In Re: Z.B., Appeal of: I.B. ( 2021 )

J-S15031-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: Z.B., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: I.B., FATHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 16 WDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered December 7, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
No(s): CP-02-AP-0000080-2020
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: JULY 9, 2021
Appellant, I.B. (“Father”), files this appeal from the order dated and
entered December 7, 2020, in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas,
granting the petition of the Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and
Families (“CYF” or the “Agency”) and involuntarily terminating his parental
rights to his minor, dependent daughter, Z.B., born in February 2019 (“Child”
or “the Child”), pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5),
(8), and (b).1 After review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the procedural and factual history as follows:
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Child’s mother, I.D.W. a/k/a A.W. (“Mother”), signed a consent to voluntarily
terminate her parental rights to Child and, pursuant to order dated and
entered December 7, 2020, the court granted a Petition to Confirm Consent
to Adoption and Terminate Parental Rights as to Mother. Order - Confirm
Consent to Termination of Parental Rights, 12/7/20.
J-S15031-21
The [c]hild in this case was born [in February 2019]. At the
time of the termination proceeding, the Child was twenty-two
months old. CYF had already been involved with the Child’s
[m]other since 2014. Mother was a dependent child and had other
older children, who had been removed and rights terminated, prior
to this [c]hild’s birth. Prior to the Child’s birth, Mother had tested
positive for marijuana at a prenatal appointment and was
uncooperative with the [A]gency. Father had been known to CYF
as Mother’s paramour during her pregnancy; however, CYF
became active with Father at the Child’s birth. Immediately after
being notified of the Child’s birth, CYF obtained an Emergency
Custody Authorization on February 13, 2019. The Child was
placed into foster care upon her discharge from the hospital the
following day, and has remained in that same foster home since.
Father told the CYF caseworker and hospital staff that he
was not prepared, willing, or able to care for a child. CYF was also
aware that Father’s housing was unstable and that he had
unaddressed substance abuse issues, despite being previously
referred to services.
CYF filed a Petition for Dependency on February 26, 2019[]
and filed an Amended Petition for Dependency on April 4, 2019.
The Child was adjudicated dependent on April 10, 2019. At the
time of the adjudication, this [c]ourt found that Father was living
between houses, had tested positive for THC
[(“tetrahydrocannabinol”)] and was continuing to test positive
[2]
for THC, and “per his own admission he is not in a position to care
for the baby today but wants to work towards reunification.”
CYF referred Father for an [sic] POWER [(“PA Organization
for Women in Early Recovery”)] assessment, provided a referral
to the DADS program,[3] a referral for coached visitation, a referral
to the Urban League of Pittsburgh for housing assistance, and
transportation assistance. Father’s goals were to address
____________________________________________
2 The primary psychoactive component of cannabis or marijuana.
3 Ms. Ketter explained this program as follows: “It is now what we call Father
Engagement[. I]t assists father[s] with understanding the court process, the
involvement with CYF, and navigating different systems within CYF and
community resources to assist a biological father or parent in trying to regain
custody of their child or understanding the termination of parental rights and
what that all entails.” N.T., 12/7/20, at 19-20.
-2-
J-S15031-21
substance abuse issues, participate in random urine screens,
attend coached parenting and visitation, obtain appropriate
housing and employment, address his outstanding criminal issues,
and attend an anger management class due to allegations of
intimate partner violence where the Child’s [m]other was the
victim.
At the first Permanency Review Hearing after the
adjudication, this [c]ourt found that Father had made minimal
compliance with the Family Plan and Father made minimal
progress towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated
the original placement. This [c]ourt found that Father was
struggling to meet his goals, that he was discharged from coached
visitation for nonattendance, that he had only two visits, was still
in-between houses, tested positive for THC, and had yet to enroll
in an anger management class, which was also a condition for a
pending criminal case.
At the Permanency Review Hearing on November 23, 2019,
this [c]ourt again found minimal compliance and minimal
progress, noting that Father was struggling to meet his goals and
he had not seen the Child in almost six months.
At the Permanency Review Hearing on January 29, 2020,
this [c]ourt again found minimal compliance and minimal progress
with Father. The [c]ourt indicated in the findings: “Father has had
the same goals. He was [sic] attend BIP [(“Batterers Intervention
Program”)] or anger management - he reported today that he has
an intake scheduled then reported he has attended five session[s].
