Com. v. Maneri, P. ( 2021 )

J-S20028-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
PHIL ANTHONY MANERI :
:
Appellant : No. 1535 MDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 10, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-21-CR-0003261-2019
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., KING, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED JULY 13, 2021
Appellant, Phil Anthony Maneri, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas, following his bench
trial convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”)—general
impairment with accident, second offense, and the summary traffic offense of
failure to drive in a single lane.1 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On
April 5, 2019, Appellant crashed his car into a stationary PennDOT vehicle
which was part of a roadwork crew on Route 581. The PennDOT employee
sitting in the vehicle suffered multiple injuries as a result of the crash.
Appellant attempted to flee but was prevented from doing so by other
____________________________________________
1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a)(1) and 3309, respectively.
J-S20028-21
members of the road crew. Pennsylvania State Trooper Larry Reedy arrived
at the scene and located Appellant’s damaged vehicle. The trooper observed
indicia of intoxication, including Appellant’s bloodshot eyes, the odor of alcohol
emanating from Appellant, and Appellant’s confused speech. Appellant
admitted to consuming two beers earlier in the evening. After Appellant failed
field sobriety tests, the trooper arrested him. Appellant refused a blood draw.
On August 11, 2020, following a bench trial, the court convicted
Appellant of DUI—general impairment with accident, second offense, and
failure to drive in a single lane. On November 10, 2020, the court sentenced
Appellant to 60 days to 6 months’ imprisonment.
On December 9, 2020, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. The
court directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors
complained of on appeal, and Appellant timely complied on December 21,
2020.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
Was there insufficient evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that [Appellant] was incapable of safely
driving his vehicle due to alcohol impairment?
(Appellant’s Brief at 6).
Appellant argues the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he was incapable of safely driving his vehicle due to
alcohol impairment because the Commonwealth did not obtain a blood draw.
Appellant asserts that his actions were consistent with a tired driver. In the
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absence of a blood draw to reveal Appellant’s blood alcohol level, Appellant
contends there was no way to tell whether “the two beers consumed earlier”
were enough to substantially impair Appellant’s ability to operate his vehicle.
(Id. at 14). Appellant concludes there was insufficient evidence to sustain his
DUI conviction, and this Court must grant him relief. We disagree.
Our standard and scope of review in this case are as follows:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at
trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence
and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition,
we note that the facts and circumstances established by the
Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may
be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means
of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the
above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
[finder] of fact while passing upon the credibility of
witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free
to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 120-21 (Pa.Super. 2005) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Bullick, 830 A.2d 998, 1000 (Pa.Super. 2003)).
The Motor Vehicle Code defines the offense of DUI—general impairment
as follows:
§ 3802. Driving under influence of alcohol or
controlled substance
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(a) General impairment.—
(1) An individual may not drive, operate or be in
actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle
after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that
the individual is rendered incapable of safely driving,
operating or being in actual physical control of the
movement of the vehicle.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1). “Subsection (a)(1) is a general provision and
provides no specific restraint upon the Commonwealth in the manner in which
it may prove that an accused operated a vehicle under the influence of alcohol
to a degree which rendered him incapable of safe driving.” Commonwealth
v. Loeper, 541 Pa. 393, 402-03, 663 A.2d 669, 673-74 (1995). Further:
The types of evidence that the Commonwealth may proffer
in a subsection 3802(a)(1) prosecution include but are not
limited to, the following: the offender’s actions and
behavior, including manner of driving and ability to pass
field sobriety tests; demeanor, including toward the
investigating officer; physical appearance, particularly
bloodshot eyes and other physical signs of intoxication; odor
of alcohol, and slurred speech. Blood alcohol level may be
added to this list, although it is not necessary....
* * *
Regardless of the type of evidence that the Commonwealth
proffers to support its case, the focus of subsection
3802(a)(1) remains on the inability of the individual to drive
safely due to consumption of alcohol—not on a particular
blood alcohol level.
Commonwealth v. Segida, 604 Pa. 103, 115-16, 985 A.2d 871, 879 (2009).
Instantly, the trial court reasoned:
In the case sub judice, we found the evidence of Appellant’s
conduct and demeanor sufficient for Section 3802(a)(1),
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notwithstanding the absence of chemical blood test results.
Appellant passed at least one highway message board
indicating the left lane was closed ahead and had a half-mile
to switch lanes to avoid driving into a closed lane at a time
with minimal traffic. He nonetheless struck the fully-[lit]
PennDOT vehicle with enough force to push the dump truck
forward and severely injure [the victim], in a demonstrative
showing of his inability to exercise judgment or react
prudently to changing circumstances. He then immediately
backed up and drove away. Trooper Reedy observed
Appellant to have “very bloodshot” and “very watery, glassy
eyes” and confused speech. Appellant indicated he had two
beers prior to operating the vehicle. Appellant could not
complete the One Leg Stand or the Walk and Turn tests after
struggling to follow directions in completing them and in
remaining balanced, and he nearly fell over…. Appellant
finally said he could not complete the One Leg Stand test
because of the gravel, though he was standing on a paved
highway, and he ultimately refused a blood test. In
essence, Appellant demonstrated classic signs of
intoxication in appearance and odor, concededly imbibed
alcohol, lacked control over his body and balance, could not
successfully complete the field sobriety tests, and struck a
parked vehicle in a closed lane with ample time to long avoid
the collision.
We note that Appellant’s counsel sought to undermine
Trooper Reedy’s testimony on cross examination and at
closing argument by suggesting that Trooper Reedy did not
know what type of beer Appellant consumed and therefore
could not say with detail what effect it may have had on
Appellant, that Trooper Reedy did not take photos of the
damage or see the damage [to the victim’s] PennDOT
vehicle, that Trooper Reedy did not note slurred speech in
his report or testimony, and that the alcohol on Appellant’s
breath was unsurprising given he admitted to consuming
alcohol. We did not find these points to weaken the
Commonwealth’s evidence to any significant extent such
that its evidence was rendered insufficient. Indeed, we
found Trooper Reedy’s testimony to be credible and
supported by the [motor vehicle record]. At the risk of
venturing into a weight-of-the-evidence analysis, we note
that sufficiency claims still require us to explain our view of
the entirety of the evidence. We agree that alcohol on
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Appellant’s breath may not have been enough alone, but it
was a corroborating factor in a list of others that indicated
beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was incapable of
safely driving his vehicle. We similarly found that lack of
slurred speech did not take Appellant out of the realm of
intoxication to the extent of incapability, nor did lack of
evidence as to the type of beer Appellant consumed. We
also were undisturbed by the lack of photos of the accident,
given Appellant’s statement acknowledging he hit the
vehicle and [the victim’s] detailed testimony.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed February 5, 2021, at 7-8).
We agree with the court’s analysis. Here, the trial testimony established
the indicia of intoxication necessary for the fact-finder to conclude that
Appellant was unable to drive safely. See Segida, supra; 75 Pa.C.S.A. §
3802(a)(1). Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as the verdict winner, sufficient evidence supported
Appellant’s DUI conviction. See Jones, supra. Accordingly, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 07/13/2021
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