Com. v. Mibroda, C. ( 2021 )


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  • J-S19028-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                            :
    :
    :
    CLAYTON MIBRODA                              :
    :
    Appellant             :   No. 1361 WDA 2020
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 1, 2020
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division
    at No(s): CP-65-CR-0000783-2012
    BEFORE:      DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                 FILED: JULY 9, 2021
    Clayton Mibroda (Appellant) appeals from the order denying his petition
    filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-
    9546. We affirm.
    On December 27, 2011, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with
    criminal homicide for the death of his 20-day-old daughter. Trial commenced
    on January 7, 2013, and on January 11, 2013, the jury convicted Appellant of
    third-degree murder.1 The trial court sentenced Appellant to 15 – 30 years of
    incarceration.        Appellant filed post-sentence motions, which the trial court
    denied. Appellant timely appealed, and this Court affirmed his judgment of
    sentence. See Commonwealth v. Mibroda, 1529 WDA 2013 (Pa. Super.
    ____________________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c).
    J-S19028-21
    July 29, 2014) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant did not seek allowance
    of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
    On May 12, 2015, Appellant pro se filed the underlying timely PCRA
    petition. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed a Turner/Finley2 no-
    merit letter on November 25, 2015. The PCRA court issued notice of intent to
    dismiss Appellant’s petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 on January 22,
    2016, and on February 8, 2016, Appellant filed a pro se response. Based on
    Appellant’s response, the court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for April 22,
    2016. On May 5, 2016, the court permitted PCRA counsel to withdraw, but
    “[i]n an effort to ensure that [Appellant’s] interests were adequately
    represented,” appointed new counsel, Appellant’s second PCRA attorney, to
    review Appellant’s petition for any issues of arguable merit. See PCRA Court
    Opinion, 12/1/20, at 3. On October 14, 2016, counsel filed a Turner/Finley
    no-merit letter, and following a hearing on October 28, 2016, the court
    granted the motion to withdraw. The PCRA court issued a second Rule 907
    notice on November 4, 2016, and Appellant filed a pro se response on
    November 18, 2016.
    On May 5, 2017, Appellant filed a pro se motion for leave to file a
    supplemental amendment to his petition, which the PCRA court granted.
    Appellant filed a pro se memorandum in support of his petition on March 9,
    2018, and a pro se supplemental amendment to his petition on March 26,
    ____________________________________________
    2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
     (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.
    Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
     (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
    -2-
    J-S19028-21
    2018, in which he raised a new claim of after-discovered evidence based on a
    letter he received from Brandon Green3 in February 2018. Appellant attached
    Green’s letter, in which Green alleged Kayla Lichtenfels contacted him through
    Facebook, and indicated “she needed to talk to [Green] about the death of
    [Appellant’s daughter].”         Supplemental Amendment to Petitioner’s First
    Amended Petition, 3/26/18, at 1. Green further claimed that after arriving at
    Green’s house, Lichtenfels told him the infant’s death was “all an accident and
    [Appellant] told [police] he did it because he doesn’t think [Lichtenfels] could
    handle prison.” 
    Id.
     According to Green, Lichtenfels told him “Appellant lied
    [to police] so [Lichtenfels] could be set free and live a life of freedom from
    unwanted parenting.” Id. at 2.
    On July 3, 2018, the court appointed another attorney, Appellant’s third
    PCRA counsel, to review Appellant’s claim of after-discovered evidence.4 The
    PCRA court held evidentiary hearings on this claim on July 31, 2019 and
    August 21, 2020.       On December 1, 2020, the PCRA court issued its order
    denying relief. Appellant timely appealed. The court ordered Appellant to file
    a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement, and Appellant complied. On January
    5, 2021, the PCRA court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion stating that its
    reasons for denying the petition were set forth in its order and opinion filed
    ____________________________________________
    3 Brandon Green is the ex-boyfriend of Kayla Lichtenfels, the mother of
    Appellant’s deceased daughter.
    4 A claim of after-discovered evidence within a timely post-conviction petition
    is distinct from the newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA’s time-bar.
    See Commonwealth v. Burton, 
    158 A.3d 618
    , 629 (Pa. 2017).
    -3-
    J-S19028-21
    December 1, 2020, which the court “hereby incorporates . . . as the brief
    opinion in support of the Order of Court subject [to] the [Appellant’s] appeal.”
    PCRA Court Opinion, 1/5/21.
    Appellant’s sole issue on appeal is whether the PCRA court erred “as a
    matter of law in determining [Appellant] was not eligible for relief based upon
    after discovered evidence?” Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    It is well-settled in reviewing the PCRA court’s dismissal of Appellant’s