He has not completed a POWER assessment. He has attended 2
out of 29 visits. He is employed and staying with friends. There
were some concerns during his visits about diapering, feeding and
holding the baby.”
At the May 27, 2020 Permanency Review Hearing, this
[c]ourt again found that there was minimal compliance and
minimal progress by Father. The [c]ourt noted that Father did not
participate at the hearing, despite having notice by mail and
phone. Father had yet to complete his POWER assessment and
had a bench warrant out for failing to comply with his criminal
court obligations.
Father had not made any progress to address any of his
goals and CYF filed the Petition for Involuntary Termination of
Parental Rights on June 16, 2020. At the Permanency Review
Hearing on September 9, 2020, this [c]ourt continued to find that
-3-
J-S15031-21
Father had made minimal compliance and minimal progress
towards remedying the conditions that led to the Child’s removal.
More specifically, this [c]ourt indicated that:
Unfortunately[,] [F]ather has not made any progress
toward his goals. He reported today that he is in an
anger management class. He has not completed D&A
or mental health. Additionally, he has been offered
coached visitation multiple times but has been
discharged and unable to visit consistently. He has
not visited consistently throughout the history of this
case. He has continued to not attend with any
consistency and when he has attended, he needs
prompting about feeding and diaper changes. He was
contacted by TRAC [(“Three Rivers Adoption
Council”)] on June 17th to schedule in person visits
which were set up[,] but he has not attended
consistently. He has unresolved criminal charges. He
is living with his father.[4]
The Child has remained in the same foster home where she was
placed immediately after birth and upon discharge from the
hospital. This [c]ourt has routinely made findings at various
proceedings that the Child is doing well in this home and her needs
are being met.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/3/21, at 2-6 (footnotes omitted) (citations to record
omitted).
Thereafter, the Agency filed a petition for the termination of parental
rights on June 6, 2020. The court conducted a hearing on December 7, 2020.
Father participated via telephone and was represented by counsel. Child was
____________________________________________
4 It is believed that the court intended to state that Father is living with his
mother, as Father testified that he is living with his mother. N.T., 12/7/20, at
55.
-4-
J-S15031-21
represented by legal counsel.5 The parties presented joint stipulations. See
Joint Exhibit 1; N.T., 12/7/20, at 6. The Agency then presented the testimony
of David Reagan6 and Lisa Ketter, Agency caseworkers. The Agency further
presented Exhibits CYF 1 and CYF 2, which were admitted without objection.7
N.T., 12/7/20, at 51-52. Lastly, Father testified on his own behalf.
By order dated and entered December 7, 2020, memorializing its ruling
on the record at the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court involuntarily
terminated the parental rights of Father pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2),
(5), (8), and (b).8 On January 4, 2021, Father, through counsel, filed a timely
notice of appeal, as well as a concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). Thereafter, on February
3, 2021, the court issued an Opinion.
____________________________________________
5 Subsequent to an order appointing legal counsel on September 9, 2020,
James J. Robertson, Jr., Esquire, entered his appearance on behalf of Child on
October 5, 2020. Entry of Appearance, 10/5/20.
6 Mr. Reagan testified solely as to Mother’s consent for the voluntary
termination of her parental rights. See N.T., 12/7/20, at 7-9. As indicated,
the court confirmed Mother’s consent to terminate her parental rights. Order
- Confirm Consent to Termination of Parental Rights, 12/7/20; N.T., 12/7/20,
at 9. Mother was not present or represented by counsel at this proceeding.
7 Exhibit CYF 1 encompasses the certified court orders from the dependency
matter, and Exhibit CYF 2 is the Psychological Evaluation Report of Patricia
Pepe, Ph.D., licensed psychologist, who, pursuant to referral, was to conduct
an individual and interactional evaluations.
8 While the court likewise indicated changing Child’s permanent placement
goal to adoption, N.T., 12/7/20, at 86, the issue of goal change is not raised
as part of the instant appeal and we therefore address the termination of
Father’s parental rights only.
-5-
J-S15031-21
On appeal, Father raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of
law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s
parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. [§ ]2511(a)(2), (5), and
(8)?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of
law in concluding that CYF met its burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights
would best serve the needs and welfare of the child pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S. [§ ]2511(b)?
Father’s Brief at 5 (suggested answers omitted).9
In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our
standard of review is as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa.
