Fischl, E. v. Fischl, E. ( 2021 )

J-A14022-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
EDWIN C. FISCHL : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
EDWIN M. FISCHL :
:
Appellee : No. 892 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered July 23, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Civil Division at No(s): FD-18-01583
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., KING, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: JULY 9, 2021
Appellant, Edwin C. Fischl (“Father”), appeals from the order entered in
the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, which divested the family
division of jurisdiction over a consent agreement involving the terms of
expiration of a temporary Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) order between Father
and his adult son, Appellee Edwin M. Fischl (“Son”). We vacate in part and
remand for further proceedings.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
Father and Son were involved in extensive litigation in the Allegheny County
Court of Common Pleas civil division. On September 6, 2018, Father filed a
petition in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas family division for a
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temporary PFA order against Son, and obtained a temporary PFA order.1 On
October 22, 2018, the parties entered into a consent agreement. The consent
agreement, inter alia, prohibited Son from contacting Father or residing in
Father’s home. The consent agreement further stated that a final PFA order
would be entered if Son violated any of the terms of the consent agreement.
The consent agreement continued the PFA action for a period not to exceed
three years, expiring on October 22, 2021. The consent agreement also
permitted Son to remove his personal belongings from Father’s home under
certain terms.
On July 16, 2020, Son filed an emergency motion for relief, alleging that
Father violated the consent agreement by refusing to let Son retrieve certain
personal belongings. On July 20, 2020, Father filed a response, claiming he
had already allowed Son to retrieve the belongings and Son had failed to
identify any specific items still inside the house.
On July 23, 2020, the court granted Son’s motion in part. Specifically,
the court ordered that, within 48 hours, Son must provide Father’s counsel
with a detailed and specific list of personal items he wished to retrieve from
the residence, and within 48 hours after receipt, Son and Father’s counsel
would agree in writing on non-disputed personal items from the list and a date
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1 Father alleged, inter alia, Son had intimidated Father and his wife by
screaming at them repeatedly and demanding access to a shotgun in the
household. Father said Son’s actions put Father and his wife in fear of bodily
injury.
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and time on which Son could retrieve the items. The court also purported to
divest the family division of continued jurisdiction over the consent
agreement, reasoning that the parties were not current or former spouses,
there were no pending complaints in the family division, and no basis existed
for the filing of complaints. According to the court, any claims related to the
consent agreement should proceed in the civil division.
On August 12, 2020, Father filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing
that the court lacked authority to divest itself of jurisdiction. The court denied
the motion that same day. Father timely appealed on August 19, 2020. No
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal was ordered
or filed.2
On appeal, Father presents the following issue for our review:
Did the Court of Common Pleas err in divesting itself of
jurisdiction, despite the existence of the parties’ parent-
child relationship, a court-administered consent agreement
under the [PFA] Act, a right to obtain relief thereunder, and
the failure to hold a hearing, and the absence of a petition
to modify?
(Father’s Brief at 2).
Father argues that the court erred in divesting itself of jurisdiction
because the parties and action were properly subject to the PFA Act, and the
consent agreement was to last until October 22, 2021, under the court’s
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2 Realizing its error, on September 28, 2020, the court entered an order
purporting to vacate the portion of the July 23, 2020 order that divested the
family division of jurisdiction.
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jurisdiction. Father contends that the court erred in determining that the PFA
action had expired, because the consent order’s ongoing date meant that
Father could seek a final PFA order if Son violated the terms of the agreement.
Additionally, Father insists the court erred by unilaterally extinguishing the
consent agreement without a motion or hearing, leaving Father unprotected
by its terms and without the ability to obtain a final order if necessary. For
the following reasons, we agree with Father’s contentions.
“Our standard of review for PFA orders is well settled. In the context of
a PFA order, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions for an error of law or
abuse of discretion.” E.K. v. J.R.A., 237 A.3d 509, 519 (Pa.Super. 2020)
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
The term ‘discretion’ imports the exercise of judgment,
wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion,
with the framework of the law, and is not exercised for the
purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge. Discretion
must be exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed
to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary
actions. Discretion is abused when the course pursued
represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the
judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not
applied or where the record shows that the action is a result
of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.
Mescanti v. Mescanti, 956 A.2d 1017, 1019 (Pa.Super. 2008) (quoting
Custer v. Cochran, 933 A.2d 1050, 1053-54 (Pa.Super. 2007) (en banc)).
The purpose of the PFA Act is to protect victims of domestic
violence from those who perpetrate such abuse, with the
primary goal of advance prevention of physical and sexual
abuse. The Act defines “abuse” as follows:
The occurrence of one or more of the following acts
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between family or household members, sexual or
intimate partners or persons who share biological
parenthood:
(1) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly
or recklessly causing bodily injury, serious bodily
injury, rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse,
sexual assault, statutory sexual assault, aggravated
indecent assault, indecent assault or incest with or
without a deadly weapon.
(2) Placing another in reasonable fear of imminent
serious bodily injury.
(3) The infliction of false imprisonment pursuant to
18 Pa.C.S. § 2903 (relating to false imprisonment).
(4) Physically or sexually abusing minor children,
including such terms as defined in Chapter 63
(relating to child protective services).
(5) Knowingly engaging in a course of conduct or
repeatedly committing acts toward another person,
including following the person, without proper
authority, under circumstances which place the
person in reasonable fear of bodily injury. The
definition of this paragraph applies only to
proceedings commenced under this title and is
inapplicable to any criminal prosecutions commenced
under Title 18 (relating to crimes and offenses).
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102 (emphasis added). The phrase “family
or household members” is further defined as “[s]pouses or
persons who have been spouses, persons living as spouses
or who lived as spouses, parents and children, other persons
related by consanguinity or affinity, current or former sexual
or intimate partners or persons who share biological
parenthood.” Id. (emphasis added).
Custer, supra at 1054–55 (some internal citations and emphasis omitted).
Regarding the termination of temporary PFA orders, “before a temporary PFA
order can be terminated, there must be ‘notice and hearing.’” Stamus v.
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Dutcavich, 938 A.2d 1098, 1101 (Pa.Super. 2007).
Instantly, we agree with Father that the court erred in determining that
the matter was not subject to the PFA Act. Per statute and case law, “family
or household members” includes parents and children. Custer, supra at
1055. Father and Son are parent and Child, and, accordingly, subject to the
Act. By divesting itself of jurisdiction, the court essentially terminated the
consent agreement prior to its end date of October 22, 2021. The court’s
order had the effect of terminating the PFA action, governed by the consent
agreement, without notice or a hearing. See Stamus, supra. Accordingly,
we vacate the portion of the July 23, 2020 order divesting the family division
of jurisdiction, and remand for reinstatement of the consent agreement under
the family division’s jurisdiction.3
Order vacated in part. Case remanded. Jurisdiction is relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/9/2021
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3 Although the court acknowledged its error with the entry of its September
28, 2020 order, because the court had already divested itself of jurisdiction,
the September 28, 2020 had no legal effect.
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