    petition, we examine “whether the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported
    by the record, and whether its conclusions of law are free from legal error.”
    Commonwealth v. Busanet, 
    54 A.3d 35
    , 45 (Pa. 2012).                 “Our scope of
    review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record,
    viewed in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed in the PCRA
    court proceeding.” 
    Id.
    With regard to a claim of after-discovered evidence, our Supreme Court
    has articulated the applicable test for judicial review:
    [There are] four distinct requirements, each of which, if unproven
    by the petitioner, is fatal to the request for a new trial. As stated,
    the four-part test requires the petitioner to demonstrate the new
    evidence: (1) could not have been obtained prior to the conclusion
    of trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely
    corroborative or cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to impeach
    the credibility of a witness; and (4) would likely result in a different
    verdict if a new trial were granted. The test applies with full force
    to claims arising under Section 9543(a)(2)(vi) of the PCRA. In
    addition, we have held the proposed new evidence must be
    producible and admissible.
    Commonwealth v. Small, 
    189 A.3d 961
    , 972 (Pa. 2018) (citations omitted).
    -4-
    J-S19028-21
    Likewise, in denying relief, the PCRA court explained:
    Upon a careful review of the testimony presented during trial and
    the evidentiary hearings, the [c]ourt finds [Appellant] failed to
    establish[] sufficient evidence to satisfy each prong of the [after-
    discovered] evidence requirement . . . by a preponderance of the
    evidence. First, it is difficult to discern whether [Appellant] could
    have obtained this new evidence from Mr. Green at or prior to trial
    through reasonable diligence. Mr. Green’s testimony at the
    evidentiary hearing reveals that he did inform the investigators as
    to some of the information contained in the letter he sent
    [Appellant] prior to trial. Although trial counsel’s testimony
    revealed that he was familiar with Mr. Green and was aware that
    Mr. Green was in a relationship with Ms. Lichtenfels following the
    incident, trial counsel testified that he was not privy to the
    information contained in Mr. Green’s letter and was informed by
    the private investigators that when they attempted to talk to Mr.
    Green, he would not talk to them. Second, the [c]ourt finds that
    the new evidence submitted by [Appellant] is corroborative to the
    evidence already presented at [Appellant’s] trial.          At trial,
    [Appellant] focused the blame solely on Ms. Lichtenfels, testifying
    that he saw Ms. Lichtenfels wrap her hands around the infant’s
    head and violently shake her. [Appellant’s] mother’s testimony
    further bolstered [Appellant’s] testimony and theory at trial.
    Third, the new evidence would be used solely to impeach Ms.
    Lichtenfels’ credibility as Mr. Green’s testimony at the evidentiary
    hearing directly contradicts her testimony at trial. Although Ms.
    Lichtenfels did not testify as to the circumstances surrounding the
    death of her daughter, Mr. Green’s testimony would be admitted
    for purposes of identifying Ms. Lichtenfels as the perpetrator
    based on her alleged statement to Mr. Green following the
    incident.
    Lastly, upon a review of all of the evidence presented, the [c]ourt
    is of the opinion that the new evidence would likely not compel a
    different verdict at trial, especially in light of the credibility
    concerns surrounding Mr. Green’s testimony and the remote
    timing of the letter. After Ms. Lichtenfels’ purported statements
    to him, Mr. Green elected not to contact the authorities, Defense
    Counsel, or [Appellant’s] mother, waiting seven years to
    memorialize this information and send a letter to [Appellant].
    Additionally, Mr. Green’s credibility has been called into question
    as he has been convicted of multiple crimen falsi convictions, and
    -5-
    J-S19028-21
    in February 2016 he pleaded guilty to aggravated assault for
    beating a six-year-old boy. During trial, the jury considered all of
    the evidence available to them and determined that there was
    sufficient evidence of [Appellant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable
    doubt, albeit largely circumstantial. Following his conviction and
    judgment      of   sentence,    two     court-appointed   attorneys
    independently reviewed the case and determined [Appellant’s]
    PCRA to be without merit. As [Appellant] has failed to establish
    each prong of the four-part test, the [c]ourt finds [Appellant] is
    not entitled to relief pursuant to [after-discovered] evidence.
    Opinion and Order of Court, 12/1/20, at 6-8.
    The record supports the PCRA court’s reasoning. Although Appellant
    asserts Green’s letter is after-discovered evidence which warrants a new trial,
    the record supports the PCRA court’s findings of fact, which in turn support
    the PCRA court’s legal conclusion that Appellant failed to meet the four criteria
    necessary to succeed on a claim of after-discovered evidence. Small, supra.
    No relief is due.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 7/9/2021
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1361 WDA 2020

Judges: Murray

Filed Date: 7/9/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/21/2024