2012). “If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts
review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or
abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. The
trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. Id. at 827.
We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., [9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa.
2010)].
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to believe
all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all
____________________________________________
9 While we observe that Father states his issues slightly different than in his
Rule 1925(b) Statement, we find that he has preserved his challenges to the
court’s order.
-6-
J-S15031-21
credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G.
& J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f
competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if
the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B.,
835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, and requires a bifurcated analysis of
the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental
rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The
party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We
have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re
C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (citation omitted).
In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). We have long held
-7-
J-S15031-21
that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only agree
with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as
Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s termination decree pursuant to
subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
...
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
...
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), and (b).
With regard to termination of parental rights pursuant to Section
2511(a)(2), we have indicated:
-8-
J-S15031-21
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] §
2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1)
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2)
such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot
be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those
grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002)). “Parents are
required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption
of full parental responsibilities. . . . [A] parent’s vow to cooperate, after a
long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of
services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” In re
A.L.D., 797 A.2d at 340 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In the case at bar, in finding grounds for termination of Father’s parental
rights, including Section 2511(a)(2), the trial court reasoned:
The record clearly demonstrates that CYF met its burden, by
clear and convincing evidence, for the grounds alleged pursuant
to 23 [Pa.C.S.] §§ 2511(a)(2), (5) and (8). The CYF caseworker
testified credibly and competently that the Family Plans and Court
Orders addressed the allegations of incapacity of Father as well as
the conditions that led to the Child’s removal and placement. The
caseworker also testified that she “had a conversation with
[Father] and I believe he understands what the goals of the case
are, and what he need[s] to do to alleviate the circumstances that
resulted in court activity in this case.”
-9-
J-S15031-21
Father had a goal to establish and maintain independent
housing. With respect to the housing goal, this [c]ourt made
findings at multiple Permanency Review Hearings that Father was
in between housing and/or had not established independent stable
housing. The caseworker testified that the first time that Father
contacted her to advise he had obtained stable independent
housing was on November 17, 2020, well after the Petition to
Terminate Parental Rights was filed and only a month before the
Contested Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights was
scheduled. At the termination proceeding, Father testified that he
had housing but that the leasing application was incomplete.
Father testified that he could not finish the housing application
process until he had the information that was stolen from his
wallet, which was a social security card and birth certificate, as
well as information for his children so he can “put them down as
who’s supposed to be staying with me.” Father admitted that at
the time of the termination proceeding he was living with his
mother.
Father had a goal to participate in anger management
programming, which was also a requirement for Father’s pending
criminal matter where Father was to participate in a program to
help address intimate partner violence. At the time of the
termination proceeding, the caseworker testified that Father had
not provided any documentation that he had completed any such
programming. Father, however, testified that he had “completed
a majority of the classes but because there was a recount it shows
that I missed some of the classes but when I talked to the judge
he asked me did I mind redoing them and I told him I had no
problem as long as it helped me get out of the program. So
instead of me having to do the full 24, I only have to do about a
good 12-15 classes.” Father agreed that he was still in the process
of completing that goal at the time of the termination proceeding.
Father had a goal to address his mental health; this goal
was established based on Father’s self-reporting of a history of
depression mental health. The caseworker testified that CYF did
not have any documentation to show that Father had participated
in any mental health treatment. Father, at the termination
proceeding, denied that he had any mental health history and/or
that he had ever been recommended for treatment in the past.
- 10 -
J-S15031-21
Father had a goal to address his substance abuse. Father
disclosed to CYF that he used marijuana and Father tested positive
for THC several times. CYF referred Father for a POWER
assessment and the court directed Father to complete random
drug screening. The caseworker testified that CYF did not have
any documentation to show that Father had addressed or
completed this goal. Father acknowledged that he never had a
substance abuse assessment and only attended a few screens.
Father contended, at the time of the termination proceeding, that
he hadn’t used in some time.
Father had a goal of participating in coached visitation. The
caseworker testified that this program would have allowed service
providers to observe the interaction between Father and Child and
provide suggestions to improve his parenting skills.
Unfortunately, the caseworker testified that Father was
discharged for noncompliance and nonattendance of the coached
visitation program.
Father had a goal of visitation. The caseworker testified that
there were gaps and inconsistencies with Father’s visitation with
his [c]hild throughout the twenty-two months Child was in care.
