Com. v. Mbewe, C. ( 2021 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CHRISTOPHER FRED MBEWE :
:
Appellant : No. 470 WDA 2020
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 24, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-CR-0000592-2006
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED: JULY 8, 2021
Christopher Fred Mbewe (Mbewe) appeals pro se from the Court of
Common Pleas of Allegheny County’s order (PCRA court) denying his petition
for writ of habeas corpus, which it treated as a petition filed pursuant to the
Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6541-6546. He maintains
that because he claims Section 1102(a) of the Crimes Code1 is void for
vagueness, his claim for relief is not a cognizable PCRA claim pursuant to this
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Section 1102 of the Crimes Code provides, in pertinent part, that: “a person
who has been convicted of a murder of the first degree or of murder of a law
enforcement officer of the first degree shall be sentenced to death or to a term
of life imprisonment in accordance with 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 (relating to
sentencing procedure for murder of the first degree).” 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 1102(a)(1).
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Court’s holding in Commonwealth v. Rouse, 191 A.3d 1 (Pa. Super. 2018),
making the PCRA time bars inapplicable. We affirm.
I.
We take the following factual background and procedural history from
our independent review of the record. On July 14, 2009, a jury convicted
Mbewe of the First Degree Murder of his mother-in-law and on October 10,
2009, the court sentenced him to a term of life imprisonment without parole
pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(a). A panel of this Court affirmed the judgment
of sentence on October 26, 2011, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied
further review on October 5, 2012. (See Commonwealth v. Mbewe, 37
A.3d 1246 (Pa. Super. filed Oct. 26, 2011) (unpublished memorandum),
appeal denied, 54 A.3d 348 (Pa. 2011)).
Mbewe filed three PCRA petitions between November 27, 2012, and
September 8, 2017. The PCRA court denied the first petition on December
18, 2014. This court affirmed the denial and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
denied Mbewe’s petition for allowance of appeal. (See Commonwealth v.
Mbewe, 135 A.3d 661 (Pa. Super. filed Dec. 16, 2015) (unpublished
memorandum), appeal denied, 136 A.3d 980 (Pa. 2016)). The PCRA court
denied his second petition on May 2, 2017, and this Court affirmed the denial
on March 3, 2018; further review was denied. (See Commonwealth v.
Mbewe, 188 A.3d 525 (Pa. Super. Mar. 13, 2018) (unpublished
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memorandum), appeal denied, 193 A.3d 2018)). The PCRA court denied his
third petition on October 23, 2018, and no appeal was filed.
On November 19, 2020, Mbewe filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
in which he argued that Section 1102(a) of the Crimes Code is unconstitutional
under the void for vagueness doctrine2 because it fails to provide fair notice
that the penalty of life imprisonment is without parole. The court treated the
request for relief as a PCRA petition, issued Rule 907 notice of its intent to
deny the petition, and formally denied it as untimely on February 24, 2020.
See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). This appeal followed.3
Mbewe raises one issue for this Court’s review:
Whether [the PCRA] court abused its discretion in dismissing
[Mbewe]’s state habeas corpus petition alleging penal statute 18
Pa.C.S. Section 1102(a) is unconstitutional and void under the
vagueness doctrine because the statute fails to give a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice that its true penalty is life
imprisonment “without parole?”
(Mbewe’s Brief, at 3).
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2 The void for vagueness doctrine “prevents the government from imposing
sanctions under a criminal law that fails to give fair notice of the proscribed
conduct.” Commonwealth v. Herman, 161 A.3d 194, 204 (Pa. 2017)
(citation omitted). A sentencing court does not have authority to sentence a
defendant pursuant to an unconstitutionally vague sentencing statute. See
Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 595 (2015).
3 Mbewe’s Rule 1925(b) statement was untimely, despite being granted filing
extensions. However, because the PCRA court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion
addresses the sole issue raised, we will overlook this procedural flaw and
proceed to a review of the appeal’s merits. See Commonwealth v. Gaston,
239 A.3d 135, 139 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2020).
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II.
1.
Before reaching the merits of Mbewe’s issue, we first address the court’s
treatment of his filing as a PCRA petition. It is well-settled that the PCRA is
intended to be the sole means of obtaining post-conviction relief. See 42
Pa.C.S. § 9542 (“The action established in this subchapter shall be the sole
means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law
and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist when this subchapter
takes effect, including habeas corpus[.]”). Issues that are cognizable under
the PCRA must be raised in a timely PCRA petition and a petitioner cannot
circumvent its time-bar by titling his petition as a writ of habeas corpus. See
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2013). Generally,
all motions filed after a judgment of sentence is final must be construed as a
PCRA petition. See id.Mbewe posits, however, that his request for relief should have been
treated as a petition for writ of habeas corpus because this Court held in
Rouse that void for vagueness claims are not illegal sentence claims
contemplated by the PCRA. (See Mbewe’s Brief, at 12-13); see also Rouse,
supra at 7. However, recently, in Commonwealth v. Moore, 247 A.3d 990(Pa. 2021), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly rejected Rouse and
held that a claim that Section 1102(a) is void for vagueness because it fails to
notify a defendant that he will be sentenced to life without the possibility of
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parole is a cognizable PCRA illegality of sentence challenge that must comport
with PCRA requirements, including timeliness. See Moore, supra at 997-98
(rejecting Rouse and affirming dismissal of habeas corpus petition raising
Section 1102(a) void for vagueness claim as untimely PCRA petition).
Accordingly, the court properly treated Mbewe’s request for relief as a
PCRA petition and we must next consider its timeliness.
2.
“The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite.”
Commonwealth v. Shiloh, 170 A.3d 553, 557 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation
omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999)
(“Although legality of sentence is always subject to review within the PCRA,
claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of the exceptions
thereto.”). A petitioner must file a PCRA petition within one year of the date
the underlying judgment becomes final unless he pleads and proves a
timeliness exception. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).
Mbewe’s sentence became final on January 4, 2013, when his time for
appealing our Supreme Court’s denial of his request for permission to appeal
expired, so his petition filed on November 19, 2020, is facially untimely. See
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (“A judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct
review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United
States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time
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for seeking the review.”). Accordingly, we cannot consider Mbewe’s PCRA
petition unless he pleads and proves one of the following limited exceptions:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
Mbewe fails to raise any timeliness exception. (See Mbewe’s Brief, at
7-14). Even if we were to liberally construe Mbewe’s argument as an attempt
to raise the constitutional right exception, it would fail because the concepts
of due process and “void for vagueness” were not newly recognized after the
imposition of Mbewe’s judgment of sentence and held to apply retroactively.
See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii); see also Commonwealth v. Ross, 140
A.3d 55, 58 (Pa. Super. 2016).
Consequently, because Mbewe has failed to plead and prove the
applicability of any timeliness exception, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to
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consider the merits of his petition and it was properly dismissed.4, 5 See
Moore, supra at 998; Shiloh, supra at 557; Fahy, supra at 223. Mbewe’s
claim does not merit relief and we affirm the order of the PCRA court.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/8/2021
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4 Having concluded that we lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal’s merits,
we likewise need not consider whether Mbewe’s issue was waived for his
failure to raise it at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion. (See Mbewe’s
Brief, at 13-14); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b).
5 Our reasoning differs from that of the PCRA court.
However, we are “not
bound by the rationale of the trial court and may affirm on any basis”
supported by the record. Commonwealth v. Martin, 205 A.3d 1247, 1248
n.3 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
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