations consecutive to each other. Originally the parole dockets were
    served concurrently.”     Appellant’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization
    omitted).   Although Appellant frames his question as a challenge to the
    discretionary aspects of his sentence and lists the corresponding standard of
    review in his brief, he is really challenging the legality of his sentence.
    Following parole revocation and recommitment, the proper issue
    on appeal is whether the revocation court erred, as a matter of
    law, in deciding to revoke parole and, therefore, to recommit the
    defendant to confinement. Accordingly, an appeal of a parole
    revocation is not an appeal of the discretionary aspects of
    sentence.
    Commonwealth v. Kalichak, 
    943 A.2d 285
    , 291 (Pa. Super. 2008)
    (citations omitted).   “An assertion that the trial court erroneously imposed
    an illegal sentence is a question of law and, as such, our scope of review is
    plenary and our standard of review is de novo.”             Commonwealth v.
    Williams, 
    980 A.2d 667
    , 672 (Pa. Super. 2009).
    Here, Appellant does not challenge the decision to revoke, but rather
    the sentences imposed following the parole revocations.        In support of his
    claim, Appellant cites a single case: Commonwealth v. Sharpe, 
    665 A.2d 1194
     (Pa. Super. 1995). Relying on Sharpe, Appellant makes the following
    argument:
    -6-
    J-A01031-21
    That Appellant’s initial sentences were to be served
    “concurrently” precluded the [c]ourt upon revocation of parole,
    to require that the sentences for the same offenses be served
    “consecutively” not only [sic] was the modification untimely …
    but it smacks of and implicates violations of the Double Jeopardy
    Clause[s] of both [the] United States and Pennsylvania
    Constitutions by enlarging the punishment imposed.
    Appellant’s Brief at 8–9 (ellipsis in original).4
    Appellant’s argument is misleading. We observe that in Sharpe, the
    defendant was originally sentenced           at two   informations to   identical
    concurrent sentences of incarceration followed by probation on the same day
    as part of the same guilty plea hearing. Sharpe, 
    665 A.2d at 1195
    . Thus,
    this Court concluded that the trial “court imposed an illegal sentence when it
    directed that the punishment phase for each crime committed be served
    consecutively, instead of merely revoking parole and ordering the balance of
    the sentences be served ‘concurrently.’” 
    Id. at 1197
    . Contrarily, Appellant
    was originally sentenced at information 7253-2015 on June 6, 2016.           His
    probation was revoked at that information on August 29, 2016, and his
    parole was revoked for the first time on April 4, 2017.       Subsequently, on
    March 9, 2018, Appellant received his original sentence at information 3536-
    2017. Based on the record before us, at no point was the sentence imposed
    4 Appellant also argues that the trial court erred by relying on 42 Pa.C.S.
    § 9771, which governs probation revocations, in defending its sentence in its
    Rule 1925(a) opinion. See Appellant’s Brief at 8. Although we agree that
    the trial court erred in its analysis, we are not bound by the rationale of the
    trial court and may affirm on any basis. See Commonwealth v. Doty, 
    48 A.3d 451
    , 456 (Pa. Super. 2012).
    -7-
    J-A01031-21
    at information 7253-2015 set to run concurrently with the sentence imposed
    at information 3536-2017. Instead, what Appellant attempts to frame as a
    concurrent-turned-consecutive illegal sentence is really an attempt to
    receive double credit.
    This Court has held that a defendant is not entitled to “receive
    credit against more than one sentence for the same time
    served.” Commonwealth v. Merigris, … 
    681 A.2d 194
    , 195
    ([Pa. Super.] 1996). We have acknowledged that such “double
    credit” is prohibited both by the statutory language of [42
    Pa.C.S. §] 9760 and by the principle that a defendant be given
    credit only for “time spent in custody ... for a particular
    offense.” Commonwealth v. Hollawell, 604 A.2d … 723, 725
    (Pa. Super. 1992).
    Commonwealth v. Ellsworth, 
    97 A.3d 1255
    , 1257 (Pa. Super. 2014)
    (brackets in original omitted).
    At the hearing on September 24, 2019, the trial court sentenced
    Appellant to serve his back time on both informations. He received credit for
    time served on information 7253-2015, and that parole was closed.
    Appellant was not entitled to receive double credit, so his back time for
    information 3536-2017 was set to begin on September 24, 2019. Thus, the
    trial court did not impose an illegal sentence upon revocation of Appellant’s
    paroles by refusing to give him double credit. Based on the foregoing, we
    affirm Appellant’s judgments of sentence.
    Judgments of sentence affirmed.
    Judge Strassburger did not participate in the consideration or decision
    of this case.
    -8-
    J-A01031-21
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 7/7/2021
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 3187 EDA 2019

Judges: Bender

Filed Date: 7/7/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/21/2024