When confronted about his lack of regular and consistent
visitation, Father explained to the caseworker “that his phone was
broken, his wallet was stolen, he was hit on the head with a brick
and he was stabbed and assaulted and he was hospitalized and he
was not able to engage or talk with the [A]gency.” Father
admitted he was inconsistent and that he needed to do more.
Father also testified that he had lost his wallet two to three months
earlier and this interfered with his ability to visit.
Finally, Father had a goal for employment, only insomuch
as it would help him obtain independent housing, and a goal to
resolve his criminal matters. The caseworker testified that she
was unaware if Father had obtained any employment or if he had
resolved his criminal matters. Father testified that he was still
working on completing some of the classes, and that “[a]s far as
I know the case is still active but once I complete all the classes
all charges and everything will be dropped.”
This [c]ourt found Father’s testimony and excuses to be not
credible. Other than offering his testimony to counter that of the
CYF caseworker, Father did not provide any evidence or witnesses
to demonstrate that he had remedied the conditions that led to
removal. Even if this [c]ourt was to accept Father’s testimony
- 11 -
J-S15031-21
that he was nearing completion of the anger management goal
and that he never needed any mental health treatment, this
[c]ourt cannot disregard the evidence that Father did not have
stable housing, did not complete any substance abuse evaluation
or treatment, did [not] demonstrate sobriety for any extended
period of time with negative screens, was discharged from a
coached parenting class for nonattendance, and failed to avail
himself of regular and consistent visitation with his young [c]hild.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/3/21, at 9-13 (citations to record omitted) (some
brackets in original).
Father, however, argues, in part, that there was not sufficient evidence
that he cannot remedy, or had not remedied, the conditions that led to Child’s
removal. Father’s Brief at 14-15. Father asserts a lack of evidence
establishing that marijuana use impaired his ability to parent Child; that he
required coached parenting; that he exposed Child to domestic violence; and
that a mental health professional recommended he engage in mental health
treatment. Id. at 15-16. Further, Father notes he indicated a desire for
reunification from February 2019. Id. at 16. Lastly, Father suggests that
consistent visitation is not a condition causing and/or leading to Child’s
removal that can be remedied. Id. at 16-17. Father concludes:
The record does not contain sufficient evidence to support a
determination that Father had not remedied the conditions which
led to the removal of [Child] from his care. The majority of
testimony presented from CYF was derived from records and not
first-hand observations. And much of that testimony was unclear,
uncertain, or incomplete. What the record does show is that
Father was never provided with an opportunity to show that he
could care for [Child]. Father was never even givin [sic] the
opportunity to schedule appointments for [Child].
Id. at 17 (citation to record omitted).
- 12 -
J-S15031-21
A review of the record supports the trial court’s finding of grounds for
termination under Section 2511(a)(2). The record reveals that Father failed
to complete his goals aimed at reunification. Agency caseworker, Lisa Ketter,
recounted that Father’s goals included housing, anger management, mental
health, sobriety, parenting, employment, and resolution of criminal matters.
N.T., 12/7/20, at 16-17. Ms. Ketter further made clear that Father was aware
of these goals and/or objectives. She stated, “I, myself, had a conversation
with him and I believe he understands what the goals of the case are, and
what he need[s] to do to alleviate the circumstances that resulted in the court
activity in this case.” Id. at 16. Moreover, Father admitted he understood
what was expected of him related to reunification. Id. at 53-54. Notably, the
permanency review order of July 24, 2019 and subsequent orders nonetheless
revealed minimal compliance and progress. Id. at 24-25; see also Joint
Exhibit 1, at ¶9; see also Permanency Review Order, 9/9/20 (stating, in part,
“Unfortunately[, F]ather has not made any progress toward his goals.”). Ms.
Ketter confirmed that this is consistent with the Agency’s assessment of
Father’s actions. Id. at 25. She noted Father’s lack of contact and failure to
complete his goals. Ms. Ketter testified, “Well he’s had no contact with the
[A]gency. He was noncompliant with all of his goals and with the previous
caseworker. My understanding is that just recently he has made himself
available[,] but he still has to provide documentation that he is addressing his
goals and that the [A]gency does not have that information that he is.” Id.
at 31.
- 13 -
J-S15031-21
Hence, the record substantiates the conclusion that Father’s repeated
and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal has caused Child to be
without essential parental control or subsistence necessary for his physical
and mental well-being. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1272.
Moreover, Father cannot or will not remedy this situation. See id.We next determine whether termination was proper under Section
2511(b). As to Section 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have
been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love,
comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791
(Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)],
this Court held that the determination of the child’s “needs and
welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds between
the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to
discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the
parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. However, as
discussed below, evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an
easy task.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “In cases where there is no evidence of any
bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond
exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on
the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-
63 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
When evaluating a parental bond, “[T]he court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
- 14 -
J-S15031-21
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal
citations omitted).
Moreover,
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and
should also consider the intangibles, such as the love,
comfort, security, and stability the child might have
with the foster parent. . . .
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219 (quoting In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d
95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
In further finding termination of Father’s parental rights was in Child’s
best interests pursuant to Section 2511(b), the trial court stated:
In the instant case, this [c]ourt considered the evidence and
testimony presented and found that CYF demonstrated, clearly
and convincingly, that termination would meet the needs and
welfare of this [c]hild. The parties were scheduled for [c]ourt[-]
ordered evaluations and interactional assessments between the
Child and her [f]oster [p]arents, and the Child and her [f]ather.
Dr. Patricia Pepe, a court-appointed evaluator, scheduled
individual and interactional evaluations in this case with Father,
the Child and her [f]oster [p]arents for November 2020. Father
did not attend the evaluation. Father acknowledged that he
received some kind of text providing notice of the evaluation date
and time but that he subsequently received another text
rescheduling it. Father admitted that he did not attend on the
rescheduled date because no one had called him or told him where
it was going to be. Father’s excuse for this was that he did not
have his phone or his wallet, which had all of the Child’s
information, and he did not have transportation. Dr. Pepe’s
evaluations concluded that the Child had a healthy bond with her
[f]oster [p]arents and the Child was doing very well in their home.
- 15 -
J-S15031-21
This [c]ourt is also aware that it need not rely on an expert
opinion to evaluate or assess the child’s emotional bond with the
parent as part of the 42 [Pa.C.S.] § 2511(b) analysis. The CYF
caseworker testified that it was the [A]gency’s opinion that “the
bond has been impaired by the lack of compliance with the
[A]gency and the lack of contact with the child.” The caseworker
testified that she has observed interactions between the Child and
her foster family and described the Child as very happy and
bonded to the people in the home. The caseworker further
testified that the foster parents are meeting all of the Child’s
psychological, developmental and medical needs.
In contrast, the caseworker testified about Father’s
involvement with his [c]hild and said that Father’s visitation was
inconsistent, that Father was generally unreachable, that Father
did not make any independent efforts to obtain information about
the Child’s health and welfare, and the caseworker was unaware
of Father sending any cards, letters or financial supports to his
[c]hild while she was in care.
Father testified about how he viewed his bond with the
Child. Father admitted some challenges[] but thought that he was
making improvements. However, Father also admitted that he
attended eight to ten visits recently and acknowledged there was
a span of time where he attended only two out of twenty-nine
possible visits.
This [c]hild was placed into this foster home directly from
the hospital because her parents were not ready, willing or able
to provide care for her. From that point forward, despite services,
multiple referrals, and transportation assistance, Father failed to
consistently visit and develop a relationship with his newborn
[c]hild. In fact, Father had extended stretches of time where he
did not have contact with the [A]gency or visit with the Child at
all. It is no surprise, therefore, that twenty-two months later this
[c]hild has bonded and attached to her foster parents, where she
has lived since birth and who have consistently met all her
emotional, developmental, and physical needs
This [c]ourt does not doubt that Father cares about his
[c]hild; however, this [c]hild’s permanency cannot be held in
abeyance for Father to gain the requisite maturity to parent and
this [c]ourt cannot create a necessary and beneficial bond
between [] Father and the Child where one does not exist.
Therefore, this [c]ourt was well within its discretion and within the
- 16 -
J-S15031-21
established caselaw when it determined that severing the Child’s
bond with her [f]ather [would not] cause extreme emotional
consequences for the Child, and that any negative consequences
that would result from such termination would be mitigated by any
subsequent bond the Child established with the current foster
parent.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/3/21, at 13-16 (citations to record omitted).
Father, however, asserts a lack of evidence that termination of his
parental rights serves Child’s best interests. Father’s Brief at 17, 19.
Critically, Father points to the fact that there was not an interactional
evaluation performed by Dr. Pepe. While acknowledging that this expert
opinion is not mandatory, Father asserts that other evidence must therefore
be presented to establish Child’s best interests. Id. at 18-19. He notes his
observation of the positive relationship between himself and Child and the lack
of any other evidence establishing that it is not a beneficial relationship. Id.
at 19. Father argues:
The record does not include sufficient evidence to support a
determination that termination of Father’s parental rights best
serves [Child]’s needs and welfare. Father clearly established the
benefit and joy that [Child] derives from her relationship with
Father. [Child] deserves to have her beneficial relationship with
Father preserved. The only way to ensure this benefit to [Child]
is to restore Father’s parental rights.
Id.
Upon review, we again discern no abuse of discretion. The record
supports the trial court’s finding that Child’s developmental, physical and
emotional needs and welfare favor termination of Father’s parental rights
pursuant to Section 2511(b). See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.
- 17 -
J-S15031-21
Significantly, Father’s visitation with Child was reported as “minimal and
inconsistent,” thereby affecting his relationship with Child.10 N.T., 12/7/20,
at 24-25, 38. Ms. Ketter testified, “I believe the bond has been impaired by
the lack of compliance with the [A]gency and the lack of contact with the
child.” Id. Further, in addressing whether the relationship between Father
and Child was a beneficial relationship, Ms. Ketter continued,
Often we defer to the interactional process and the [d]octors to
make a recommendation for that. At this time[,] I don’t believe
it would be in her benefit just from reading the record and being
familiar with the case and the lack of contact[.] I don’t believe it
would be beneficial for her to be removed from the current foster
home and be in his care. He has even indicated that he would like
to maybe have his father who resides in Florida be a caregiver
during that conversation that we had on November 17th of this
year. So he’s [-] I don’t believe able to and still not in the position
to care for his child.
Id. at 26-27.
Moreover, and more importantly, Child has been in her foster home
since birth, almost two years at the time of trial, where she resides with her
older half-brother. Id. at 27. In the foster home, Child’s needs are met and
she is bonded with her family. Id. at 27-28. As described by Ms. Ketter,
“She's just [a] very happy and pleasant young lady. Bonded with her foster
____________________________________________
10 As indicated by the court, Father testified to attending eight to ten visits
and acknowledged a period where he attended only two of twenty-nine visits.
Id. at 63, 71. Father offered multiple explanations for his minimal visitation,
including transportation issues, his wallet being lost and/or stolen, a
hospitalization, the fact that he was no longer speaking to Mother who kept
track of all the dates and what he needed to do, and COVID-19. Id. at 72-
75.
- 18 -
J-S15031-21
home parents and the people that are in the home. I believe a strong bond
between her and [her brother] as well.” Id. at 27-28. This was confirmed by
Dr. Patricia Pepe, who conducted an interactional evaluation of Child and her
foster parents.11 See Exhibit CYF 2. Dr. Pepe observed Child’s “primary and
positive attachment” to her foster parents. Id. at 3 (unpaginated). Dr. Pepe
further opined, “. . .[C]onsidering the child has been with [foster parents] for
the entirety of her young life and because she exhibits primary attachment
toward her foster parents, it is in her best psychological interest to remain
with them, hopefully on a permanent basis.” Id. As such, Ms. Ketter
recommended termination of Father’s parental rights. N.T., 12/7/20, at 28.
While Father may profess to love Child, a parent’s own feelings of love
and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights.
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. At the time of the hearing, Child had been in
placement for almost two years, her entire life, and is entitled to permanency
and stability. As we stated, a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the
hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of
parenting.” Id. at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the
custody and rearing of his child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or
____________________________________________
11 As referenced infra, pursuant to referral, an individual evaluation of Father
and an interactional evaluation of Father and Child was scheduled before Dr.
Pepe, but Father failed to appear. While Father acknowledged receipt of a
text message rescheduling his appointment, he suggested he was not
provided the appropriate location information. He noted reaching out to his
visitation supervisor, but not hearing back from her until a day or two later.
He further recounted issues with his phone and wallet, and difficulties with
transportation. N.T., 12/7/20, at 45, 62, 72; see also Exhibit CYF 2.
- 19 -
J-S15031-21
her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment
of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,
N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of
discretion and conclude that the trial court appropriately terminated Father’s
parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/9/2021
- 20 -